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Abstract
Understanding the behaviour of systems of interacting individuals is a key
aim of much research in the social sciences and beyond, and a wide variety
of modelling paradigms have been employed in pursuit of this goal. Often,
systems of interest are intrinsically spatial, involving interactions that occur
on a local scale or according to some specific spatial structure. However, while
it is recognised that spatial factors can have a significant impact on the global
behaviours exhibited by such systems, in practice, models often neglect spatial
structure or consider it only in a limited way, in order to simplify interpreta-
tion and analysis.
In the particular case of individual-based models used in the social sciences,
a lack of consistent mathematical foundations inevitably casts doubt on the
validity of research conclusions. Similarly, in game theory, the lack of a uni-
fying framework to encompass the full variety of spatial games presented in
the literature restricts the development of general results and can prevent re-
searchers from identifying important similarities between models.
In this thesis, we address these issues by examining the relationship between
local interactions and global outcomes in spatially explicit models of interact-
ing individuals from two different conceptual perspectives.
First, we define and analyse a family of spatially explicit, individual-based
models, identifying and explaining fundamental connections between their lo-
cal and global behaviours. Our approach represents a proof of concept, sug-
gesting that similar methods could be effective in identifying such connections
in a wider range of models.
Secondly, we define a general model for spatial games of search and conceal-
ment, which unites many existing games into a single framework, and we
present theoretical results on its optimal strategies. Our model represents an
opportunity for the development of a more broadly applicable theory of spa-
tial games, which could facilitate progress and highlight connections within
the field.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overall aim
The principal aim of this thesis is to investigate the three-way relationship between
local interactions, global outcomes and spatial structure in systems of interacting
individuals. This overarching goal is addressed from two different perspectives, a
‘wide-angle’ perspective, focusing on the collective dynamics of very simple indi-
viduals, and a ‘close-up’ perspective, focusing on the strategic decisions of more
sophisticated individuals. Each of these perspectives involves a different modelling
paradigm that is employed in the field of complexity science: individual-based mod-
elling and game theoretic modelling.
1.2 Complexity and spatial structure
If a system of interacting entities exhibits behaviours on a global scale that could
not be predicted or understood by studying the entities in isolation, then it is de-
scribed as complex. For example, the shape and motion of a large flock of birds
could not easily be predicted by studying the behaviour of a single bird, but these
collective features are nonetheless determined by the aggregated effect of the inter-
actions between individuals. In this example, the importance of spatial structure is
also evident; distances between individual birds, lines of sight and the direction in
which gravity acts might all be supposed to have a significant effect on the global
behaviour of the flock. A detailed discussion of complex systems and the property
of complexity is provided in Chapter 2, while the importance of spatial structure in
such systems is a key thread that runs throughout this thesis.
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1.3 Explanation of thesis title
The precise nature of the “individuals” referred to in the thesis title is different
under each of the two perspectives to be considered, and will therefore be described
in detail in the relevant sections. At this stage, it suffices to state that the term
will refer to the entities of certain simple individual-based models in Part II and to
the players in a family of game theoretic models in Part III. Conceptually, however,
thinking in terms of real world systems rather than mathematical models, the term
should be understood in its broadest possible sense. An individual may be any en-
tity – whether a human being, an animal, a computer, a company, an elementary
particle or a coordinated group of such entities – which interacts with others that
may be of the same type or of different types. Individuals may have an associated
“state”, meaning some description of their properties, which may or may not vary
in time, and may perform “actions” of some kind, which together constitute their
“behaviour”.
The term “system” is used to refer to the object formed by all individuals of interest
and the rules or principles governing their behaviour, along with the space that they
inhabit and any other features that are considered to affect them. The word may
be used to refer either to something observed in the real world, whether specific or
generic, or to the abstract construct represented by a mathematical model, which
need not necessarily have a particular real world interpretation. Systems may vary
in time, and may be described by their current “state”, a complete or partial de-
scription of their properties. Particular states observed within a system at a certain
time may be referred to as “events”.
By the phrase “spatially explicit model” we mean a mathematical representation of
a system in which the space that the individuals inhabit (sometimes referred to as
the “model geography”) is represented in a detailed manner, rather than in a strictly
implicit sense through its influence on the actions or states of the individuals only.
In all the work presented in this thesis, space is represented either as a graph (or
network) or as a metric space. The phrase “local interactions” is then taken to mean
any effect which involves more than one individual and whose occurrence or effect
is dependent on the positions of the individuals in the space. Specifically, the local
interactions that we will consider will involve two individuals that are located in
close proximity to each other.
The broad phrase “global outcome” is intended to refer to any event or state that
relates to the entirety of a system, rather than to a particular individual or group
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of individuals, but which is nevertheless determined, at least in part, by the states
of the individuals (rather than simply on the structure of the space, for example).
The global outcomes that we will be interested in will involve long-term population
density dynamics in simple individual-based models (in Part II) and the payoffs and
optimal strategies in certain game theoretic models (in Part III).
1.4 Motivations
1.4.1 Perspective one: Individuals as automata
The first of our two perspectives makes use of the theory of individual-based mod-
elling. One of the most important and challenging research questions in this field,
and indeed in the field of complexity science more generally, is to understand the
connections between local and global features. More specifically, we might desire to
understand how the local interactions between individuals in a model or in a real
system give rise to observed emergent global behaviours.
General results relating to such questions are scarce and, indeed, no consolidated
theory of individual-based models yet exists. The absence of these theoretical foun-
dations represents a serious problem, since the use of such models is now widespread,
particularly in the social sciences. Because the theoretical basis of much of this work
is patchy or non-existent, conclusions drawn from these models may not be reliable
or the circumstances in which they are valid may not be known. Furthermore, a
lack of understanding of the mechanisms driving observed outcomes may make the
planning of appropriate interventions to modelled systems difficult or impossible.
What is acknowledged is that spatial structure can be crucially important in de-
termining the characteristics of the global behaviour of a system of interacting in-
dividuals. However, spatial systems (such as ecological systems of different species
interacting within a habitat) are often represented with non-spatial models, in which
the behaviours of individuals are represented implicitly, through the dynamics of ag-
gregated quantities such as population densities. One method for producing such
simplified models is provided by mean field theory (see Section 3.2), in which spatial
correlations are neglected and individuals are assumed to be, in some sense, ‘evenly
distributed’ throughout the system.
While, in many cases, such simplifications may be appropriate, the lack of general
theory in the area means that it is often not possible to determine whether or not
this will be the case without explicit comparison of model outputs with empirical
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observations. Even then, it can be impossible to determine the extent to which
a model captures the full spectrum of system dynamics, since rare or extreme be-
haviours may not be represented in the data.
Traditional reductive models, utilising ordinary differential equations (ODEs) or par-
tial differential equations (PDEs) to describe temporal and spatial variation, which
have long been successfully deployed to analyse physical systems such as fluid mo-
tion, diffusion and heat transfer, may fail to capture all the emergent phenomena of
crowds of interacting individuals. However, it is not at all obvious how to formu-
late an alternative description of these complex systems that would preserve their
fundamental character as collections of separate elements, or indeed whether such a
description would be possible or valuable.
The relationship between ‘simplified’ representations of complex systems (such as
those based on ODEs or PDEs) and ‘comprehensive’ representations (based on de-
tailed ABMs) and the extent to which they exhibit similar behaviour, both to each
other and to the original system, is therefore a key question in the field.
In Part II of this thesis, we address these issues through analysing the links between
local events and global dynamics in a particular family of individual-based models,
focusing on the key role played by the spatial distribution of individuals. In these
models, individuals are not treated as decision-making entities, but rather as basic
automata, whose behaviour is governed by very simple stochastic rules. Although the
results obtained relate to the particular models under consideration, the simplicity
of the approach and of the system concerned are such that we believe the methods
may serve as foundations for the development of more general approaches.
1.4.2 Perspective two: Individuals as decision-making agents
The approach outlined above could be described as a ‘wide-angle’ perspective on spa-
tial systems of interacting entities, since it seeks to develop understanding through
consideration of the combined effect of the simultaneous local actions of large groups
of very simple individuals. In contrast, our second approach is a ‘close-up’ perspec-
tive in which we consider the relationship between spatial structure and the strategies
employed by more sophisticated, decision-making individuals in certain game theo-
retic models.
Spatial game theoretic models have been studied in relation to various situations of
search and concealment, attack and defence, patrol and rendez-vous. However, as
in the case of individual-based modelling, such analyses lack a common theoretical
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framework at an appropriate level of generality. Furthermore, the role of spatial
structure in such models is often limited to determining how players may move
through a space. Only rarely is consideration given to the impact of local spatial
structure on the way in which players interact with nearby opponents or collabora-
tors. However, proximity-based interactions are of key importance in many of the
situations that spatial games seek to model. For example, in a game theoretic model
of the policing of urban riots, a police unit deployed at a particular location would
be able to respond to incidents in some neighbourhood of that point, the precise
form of which would depend on the local structure of the street network.
The formulation of a general framework of spatial game theory would allow for a
strategic analysis of spatial interactions from the perspective of a particular individ-
ual, in parallel with the analysis of the connections between local interactions and
global dynamics afforded by our work on simple individual-based models.
In Part III, we address these issues through the development and analysis of a gen-
eral search game that takes explicit account of the local structure of the space over
which it is played. We consider both a static version of the game, in which the
searching player deploys at a particular location, and a dynamic version, in which
the searching player chooses a randomised patrol strategy. While some of the re-
sults relate to games played over specific spaces, the model is formulated in a highly
general way so as to unite many existing models in the literature.
These twin approaches, based on individual-based modelling and game theory, pro-
vide complementary perspectives on the complex connections between spatial struc-
ture, individual behaviours, local interactions and global outcomes, allowing us to
move towards a greater understanding of the general principles underlying these
features in a wide variety of spatial models.
1.5 Research objectives
Having established our overall aims and our motivations for each modelling per-
spective, we now crystallise these into a more specific set of research objectives.
In relation to the first perspective, discussed above in Section 1.4.1 and covered in
Part II, our objectives are:
• To improve understanding of the relationship between the long term popula-
tion dynamics of spatially explicit individual-based models and the dynamics
predicted by corresponding non-spatial models, derived using mean field the-
ory.
16
• To develop methods to understand and explain the causal link between local
spatial interactions and global population dynamics in such models.
In relation to the second perspective, covered in Part III, our objectives are:
• To create a general, explicitly spatial, search and concealment game, in order to
unite many similar games presented in the literature under a single theoretical
framework.
• To develop general results on the optimal mixed strategies of this game and
on how these strategies may be determined.
1.6 Thesis structure
In this section, we present a detailed breakdown of the content of the thesis. A
visualisation illustrating the connections between the aims, concepts, methods and
outcomes, is provided in Figure 1.1, at the end of the chapter.
Part I : Introduction and background
Chapters 1-2
In Chapter 1, we explain our broad aims and motivations, define the scope and
objectives of the thesis and discuss the ideas that link the various sections. We then
provide a detailed breakdown of the structure of the thesis and the content of each
part, along with a list of the key contributions to knowledge, with references to where
in the text they may be found. Following this, in Chapter 2, we discuss some of
the main concepts used throughout the thesis in more depth, with reference to key
literature. Further background is introduced at the start of each of the remaining
parts of the thesis, as and when it is necessary.
Part II : Understanding the connection between micro and macro-scale
behaviour in individual-based models
Chapters 3-6
In Part II, our main goal is to find ways to understand the connection between lo-
cal interactions and global behaviour in a family of simple individual-based models
through observation of the collective dynamics of the individuals. After presenting
some necessary background information in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 introduces the
model that forms the basis of this part of the thesis: a spatially and temporally dis-
crete stochastic model created by Professor Graeme Ackland1 as part of the NANIA
1 Professor Ackland was identified as the creator of the model through personal correspondence
with researchers from the NANIA project.
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project (Novel Approaches to Networks of Interacting Autonomes, 2009), related to
the widely studied ecological patch model (see McKane and Newman, 2004), de-
signed to represent predator-prey relationships, much like those described by the
well-known Lotka-Volterra equations (see Section 3.3.2).
The basic NANIA predator-prey model has two species with a specific set of possible
interactions and is run over a rectangular or toroidal lattice of cells. However, we
recognise that it is just one representative of a much broader family of possible mod-
els, which could be run over any graph, and which admit a much wider variety of
possible interactions between any number of different species. We therefore proceed
to define the entire family of possible models, which we label A. However, A includes
cases which no longer have a reasonable interpretation as individual-based models,
so we also define a subfamily, B, containing the models that preserve those features
of the NANIA model that are conducive to an individual-based perspective.
Having clearly defined B, in Chapter 5, we go on to perform a thorough investi-
gation of all the possible model behaviours in the simplest of all possible cases, that
of a single species on a one-dimensional ring of cells. The investigation is carried
out through performing a large number of computer simulations to extensively ex-
plore the parameter space of the rules that govern the behaviour of individuals in
the model, resulting in the creation of a taxonomy of possible behavioural regimes.
Through a quantitative analysis of the results of these simulations, we observe that,
of all those local transitions that may occur at a given iteration, there exists one in
particular that seems to cause the model to diverge from the behaviour predicted
by mean field theory.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we focus on these local transitions in an attempt to under-
stand the discrepancy between the majority that respect the mean field analysis and
the one that does not. To do this, we transform the state space of the model, taking
a perspective on its dynamics that more directly represents the spatial distribution
of the individuals. This new perspective, alongside the introduction of a measure
of the degree of clumping of individuals in the system, allows us to identify key
differences in the effect of the particular transition of interest, thus explaining its
disruptive effect on the behaviour predicted by mean field analysis.
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Part III : A general framework for static, spatially explicit games of search
and concealment
Chapters 7-10
In Part III, our perspective shifts to consider models of search and concealment sce-
narios, involving more sophisticated individuals, capable of making reasoned strate-
gic decisions. The overarching goal is to define and analyse a general, explicitly
spatial game to model such scenarios, which could unite other games from the lit-
erature, potentially allowing for the formulation of results with relevance to a wide
range of different spatial games.
After setting out some necessary game theoretic concepts in Chapter 7 and pre-
senting a review of the literature of search and security games, in Chapter 8, we
define a two-player game that will form the basis for all our subsequent work: the
Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG). This game is formulated both over a general
metric space and in the special case in which this space is a graph (the “Graph
Search Game” or GSG), and the connections between the SSSG and certain other
games from the literature are highlighted. Initial results related to the concepts of
strategic dominance and equivalence in the SSSG are presented, and bounds on the
value of the game to each player are identified.
In Chapter 9, we discuss various methods for simplifying and solving the GSG
(finding optimal mixed strategies (OMSs) for each player and their respective game
values). These include a version of the established IEDS algorithm (iterated elimi-
nation of dominated strategies) for the SSSG on a graph, along with a proof that,
in the special case of games played on trees, this procedure is always successful in
identifying trivially simple solutions. Other methods presented include a means of
exploiting symmetries of the underlying graph and a technique for determining exact
solutions of a particular family of games over a particular family of graphs, which
we describe as “poly-level graphs”.
Chapter 10 is built around two significant extensions to the SSSG. Firstly, we allow
the value of the space over which the game is played to be non-uniform and examine
how this affects the OMSs. Secondly, we consider a scenario in which one player
is able to patrol around the space while the other attempts to avoid detection,
demonstrating a fundamental relationship between the optimal strategies of the
static game and those of this new dynamic version. We conclude by formulating the
situation of the patrolling player as an optimisation problem, to allow this individual
to choose between alternative strategies in a more sophisticated way.
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Part IV : Conclusions
Finally, in Chapter 11, we reflect on the main results of the thesis. We consider
the relationships between the different perspectives examined in Parts II and III,
including a way in which they may be brought together to form a more holistic
view of systems of interacting individuals, involving both a broad perspective on
the collective dynamics of the individuals and a strategic perspective, focusing on
individual decision making. We propose directions for further research, to build on
the results that we have presented, and we discuss potential applications, both of
the work in its current form and of its possible extensions.
1.7 Advances to knowledge
For ease of reference, we present a list of some of the key original contributions
contained in this thesis:
• Comprehensive analysis of the microstates (possible configurations) of the
NANIA predator-prey model (over a rectangular lattice) and the transitions
between them (4.3.1-4.3.2).
• Generalisation of the NANIA model to define the two more fundamental classes
of discrete space-time models: A and B (4.4).
• Use of computer simulation to produce a complete taxonomy of behavioural
types for a family of individual-based models derived from the NANIA model
(5.3).
• Presentation of a method for the transformation of model states into a new
space in which the dynamics may be more naturally observed, for the above
family of models (6.3-6.4).
• Identification of a causal link between local individual behaviours and the
spatial distribution of individuals on a global scale, in the above family of
models, through consideration of a measure of the clumping of individuals
(6.6.3).
• Use of this clumping measure to explain the relationship between the equi-
librium population density and the predicted “mean field” equilibrium, in the
above family of models (6.6.4).
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• Definition of the Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG), a generalisation of
many games considered separately in the literature (over a general metric
space: 8.2.1-8.2.2; over a graph: 8.3.1; over spaces of non-uniform value:
10.2.1-10.2.2).
• Various results on strategic dominance and equivalence in different versions of
the SSSG, including an algorithm to simplify games over graphs and a proof
of the effectiveness of this procedure for the special case of games played on
trees (8.2.4, 8.3.3, 9.2.1-9.2.5).
• Various results on OMSs and game values for different versions of the SSSG
(8.2.3, 8.3.4, 9.3.1-9.3.4, 9.4.2-9.4.3, 10.3.3-10.3.4).
• Reformulation of the SSSG as a patrol game (10.4.1-10.4.3).
• Identification of a relationship between OMSs of the SSSG and optimal strate-
gies of the patrol game (10.4.4).
1.8 Notes on notation
It should be noted that, throughout this thesis, the symbol N is taken to represent
the set of strictly positive integers; it does not contain 0. Where necessary, the set
of non-negative integers will be referred to as N ∪ {0}.
Note also that, beyond standard mathematical symbols, there is no crossover of
notation between Parts II and III, which comprise the main body of the thesis.
1.9 Research context
This thesis was completed as part of ENFOLD-ing - Explaining, Modelling, and
Forecasting Global Dynamics (see ENFOLD-ing, 2010, Wilson, 2010), a research
project funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(EPSRC, 2015), grant reference EP/H02185X/1.
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Figure 1.1: Diagram illustrating the connections between the aims, concepts, mod-
elling paradigms, representations of spatial structure, mathematical tools and methods,
research outcomes and potential applications of the work presented in this thesis.
The relationship between the different approaches presented in Part II, which focuses
on an investigation of the behaviours of certain individual-based models, and Part III,
which presents a strategic analysis of a variety of search and concealment games, may be
observed through a comparison of the green and purple paths through the chart.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Complex systems
2.1.1 Definitions
In broad terms, the foundation of this thesis is the field of complex systems or
complexity science. Although the concept of complexity is now fairly well estab-
lished in the academic scientific consciousness, having inspired a large amount of
attention in recent years, there is still no universally agreed mathematical definition
of a complex system. However, the following qualitative description, drawn from a
wide-ranging review of the field by Newman (2011), is fairly typical:
“... a system composed of many interacting parts, such that the collective
behavior of those parts together is more than the sum of their individual
behaviors.”
San Miguel et al. (2012), in the introduction to their broad review of contemporary
challenges in complexity science, prefer to define complex systems in the negative,
through contrasting them with more well behaved physical systems, which consist
of:
“... objects that could be described in terms of a few variables, [and
that] could be well separated from their environment...”
The implication is that complex systems cannot be adequately represented using a
small number of variables and their component parts cannot be meaningfully stud-
ied (at least in terms of their role in the dynamics of the complete system) without
considering their interactions with their environment, particularly with other parts
of the system itself.
The collective behaviours mentioned by Newman are referred to as emergent fea-
tures and understanding the way in which the particular details of a given complex
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system give rise to its emergent behaviours is a key question behind much research
in the field.
Many works on complex systems make a point of highlighting the difference be-
tween complexity and mere complication, the former being a property of systems
whose parts interact in ways that give rise to unpredictable or unforeseeable be-
haviours on a global scale, while the latter is a property of systems whose parts
may be connected in an intricate fashion, but which nonetheless have specific roles
and which contribute in an identifiable way to the overall “purpose” of the system.
San Miguel et al. explain this distinction through drawing a comparison between
the human brain, a complex system of interacting neurones exhibiting a wide range
of unforeseeable behaviours, and an aeroplane, a complicated system of mechanical
parts designed to fly through the air.
While loose qualitative descriptions of complexity, such as those discussed above,
may be broadly accepted, one of the obstacles to a more specific or rigorous defi-
nition of the term is the fact that the field of complex systems research is a highly
transdisciplinary one. As noted by San Miguel et al., systems that might be de-
scribed as complex can be found in practically all branches of science (and indeed
beyond the sciences), each of which brings its own preconceptions, interests and
concerns to the subject. It can therefore be difficult to determine the extent to
which two articles from different disciplines are truly referring to the same thing
when they use the term “complex systems”; compare, for example the work of
Lewis (2007), which examines complex systems from a medical perspective, with
that of Buhr (1996), which comes at the subject from the perspective of computer
science.
This ubiquity, coupled with the fact that the word “complex” may also be used in its
colloquial sense, means that any attempt to pin down the concept to a greater degree
would likely struggle to gain universal acceptance or even to be widely understood.
Attempts at broader definitions of “complexity” can consequently occasionally verge
on the philosophical rather than the formal (see, for example, Hu¨bler, 2007).
2.1.2 Features
Owing to the difficulty of defining complex systems in a consistent and specific way,
it can be helpful to consider the field of complexity science in terms of a set of
key concepts and features around which research is focused, rather than in terms of
any overarching and clearly defined framework. San Miguel et al. provide a useful
starting point for such an approach, presenting the following list of “reasons why
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systems might be considered to be complex”:
• many heterogeneous interacting parts
• complicated transition laws
• unexpected or unpredictable emergence
• sensitive dependence on initial conditions
• path-dependent dynamics
• networked hierarchical connectivities
• interactions of autonomous agents
• self-organisation or collective shifts
• non-equilibrium dynamics
• combinatorial explosion
• adaptivity to changing environments
• co-evolving subsystems
• ill-defined boundaries
• multilevel dynamics
To the ideas of emergence and self-organisation, we may add the related and
more specific concept of self-organised criticality (see Bak et al., 1987; Drossel and
Schwabl, 1992), in which systems may tune themselves to a critical point at which
aspects of their behaviour follow a power-law distribution. Indeed, power-law be-
haviour, which has the property of being invariant under rescaling of a variable of
interest, is a key concept of complexity science in its own right, with power-laws
governing behaviours across a wide range of different systems (Clauset et al., 2009;
Newman, 2011).
Other focuses of complexity research include the ability (whether observed or de-
sired) of complex systems to learn from their interactions and experiences, either
at the global level or at the level of their component parts (a stronger concept
than the “adaptivity” mentioned by San Miguel et al.), and the concept of re-
silience, “the ability of a system to spontaneously recover after strong perturbations”
(Deffuant and Gilbert, 2011). Complex systems may also display features familiar
from the field of nonlinear dynamical systems, such as multiple equilibria, phase
transitions and chaos (related to, but not the same as, the “sensitive dependence
on initial conditions” mentioned above). An introduction to the concepts and tech-
niques of dynamical systems is provided by Strogatz (1994).
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2.1.3 Applications
Naturally, the problems to which complexity theory has been applied are as diverse as
the range of disciplines that have embraced it. Newman identifies five extensive areas
of application: physical systems (such as condensed matter systems); ecosystems
and evolution; human societies; economics and markets; and pattern formation and
collective motion (such as flocking behaviour in animals). Structures described and
analysed as complex systems run the full spectrum from the practical and political,
such as the US health care system (Lipsitz, 2012), to the highly abstract, such as
the structure of mathematics itself (Foote, 2007).
2.1.4 Modelling
The way in which a given complex system is ultimately analysed will depend to
a large extent on how it is modelled, since different theory and tools are available
for different types of model. However, general principles for the study of complex
systems have been set down, with San Miguel et al. outlining a five step programme:
1. Exploration, observation and basic data acquisition
2. Identification of correlations, patterns and mechanisms
3. Modelling
4. Model validation, implementation and prediction
5. Construction of a theory
Although stated with reference to complex systems specifically, while the identifica-
tion of “patterns and mechanisms” may admittedly be particularly relevant in the
context of complexity, it is not immediately obvious how this approach is considered
different from that which would be applied to the scientific modelling of any other
phenomena. In practice, it is more the way in which complex systems are modelled
and the sorts of research question that are posed about them that may differ from
other forms of study.
Given a particular complex system, it would of course be possible to take a purely
empirical approach to its study, gathering and analysing data on the system without
the creation of any ‘structural’ mathematical model. In this case, the model created
at Step 3 of the above process would be purely statistical. However, as Newman
observes, such empirical studies are “usually not considered a part of the field of
complex systems itself”.
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If the decision is made to represent a particular complex system by means of a struc-
tural model, one of the key questions is which modelling paradigm to use to rep-
resent its behaviour. Newman and San Miguel et al. highlight two main approaches.
The first can be described as the reductionist approach, in which a system is repre-
sented through simple abstract descriptions of a small number of relevant features;
for example, the relationship between different species in an ecosystem may be repre-
sented by a set of differential equations describing the changes in their populations,
with no explicit consideration of their spatial distribution or environment.
The second approach could be labelled the comprehensive approach, in which the
researcher seeks to create as faithful as possible a representation of a system and its
functioning, down to the modelling of each specific part and the interactions between
such parts, potentially with an explicit representation of the space over which the
system operates. Such models are generally analysed through computer simulation.
Before the advent of powerful computing technology, the majority of scientific re-
search was necessarily based around reductionist models, so the use and analysis of
comprehensive models is consequently more weakly supported by fundamental the-
ory. While reductionist models may offer the advantage of simplicity and tractability,
the question of which details to include and which to ignore in order to produce use-
ful results is not always straightforward. Comprehensive models, on the other hand,
allow for a far greater amount of detail to be included, but it can be extremely
difficult to determine whether the way in which their component parts and their
interactions are modelled is truly a good representation of the system of interest.
For these reasons, among others, San Miguel et al. identify both the relationship
between simple and comprehensive models and the question of how to identify a
sufficiently informative set of descriptive variables to represent complex behaviour
in a given system as fundamental open challenges for complexity theory.
Going a little deeper into the subject of complex modelling, Newman divides the field
into eight strands, each of which involves different modelling paradigms and underly-
ing theory: lattices and networks; dynamical systems; discrete dynamics and cellular
automata; scaling and criticality; adaptation and game theory; information theory;
computational complexity; and agent-based modelling. Of these, cellular automata,
game theory and agent-based modelling are directly relevant to the work presented
in this thesis and will be examined in more detail in future sections. Lattices and
networks are also relevant, in that they underpin all the models that will be defined
and investigated, though only a relatively basic level of theoretical knowledge and
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methodology from this area is actually applied and required in this thesis.
The potential of statistical mechanics for the representation and analysis of com-
plex systems has been recognised by many authors (e.g. Wang, 2011). One ap-
proach of this nature that is worthy of note is the “kinetic theory of active particles”
(KTAP), which extends the tools of statistical mechanics to allow for the modelling
of entities that interact in a manner that goes beyond the strictly physical and
which may indeed affect their physical properties (De Angelis and Delitala, 2006;
Bellomo et al., 2009). This is achieved through the introduction of “activity” vari-
ables alongside the physical variables of position and velocity to describe the com-
plete state of each particle in a system. The method has also been extended to
model complex nonlinear interactions (Bellomo et al., 2010).
A final issue of complex systems modelling that should not be overlooked is the ques-
tion of model comprehensibility. If a comprehensive modelling approach has been
chosen, the resulting model may be extremely complicated, potentially involving
many different types of entity, hierarchical structures or the combination of different
modelling paradigms (in the case of an agent-based model run over a complex net-
work, for example). Even understanding how a model functions and the structure of
its interactions can be a significant challenge and communicating this understanding
to someone else may be an even greater one. Buhr (1996) proposes a solution to
this issue through the use of “use case maps” to visualise the structure of complex
systems. Although use case maps were conceived in the context of understanding
software systems, Buhr claims that “they are useful for systems of all kinds”.
2.1.5 Prediction and control
The twin issues of prediction and control in the context of complex systems also
represent a significant research topic, for obvious reasons. San Miguel et al. set out
some of the main difficulties of prediction, including divergence of true behaviour
from model behaviour due to sensitivity to initial conditions; the accumulation of
small inexactitudes in the representations of particular processes over many thou-
sands of interactions; the possibility that systems (particularly human systems) may
change their behaviour in response to a particular prediction; and the dangers of
overfitting and underfitting of predictive functions when working with a high num-
ber of dimensions.
To add to this, with reference to a model of plant growth, Hu¨bler (2005) notes the
tendency of complex systems to form structures both in a “top-down” sense, in which
large scale effects are reproduced on smaller and smaller scales, and a “bottom-up”
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sense, in which local patterns grow to influence the entire system. Hu¨bler claims that
the interference of these two processes, coupled with issues of path dependence, can
lead to behaviour whose character may be difficult to determine without a “holistic
perspective” on the system, thus rendering prediction difficult.
Given these difficulties, one approach to prediction in certain complex systems is to
use symbolic dynamics, reducing the ‘resolution’ at which the system is analysed
and only attempting to make predictions that are meaningful at this level of detail.
Using this method, the state space of a complex system or of a model of a complex
system, which may have a very high dimension, is partitioned into discrete regions,
with the dynamics of the system tracked only to the extent of recording which of
these regions the system occupies at particular times. This transforms the dynamics
of the system into a time series of symbols (representing the regions), which may be
analysed as a stochastic process, allowing for the estimation of probabilities that the
system will occupy a particular region at a particular future time, given its current
state and possibly its previous states. This approach also allows for the identifica-
tion of anomalous system behaviour where an observed series of symbols does not
match expectations with regard to its statistical properties (Ray, 2004).
Regarding the control of complex systems, San Miguel et al. set out a number of
issues. In particular, attempts at precision control of such systems can be subject to
significant unintended consequences due to the difficulty of understanding the true
relationship between local interactions and global emergent behaviours that is char-
acteristic of complexity. This necessitates the use of “weak” control, in which the
objective is to ensure that the probability distribution of future states of the system
displays an observed behaviour, rather than the future system state itself.
Another approach to the control of complex systems, particularly in the case of hu-
man systems, involves setting up the conditions for the system to lead itself towards
a desired outcome. For example, this concept has been discussed in the context of
improving health care, in which increasing the quality and quantity of interactions
between the entities of the system (doctors, patients, etc.) and ensuring that they
share the correct goals and incentives could allow the system to move towards a
desired state without the need for a single guiding hand (Lipsitz, 2012).
Control may also be considered from the point of view of an individual entity,
through its attempts to use its interactions to optimise some property or prop-
erties. In this case the problem is in determining a successful strategy for each
entity in its interactions with others, which may be achieved through game theoretic
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analysis or through allowing for the evolution of the entities by means of genetic al-
gorithms (Holland, 1992), artificial neural networks (see, for example, Gilbert, 2008)
or similar.
2.2 Agent-based and individual-based models
2.2.1 Definitions
Agent-based modelling is a means of representing certain kinds of complex system,
through which the local interactions that are characteristic of such systems may
be explicitly described and observed. While agent-based models (ABMs) may be
analysed from a theoretical perspective, in practice their behaviour is generally in-
vestigated through computer simulation, an approach to which these models are
particularly well suited.
Much as in the case of complex systems themselves, there is no universally agreed
formal mathematical definition of an ABM. In his introductory book on the subject,
Gilbert (2008) describes agent-based modelling as:
“... a computational method that enables a researcher to create, analyze,
and experiment with models composed of agents that interact within an
environment.” [author’s emphasis]
Gilbert subsequently provides qualitative definitions for each of the italicised terms.
While most of these are in line with what one might intuitively expect, the expla-
nations of the terms “agent” and “environment” merit further examination.
Having described agent-based modelling as a “computational method”, Gilbert pro-
ceeds to define agents in principally computational terms, describing them as “sep-
arate computer programs” or “distinct parts of a program” that represent “social
actors” (humans or human organisations), which are programmed to react to their
computational environment and which interact by passing informational messages
(whether voluntarily or involuntarily) and acting on what they learn.
This definition is later developed through the enumeration of four features that
agents should possess:
1. Perception (particularly within some local neighbourhood)
2. Performance (incorporating all behaviours that an agent is capable of perform-
ing, including “motion” and “communication”)
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3. Memory (of previous states and actions)
4. Policy (rules governing how behaviour is determined)
Gilbert explains that these features were chosen with a particular view to the pro-
gramming of ABMs, making reference to a similar list of features (autonomy, social
ability, reactivity, proactivity) proposed by Wooldridge and Jennings (1995), which
he judged to be too broad or too vague for this purpose.
In describing the environment of an ABM, Gilbert highlights the distinction between
spatially explicit models, in which the environment represents a geographical space
inhabited by the agents, and spatially non-explicit models, in which agents are linked
by means of some abstract network.
In their own practical introduction to agent-based modelling, Railsback and Grimm
(2012) provide a similar, if slightly broader, perspective, defining ABMs as:
“... models where individuals or agents are described as unique and
autonomous entities that usually interact with each other or their envi-
ronment locally.”
The authors go on to specify that agents generally possess heterogeneous features,
pursue their own objectives, aim to “survive and reproduce” and display “adaptive
behaviour”, changing their approach in response to other agents and to the envi-
ronment. Besides Gilbert’s “social actors”, Railsback and Grimm’s definition en-
compasses “organisms” and “any other entity that possesses a certain goal.” Again,
both spatially explicit and non-explicit environments are mentioned.
Although most authors provide definitions of ABMs that are broadly in line with
these, there is a degree of variation over which particular features are emphasised or
considered necessary. For example, Macal (2010) specifically underlines the impor-
tance of agent learning:
“Agents interact with and influence each other, learn from their expe-
riences, and adapt their behaviors so they are better suited to their
environment.”
The general lack of consensus over which features are necessary for the definition of
an ABM can occasionally lead to subtle inconsistencies between different authors,
such as in this definition by Cartwright (2010), which would appear to contradict
Gilbert’s requirement that agents have “memory”:
“Agents are automata that take actions that depend on their current
state and that of their neighbourhood.”
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Adding to the confusion, inconsistency of terminology extends to the name of
the modelling paradigm itself, with Hare and Deadman (2004) identifying at
least seven alternative terms that have been used to describe agent-based
modelling. To take a single example, while the term multi-agent systems (MAS) is
generally used to refer to a specific computational implementation of an
ABM or to a software system built on the principles of an ABM (see, for exam-
ple, Cartwright, 2010), the terms MAS and ABM are occasionally used interchange-
ably. Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009) explain that a precise definition of an MAS
cannot be provided, owing to the fact that “many competing, mutually inconsis-
tent answers have been offered in the past.” The loose definition of an MAS that
they subsequently provide does not differ significantly from the definitions of ABMs
given above, this time focusing on the importance of heterogeneity over interaction
or adaptation:
“... systems that include multiple autonomous entities with either di-
verging information or diverging interests or both.”
To attempt a synthesis of these definitions, then, we might state that ABMs involve
a large number of entities, distributed throughout some environment, which may
represent a geographical or a more abstract space. The entities interact with this
environment and with one another, their behaviour being governed by rules that
exhibit some degree of sophistication, be it in terms of communication of informa-
tion, adaptation and learning from past experience, goal-oriented decision making,
or similar.
Unfortunately, this definition is not entirely satisfactory, since some of the most well
known agent-based models do not display the sophisticated behavioural features that
are explicitly referred to in the definitions quoted above. For example, the Schelling
model of segregation (Schelling, 1971) is often held up as one of the first agent-based
models, but its ‘agents’ are very basic automata, able to perform only one action
(moving) dependent on a single extremely simple calculation of the colour of their
neighbours on a grid. They have no memory, they do not communicate or learn and
they adapt only in the sense of changing their position until they share their colour
with a sufficient proportion of their neighbours.
The phrase “individual-based models” (IBMs) is also frequently encountered in the
literature, and may offer a degree of flexibility in the way that models are described.
Although Railsback and Grimm explicitly state that the terms IBM and ABM are
absolutely synonymous, McKane and Newman (2004) assert that there is in fact
a distinction based on the amount of variation between model entities, contrasting
homogeneous “individuals” with heterogeneous “agents”. Considering the field as
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a whole, there does appear to be a loose distinction made between the two terms,
though not necessarily over the question of agent heterogeneity. In general, agent-
based models tend to involve more sophisticated entities, displaying more of the
special features mentioned in the definitions above (possibly including heterogene-
ity), while individual-based models may involve simpler entities which display more
automatic and “unconsidered” behaviours. However, there is admittedly a high de-
gree of inconsistency in this usage and there is certainly no agreement over where
the threshold of sophistication should be traced, beyond which “individuals” become
“agents”.
Since the models presented in Part II of this thesis all involve extremely simple
entities, which interact in limited and deterministic ways, with no real intention to
model true decision making processes or communication, we follow the above distinc-
tion, using the phrase “individual-based models” throughout the relevant chapters
(Part III involves game theoretic models, for which this distinction is essentially not
relevant). However, owing to the wider use of the phrase “agent-based models” in
the literature, we will continue to use this more common phrase for the remainder
of this review chapter to avoid confusion.
It is worth highlighting the distinction between agent-based modelling and the re-
lated field of microsimulation (see Gilbert, 2008). Microsimulation is a technique
used principally in demographic modelling, in which a database of records is gen-
erated from real data relating to a particular population (either recorded at the
individual level or summarised in terms of population statistics), with each record
representing an individual. The database is then updated according to assumptions,
hypotheses or knowledge of how the population is expected to change over time,
with the results being used to make predictions about the profile of the population
in the future.
Note that this approach differs from agent-based or individual-based modelling
through the lack of a model environment for the individuals to inhabit and through
the lack of any kind of interaction between the individuals represented. The use
of real data also represents a difference in the common usage of microsimulation
models as compared with ABMs, although ABMs are often initialised from real
data to some extent when used in experimental research (see, for example,
Dunstan and Johnson, 2005).
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2.2.2 Types of model and corresponding research questions
Since the definition of an ABM is fairly loose, the term accommodates a very wide
variety of different kinds of model.
The overall characteristics of an ABM are determined to a large extent by its in-
tended purpose. The question of how to identify different types of ABM cannot,
therefore, be disentangled from the question of the sorts of research questions that
ABMs are capable of addressing. On this basis, Gilbert outlines three broad classes
of ABM, each of which is associated with different types of research question:
• Abstract Models are generally fairly simple and aim to represent real sys-
tems only in terms of a few basic or fundamental properties. Such models may
provide a proof of concept for some theoretical effect (such as the Schelling
model, which demonstrates that high levels of racial segregation can poten-
tially emerge from low levels of racial bias) or they may provide a means for
investigating the kinds of local interactions that might give rise to particular
global behaviours.
• Middle Range Models aim to provide a general representation of a partic-
ular class of system, such as a city or a forest ecosystem, without representing
any specific real world system. Such models can be used to understand the
cause and effect relationships of certain processes in that class of systems (for
example, importance of biodiversity for the resilience of an ecosystem) or to
examine possible behaviours that the class may exhibit.
• Facsimile Models aim to provide as accurate and comprehensive a repre-
sentation as possible of a specific real world system. Such models are used
to predict future behaviour within the system and to determine the effect of
potential interventions (such as the effect that a new road may have on traf-
fic patterns within a particular city) A facsimile model may be developed in
isolation or through enhancement of a middle range model.
In terms of this thesis, the NANIA model that is defined and analysed in Chapter 4
(and all the models derived from it) falls into the first of these categories. It is
an extremely simple and abstract model, whose objective is to investigate the links
between local and global behaviour in a theoretical sense. Meanwhile, the SSSG of
Chapter 8, while not an ABM, could nevertheless be described as a middle range
model of search and concealment situations with the potential to be developed into a
facsimile model if developed further, though it remains quite abstract in its current
formulation.
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Going beyond the broad categories that Gilbert has identified, Hare and Deadman
(2004) have attempted to create a complete taxonomy of ABMs. Although their
work is now ten years old and although it nominally relates specifically to ABMs
used in the field of environmental management, it nonetheless remains a useful tool
for understanding the range of different characteristics that such models may display.
Much like the distinction that we established between agent-based and individual-
based modelling in the previous section, Hare and Deadman identify the spectrum
from simple mechanical entities at one extreme to complex cognitive agents at the
other as the most important axis of variation in the field. They then proceed to
outline a series of “requirements” that a prospective agent-based modeller may have
and use these to create a taxonomic tree by which agent-based models may be cat-
egorised, providing examples of models lying at the end of each branch, each drawn
from the environmental modelling literature.
The potential “modelling requirements” by which a model may be characterised fall
into the following six categories. Note that the names of these areas have been
altered from those provided by Hare and Deadman for reasons of clarity:
1. Modelling space. This essentially amounts to the distinction between spa-
tially explicit and spatially non-explicit models that we have already estab-
lished. However, it is interesting to note that Hare and Deadman include
models in their framework of “Agent Based Simulation” that essentially have
no representation of space at all (for example, the “Rangeland” model of
Janssen et al., 2000), and which would therefore not strictly be covered by
the majority of the definitions of agent-based modelling discussed in the pre-
vious section.
2. Modelling decision making. This places a model on a continuum from those
whose agents exhibit fixed behaviour to those whose agents use sophisticated
rules and algorithms to choose their course of action.
3. Modelling interaction. Here, Hare and Deadman identify three distinct
categories: completely asocial models, in which agents do not interact; mod-
els with “group based interaction”, in which agents interact to perform tasks
collectively; and “social adaptation”, in which agents interact through imita-
tion of the behaviour of others (or through some similar process that does not
directly affect the state of other agents) either locally, through observation
of their neighbours, or globally, through access to summary statistics on the
population as a whole.
35
4. Modelling intrinsic behavioural adaptation. While the previous cate-
gory refers to the character of the interactions within a model, this refers to
the freedom that agents have to alter their behaviour in an absolute sense.
Hare and Deadman consider three possibilities: models in which agents have
no capability to change their decision making strategy; those in which agents
may choose between a number of predetermined strategies; and those in which
agents may “fine tune” their strategy in a detailed fashion in response to their
current state, their observations and their experiences.
5. Modelling population-level adaptation. This refers to the existence or
otherwise of evolutionary dynamics within the model. Some models have a
constant population of agents, while others allow new agents to be created
and existing agents to be removed. Removals may occur as a direct or an
indirect result of agent performance, often with the goal of determining an
optimal strategy or set of characteristics.
6. Modelling on multiple scales. This consideration separates mono-scale
models, in which all agents operate on an equal footing and in the same en-
vironment, from multi-scale models, in which hierarchies of agents may exist,
with some able to operate on different time scales, with greater power or with
access to higher level information. Alternatively, a model may involve multi-
scale agent behaviours, where decision rules involve both individual actions,
which operate locally, and collective actions, which operate globally.
Through consideration of each of these six categories, a specific profile may be built
up for a particular ABM, with Hare and Deadman using this method to characterise
the models used in eleven representative case studies.
2.2.3 Communicating and representing ABMs
A particular problem in the field of agent-based modelling is the lack of consis-
tency in the way that modelling methodologies are reported, leading to problems
with the verification and reproducibility of research. Grimm et al. (2006) comment
that there exists “no standard protocol” for the description of ABMs and that pub-
lished descriptions of ABM methodology have often been “hard to read, incomplete,
ambiguous, and therefore less accessible [than descriptions of analytical models]”,
meaning that they are “not easily reproduced.” Itakura et al. (2010) add that, since
ABM research is generally based on computational simulation, there may be discrep-
ancies between the results obtained when models are implemented using different
softwares, owing to the effect of bugs or to differences in the accuracy to which
floating point values are handled, which may accumulate over a large number of
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iterations.
In an attempt to address these issues of inconsistency, a large group of authors work-
ing in the field of agent-based modelling combined to propose a standard frame-
work for the presentation of ABMs in the scientific literature: the ODD proto-
col (Overview, design concepts, details) (Grimm et al., 2006). The protocol was
subsequently revised following an extensive review of its use and a consultation
with researchers working with ABMs (Grimm et al., 2010). Both the original
ODD article and the more recent revised version have been highly influential, par-
ticularly in the field of ecological modelling in which the protocol was first pro-
posed. At time of writing, in total the two articles have received over 700 citations
(Thomson Reuters, 2014) and the ODD protocol has been employed many times.
The ODD protocol specifies the precise areas that should be discussed when present-
ing an ABM and the order in which they should be presented. The revised version
of the framework is as follows:
1. Purpose. The model description begins with a thorough statement of the
purpose of the model and the research question that it is designed to address.
2. Entities, state variables and scales. The entities that make up the model
are described, including specification of any variables associated with them
and the way in which these variables relate to real world quantities (if ap-
propriate). Here, the word “entities” is intended to be taken in a very broad
sense, including any relevant groupings of agents as well as the environment
itself or its component parts.
3. Process overview and scheduling. This section sets out the events that
occur within the model and the order in which they occur. At this stage,
events are described in general terms only. Detailed descriptions are reserved
for the section on “submodels” below.
4. Design concepts In this section, after an initial discussion of the fundamen-
tal theory or methodology that informs the model design (“basic principles”),
any key concepts relevant to the model are discussed in more detail. Several
of the concepts listed by Grimm et al. are among the features of complex-
ity that we discussed in Section 2.1.2 or were mentioned in the many defini-
tions of agent-based modelling discussed in Section 2.2.1. The complete list
is: Emergence; Adaptation; Objectives; Learning; Prediction; Sensing; Inter-
action; Stochasticity; Collectives; Observation. Some of these concepts are
discussed in Section 2.2.4.
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5. Initialisation The initial conditions used in implementations of the model, or
the procedures used to generate these initial conditions, are stated here.
6. Input data This section is used to explain which data, if any, are used as
inputs to the model while it is running (as opposed to data that is used to
initialise the model, which should be discussed in the previous section).
7. Submodels This section is reserved for a detailed description of all processes
that occur within the model, including equation based submodels, agent deci-
sion rules and so on.
As well as making ABM descriptions more readable and making agent-based re-
search easier to reproduce, it has been suggested that the ODD protocol “promotes
rigorous model formation”, “facilitates reviews and comparisons of ABMs” and pro-
motes “holistic approaches to modelling and theory”. However, it has also been
criticised as being inefficient, particularly for simple models, and as relating poorly
to the structures of object-oriented programming (Grimm et al., 2010). It has also
been suggested that the ODD protocol provides only a partial solution to the issue
of model representation, with ABMs still lacking a standard mathematical language
(Hinkelmann et al., 2011).
In this thesis, the ODD protocol is used to provide a framework for the descrip-
tion of the NANIA predator-prey model in Section 4.2, a model that provides the
foundation for all the material in Part II. Although the NANIA model is fairly sim-
ple and could therefore probably be described efficiently without recourse to ODD,
the decision to use the protocol was made both for the sake of consistency with
the literature and to support this valuable effort to bring uniformity to the field of
agent-based modelling research.
In terms of the actual implementation of ABMs, the modelling paradigm is partic-
ularly well suited to the techniques of object-oriented programming, in which the
environment and agents of all types may be programmed as distinct objects, pos-
sessing all the code relevant to their own behaviours and decision making functions
(see Gilbert, 2008). Gilbert also compares a number of specific languages and soft-
ware packages for the programming of ABMs, including the widely used NetLogo
(Wilensky, 2015) and Repast (Argonne National Laboratory, 2013), and discusses
good practice for presenting agent-based research, without reference to the ODD
protocol.
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2.2.4 Key concepts and considerations
As we have discussed, one of the most important concepts associated with
ABMs, and with complex systems more generally, is that of emergence.
Attempting to “figure out what underlying processes give rise to the emergent
outcomes” is one of the main goals of much agent-based modelling research
(Railsback and Grimm, 2012, chap. 8).
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the general lack of consensus over terminology in the
field, there is no universally agreed formal definition of this property. Indeed, at-
tempting to produce a definition of emergence that would be valid and meaningful
across the entire domain of complexity science and agent-based modelling research
would probably be impossible owing to the wide variety of approaches, perspectives
and requirements encompassed by these disciplines.
Luck et al. (1998) root the idea of emergence in economics, tracing it back
to Adam Smith’s description of the “natural regulation” of market prices
(Smith, 1776, chap. 7). In the modern context, the following criteria, outlined
by Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 8), provide a useful basis for the understand-
ing of emergent phenomena.
Emergent phenomena or behaviours...
• “... [are] not simply the sum of the properties of the model’s individuals...”
• “... [are] a different type of result than individual-level properties...”
• “... cannot easily be predicted from the properties of the individuals.”
Railsback and Grimm go on to comment that the distinction between emergent and
“imposed” behaviours is generally not straightforward and that emergent properties
can be hard to quantify.
The authors also remark that “stable” emergent properties may not always mani-
fest themselves immediately in the behaviour of a particular model. Instead, there
may be a “warm up” period that must elapse before the effects of interest become
apparent, a consideration that should be taken into account when designing ABMs.
Strongly related to the concept of emergence, is that of agent “collectivities”. This
phrase is used by Gilbert (2008, chap. 3) to refer to any cluster, organisation or
grouping of agents, whether spatially defined or otherwise, that may be observed in
an ABM. While a collectivity can be built into the design of a model, they often
arise within models as emergent phenomena, and it is these spontaneously generated
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collectivities that are generally of most interest to complexity researchers.
As described by Gilbert, collectivities will generally be difficult to define precisely,
with ambiguities of membership or shifting membership criteria. Not all members
of a collectivity need be of equal status; some may be more “central” than others or
exhibit different abilities.
Collectivities are principally identified by some form of shared characteristics or
knowledge among their members. Indeed, the sharing of knowledge may significantly
increase the reasoning power of a collectivity, beyond that of the individual agents,
since it has been shown that, under certain assumptions, the collective knowledge
of a group can be considered to be strictly greater than the sum of the knowledge
of its members (Nguyen, 2008).
While the concept of a collectivity is widely recognised as being central to
much agent-based modelling research (consider the many models that seek to un-
derstand the formation of animal flocks or shoals, for example Go´mez-Mourelo,
2005; Mirabet et al., 2007; Sun, 2013) the specific terminology is not. For example,
Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 16) prefer the term “collectives”, which they
define as “groups that strongly affect both the agents and the overall system”.
Nonetheless, “collectivity” remains the most attractive term to describe this phe-
nomenon, because, since the word itself is otherwise rarely used, it carries fewer
unhelpful prior associations than other alternatives.
Adaptation is also a key concept of agent-based modelling research. Agent be-
havioural adaptation is often based around the optimisation of a particular objective
function that the agent wishes to maximise through its decisions and interactions.
Alternatively, agents may have binary goals that they wish to achieve; for example,
they may wish to arrive at a particular destination. In this case, the aim of be-
havioural adaptation would be to improve their chance of achieving this goal or to
reduce the time required to achieve it.
A common approach to the programming of adaptive behaviour is the use of “sat-
isficing optimisation” (see Railsback and Grimm, 2012, chap.11). This technique
is necessitated by the fact that individual agents seeking to achieve a particular
objective often cannot determine the optimal behaviour to achieve their goal, since
they do not have access to sufficient information. They therefore choose behaviours
for which their objective function or some measurable projected outcome exceeds a
certain “satisficing threshold”. In this way, agents attempt to attain states that are
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in some sense ‘good enough’, rather than searching for strictly optimal states.
The concept of learning is related to that of adaptation, but while adaptation
may be motivated exclusively by an agent’s current state, the term “learning” im-
plies a more sophisticated process, in which individual agents or groups of agents
may use past experience and inference to build up some form of model of their envi-
ronment or of other agents, using this model to determine appropriate behaviours.
Gilbert (2008, chap. 1) lists three forms of learning in ABMs:
• Individual learning, in which agents learn from their personal experience;
• Evolutionary learning, in which an entire system ‘learns’ by means of the
‘survival of the fittest’;
• Social learning, in which agents learn through imitating or adapting the be-
haviour of others.
One of the most important considerations in the design of ABMs is the question
of how events should be scheduled and how time should be modelled. In most
ABMs, time proceeds at a constant rate by means of a series of iterations, at which
some or all agents ‘take turns’ to take some form of action. This process may in-
volve “sequential asynchronous execution”, in which the sequence in which agents
take their turns at each iteration is predetermined, with the effects of an agent’s ac-
tions being resolved immediately; “random asynchronous execution”, in which the
sequence of agents is randomly generated after each iteration, again with actions
being resolved immediately; or “simulated synchronous execution”, in which agents
take turns according to any sequence, but with all actions being resolved simultane-
ously (Gilbert, 2008, chap. 2).
The importance of scheduling decisions on the results obtained from ABMs has been
demonstrated by Caron-Lormier et al. (2008), who broadly argue for asynchronous
over synchronous execution, asserting that it offers a “good approximation of real
continuous time” and that models based on synchronous approaches may offer “a
poor representation of reality”. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the dif-
ferent scheduling methods in a simple ABM of an ecosystem, in which the authors
noted that the synchronous approach produced oscillations in the energy of trophic
levels that did not correspond to the behaviour observed in real ecosystems. The
conclusion directly contradicts that of Gilbert, who claims (without explanation)
that synchronous execution is the best option.
An alternative option for the modelling of time is “event-driven simulation”, in which
time is represented indirectly through the sequence of events that occur in a model,
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with the durations between these events left unspecified (Gilbert, 2008).
When designing an ABM, it is also necessary to decide which features will be
modelled by means of stochastic processes and which will be modelled by deter-
ministic processes. Provided that care is taken over the choice of statistical
distributions, stochastic processes can provide a useful representation of effects
that would be too complex to include in a strictly deterministic model. They can
also be matched to observed variations in a real system even if the true underlying
processes governing these variations are not understood. However, for any given
scenario, models involving stochastic elements must generally be run many times to
determine the full spread of possible outcomes and their relative probabilities (see
Railsback and Grimm, 2012, chap. 15).
Stochasticity can also be employed in “middle range models” to ensure that artificial
scenarios are truly representative of the diversity of systems observed in the class
that the model is intended to represent. For example, a model of an industrial
network may generate random links between firms according to some appropriate
algorithm in order to represent a variety of different possible networks that share
some desired property, such as a particular degree distribution for their nodes (see
Gilbert, 2008, chap. 2).
2.2.5 Motivations for agent-based modelling
Many criticisms have been levelled against agent-based modelling as a scientific
approach. Difficulties have been highlighted in the design, calibration and manipu-
lation of ABMs and in the verification of the results derived from them. It has also
been suggested that ABMs are not able to simultaneously “cope with multiple levels
of abstraction” and as a result of these criticisms, the very nature of these models as
valid research tools has been called into question (Drogoul, 2008). It is therefore im-
portant to consider what advantage ABMs may have over alternative types of model.
It is worth mentioning that, while there is naturally a universal recognition that
agent-based modelling, in common with all other modelling paradigms, has its weak-
nesses, there is not necessarily a universal agreement over what these weaknesses are.
For example, Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 1) dispute the assertion that ABMs
are unsuitable for the modelling of “multiple levels of abstraction”, instead seeing
them as fundamentally “across level” models, in which a system, its inhabitants,
and the relationships between these two representational scales may be modelled
simultaneously.
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The most obvious potential benefit of ABMs over reductive equation based
models is that the former represent processes in greater detail and may therefore
provide more information on the functioning of a system (Macal, 2010). This rea-
soning is supported by a number of pieces of work, including an investigation by
Itakura et al. (2010), which found that an ABM was able to provide a better match
to the dynamics of a chronic viral infection than a model based on differential equa-
tions (in common with the work of Caron-Lormier et al. (2008), the difference was
largely related to the presence of dynamic oscillations that did not correspond to
the behaviour of the real system).
ABMs may also prove advantageous for the modelling of systems in which little data
is available on the global characteristics of a population, but where the behaviour
of individuals is much better understood. For example, Mock et al. (2007) offered
this reason for their decision to use an ABM to model the interaction between killer
whales and their prey.
Cartwright (2010) similarly presents the case for the use of ABMs to represent
systems that resist traditional equation based approaches. Cartwright’s particular
concern is the topic of “excitable media”, materials that require a period of inac-
tivity (the “refractory period”) between periods of stimulation, thus limiting the
possible behaviours of waves that propagate through them. The author goes on to
argue that media for which global behavioural laws cannot be easily derived but for
which local behavioural rules can be simply described (such as crowds participating
in a “Mexican Wave”) may be most naturally and effectively modelled by means of
agent-based approaches.
Oakes (2008) argues for the importance of agent-based modelling (particularly in
the field of epidemiology), citing the ability of ABMs to successfully model com-
plex dynamics, to explicitly examine the effect of policy interventions on multiple
agents simultaneously, to represent the two-way interactions between people and
their environment, to model “purposeful” individual activity and to explicitly rep-
resent the mechanisms behind observed changes in a system, rather than only the
effects of such changes. Patlolla et al. (2006) also advocate the power of agent-based
modelling (again focusing on its epidemiological applications), with particular ref-
erence to the representation of agents whose behaviour is governed by their desires
to achieve personal goals (such as finding something to drink when they are thirsty)
rather than by abstract rules derived from global theory. This explicit linking of
intention and behaviour is not possible in other forms of modelling.
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Several authors also outline the specific benefits of explicitly spatial ABMs over non-
spatial models. Itakura et al. (2010) comment on the importance of spatial factors
in drawing meaningful biological conclusions from their virus infection model, while
Dunstan and Johnson (2005) state that the explicit modelling of space is essential to
provide good representations of certain real ecologies, which may display multi-scale
spatial patterns, high levels of variability between individuals at different spatial
locations, and in which species may interact on a highly localised basis (referring in
particular to communities of marine organisms living on a jetty wall). The authors
argue that these factors mean that only spatially explicit agent-based models are
capable of exhibiting the emergent features of interest in such systems.
Meanwhile, Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 1) highlight the example of an ABM
that was designed to model the spread of rabies in fox populations and later ex-
tended to include the modelling of vaccination programmes. This model was shown
to provide more accurate results than traditional population ecology models (based
on differential equations) owing to its explicit modelling of space and to the fact
that it was able to accurately represent the rare long range migrations of individuals
that drove the characteristic spatial patterns of rabies outbreaks that were observed
in the field (Jeltsch et al., 1997; Eisinger et al., 2005; Eisinger and Thulke, 2008;
Thulke and Eisinger, 2008).
It should however be noted that, in the absence of other factors, the importance of
the explicit modelling of space does not constitute an argument in favour of agent-
based modelling. Other forms of modelling – for example, deterministic models
based on systems of partial differential equations – are also capable of representing
space explicitly and of generating spatial patterns.
2.2.6 Application and analysis
Gilbert (2008, chap. 1) provides a list of different areas in which agent-based mod-
elling has been applied, with examples of published models in each area. The list
includes models of urban systems, opinion dynamics, consumer behaviour, industrial
networks, supply chains and electricity markets.
ABMs have also been used for such diverse purposes as designing evacuation schemes
for large buildings (Rahman et al., 2008), investigating the supply of Halal food
(Lam and Alhashmi, 2008), understanding the spread of the H5N1 virus (Amouroux
et al., 2008) and helping tourists to plan holidays (Valde´s and Cubillos, 2008).
However, despite the wide use of ABMs, tools for their analysis remain underdevel-
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oped and lack a standard framework; Hinkelmann et al. (2011) comment that “it is
difficult to bring mathematical analysis tools to bear [on ABMs]”. For this reason,
as discussed by Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 5), it may often be necessary to
develop improvised and ad hoc metrics for the measurement of the effects that we
may wish to observe in any specific ABM.
Because there are no standard tools, discussion of the analysis of ABMs is restricted
to the description of loose heuristics, which must be interpreted to suit the particular
model that is being studied. Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 22) present the
following list of ten such heuristics:
1. Examine the behaviour of the system for extreme parameter values;
2. Find “tipping points” in the emergent behaviour of the model;
3. Visualise the model in different ways;
4. Step through a simulation iteration by iteration to understand the causal mech-
anisms driving observed behaviour;
5. Identify interesting or unusual patterns in the observed behaviour;
6. Fix certain parameters at “interesting” values and allow others to vary;
7. Use different “currencies” (see below) to evaluate model outcomes;
8. Analyse simplified versions of a model;
9. Understand a model from the ‘bottom up’, first examining individual entities,
then the relationships between them, building up a picture of the complete
system;
10. Consider unrealistic scenarios or parameter values to determine which realistic
features are necessary to produce the observed behaviour and which could be
neglected.
The word “currencies” is used here to describe different ways of measuring model
behaviour. The examples of such “currencies” proposed by Railsback and Grimm
(2012) include global statistical quantities, parameters of best-fit statistical distribu-
tions, statistics derived from time series, spatial statistics, measures of heterogeneity
between agents and properties related to model stability (such as the time required
to return to equilibrium after a perturbation or the size of the basin of attraction of
a particular fixed point).
As evidenced by these heuristics, the analysis of ABMs remains largely reliant on
the gathering of data from repeated computer simulation rather than on any form
of theoretical analysis of the rules that govern the behaviour of individual agents.
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2.2.7 The practice of agent-based modelling
Owing to the fundamental differences between agent-based modelling and more
established reductive mathematical modelling techniques, the design and imple-
mentation of an ABM requires a specific procedure and set of considerations.
Gilbert (2008, chap. 3) sets out the process in detail.
After defining a research question suitable for investigation by means of agent-based
modelling, Gilbert suggests that the first step should be to specify all the agents
that will feature in the model and to identify the ways in which they may affect or
be affected by their environment (including other agents). The form of this envi-
ronment should be carefully considered, with decisions made over which features to
include and which to omit. The next step is to design and program the model in an
appropriate programming language so that it can be implemented computationally.
When an initial version of the model program has been created, it must be subjected
to verification (testing to ensure that the program does what it is intended to do)
and validation (testing to determine whether the behaviour of the model provides a
good representation of the real system or systems of interest). Finally, the model is
ready for use as an analytical tool, and sensitivity analyses and robustness analyses
may be performed. If possible, model outputs may also be compared against empir-
ical data from the real system.
An alternative perspective on the design of ABMs is provided by Railsback and
Grimm (2012, chaps. 17-19), who discuss the question in terms of “pattern-oriented
modelling”. With this approach, the starting point of the design process is the iden-
tification of a number of large-scale qualitative patterns observed in a real system
or systems, the aim being to create a simple ABM that replicates these patterns.
In this way, it may be possible to determine the nature of the local processes and
interactions that are driving the emergence of these patterns in the real system.
Gilbert’s procedure for verification is focused on the use of good programming prac-
tices, including the use of an object-oriented rather than a linear programming lan-
guage, the insertion of debugging switches, the addition of checks that variables take
valid values and so on. In comparison, his proposed procedure for validation involves
the investigation a series of questions about the model’s behaviour, the particular
focus of which varies according to the type of model to be validated. For abstract
models, validation involves determining whether the model produces any expected
large scale patterns (as in Railsback and Grimm’s interpretation of “verification”);
for middle range models, it involves checking that model behaviour is statistically
similar to the behaviour of relevant systems in the real world; and for facsimile mod-
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els, it involves the attempted ‘prediction’ of past system behaviours given historical
data.
Unfortunately, the distinction drawn by Gilbert between the terms “verification”
and “validation” is not universally recognised. Go´mez-Mourelo (2005), for instance,
outlines a five step “verification” procedure, which involves the derivation of a set of
partial differential equations (PDEs) from a given ABM. The behaviour described
by the PDEs is then statistically compared with the behaviour of the ABM, which
“builds up our confidence in the [model] and results in a verification of the [model]”.
This procedure is clearly more in line with Gilbert’s description of “validation” than
“verification”, although it is not altogether clear that matching the behaviour of an
ABM to that of a set of equations that were derived from it would reveal anything
of value about the quality of the model itself. However, such a procedure could po-
tentially provide grounds for confidence that analytical results calculated from the
derived PDEs were also relevant to the original ABM.
Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 18) have another interpretation of the terms
“verification” and “validation”, considering the former to refer to the practice of
ensuring that a model reproduces those large scale emergent patterns of the real
system that it was designed to reproduce, and the latter to refer to the practice of
checking that the model also reproduces secondary patterns or features of the real
system that were not considered during the design process. This approach does have
similarities to that of Gilbert, in that it distinguishes between checking that a model
does what it was intended to do and checking that it is a good match to the real
system of interest, though the interpretation is somewhat different.
Sensitivity analyses and robustness analyses, as described by Gilbert, are both means
of determining the effect of changes on model behaviour, but the two terms refer to
changes of different natures. Sensitivity analyses involve changing parameters to see
how model behaviour is affected and to see which changes have the largest impact
on this behaviour across the parameter space. Robustness analyses involve making
fundamental changes to the structure of the model, perhaps removing certain fea-
tures, altering assumptions or changing the form of submodels, assessing whether
these changes have a significant impact on model behaviour and thus determining
whether the features, assumptions or submodels that were changed are genuinely
necessary to produce the observed dynamics. For an example of a thorough ro-
bustness analysis, see the work of Dunstan and Johnson (2005), who systematically
remove processes from their marine epibenthic community ABM to determine how
each one contributes to the overall system behaviour.
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Railsback and Grimm (2012, chap. 23) provide detailed explanations of how to con-
duct sensitivity and robustness analyses, also adding a third analytical approach:
uncertainty analysis. Uncertainty analysis is used to determine the extent to which
the uncertainty associated with calibrated parameter values could affect model be-
haviour (the issue of choosing and calibrating model parameters in the first place
poses problems of its own; see Railsback and Grimm, 2012, chap. 20). The method
of uncertainty analysis described by Railsback and Grimm involves the creation of
prior distributions on the values of parameters, with normal or uniform distributions,
and determining the resulting distribution of possible model outcomes by means of
Monte Carlo simulation. This provides a means of establishing the level of confidence
that should be afforded to the conclusions drawn from a model.
2.2.8 Mathematical foundations
Perhaps the most significant issue associated with ABMs is the lack of rigorous
mathematical theory to support and inform their use. Cartwright (2010) comments
on this issue in the context of the discipline of sociology:
“At present, progress [...] is hampered by the fact that there is not the
same depth of knowledge about how to deal theoretically with discrete
systems such as cellular automata and agent-based models as there is of
the continuum systems studied in the past...”
Nguyen et al. (2008) make a similar point:
“There are no general theories linking the knowledge of the individuals’
rules to the emergence of a global property.”
McBurney and Omicini (2008) further emphasise the importance of this issue, de-
scribing the situation as:
“... a point of crisis for agent-based models and technologies, where
foundations have to be reconsidered...”
These quotations demonstrate the broad agreement that exists over the necessity
for a significant improvement in the theoretical foundations and mathematical un-
derstanding of agent-based modelling. As long as the discipline is not built on a
solid foundation of theory, our confidence in the conclusions drawn from ABMs
must always be called into question. Furthermore, the lack of a unified theoretical
framework means that tools for the analysis of ABMs are frequently invented and
reinvented on a case-by-case basis, leading to a considerable amount of wasted in-
tellectual effort and meaning that, when reviewing agent-based modelling research,
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methodology must frequently be evaluated from scratch.
Naturally, attempts have been made to create a theoretical framework for agent-
based modelling, but none has yet gained universal acceptance. In any case, certain
of these attempts, such as KTAP (De Angelis and Delitala, 2006, see Section 2.1.4),
do not address the issue directly, preferring to represent the behaviour of an ABM
in a form that is already well understood (such as a system of PDEs) rather than
attempting to create a true mathematical theory of agent-based modelling itself.
Since the concept of emergence is such an important one in the field of agent-based
modelling, general theoretical results on the links between local processes and global
emergent behaviours would be extremely valuable to the discipline. However, al-
though many researchers have attempted to address this issue, few definite formal
conclusions have been drawn.
Global features are commonly stated to emerge from local interactions, without fur-
ther explanation of how this might occur and without attempts to draw parallels or
to identify general rules that apply to similar emergent processes across other mod-
els (see, for example, Dunstan and Johnson, 2005). Other authors identify causal
links between the nature of local interactions and the character of global behaviour
(such as the link between the way in which individuals observe their neighbours
and the structure of resulting flocks, Mirabet et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008), but
this is not equivalent to the development of a genuine theory that links local and
global behaviours. Those more theoretical approaches that do exist tend to focus on
specific types of model or specific types of behaviour rather than on general theories
of agent-based modelling (see, for example, the more formal examination of flocking
models presented by Sun, 2013).
The lack of consensus over the definitions of ABMs and of the key terms associated
with them and the consequent diversity of models to be found in the literature rep-
resent formidable barriers to the formalisation of the discipline. These factors also
mean that there is no agreement on what the starting point of such a local-to-global
theory might be.
Although novel approaches to the problem have been investigated in recent years,
such as the use of “equation free” methods (see, for example, Siettos, 2011), the
question of how to create a theory of agent-based modelling, which roots the con-
cept of emergent behaviour in a formal mathematical foundation, remains largely
open.
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These issues, relating to the lack of formal foundations for agent-based modelling
and, more specifically, to the lack of a general framework for understanding the
connections between local interactions and global emergent behaviours in ABMs,
are key motivators for the work presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis, in which we
investigate the divergent influences of different types of local transition on the long
term equilibrium behaviour of a particular family of IBMs.
2.3 Cellular automata
2.3.1 Context and definitions
A cellular automaton1 (CA) is a form of spatially and temporally discrete dynamical
system. The most well-known example is Conway’s “Game of Life”, which generated
considerable interest after being featured in Gardner’s Mathematical Games feature
in Scientific American in the early 1970s (Gardner, 1970, 1971). However, the ori-
gins of these models are often traced back to work on self-reproducing systems by
Von Neumann and Ulam in the 1950s (Gardner, 1971; Wolfram, 1983) or to work
on “finite automata” by Tsetlin in the 1960s (Vanag, 1999).
One of the most thorough and influential works on the subject of CAs is Wolfram’s,
A New Kind of Science (2002), in which the author puts forward the case for these
models (and other similar discrete systems, described collectively as “simple pro-
grams”) as representing a new class of mathematical objects, with the potential to
model the behaviour of the universe on a deep and fundamental level.
In contrast with ABMs, there is broad consensus over the definition of a CA, al-
though, owing to the wide range of fields in which CAs are used, definitions are
often formulated loosely rather than in formal mathematical terms. For example,
Gardner (1971) defines CAs (referred to as “uniform cellular spaces”) as:
“... equivalent to an infinite checkerboard. Each cell can have any finite
number of “states,” including a “quiescent” (or empty) state, and a finite
set of “neighbor” cells that can influence its state. The pattern of states
changes in discrete time steps according to a set of “transition rules”
that apply simultaneously to every cell.”
1 Although some authors use the term “cellular automata” to refer to a single model (consider-
ing the separate cells to constitute the “automata”), in this thesis, the terms “cellular automaton”
and “cellular automata” are used as the respective singular and plural forms when referring to such
models. In any case, for the most part, the terms will be substituted by the abbreviations CA and
CAs, thus avoiding any potential source of confusion.
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While the description of an “infinite checkerboard” suggests a square lattice, Gardner
later states that other tessellations may be used, but qualifies this with the comment
that any such regular tessellation can, in any case, be simulated on a square lattice
through an appropriate definition of the neighbourhood of a cell, which need not
necessarily be contiguous (indeed, Wolfram (2002, pp. 327-336) observes that, in
many cases, the structure of the underlying lattice does not affect large scale be-
havioural patterns in CAs and CA-like systems).
Gardner’s description was streamlined by Wolfram (1983), who shifted the focus
slightly to the role of CAs as models of physical phenomena:
“Cellular automata are mathematical idealizations of physical systems in
which space and time are discrete and physical quantities take on a finite
set of discrete values. A cellular automaton consists of a regular uniform
lattice... usually infinite in extent... A cellular automaton evolves in
discrete time steps... [and the state of a cell is] affected by the values of
variables at sites in its “neighborhood” on the previous time step... [Cell
states are] updated simultaneously... according to a definite set of “local
rules.”
Wolfram went on to limit the scope of these “local rules”, suggesting that config-
urations in which all cells occupy the “null” state should remain so for all future
times and that rules should have a degree of spatial symmetry in terms of how
they consider the neighbours of a cell. However, these restrictions were described
as “inessential”, apparently intended to limit the number of possible rules and to
focus on rules with the most physically relevant behaviour, rather than to narrow
the definition of CAs as mathematical objects.
A more formal description is provided by Hogeweg (1988), who defines CAs as
“large tessellations of identical finite-state” cells, each of which is defined by a triplet
〈I, S,W 〉, where I is a finite set of inputs (an ordered or unordered n-tuple of states
of some locally defined neighbourhood of cells), S is a finite set of states that a cell
may take on (and which also establishes the possible values of the inputs I) and W
is a function that maps from a particular state and set of input states to a new state
in S.
While other authors may place more or less emphasis on particular features to suit
the requirements of their discipline, the majority of definitions are in line with these
(see, for example, Itami, 1994; Vanag, 1999; Garc´ıa-Morales, 2013). Drawing on all
these sources, we formulate the following (non-rigorous) definition, which should be
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broad enough to be applicable in the large majority of cases found in the literature.
Definition 2.3.1. A cellular automaton (CA) consists of the following:
• A simple graph2, G, whose vertices are referred to as cells;
• A countable set, C, containing the states that individual cells can exhibit;
• A deterministic local transition rule, Tlocal , which establishes a new state for
each cell, given its current state and the current states of its neighbours.
• A global transition rule, T, which applies the local transition rule to all cells
simultaneously.
The CA may be run by specifying initial states for all cells and iteratively applying
T to create a sequence of new generations of cell states.
Note that this definition permits CAs to be defined over any finite simple
graph G rather than restricting them to two-dimensional lattices based on
tessellations of regular polygons. This more general type of CA is discussed by
Wolfram (2002, p. 930), who observes that such a generalisation is reasonable
provided either that G has the same structure around each vertex, thus making
it clear how vertices in a neighbourhood should be ordered (thus allowing Tlocal
to differentiate between the “northern”, “eastern”, “southern” and “western”
neighbours of a cell in a rectangular lattice, for example), or that the local transition
rule does not depend on the order of cells in a neighbourhood (with the exception
of the central cell).
2.3.2 Special cases and extensions
Within the framework of those CAs that are consistent with Definition 2.3.1, there
are a number of special cases of interest. For example, totalistic CAs, such as
Conway’s “Game of Life”, have numerical cell states and local transition rules that
depend only on the sum (or the mean) of the states of cells in a neighbourhood
(and possibly on the state of the central cell) (Wolfram, 2002, p. 60), additive
CAs have local transition rules that can be written in terms of sums of states in the
neighbourhood (typically using modular arithmetic) (Wolfram, 2002, pp. 952-953)
and reversible CAs have bijective global transition rules, such that the behaviour
may be evolved backwards as well as forwards in time (Wolfram, 2002, pp. 435-457).
2 A “simple graph” is an unweighted, undirected graph, in which every edge joins two
distinct vertices, and every pair of vertices is joined by at most one edge (see Bondy and Murty,
1976, p. 3).
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Going beyond the most basic CAs, many authors have considered extensions to the
concept through the relaxation of certain of the rules. While many such extensions
amount to alterations to the graph structure, the number of states in C or the way
that neighbourhoods are defined (see Wolfram, 1983), all of which are covered by
Definition 2.3.1, more fundamental changes to the concept have also been made.
For example, CAs may be defined with probabilistic transition rules (Vanag, 1999)
or with behaviour that is subject to noise (Wolfram, 1983), they may be influenced
by external inputs or the structure of their underlying graph may change over time
(Hogeweg, 1988). CAs have also been adapted for use in conjunction with geographic
information systems (GIS), such that they may be more easily applied in real world
contexts.
Continuous CAs, in which the discrete cell state space C is substituted by a continu-
ous subset of the real numbers, have been considered by several authors (see, for ex-
ample, Wolfram, 2002, p.155) and are of particular importance, owing to their ability
to represent the behaviour of systems of partial differential equations (Rausch, 2001)
in a manner akin to the finite difference method (see Strauss, 2008, pp. 199-222).
Some models also involve continuous times, such as CA-ODE models, described
by Vanag (1999) as being “intermediate between... simple CA and DE in partial
derivatives”.
2.3.3 Behaviours and key concepts
The concept of emergence (referred to as “unexpected behaviour” by Vanag, 1999) is
key to the study of CAs. Since CAs are generally described with fairly simple rules
and often display patterns on larger scales, emergent behaviour is an intrinsically
important feature of many such models.
The most widely acknowledged system for classifying CAs in terms of their behaviour
was provided by Wolfram (2002, from work first published in 1983), who undertook
a comprehensive investigation of one-dimensional CAs alongside a broader examina-
tion of more general CAs and related discrete systems. As a result of this research,
Wolfram concluded that almost all CAs (barring rare borderline cases) could be
assigned to one of four categories, based (initially) on a qualitative observation of
their behaviour when run from randomly generated initial conditions (implicitly as-
suming a random uniform selection of initial conditions across a model’s complete
state space) (Wolfram, 2002, pp. 231-249):
• Class 1. In these CAs, all cells evolve to the same state; the system tends to
a uniform equilibrium. In such systems, almost all the information contained
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initial conditions is destroyed, although the initial conditions may determine
which of several uniform equilibria the system ultimately attains.
• Class 2. These CAs evolve to either an invariant (though spatially non-
uniform) state or to a periodic sequence of states. In these systems, information
contained in the initial conditions may be preserved, but is not transmitted
spatially throughout the system.
• Class 3. These CAs exhibit apparently random, non-periodic behaviour which
persists for all time (discounting the enforced long term periodicity of systems
of finite size, with a finite set of cell states). In these systems, information
contained in the initial conditions is transmitted throughout the system.
• Class 4. These CAs exhibit complex non-periodic behaviour, with self-
organisation into persistent localised structures, which displace themselves
through space and interact with one another. In these systems, information
contained in the initial conditions is transmitted, but in a limited way, through
the behaviour of the localised structures.
It should be noted that these classes are based on the behaviour exhibited by a
CA for the majority of possible initial conditions. There may exist specific initial
conditions for which a given CA exhibits behaviour of a different class from that to
which it properly belongs. For example, Conway’s “Game of Life” is a class 4 CA
(Wolfram, 2002), but any initial condition over any graph involving only cells in the
“quiescent” state (Gardner, 1970) is invariant (class 1 behaviour).
A discussion of the specific relevance of Wolfram’s four classes for the IBMs consid-
ered in Part II of this thesis may be found in Section 5.3.6.
One of the most important results in CA theory is Wolfram’s proof (2002, pp. 675-
691) that even very simple class 4 CAs can be capable of universal computation,
which utilises the ability of certain CAs to simulate the behaviour of other discrete
systems, and ultimately to simulate the behaviour of a Turing machine.
The concept of randomness is also important in the field of CAs. In particular,
Wolfram (2002, p. 299-301) suggests that the simple rules behind certain CAs (and
related discrete systems) may represent the only fundamental mathematical pro-
cesses capable of generating ‘randomness’ from order, dismissing two other candi-
dates in stochastic systems (in which randomness is an external input) and chaotic
systems (in which randomness is reproduced from the initial conditions on larger
scales). Wolfram (2002, pp. 596-597) even suggests that CAs may be used to test
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patterns for ‘randomness’, since, given a set of initial conditions that appear to be
random, through their evolution, CAs may highlight subtle regularities that would
not otherwise be readily apparent.
Many of the concepts and methods familiar from the field of nonlinear dynamical
systems, such as the existence of multiple equilibria, phase transitions and
conserved quantities, have also been studied in the context of cellular automata
(Hogeweg, 1988; Wolfram, 2002, pp. 337-342, 981-983, 1022-1023), as have concepts
drawn from statistical mechanics, such as entropy and the convergence of systems to
dynamic equilibria, defined by global quantities analogous to temperature or pres-
sure (Wolfram, 1983, 2002, pp. 441-457).
One concept that is specific to CAs (although linked to the notion of irreversibility
more generally) is the idea of a “Garden of Eden”, a particular configuration of
states for the cells of a given CA that can never occur as the result of the ongoing
dynamics of the system (including as an invariant state) and which can therefore only
be observed in the initial conditions. While it is often easy to prove the existence
of “Garden of Eden” configurations, finding particular examples can be challenging
(Gardner, 1971); the search for “Gardens of Eden” of minimal size in Conway’s
“Game of Life” has been ongoing since the 1970s (Hartman et al., 2013).
2.3.4 Applications and relevance
Vanag (1999) describes CAs as a “universal tool with which the highly complex
behaviour of nonlinear dynamical systems can be analyzed and modelled” and CAs
have indeed been used as models for a wide variety of real world systems. In terms
of Gilbert’s (2008) classification scheme for ABMs (see Section 2.2.2), the nature of
CAs as extremely simple models dictates that, in the majority of applications, they
fall into the category of “Abstract Models”, used to explore possible mechanisms
driving observed global behaviours or to understand processes in very general terms.
For example, through comparing various candidate transition rules, Xiang and Bishop
(2010) use a CA model of sand dune dynamics to determine the nature of local pro-
cesses that generate large scale dune patterns in the real world. Itami (1994) simi-
larly uses a CA to model vole population dynamics, in an attempt to understand the
mechanisms that may be responsible for the significant fluctuations observed in such
populations in the wild. Other applications of CA modelling include understanding
the growth of cancerous tumours (Hatzikirou et al., 2010), traffic flow (Tian, 2009),
the proliferation of invasive tree species (Cannas et al., 2003) and the collisions
of microscopic particles, using the well-known “Lattice-Gas Cellular Automata”
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model (Vanag, 1999). Additional applications are summarised by Gardner (1971),
Wolfram (1983) and Vanag (1999).
Beyond their role as abstract models of real world systems (and, in the case of con-
tinuous CAs, as discretisations of continuous systems, as discussed in Section 2.3.2),
other uses for CAs have been suggested. Hogeweg (1988) discusses the use of CAs
as “paradigm systems”, which may be used to investigate important concepts, such
as symmetries, causality or emergence, without reference to a specific real world
context, while Vanag (1999) suggests that CAs may be used to test the validity of
the results of aggregated models in statistical physics. More speculative applications
include the use of CAs as an encryption tool (Wolfram, 2002, pp. 598-606).
As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, some of the boldest claims for the relevance of CAs
are to be found in the work of Wolfram, who describes the discovery of complex
behaviour in CAs and other related systems, referred to collectively as “simple pro-
grams”, as “one of the more important single discoveries in the whole history of
theoretical science” (Wolfram, 2002, p. 2). He proposes CA-like processes as the
fundamental mechanisms behind the patterns and behaviour observed in a wide of
physical and biological phenomena (see pp. 363-432), going on to suggest that, on
the most basic level, the universe itself may be a simple program and that “the
vast majority of physical laws discovered so far are not truly fundamental, but are
instead merely emergent features of the large-scale behavior of some ultimate un-
derlying rule” (p. 470), thus echoing the hypothesis of “the universe... [as] a cellular
automaton run by an enormous computer”, which had been proposed as far back as
the early 1970s (Gardner, 1971).
2.3.5 Advantages and disadvantages
Although stated with specific reference to a model of forest succession, the comments
of Hogeweg (1988) on the advantages of CAs over other modelling paradigms are
of general relevance. The first stated advantage (described by Hogeweg as “extend-
ability”) is that, since CAs are based on local rules that are frequently intuitively
straightforward to understand, CAs are often easy to alter to take account of alterna-
tive or additional assumptions and features. The second advantage (“observability”)
is that making observations of a CA model is generally simple, since “the output of
the model is “similar” to the real system”. Both these advantages, then, are related
to the clarity and comprehensibility of CAs as modelling tools.
On the other hand, Hogeweg cites the synchronous updating of cell states as a dis-
advantage of CAs, since it can lead to “artefacts” and behaviours not present in a
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corresponding physical system. She also cautions against the use of CAs, a space-
oriented modelling approach, in situations where an agent-oriented approach would
be more natural.
The clarity of “the correspondence between physical and computational processes”
in CA models is also noted as an advantage by Itami (1994), before going on to list
several further advantages, some of which are not in line with general opinion. The
claimed advantages include the ability of CAs to produce more “comprehensive”
behaviour than mathematical equations, the fact that they can be simulated pre-
cisely without approximation and their capacity to “mimic the action of any possible
physical system”. While the second of these claims is clearly true and the first is
open to interpretation, the last claim (which is not justified by the author) would
appear to be rather strong, since there exist many real world systems that are not
generally modelled using CAs. The irreducibility of certain CAs (in the sense that
their behaviour cannot be simulated by any more efficient system) is also cited as an
advantage by Itami, since systems whose behaviour is governed by any such CA can
only be precisely simulated with the CA itself. However, it could be argued that this
property could only truly be considered an advantage if it had previously been es-
tablished that the behaviour of a given system of interest was genuinely determined
by a CA process and that no other model could provide a sufficiently accurate rep-
resentation of its behaviour.
Vanag (1999) asserts that CAs are particularly well-suited to modelling noisy sys-
tems (owing to the fundamental characteristics of their discrete dynamics), systems
involving cooperative local behaviour and those exhibiting a high degree of hetero-
geneity, such that quantities averaged across the system provide a poor representa-
tion of its state. It should be noted, however, that many of these stated advantages
could equally be applied to ABMs. It would perhaps be most accurate to say that it
is the combination of these features with the unique simplicity of the CA approach
that sets the modelling paradigm apart from its alternatives.
2.3.6 Understanding and analysing
One approach for understanding and analysing CAs is to attempt to define alge-
braic formulae that precisely represent their behaviour, such that, given a particular
model, for any future time, the state of every cell could be calculated without the
need for explicit simulation. It might be expected, however, that the value of such
a strategy would be limited, since the fact that CAs are driven by simple discrete
rules rather than by equations is one of their defining features.
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Indeed, Wolfram (2002, pp. 606-616) argues that, in the vast majority of cases of
CAs that exhibit complex behaviour, no formula could be found that would offer
any computational advantage over explicit simulation of the system for the purpose
determining future states. For example, while Boolean expressions for the configu-
ration of any two-state CA can be stated, in all but the most trivial cases, separate
expressions must be written for each future time step and the length of these expres-
sions may grow extremely rapidly for more distant prediction horizons, such that
the expressions have little practical value (Wolfram, 2002, pp. 616-618).
On the other hand, useful formulae can sometimes be stated for particular families
of CAs, such as those whose transition rules are equivalent to simple arithmetic op-
erations (generally defined in modular arithmetic, to ensure that the cell state space
is finite), such as addition or multiplication Wolfram (2002, pp. 613-615). Even
where CAs do exhibit complex behaviour and precise and explicit formulae cannot
be found, partial solutions may exist. Garc´ıa-Morales (2013) has demonstrated that,
in some cases, it is possible to create formulae to determine future states that are
“mostly valid” save for rare “defects” in the model dynamics, whose nature and
effects may be predicted, even if their occurrence may not.
So far, we have discussed attempts to create formulae that represent CA behaviour
exactly. An alternative approach is to represent the behaviour approximately,
through equations that describe changes in key summary variables, such as the
global density of cells exhibiting a particular state. Such approaches may be data-
focused, attempting to create equations that match observations made from the CA
(see Hogeweg, 1988, pp. 92-94), they may draw on the techniques of statistical me-
chanics (see Wolfram, 1983) or they may be based on mean field methods, which are
discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
Alternatively, the statistical properties of CAs may be used to analyse model be-
haviour without attempting to produce equations or formulae to represent their
dynamics. Since CAs are explicitly spatial models, alongside the quantities used
in statistical mechanics, we may also consider quantities intended to identify spa-
tial patterns and regularities, such as correlation coefficients calculated on the cell
states or the relative frequencies of occurrence of particular small configurations of
cell states (Wolfram, 1983, 2002, pp. 588-597).
Other authors have attempted to analyse CAs through consideration of the equi-
libria and their basins of attraction, taking a more traditional dynamical systems
approach to the issue (see, for example, Tian, 2009). However, owing to the inherent
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complexity of the behaviour that CAs are capable of displaying, a phenomenon that
is, by definition, difficult to analyse reductively in terms of simple expressions and
processes, one of the most important analytical approaches for the study of CAs has
been repeated simulation and visualisation of the dynamics, allowing researchers
either to exhaustively explore the spaces of possible rules and initial conditions
(where these are sufficiently small) or to sample these spaces, thus gaining a qual-
itative understanding of the range of behaviours that a given family of CAs may
exhibit and the types of transition rules that are associated with each of these be-
haviours. This is the approach taken by Wolfram, when he examined the complete
set of one-dimensional, two-state CAs (Wolfram, 2002), and it is the approach that
we take in this thesis when examining a different family of models (related to CAs)
in Chapter 5.
2.4 Stochastic processes
The work presented in Parts II and III requires the use of a limited amount of ter-
minology and theory drawn from the field of stochastic processes. Some key aspects
of this topic are presented here. However, it should be noted that this section is
not intended to serve as a comprehensive introduction to the field, but merely to
collect together those definitions and results that are necessary to support later work.
The material on stochastic processes presented in this section is derived from
a variety of sources, including Ross (1996), Grimmet and Stirzaker (2001),
Stirzaker (2005), Cotar (2012) and Stroock (2014).
A stochastic process is a collection of random variables {X(t) : t ∈ T} taking
values in a particular set X (the state space), each corresponding to a particular
time t ∈ T , where T is generally a subset of Z or R, depending on whether the
process is discrete or continuous. A particular set of realisations of these random
variables, {xt ∈ X : t ∈ T} is called a sample path of the process, with xt referred
to as the state of the process at time t.
The variables of a stochastic process may be dependent or independent. For example,
consider an infinite sequence of coin flips, indexed by N. If we let X(t) represent the
outcome of flip t, then {X(t) : t ∈ T} is a stochastic process consisting of mutually
independent, identically distributed random variables, with X = {“Heads”, “Tails”}
and T = N. However, if we instead let X(t) represent the number of heads that ap-
pear in the first t flips, then X = N∪{0} and the random variables of {X(t) : t ∈ T}
are clearly not independent.
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In this thesis, we will largely be concerned with discrete time stochastic processes,
with T = N ∪ {0}. We will also restrict our focus to consideration of stochastic
processes for which X is a countable set.
The following definition specifies a particular family of stochastic processes:
Definition 2.4.1. Given a stochastic process {X(t) : t ∈ T} with state space X and
T = N ∪ {0}, we say that the process fulfils the Markov property if and only if,
for all t ∈ T , y ∈ X and x0 , . . . , xt ∈ X :
P[X(t+ 1) = y |X(0) = x0 , . . . , X(t) = xt] = P[X(t+ 1) = y |X(t) = xt]
A stochastic process that fulfils the Markov property is called a Markov process.
A discrete time Markov process is called a Markov chain. In this thesis, we will
exclusively consider Markov chains that also fulfil the following property:
Definition 2.4.2. A stochastic process {X(t) : t ∈ T} with state space X and
T = N ∪ {0}, is described as time homogeneous if and only if, for all t ∈ T and
y0, y1 ∈ X :
P[X(t+ 1) = y1 |X(t) = y0] = P[X(1) = y1 |X(0) = y0]
Combining these two definitions, we see that a time homogeneous Markov chain is
a discrete time stochastic process in which, at all times, future states depend ex-
clusively on the current state. Past states essentially have no influence on future
behaviour in such processes, beyond their role in having determined the current state.
The property of time homogeneity implies that the probability of moving from a
particular current state x to a particular state y remains constant over time. We
may denote these transition probabilities as pxy. If the state space X of a time
homogeneous Markov chain is finite, with cardinality n, then the states may be
identified with the integers 1, . . . , n , and the transition probabilities may be collected
in a transition matrix M , defined by3:
M> = (pij)i,j∈{1,...,n}
For a time homogeneous Markov chain, the following concepts may also be defined:
3 The decision to define M> rather than M is made for convenience, providing a better match
to the notation used in Section 10.4. If M = (mij), this choice implies that mij = pji , so mij
represents the probability of a transition to i from j.
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Definition 2.4.3. Consider a time homogeneous Markov chain {X(t) : t ∈ T} with
state space X and T = N ∪ {0}. Consider two possible states x, y ∈ X and a time
interval ∆t ∈ N:
• The ∆t-step transition probability p(∆t)xy is the probability that the process
will move from state x to state y in precisely ∆t steps:
p(∆t)xy = P[X(t+ ∆t) = y | X(t) = x] , ∀t ∈ T
• x communicates with y (denoted x → y) if and only if there exists k ∈ N
such that p
(k)
xy > 0.
• x and y intercommunicate (denoted x ↔ y) if and only if x → y and
y → x.
• The Markov chain is described as irreducible if and only if x→ y, ∀x, y ∈ X .
In other words, one state communicates with another if the second may possibly
be reached from the first after a certain number of steps in the process, while an
irreducible Markov chain is a chain in which every state may be reached from every
other state. Knowing which states communicate with one another is a first step in
understanding how the sample path produced by a Markov chain might evolve.
For the purposes of all that follows, let Πn be the set of valid probability distributions
for a random variable that takes values in the finite state space X = {1, . . . , n}. In
other words:
Πn =
{
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn)
> ∈ [0, 1]n :
n∑
i=1
ρi = 1
}
The following definition relates to the long term behaviour of a Markov chain:
Definition 2.4.4. Consider a time homogeneous Markov chain {X(t) : t ∈ T} over
the finite state space X = {1, . . . , n}, with T = N ∪ {0}, defined by the transition
matrix M . If there exists pi ∈ Πn such that:
Mpi = pi
then pi is described as a stationary distribution. If, in addition:
lim
N→∞
[
MNρ
]
= pi , ∀ρ ∈ Πn
then pi is described as a limiting distribution.
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This definition may be interpreted as follows. Suppose that ρt represents the distri-
bution of the random variable X(t):
ρt = (P[X(t) = 1], . . . ,P[X(t) = n])
>
By the definition of the transition matrix, we may observe that, for all N ∈ N∪{0}:
MNρt = (P[X(t+N) = 1], . . . ,P[X(t+N) = n])
>
= ρt+N
So we see that a stationary distribution represents an initial distribution of prob-
abilities across the states of the Markov chain that remains constant for all future
times. If it is also a limiting distribution, then the probabilities that the process will
be found in each state at any future time will converge to the limiting distribution,
for any initial conditions.
Given a time homogeneous Markov chain {X(t) : t ∈ T} with state space X and
T = N∪{0}, it is valuable to define the following family of random variables, called
times of first return4, each of which corresponds to a particular state x ∈ X :
Λ(x) = inf {∆t ∈ N : X(t+ ∆t) = x | X(t) = x} (2.1)
Λ(x) represents the time that it takes for the process to return to the current state x
for the first time, after leaving it. If the process never returns to x, then Λ(x) = ∞.
Since Λ(x) is a random variable, whose distribution is determined by the joint dis-
tribution of the X(t), we can make the following further definitions:
Definition 2.4.5. Consider a particular state x ∈ X of a time homogeneous Markov
chain {X(t) : t ∈ T}, with T = N ∪ {0}.
• x is described as recurrent if and only if P[Λ(x) < ∞] = 1. Otherwise, x is
described as transient.
• If x is recurrent, then x is described as positive recurrent if and only if
E[Λ(x)] <∞. Otherwise, x is described as null recurrent.
• A Markov chain is described as positive recurrent if and only if all states
are positive recurrent.
4 Note that, strictly speaking, (2.1), which defines the random variable Λ(x), requires that we
choose a particular t ∈ T . However, since we are concerned only with time homogeneous Markov
chains, the value of t is arbitrary.
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Broadly speaking, a positive recurrent Markov chain is one in which all states are
visited and revisited infinitely often.
We end this section with the following propositions, which are presented without
proof. Proofs of Proposition 2.4.6 may be found in Stirzaker (2005, pp. 132-134)
and Grimmet and Stirzaker (2001, pp. 223-225), while proofs of Proposition 2.4.7
may be found in Grimmet and Stirzaker (2001, pp. 227-230) and Ross (1996, pp. 175-
177).
Proposition 2.4.6. Given a time homogeneous Markov chain {X(t) : t ∈ T} with
a finite state space X and T = N∪{0}, if the chain is irreducible, then it is positive
recurrent.
Proposition 2.4.7. Consider a time homogeneous Markov chain {X(t) : t ∈ T}
with a finite state space X , of cardinality n, where T = N ∪ {0}. If the chain is
positive recurrent then it has a unique stationary distribution pi ∈ Πn.
Finally, we observe that while the unique stationary distribution guaranteed by
Proposition 2.4.7 is not necessarily a limiting distribution in the sense of Defini-
tion 2.4.4, it may nonetheless be demonstrated that its terms provide the “long-run
proportion of time that the Markov chain is in [each state]” (Ross, 1996, p. 177;
Stroock, 2014, pp. 33-35, also deals with this issue). This fact will prove cru-
cially important for our work on the optimal strategies of patrol games, presented in
Section 10.4.
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Part II
Understanding the connection
between micro and macro-scale
behaviour in individual-based
models
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Chapter 3
Key Concepts
3.1 Introduction to Part II
In Part II, we concentrate on the first two research objectives stated in Section 1.5.
These objectives require that we investigate the relationship between the dynamics
of systems of interacting individuals and those of corresponding models derived us-
ing mean field theory (see Section 3.2), and the causal mechanisms that link local
and global scale dynamics in IBMs. In addressing these issues, we employ the first
of our two modelling perspectives (see Section 1.4.1), with individuals modelled as
basic automata, whose behaviour is governed by simple stochastic rules, rather than
sophisticated decision making.
Our starting point for these investigations will be a particular IBM, which we call
the NANIA model. This model was mentioned in Section 2.2.2 and is defined in
detail in Section 4.2. The NANIA model is of interest because it has been used
as something of an exemplar for the purposes of the teaching and visualisation of
agent-based and individual-based models, as discussed briefly in Section 4.2.1. After
a short investigation of the possible behaviours of the NANIA model, we shift our
focus to a particular generalisation: a family of discrete space-time IBMs, which we
label as B-models.
In Chapter 5, concentrating specifically on B-models over one-dimensional spaces,
in which all individuals are identical, we perform simulation experiments to compare
the behaviour of these models with the predictions of mean field theory, in terms of
their observed population densities at equilibrium. The findings from these experi-
ments are then used as the foundation for a more theoretical approach in Chapter 6,
where the model dynamics are translated into a new space to facilitate the iden-
tification of a causal link between particular individual behaviours at a local scale
and population dynamics on the global scale, built upon a close investigation of the
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spatial distribution of individuals.
Throughout Part II, borrowing terminology from the field of statistical mechanics,
we use the term “microstate” to refer to a precise and complete description of the
instantaneous configuration of a system, in which every possible degree of freedom is
specified. In terms of individual-based modelling, the microstate of a system would
specify the precise location of every individual, along with the values of any other
individual-specific and global variables. Anything that remain unchanged while a
model is operating, such as the values of any model parameters and the underlying
geography of a spatially explicit model (where this geography is fixed), is not con-
sidered part of a model microstate, but rather part of the model structure.
The term “state” is used in a more general sense, referring either to the status of a
particular part of a system (a single cell, for example) or to a reductive description
of the complete system in terms of a limited number of global properties, such as
the population densities of various species in a particular environment.
3.2 Mean field theory
3.2.1 System dynamics
Mean field theory is a method for representing the behaviour of a system by means
of one or more differential equations or difference equations. The method itself will
be discussed in Sections 3.2.2 (the non-spatial case) and 3.2.4 (the spatial case), but
we first take the time to consider such representations in more general terms.
System dynamics is a means of representing the dynamics of complex systems
through consideration of a set of dynamical summary variables and their relation-
ships. This modelling approach is often applied to systems of interacting entities,
which may be divided into a number of distinct types or which may exhibit a number
of distinct states or both. The summary variables represent the number or propor-
tion of entities of each possible type or occupying each possible state at each time,
as well as any important system-wide quantities that may also vary with time (such
as the amount of available food in an ecological model). The relationships between
these quantities are described in terms of differential equations or difference equa-
tions establishing the rate of change of each one as a function of the current values
(and, occasionally, of certain past values) of all variables. In this way, system dy-
namics are able to describe the flows of individuals between a number of different
states or the simultaneous and interrelated changes in the sizes of a number of dif-
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ferent populations, based on considerations of known or supposed cause and effect
relationships within a system.
A general discussion of system dynamics is presented by Gilbert (see 2008, chap. 1),
with a more formal description being provided by Macal (2010). Wolfram (2002,
p. 984) also discusses a system dynamics type approach to the study of CAs (de-
scribed simply as “rate equations”). It should be noted that system dynamics is
a more specific and narrow concept than the field of general system theory, as dis-
cussed by Von Bertalanffy (1969) and others.
Gilbert suggests that system dynamics offers a useful approach for “topics where
there are large populations of behaviourally similar agents...” but argues that it is
not appropriate for systems in which agent heterogeneity, agent memory or agent
learning are important, since these features cannot be efficiently represented in such
a model. It should also be noted that since system dynamics models of systems
of interacting entities only monitor the sizes of different groups within a system,
in general, any information about the spatial distribution of these entities is lost,
whether or not such information is of relevance to the model dynamics.
A relationship exists between the system dynamics approach and the concept of a
master equation, used in the analysis of certain stochastic systems. Given a system
that moves between different states (such as a Markov process), a master equation
is a system of differential or difference equations that describes the rates of change
of the probabilities that the system occupies each state as functions of the current
values of these probabilities (see Macal, 2010).
If the summary variables of a system dynamics model represent the proportions of a
population occupying different states or belonging to different types, then these sum-
mary variables clearly represent the probabilities of a master equation that describes
the process of selecting a single entity randomly uniformly from the population and
recording its state or type. The entity states or types of the system dynamics are
therefore identified with the system states of the master equation and the same dy-
namical equations apply in each case.
For a particular example of this, consider the many variations of the widely used SIR
epidemiological model1, used to study disease transmission in a population (see, for
1 SIR stands for “Susceptible, Infected, Removed”, referring to three possible infection states
of an individual. Although the “R” is sometimes taken to stand for “recovered”, “removed” is a
more general term, encompassing all those individuals who can no longer infect others, whether
owing to recovery, quarantine or death.
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example, Funk et al., 2010; Macal, 2010; Fenichel et al., 2011; Meloni et al., 2011).
In its most basic form, SIR is a system dynamics model, in which a population is di-
vided into three groups based on their infection status for a particular disease, with
the dynamics of movement between these groups modelled by differential equations.
In this model, the master equation for the stochastic procedure defined by selecting
an individual at random at any time and noting its disease status is equivalent to
the differential equations that define the system dynamics.
The non-spatial mean field techniques that we discuss in the next section may be
thought of as a particular approach for constructing a system dynamics model from
a given ABM or CA by means of some key simplifying assumptions.
3.2.2 Non-spatial mean field techniques for models of inter-
acting entities
In this thesis, we are primarily interested in the role of mean field theory as a
technique for the derivation of differential or difference equations to describe the
behaviour of models of interacting entities. This technique of producing one model
to represent the behaviour of another is described by Huet and Deffuant (2008) as
“double-modelling”. The authors cite this approach as a means to “provide expla-
nations of the collective effects observed in IBM simulations”, as well as being a tool
for the prediction of the long term behaviour of an IBM without recourse to simu-
lation. They also suggest that “double-modelling” represents a useful exploratory
approach for the study of IBMs, allowing for the easier formulation and verification
of hypotheses. Our interest in mean field theory will be motivated mainly by the
first of these features, the potential of the technique to aid in understanding the
connection between local interactions and global behaviour in IBMs.
In the non-spatial case, the mean field approach is based on a single key assumption,
which may be described in a number of different ways, depending on the precise fea-
tures of the model to which it is being applied. Note that the qualifier “non-spatial”
relates to the equations derived using mean field techniques and not to the original
model or system. Indeed, mean field theory is most commonly applied to spatial
systems to simplify the description of their behaviour.
In loose terms, the mean field assumption states that, given some population of en-
tities, when each of these entities is considered individually, it may be supposed to
interact with the others as if they formed a “mean field”, a uniform medium whose
properties correspond to the averages of those of the individual entities.
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In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to state the mean field assumption
as relating to the “homogeneous mixing” of agents within the system (McKane and
Newman, 2004; Wessel et al., 2011), in the sense that all pairs of agents are equally
likely to interact or that the location of an agent at any time may be considered to
be random, following a uniform distribution across the space of the system.
In systems with discrete spatial entities, such as CAs or IBMs over cellular lattices
or general networks, the mean field assumption may instead be taken to imply that
the state of each spatial entity can be treated as an independent random variable,
constrained by global averages (such as the proportions of the entities known to
occupy each state or the population densities of different types of agent) but with
all spatial correlations neglected (see Wolfram, 1983, p. 615; Wolfram, 2002, p. 952;
Fibich and Gibori, 2010, p. 1460).
For example, consider a CA over some finite graph G with n cells, in which each
cell may occupy one of two states, labelled 0 or 1, with neighbourhoods defined
according to adjacency in G and with some local transition rule Tlocal to govern its
dynamics (see Section 2.3.1). Suppose that the proportion of cells in state 1 at time
t is given by the dynamic variable pt, where t ∈ N ∪ {0}. A mean field analysis
of this CA would assume that the states of all cells at time t could be treated as
independent random Bernoulli variables with parameter pt. The dynamics of the
system could then be modelled by considering the expected change in pt given this
assumption (see Seck-Tuoh-Mora et al., 2014, pp. 946-7).
Note that, in the example given above, provided that n  1, npt  1 and
n(1 − pt)  1, the independence assumption may often be considered to be ef-
fectively equivalent to the assumption that all possible configurations of cell states
with global density pt are equally likely, since the stated inequalities ensure that
those dependencies between the states of adjacent cells that arise from counting ar-
guments are negligible. Similarly, in cases in which the graph G is regular, the mean
field technique may sometimes be considered to refer to the dynamics in the limit
as n→∞. For example, McKane and Newman (2004, pp. 3-5) provides a thorough
demonstration of the mean field technique as applied to a certain family of IBMs
over a regular lattice, in the large n limit.
A key question in mean field theory is to understand the conditions under which
the dynamics of a particular system or family of systems are well represented by
the corresponding mean field equations. For example, McKane and Newman (2004)
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examine the conditions under which mean field equations provide a good repre-
sentation of the dynamics of a certain family of ecological models, while Huet and
Deffuant (2008) addresses the same question for an IBM of the dynamics of changing
attitudes. This question is also the principal focus of Chapter 6 of this thesis, in the
context of a particular family of IBMs, which will be defined in Chapter 4.
3.2.3 Benefits and limitations of mean field analysis
Mean field analysis can be advantageous, since it offers a simplified representation
of the dynamics of a complex system. As noted by Nguyen et al. (2008), a model
defined by systems of equations, such as a mean field representation, admits a huge
number of analytical techniques and approaches which are notably lacking in the
field of IBMs (see Section 2.2.6). Nguyen et al. also observe that an equation-based
representation of a dynamical system may be easier to calibrate than a corresponding
IBM, since the behaviour of the equations may depend on a much smaller number
of parameters.
Huet and Deffuant (2008) suggest that an equation-based representation of a system
facilitates a richer analysis, since it “provides a more compact view of the processes,
which eases their understanding.” The authors also note the capacity of mean field
type models to exhibit “asymptotic results, corresponding to an infinite population.”
However, since mean field analysis necessarily involves aggregation and simplifica-
tion, the resulting equations cannot precisely capture the complete behaviour of a
complex system of interacting entities. There are therefore some inevitable limita-
tions of mean field analysis that must be understood.
The most obvious of these limitations (and indeed one of the key drivers behind
several others that we will go on to describe) is the fact that mean field analysis, in
the non-spatial form in which it is most frequently applied, takes no account of the
spatial distribution of the entities that make up a system of interest. In the specific
example of a model of viral infection, Itakura et al. (2010) note that the lack of space
in aggregated models, and specifically the lack of consideration of non-uniform agent
densities across a system, can result in unrealistic behavioural features that are not
present in a corresponding ABM. In a similar vein, Wolfram (1983) notes that the
discrepancies between equilibrium densities exhibited by CAs and those predicted
by corresponding mean field equations are due to the inability of mean field analysis
to take account of spatial correlations between cell states produced as a result of the
characteristics of the local transition rule.
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Another key limitation of mean field equations is that they are deterministic, while
the systems that they are intended to represent may involve significant stochastic
elements. Such a deterministic model may demonstrate only a reduced range of the
possible system behaviours (Macal, 2010). McKane and Newman (2004) observe
that mean field models are generally not able to represent rare stochastic events
that may occur within a system, such as rare stochastic extinctions in a model of
an ecosystem, and this problem persists even when the equations are adapted to
include the dynamics of the variances of summary variables.
Nguyen et al. (2008) identify the inability of equation-based models to
efficiently represent the heterogeneity of agents a further limitation, concluding
that, owing to their increased degree of abstraction and lower level of detail
as compared with ABMs, such models “cannot be very realistic”. Meanwhile,
Huet and Deffuant (2008) remark that aggregated models, such as those gener-
ated by mean field analysis, can be impractically complicated for highly detailed
systems. The authors claim further that, in certain cases, it may be impossible to
find a single aggregated model that provides a good representation of the behaviour
of a given system, since this behaviour may differ very significantly depending on
the initial conditions and the particular choices of parameter values.
Finally, Seck-Tuoh-Mora et al. (2014, pp.946-948) observe that mean field techniques
often do not provide a satisfactory representation of the behaviour of CAs, since the
equations are intrinsically incapable of reproducing the inherent complexity that is
so often of fundamental importance in the study of these models.
3.2.4 Spatial mean field techniques
Although mean field analysis is usually taken to mean the generation of ODEs
or difference equations to represent the dynamics of a system, with quantities
of interest being globally aggregated and spatial structure ignored (as described
in Section 3.2.2), it is also possible to perform a form of mean field analysis that
retains a significant amount of spatial information. Under this technique, system
behaviour is represented by partial rather than ordinary differential equations, or
by difference equations with a spatial dependency, such that the values of summary
variables may be non-uniform across space.
The apparent contradiction between the term “mean field”, which we have described
as involving an assumption of spatial uniformity and homogeneous mixing, and a
spatially explicit interpretation is clarified by McKane and Newman (2004), who
write:
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“By “mean field” we mean the neglect of correlations between degrees of
freedom, allowing one to write the mean of the product of two stochastic
variables as the product of their means. Thus, a spatial model in which
statistical correlations are neglected is still a “mean-field model” within
this usage.”
In a spatial mean field model, we can imagine that, rather than each entity of a sys-
tem interacting with a single global “mean field”, each distinct location or patch has
its own such field. An entity is supposed to interact with those that share its patch
as if they formed a “mean field”, as in the non-spatial case, but is also supposed to
interact with the “mean fields” of neighbouring patches, according to certain spatial
relationships derived from the dynamics of the original system. In this way, each
patch, which may be a single point or a larger area, has its own values for the sum-
mary variables, representing the means or expectations of these quantities over the
corresponding spatial region.
This approach results in system dynamics type equations to represent the behaviour
of the system within each patch, with interdependencies between the equations of
neighbouring patches. If the underlying geography of the model is suitable (as in the
case of square lattices, for example), PDEs may be formulated from these equations
through consideration of the limiting dynamics (if it exists) as spatial and temporal
increments tend to zero.
An example of a spatial mean field procedure is provided by McKane and Newman
(2004) for two variations of an ecological patch model.
Spatial mean field techniques distinguish between those processes of a system that
occur at a particular point or whose effects are sufficiently locally to be modelled
as occurring at a particular point (such as the death of an individual organism in
a model of an ecosystem) and those processes that occur across space (such as the
movement of organisms between locations). When expressed as systems of PDEs,
the former involve temporal derivatives only, while the latter involve temporal and
spatial derivatives. Which processes may be considered to be local and which should
be considered to be spatial will vary depending on the precise nature of the system
to be modelled and the way that it is divided into patches.
Spatial mean field equations will often resemble the corresponding non-spatial
equations, with the introduction of additional diffusion terms to model spatial
dynamics. However, care must be taken, since while spatial interactions are of-
ten modelled as simple diffusion processes, in many cases the true spatial dynamics
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of a system would be more accurately represented by more complex expressions
(McKane and Newman, 2004).
Spatial mean field models are strongly related to the “CA-ODE models” described
by Vanag (1999, p. 418), in which a continuous-valued CA is derived from a spatial
system through the discretisation of space into a cellular lattice. Vanag describes
CA-ODE models as being an intermediate class of models lying between CAs and
PDE models.
3.2.5 Alternative methods for translating between different
representations of complex systems
While mean field approaches allow for the translation from CA or ABM representa-
tions of systems to models based on ordinary or partial differential equations, many
other techniques have been proposed for translating between different modelling
paradigms.
For instance, the “kinetic theory of active particles” (De Angelis and Delitala, 2006;
Bellomo et al., 2009), discussed in Section 2.1.4, offers an alternative approach to
the representation of systems of interacting entities by systems of differential equa-
tions, as does the method for representing IBMs with systems of PDEs set out by
Go´mez-Mourelo (2005), which makes use of an intermediate representation of the
system in terms of stochastic ODEs.
A different approach is taken by Hinkelmann et al. (2011), who outline a method
for the exact representation of certain spatially discrete ABMs using systems of
polynomials over finite fields. The authors argue that, although the resulting alge-
braic representations appear to be extremely complicated, the number of variables
required in these expressions increases much more slowly than the number of mi-
crostates of the ABM, suggesting that they may offer a more efficient route for
precise dynamical analysis than prohibitively time consuming simulation-based ex-
plorations of the state space.
Certain continuous CAs can be represented concisely by systems of differential equa-
tions without recourse to the assumptions of mean field theory (see Rausch, 2001).
Meanwhile, the well-known method of finite differences, which provides numerical
solutions to PDEs (see, for example, Strauss, 2008, pp. 199-222), is effectively a
means of translating a differential equation model into a discrete time, continuous-
valued CA, as noted by Wolfram (2002, p.924). Wolfram also observes that both
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these types of model can exhibit complex behaviour of a very similar character
(pp. 155-168).
Transforming an ODE or PDE model of a system into an ABM (the reverse transla-
tion of that achieved by the mean field approach) is not straightforward owing to the
additional detail inherent in the latter modelling paradigm and to the many different
ways in which ABMs may be described. Methods to achieve this translation gener-
ally involve loose algorithmic procedures in which features of the original equations
are progressively “distributed” to a population of agents, with the resulting ABM
and its subprocesses being repeatedly validated against the equation-based model
by means of simulation (see Nguyen et al., 2008; Macal, 2010).
3.3 Models from mathematical ecology
3.3.1 The place of ecology models in this thesis
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main aims of this thesis are largely theoretical in
nature, relating to the way in which certain mathematical models operate rather
than to any particular practical applications. However, since close links exist be-
tween the models studied in Part II and some particular models from the field of
mathematical ecology, a brief overview of these models is necessary. Note that, as
with the discussion of stochastic processes provided in Section 2.4, the purpose of
this section is neither to provide a detailed analysis of ecological models, nor an
in-depth review of the literature surrounding them, but merely to provide sufficient
information to support the work presented in later sections.
3.3.2 The Lotka-Volterra equations
In their most basic form, the Lotka-Volterra equations are a system of ODEs repre-
senting the rates of change of the sizes of two interacting populations, a prey species
and a predator species. Letting the population density per unit area of the prey
species be represented by u and that of the predator species be represented by v,
and letting u and v be functions of the time t ∈ R, the equations may be written:
u˙ = u(a− bv)
v˙ = −v(c− du)
(3.1)
where u˙, v˙ represent the time derivatives of u and v and where a, b, c and d are
positive constants (see, for example, Murray, 1993, p. 63).
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In the context of interacting species, the equations were originally proposed by
Volterra (1926)2. However, they had also previously been derived by Lotka (1920)
to model certain types of chemical reaction.
It may be observed that, when u = 0, the dynamics of the predator species is given
by the equation v˙ = −cv, which indicates that, in the absence of prey, the predator
population decays exponentially. Similarly, when v = 0, the dynamics of the prey
species is given by the equation u˙ = au, indicating that, in the absence of preda-
tors, the prey population grows exponentially. We also observe that the presence
of prey stimulates growth of the predator population (through the term duv), while
the presence of predators inhibits growth of the prey population (through the term
−buv), thus representing the nature of the predatory interaction between the two
species. Furthermore, the equations clearly guarantee that u˙ = 0 when u = 0 and
v˙ = 0 when v = 0, thus ensuring that the system remains in the region u, v ≥ 0,
where the values of u and v are physically meaningful.
Setting u˙ = v˙ = 0, we see that the Lotka-Volterra equations have two physically
meaningful equilibria. The first is the trivial equilibrium (u∗0, v
∗
0) = (0, 0) repre-
senting the extinction of both species. The second is (u∗1, v
∗
1) = (c/d, a/b), which
represents a state of persistent coexistence.
The Lotka-Volterra equations are of particular interest because, despite their sim-
plicity, they exhibit undamped oscillations (periodic coupled population cycles) in
u and v about the non-trivial equilibrium (u∗1, v
∗
1), a form of behaviour that, prior
to analysing the equations, Lotka had considered to be “improbable” in such sys-
tems (1920, p. 1595). Population cycles of this kind have been observed in a wide
range of interacting species, and while the Lotka-Volterra equations tend to be too
simplistic to provide a realistic model of any particular real world system, they have
nonetheless formed a foundation upon which more detailed models of ecosystems
have been constructed (see Murray, 1993, pp. 66-68).
One limitation of the basic Lotka-Volterra equations given in (3.1) is that the ex-
ponential growth assumption for the prey species is clearly unrealistic. However,
this issue may be addressed by altering the equations such that, in the absence of
predators, the prey population instead exhibits logistic growth, limited by a pre-
determined carrying capacity, the maximum density of the prey species that the
environment can support (see, for example, Wilson, 2011, pp. 46-47).
2 The source is in Italian. See also the English translation: Volterra, 1931
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As discussed by Volterra (1926), the basic Lotka-Volterra equations shown in (3.1)
can also be generalised to model ecosystems with multiple species, which may exhibit
a wider range of types of interaction, going beyond predation to mutual competition,
symbiosis and parasitism. For a system with n species, Murray (1993, p. 85) provides
the following highly generalised form of the equations:
u˙i = uifi(u0, . . . , un−1) , for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (3.2)
where ui represents the population density of species i, with the general function
fi(u0, . . . , un−1) describing the nature of the influence of each species on the rate
of change of ui . Note that (3.2) preserves the key property of (3.1), that general
extinction is an equilibrium, while the extinction of any individual species is irre-
versible.
Spatial versions of the Lotka-Volterra equations, based on PDEs, often incorpo-
rating diffusion-like processes to represent the movement of individuals, have been
widely studied (see, for example, Cosner and Lazer, 1984; McLaughlin and Rough-
garden, 1991; Wilson, 2011, p. 238). A large number of predator-prey CAs and
ABMs have also been proposed (see, for example, He et al., 2003; Mock et al., 2007;
Pineda-Krch et al., 2007). In this thesis, we are particularly interested in two of
these models: the ecological patch model, discussed in Section 3.3.3, and the
NANIA model (Ackland, 2009), which will be introduced in Section 4.2.
3.3.3 Ecological patch models
The ecological patch model is a temporally and spatially discrete, stochastic
IBM, which represents the interactions between species within an ecosystem. The
“patches” in question correspond to discrete geographical areas, within and between
which individuals move and interact. Ecological patch models may be spatial, with
many connected patches, or non-spatial, with all events occurring within a single
patch, which represents the complete system of interest. In each case, it is assumed
that within each patch there is perfect mixing of individuals, such that all possible
pairwise interactions between them may be considered to be equally likely.
McKane and Newman (2004) present a detailed description of the ecological patch
model alongside a review of its use, both in ecological contexts and beyond (see,
for example, Svirezhev, 1999; Alonso and McKane, 2002). A related patch model is
considered by Nguyen et al. (2008). In the context of this thesis, the ecological patch
model is of importance owing to its close relationship to the NANIA predator-prey
model (Ackland, 2009), which forms the basis of the work presented in Part II.
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In the version of the patch model described by McKane and Newman (2004), each
patch is subdivided into a number of “plots” (possibly only one), which may be
either empty or occupied by a single individual. The maximum capacity of a patch
is therefore equal to the number of plots that it contains. In a spatial model, patches
form the vertices of a graph, whose structure reflects the geography of the modelled
region.
The model dynamics proceed in discrete time steps, with one of three possible types
of transition occurring at each step. The choice of which of the three forms of
transition occurs is governed by a predetermined set of probabilities. The different
types of transition are outlined below:
• Mortality: This type of transition involves the selection of a single plot,
according to a discrete uniform distribution across all plots, across all patches.
If the plot is empty, there is no change. Otherwise, if the selected plot contains
an individual then that individual is removed with a predetermined probability,
specific to its species.
• Interaction (non-spatial): This type of transition involves the selection of
a single patch, according to a discrete uniform distribution across all patches,
followed by the selection of two plots from this patch, by means of a simple
random sample. If the two plots are empty, there is no effect. Otherwise,
there may be a change in the number or species of the individuals occupying
the plots, as determined by a specified stochastic transition function. Note that
this transition is only possible in models whose patches each contain more than
one plot.
• Interaction (spatial): This type of transition involves the selection of a
single patch, according to a discrete uniform distribution across all patches,
followed by a neighbouring patch (in the sense of adjacency in the underlying
graph), according to a discrete uniform distribution across all such neighbours.
One plot is then selected from each of these two patches, according to the
appropriate discrete uniform distributions. If the two plots are empty, there is
no effect. Otherwise, there may be a change in the number or species of the
individuals occupying the plots or individuals may move from one plot to the
other, as determined by a specified stochastic transition function (which may
or may not be the same as the function that is applied in the non-spatial case).
Note that this transition is only possible in the spatial (multi-patch) version
of the model.
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Through careful selection of the transition functions mentioned in the above descrip-
tions, the ecological patch model is sufficiently flexible to represent a wide variety of
different processes and interactions, both those that can be considered to occur at
a particular point (such as reproduction or predation) and those whose effect takes
place across space (such as migration).
McKane and Newman (2004) use mean field theory (see Section 3.2) to identify a
close relationship between a particular version of the ecological patch model and the
Lotka-Volterra equations, in both spatial and non-spatial contexts. In Section 4.3.4,
we use a similar method to demonstrate a connection between the NANIA model
(defined in Section 4.2) and the Lotka-Volterra equations.
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Chapter 4
Definition and initial discussion of
a general family of simple IBMs
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce the NANIA predator-prey model, which forms the
basis for all of the work presented in Part II. After defining this model, we present
an initial discussion of its behaviour and look at the connection between it and the
Lotka-Volterra equations (see Section 3.3.2). We observe that the NANIA model is
a particular example of a broader family of simple IBMs and we describe this family
in detail. We discuss the models that belong to this family and the importance of
spatial symmetries in limiting the variety of their possible dynamics.
Our ultimate intention is to determine ways to analyse the connections between
local and global behaviours in IBMs, a problem whose importance was discussed in
Section 2.2.8. The family of simple IBMs that we derive from the NANIA model
here provides an ideal subject for the investigation of this goal in later chapters.
4.2 The NANIA predator-prey model: An ODD
description
4.2.1 Background
Novel Approaches to Networks of Interacting Autonomes (NANIA) was a complexity
science project funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(EPSRC), which ran from 2004 to 2009 (Marion, 2004; NANIA, 2009). One page of
the NANIA website was dedicated to an interactive simulation of a predator-prey
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model (created by Ackland, 2009), described as “[an] autonome model1 which sim-
ulates the behaviour of [a Lotka-Volterra] system and introduces space, with either
periodic or fixed boundaries”. The page has since been removed, but can still be
accessed at the Internet Archive (1996).
We refer to this model simply as the “NANIA model” (although many other models
were also created as part of the NANIA project). As discussed in Section 2.2.1,
owing to the simplicity of its entities and interactions, we classify the NANIA model
as an individual-based model (IBM) rather than an agent-based model (ABM), and
we accordingly refer to “individuals” rather than “agents” throughout.
Although we focus specifically on the NANIA model, many predator-prey
models have been proposed based on similar or identical mechanisms. Since
these models are often presented in informal contexts, such as in lecture notes
(Ackland, 2008; He, 2013; Forrest, 2014) or as interactive web simulations
(Tyl, 2009; Idkowiak and Komosinski, 2014; Sayama, 2015), it is not possible to
definitively identify any particular example as the original version. However, de-
spite its simplicity, the fact that versions of the NANIA model may be found in
such a diverse range of sources, and that it is often employed as an exemplar for the
teaching and visualisation of IBMs, underlines its importance and relevance as an
object of study.
The NANIA model is presented here using the ODD protocol (see Section 2.2.3).
4.2.2 Purpose
No specific aim was stated for the NANIA model beyond demonstrating that an
‘autonome’ model was capable of simulating the dynamics of the Lotka-Volterra
equations. However, it may be assumed that the model was intended to feed into
the overall objectives of the NANIA project. On the project website (NANIA, 2009),
the overall aim of the project is stated as:
“... the search for overarching principles which apply in complex nat-
ural systems such as geophysical and ecological systems, and how such
principles might be exploited for novel computation.”
This general statement is then broken down into six “overarching scientific ques-
tions”. However, it is unclear which of these, if any, the predator-prey model was
1 The NANIA website (NANIA, 2009) defines an “autonome” as “any interacting multi-state
system which can encompass cellular automata, agent, organisms or species”. Although this defi-
nition is a little ambiguous, in context, the word appears to be intended to serve as a generic term
to cover all forms of interacting entity in complex models (rather than the models themselves).
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Von Neumann Adjacency Moore Adjacency 
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the Von Neumann and Moore adja-
cency schemes in graphs over rectangular lattices (see, for example,
Hogeweg, 1988).
intended to address.
In the context of this thesis, the purpose of the NANIA model is to act as a par-
ticular example of a broader family of simple IBMs, forming the basis for a series
of investigations relating to the links between local and global behaviours in such
models.
4.2.3 Entities, state variables and scales
The model involves two different types of entity: ‘biological’ entities (the individ-
uals) and ‘geographical’ entities, comprising particular cells and the network that
links them.
The individuals of the model are divided into two species, described as rabbits
(the prey) and foxes (the predators), represented by the letters ‘R’ and ‘F’ re-
spectively. The space inhabited by the individuals is a rectangular lattice of cells
L = {Cxy : x, y ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}} of size n× n. This lattice forms the vertex set of a
graph whose edges are defined as linking either orthogonally adjacent cells (Von Neu-
mann adjacency) or orthogonally and diagonally adjacent cells (Moore adjacency,
see Figure 4.1). The boundaries of the lattice graph may be fixed, forming a square
region or periodic, forming a toroidal region.
At time t, a particular cell Cxy ∈ L may be empty Cxy[t] = ‘E’, inhabited by a
rabbit Cxy[t] = ‘R’ or inhabited by a fox Cxy[t] = ‘F’. A cell may never be occupied
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by more than one individual. The only variables associated with a particular cell
are therefore its fixed x and y coordinates in the lattice and its current occupancy
status. For a particular cell Cxy , the expression N(Cxy) refers to its neighbourhood
2,
the set of all cells adjacent to Cxy in L.
The only state variable associated with an individual of a particular species is the
current cell that it occupies. Individuals of a particular species are therefore indis-
tinguishable and effectively interchangeable. Since cells may not contain more than
one individual, the state of the model (and its behaviour) may be described entirely
in terms of the cells and their occupancies. In this formulation of the model, the in-
dividuals are therefore disregarded as independent entities, considered to exist only
implicitly through the occupancy states of the cells.
Note that, in common with many cellular automata (CAs), this model is based on
a rectangular lattice of cells each of which can take on one of a finite set of distinct
states at each discrete time step. However, the model differs from typical CAs in the
respect that cells are not updated simultaneously, but in randomly chosen pairs at
each time step. Thus, it is more sensible to consider it as a temporally and spatially
discrete IBM (even if individuals are only modelled indirectly), rather than as a CA.
Since the model is highly abstract, the spatial and temporal increments are not
intended to correspond to any particular units in the real world.
4.2.4 Process overview and scheduling
Beginning at t = 0, time advances in discrete increments of size δt. For convenience,
we suppose that δt = 1. At each time step:
1. A cell Cxy is randomly selected by means of a discrete uniform distribution
over L ;
2. One of its neighbours Cx′y′ is randomly selected according to a discrete uniform
distribution over N(Cxy) ;
3. The occupancy states of these cells are updated according to a particular local
transition rule Tlocal : (Cxy[t], Cx′y′ [t])→ (Cxy[t+ 1], Cx′y′ [t+ 1]) .
The details of the local transition rule Tlocal are described in Section 4.2.8.
2 More specifically, N(Cxy) is the open neighbourhood of Cxy. The closed neighbourhood
of Cxy, denoted by N [Cxy], includes the cell Cxy itself: N [Cxy] = N(Cxy) ∪ {Cxy}.
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4.2.5 Design concepts
Basic principles: The model is intended to represent the interaction of the pop-
ulations of a prey species (called “rabbits”) and a predator species (called “foxes”)
in a shared habitat, albeit in a highly abstract form. The fundamental implicit
hypothesis underlying the model is that its behaviour in some sense matches that
described by the Lotka-Volterra equations (see Section 3.3.2).
Emergence: If the behaviour of the model does match that of the Lotka-Volterra
equations, then we would expect to observe the emergence of cycles in the predator
and prey populations similar to those of the equations. However, since the model
also involves a spatial element, we may also expect to observe some form of emergent
spatial waves in the densities of the two populations.
Interaction: The only direct interactions between individuals in the model involve
the predation of a rabbit by a fox, possibly resulting in the creation of a new fox
individual. However, since cells cannot be occupied by more than one individual,
there is also indirect interaction, through individuals blocking space and preventing
movement and reproduction.
Reproduction in the NANIA model is essentially asexual, since it does not require
any interaction between individuals of the same species. The processes governing
the model are discussed in detail in Section 4.2.8.
Stochasticity: The model is governed almost entirely by stochastic processes. As
described in Section 4.2.4, individuals may only ‘act’ at a particular time step if they
are randomly selected. Reproduction and mortality are also modelled stochastically,
as described in Section 4.2.8.
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, it has been argued that asynchronous stochastic up-
dating, such as is employed in this model, may provide a good representation of the
behaviour of systems of individuals in the real world (Caron-Lormier et al., 2008).
Observation: Since the model is extremely simple, provided that the size of the
lattice L is not too great, it is not unreasonable to store a complete description
of the system at a given iteration. However, owing to the fact that only two cells
are updated at each time step, for all but fairly small lattices, the model dynamics
tend to evolve extremely slowly, such that meaningful temporal patterns can only
be observed over many thousands or tens of thousands of iterations.
83
In all simulations of the model performed in this thesis (and of any models derived
from this model), complete descriptions of the system state are recorded at fixed
intervals, starting with the state at t = 0. However, while complete descriptions of
the system are recorded, summary measures of the system state will sometimes be
used, particularly the global population density of each species.
The interval between observations ranges from 3200 iterations, in the one-dimensional
models examined in Chapter 5, to 16 000 iterations, for the two-dimensional model
from which Figure 4.5 was generated.
4.2.6 Initialisation
The model is initialised through assigning occupancy statuses to all cells. This may
be achieved by means of any stochastic or deterministic process. The particular
means of initialisation employed will be described separately each time the model is
used.
4.2.7 Input data
The model does not use any external data inputs during the course of a simulation.
4.2.8 Submodels
The local transition rule Tlocal : (Cxy[t], Cx′y′ [t]) → (Cxy[t + 1], Cx′y′ [t + 1]) for the
model is defined as follows:
1. If the first cell contains a rabbit and its neighbour is empty,
Cxy[t] = ‘R’, Cx′y′ [t] = ‘E’, then the rabbit reproduces with probability κ ,
Cxy[t+1] = ‘R’, Cx′y′ [t+1] = ‘R’. Otherwise there is no change, Cxy[t+1] = ‘R’,
Cx′y′ [t+ 1] = ‘E’.
2. If the first cell contains a fox and its neighbour is a rabbit, Cxy[t] = ‘F’,
Cx′y′ [t] = ‘R’, then the fox eats the rabbit and reproduces with probability ς,
Cxy[t+ 1] = ‘F’, Cx′y′ [t+ 1] = ‘F’. Otherwise the fox eats the rabbit but does
not reproduce, Cxy[t+ 1] = ‘F’, Cx′y′ [t+ 1] = ‘E’.
3. If the first cell contains a fox and its neighbour is not a rabbit,
Cxy[t] = ‘F’, Cx′y′ [t] = ‘F’ or ‘E’, then the fox dies with probability τ ,
Cxy[t + 1] = ‘E’, Cx′y′ [t + 1] = Cx′y′ [t]. Otherwise there is no change,
Cxy[t+ 1] = ‘F’, Cx′y′ [t+ 1] = Cx′y′ [t].
4. If the first cell is empty, Cxy[t] = ‘E’, then any adjacent individual moves into
the cell Cxy[t+ 1] = Cx′y′ [t], Cx′y′ [t+ 1] = Cxy[t].
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5. In any other case, there is no change, Cxy[t+ 1] = Cxy[t], Cx′y′ [t+ 1] = Cx′y′ [t].
Transitions that result in no change will be referred to as “null transitions”.
4.3 Behaviour of the NANIA model
4.3.1 The NANIA model as a stochastic process
Before attempting to analyse or generalise the NANIA model, it will be useful to
understand its behaviour in the most simple and fundamental terms possible. We
wish to know, in a very broad sense, which microstates the model may occupy and
how it is able to move between these states.
To achieve this aim, we formulate the model as a stochastic process, as described in
Section 2.4. This approach is in line with McKane and Newman’s discussion of the
closely related ecological patch models as stochastic processes (2004, Section I).
Consider the NANIA model on an n×n square or toroidal grid, with either Von Neu-
mann or Moore adjacency. Relabel the cells Cxy , x, y ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} with a single
index Ci , i ∈ {0, . . . , n2− 1} by means of the transformation i = nx+ y and relabel
the states taken by particular cells with a pair of binary variables (ri, fi) ∈ {0, 1}2,
constrained by the inequality ri + fi ≤ 1, such that the states ‘R’, ‘F’ and ‘E’ corre-
spond respectively to the pairs (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0).
The model may now be described as a stochastic process {X (t) : t ∈ T}, where
T = N∪{0} and where the X (t) are discrete vector random variables taking values
in the state space:
Ω =
{
( r0 , . . . , rn2−1 , f0 , . . . , fn2−1 ) ∈ {0, 1}2n
2
: ri + fi ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n2 − 1}
}
(4.1)
Ω consists of the 3n
2
microstates representing all possible arrangements of foxes
and rabbits across the lattice and is a subset of the 2n2-dimensional space R2n2 . If
we specify a probability distribution for X (0), then the family of joint probability
density functions:
pt(x 0, . . . ,x t) = P[X (0) = x 0, . . . ,X (t) = x t] , t ∈ T , x 0, . . . ,x t ∈ Ω
is unambiguously defined by the local transition rule Tlocal described in Section 4.2.8
(assuming that the values of the parameters κ, ς and τ have been specified). More-
over, since Tlocal determines the microstate at time t + 1 with reference only to
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Figure 4.2: Figure illustrating the communication between different microstates of the
NANIA model (in the sense of Definition 2.4.3), valid for models on grids of side length
n ≥ 2 with κ, ς, τ ∈ (0, 1). Rounded boxes represent collections of microstates, all of which
intercommunicate with one another. Hexagonal boxes represent particular microstates. Ar-
rows indicate that all microstates in the box at the tail of the arrow communicate with all
microstates in the box at the head of the arrow. The dashed boxes are only separate from
the box labelled “ALL OTHER MICROSTATES” under certain circumstances, as discussed
in the main text.
the microstate at time t and not to any previous microstates or to the value of t
itself, considering Definitions 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, we see that the NANIA model is a
time homogeneous Markov chain. Hence, consideration of communication between
microstates (in line with Definition 2.4.3) is meaningful, and this will be the focus
of the following section.
4.3.2 Communication between microstates in the NANIA
model
In light of the previous section, we now examine which microstates of the NANIA
model communicate with one another and thus determine the broad sweep of possi-
ble model behaviours. The complete network of communications is summarised in
Figure 4.2 and the remainder of this section is dedicated to explaining and justifying
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this structure.
The figure relates only to models for which the underlying lattice L has side-length
of n ≥ 2 and for which the three parameters κ, ς and τ lie in the open interval (0, 1)
(meaning that, when cells of the appropriate states have been selected, the pro-
cesses of rabbit reproduction, fox reproduction and fox mortality are each possible,
but not automatic). The model lattice may have Von Neumann or Moore adjacency
and fixed or periodic boundaries. These choices do affect microstate communication
to a certain degree, as discussed later.
In the figure, rounded boxes represent collections of microstates, all of which inter-
communicate with one another. Hexagonal boxes represent particular microstates
(for example, there is only one microstate corresponding to the extinction of both
species and only one for which all n2 cells are occupied by rabbits). Arrows indi-
cate that all microstates in the box at the tail of the arrow communicate with all
microstates in the box at the head of the arrow (more strictly, they indicate that
there exists a microstate in the head box that may be reached from a microstate in
the tail box by means of a single transition). Therefore, given any particular initial
microstate, the behaviour of the NANIA model traces a path through the diagram,
moving between microstates within its current box or moving between boxes in the
direction of the arrows.
We consider each part of the figure in turn. Firstly, the right hand column of green
boxes relate to microstates in which the fox population is extinct. Since a popula-
tion of rabbits of a given size may clearly move to take on any particular arrange-
ment over L (recall that individuals of the same species are indistinguishable), all
microstates for which the rabbit population has a particular size must intercommu-
nicate. Similarly, since rabbits may reproduce (even when alone), such microstates
also communicate with microstates of a higher rabbit population, but since there
is no mechanism for the removal of rabbits in the absence of foxes, communication
does not operate in the opposite direction.
The left hand column of red boxes relates to microstates in which the rabbit popu-
lation is extinct. The logic here is almost identical to that of the right hand column,
except that fox populations may decrease, owing to mortality, but cannot increase,
since fox reproduction is dependent on the presence of rabbits. This explains why
the direction of communication in the left column is opposite to that of the right
column. We also observe that microstates involving a single fox and no rabbits are
the only microstates from which general extinction can be reached in a single tran-
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sition.
All other microstates (with two possible exceptions, represented by the dashed
hexagons) lie in the large central box and they all intercommunicate. Also, al-
most all single species microstates may be reached from a microstate with a mixture
of species by means of a single transition, since, in a mixed population, a single
fox may die or a single rabbit may be predated (replaced either by a fox or by an
empty cell). The exceptions are due to the fact that, in order to die, a single fox
requires an adjacent empty cell or an adjacent cell containing another fox, meaning
that populations of n2− 1 or n2 rabbits cannot be accessed from the central box by
means of a single transition, which accounts for the omitted arrows in the bottom
right hand corner of the diagram.
The diagram shows that there are two absorbing microstates of the model dynamics.
These are, as expected, the microstate representing general extinction and that in
which every cell is occupied by a rabbit.
The assertion that all (or all but two) microstates involving mixed populations of
foxes and rabbits intercommunicate requires further justification. For very dense
populations of rabbits and foxes, particularly those with no empty cells, in which
movement is impossible, it is not immediately obvious that a possible series of tran-
sitions exists from any such microstate to any other. It also remains to explain the
role of the two “Check Pattern” microstates, which occupy the dashed boxes at the
bottom of Figure 4.2. Both of these issues are addressed in the proof of the following
proposition, which summarises the results of this section:
Proposition 4.3.1. Consider a NANIA model over an n× n lattice L, with n ≥ 2
and parameters κ, ς, τ ∈ (0, 1).
• If using Von Neumann adjacency with either fixed boundaries or periodic
boundaries and an even value of n, then all microstates for which neither
species is extinct intercommunicate except the two microstates for which no
cell is empty and in which no two adjacent cells are occupied by the same
species (denoted “Check Pattern A” and “Check Pattern B”).
• Otherwise, all microstates for which neither species is extinct intercommuni-
cate.
In the former case, the microstates denoted “Check Pattern A” and “Check Pattern
B” communicate with all other microstates that involve mixed populations of rabbits
and foxes. However, no microstate communicates with either of these microstates
and they do not communicate with each other.
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Owing to its length, the proof of Proposition 4.3.1 is presented separately, in
Section 4.3.5. Examples of the two “Check Pattern” microstates are presented in
Figure 4.3.
From Proposition 4.3.1, we see that, for NANIA models with Von Neumann adja-
cency with fixed boundaries or with periodic boundaries and even side-length, the
two “Check Pattern” microstates play a similar role to “Gardens of Eden” in CAs
(see Gardner, 1971), arrangements of cells that can never occur spontaneously as a
result of model dynamics. However, the “Check Patterns” are not strictly the same
as “Gardens of Eden”, since there do exist null transitions from a “Check Pattern”
to itself, which occur automatically when the initial cell selected at a particular
iteration is a rabbit.
R F R F R F R F R F R F F R F R F R F R F R F R
F R F R F R F R F R F R R F R F R F R F R F R F
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Check Pattern A Check Pattern B 
Figure 4.3: An example of the two “Check Pattern” mi-
crostates on a 12×12 lattice. The designations “A” and “B”
are arbitrary and may be applied to the two microstates in
either order.
4.3.3 From the NANIA model to the Lotka-Volterra equa-
tions
From Figure 4.3.1, we can draw some important conclusions about the model be-
haviour. Since we clearly see that every microstate in the model communicates with
one or other of the two absorbing microstates (the “General Extinction” microstate,
in which every cell is empty, and the microstate in which every cell is occupied by
a rabbit), we conclude that all but these two microstates are transient: when oc-
cupying such a microstate, the probability of returning to it at some point in the
future is strictly less than 1 (see Definition 2.4.5). Since the total number of possi-
ble microstates is finite, one consequence is that any initial condition will eventually
necessarily evolve to one of the two absorbing states. Therefore, in any such model,
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Figure 4.4: An example of a Markov chain that exhibits quasi-stable oscillations,
despite the fact that the system is certain to evolve to an absorbing state in the long
term. Vertices represent states of the system and edge weights represent the probabilities
of moving between states.
For  > 0, any initial condition will eventually evolve to one of the two absorb-
ing states Q or Y . However, if 0 <   1, the state space can be divided into three
distinct regions: a region of rapid convergence to Q, {P1, P2, Q}, a region of rapid
convergence to Y , {X1, X2, Y }, and a region of convergence to quasi-stable oscillations
{A,B1, B2}. Though the system will not remain in the third region indefinitely, through
a suitable choice of , the expected time spent in this region can be made arbitrarily
large. Note that A is in the third region, though A itself does not form part of the
oscillations.
extinction of the fox population is certain in the long term, leading either to extinc-
tion of both species, or to the expansion of the rabbit population to fill the lattice.
However, while these observations are true, they are not necessarily very helpful in
practice, since it may be the case that, for certain models and from certain initial
microstates, the expected time required to evolve to one of the two absorbing states
is so large that we can, in fact, meaningfully talk about situations of quasi-stable
coexistence between the two species. This would be the case if, for example, evolv-
ing from a particular microstate to either of the absorbing microstates would require
sequences of transitions that only occur with very low probability. Figure 4.4 illus-
trates a simple Markov chain which exhibits similar behaviour to this.
Ackland (2009) asserts that the evolution of the populations of rabbits and foxes in
the NANIA model has dynamics similar to those of the widely studied Lotka-Volterra
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equations (see Section 3.3.2):
u˙ = u(a− bv)
v˙ = −v(c− du)
(4.2)
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, these equations display regular oscillations of the
predator and prey population densities (u and v) about the fixed point
(u∗, v∗) = (c/d, a/b) , but we have shown that the NANIA model necessarily evolves
to one of its two absorbing states. It is therefore through this concept of quasi-stable
coexistence in the NANIA model that the claims of Ackland should be understood.
While it cannot truly replicate the permanent oscillatory behaviour of the Lotka-
Volterra equations, over long time periods, the NANIA model could exhibit quasi-
stable behaviour that does display similar oscillatory dynamics.
An implementation of the NANIA model was created in Python (Python Software
Foundation, 2012) using the NumPy (Numpy Developers, 2012) package. Figure 4.5
shows an example of the population dynamics of the NANIA model, demonstrating
that, for suitably chosen values of the parameters, it does indeed display distinct
cycles in the densities of the two species.
Figure 4.5: Sample dynamics of the NANIA model over a 120 × 120 toroidal lattice,
with Moore adjacency and parameter values κ = 0.02, ς = 1.00, τ = 0.15. The plot
shows 8 million iterations of the model, with observations made at intervals of 16 000
iterations. This is an extract from the dynamics of a longer simulation (for which the
initial conditions were randomised) and is displayed since it provides a clear illustration
of the population cycles of the system.
In the next section, we discuss one way in which an analytical connection may be
made between the NANIA model and the Lotka-Volterra equations.
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4.3.4 Connecting the NANIA model and the Lotka-Volterra
equations using mean field theory
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, mean field theory is a method for representing the
dynamics of systems of interacting entities as sets of differential equations that de-
scribe the evolution of globally aggregated quantities, such as population densities.
In this section, we apply non-spatial mean field techniques to the NANIA model,
in order to determine whether and to what extent the resulting ODEs match the
Lotka-Volterra equations (4.2), with which the NANIA model is claimed to share
certain dynamical features. Mean field theory will also form a key part of the anal-
ysis of a more general family of NANIA-like models, presented in Chapter 5.
Here, we consider a NANIA model over a toroidal lattice of size n× n, with Moore
adjacency. It should however be noted that the nature of the model geography is
not actually relevant for the non-spatial mean field approach deployed in this section.
The dynamic variables of the Lotka-Volterra equations are the global population den-
sities of the prey (“rabbits” in the NANIA model) and predator species (“foxes”),
denoted respectively by u and v in equation (4.2). These will therefore be the sum-
mary variables used in the mean field analysis of the NANIA model.
We write u(t) and v(t) to represent the global densities of rabbits and foxes in the
NANIA model at a particular time t. The continuous-time variables u and v will
later be generated through consideration of a limiting case where δt (the time be-
tween iterations) is allowed to go to zero.
Based on the discussion of Section 3.2.2, and employing the notation introduced
in Section 4.2, the mean field assumptions for the NANIA model will be stated as
follows:
1. The states of all cells at a particular time t may be treated as independent
identically distributed random variables, with the probability that a cell Cxy
exhibits a particular state being proportional to the total number of cells in
that state at that time.
2. The changes in u(t) and v(t) at any iteration will be assumed to be precisely
equal to the expected values of these changes, as calculated under the previous
assumption.
Note that, under assumption 1, two different forms of dependence between cell states
are neglected. The first of these is the dependence induced by spatial correlations
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Event Cxy[t] Cx′y′ [t] Probability of Event δu δv
Rabbit born ‘R’ ‘E’ κu(1− u− v) n−2 0
Fox eats rabbit, fox born ‘F’ ‘R’ ςvu −n−2 n−2
Fox eats rabbit, no fox born ‘F’ ‘R’ (1− ς)vu −n−2 0
Fox dies ‘F’ ‘F’ or ‘E’ τv(1− u) 0 −n−2
Table 4.1: Summary of those events of a NANIA model that result in a change
δu or δv in u(t) or v(t) respectively. Also presented are the probabilities of these
changes under the mean field assumptions and their magnitudes (assuming an n×n
lattice). The t dependence of u and v has been omitted for the sake of clarity.
generated by the transition rule of the NANIA model, the neglect of which is the
basis of the mean field approach. The second form of dependence is that which
follows from the knowledge of the global densities of different cell states, u(t), v(t)
and 1− u(t)− v(t) (the density of empty cells).
For the neglect of the second form of dependence to be reasonable, we require that
n2, n2u(t), n2v(t) and n2(1− u(t)− v(t)) are all sufficiently large that the effect of
conditioning the probability distribution for the state of Cx′y′ [t] (the second cell to
be chosen at a particular iteration) on the state of Cxy[t] (the first cell chosen) would
be negligible. The following mean field analysis can therefore only be considered to
be valid if the lattice of the NANIA model is sufficiently large and in situations in
which none of the three cell states is too scarce.
Assumption 2 fulfils a similar role to a consideration of the limiting behaviour of
the model as n→∞, a procedure that would not otherwise be possible in this case,
since the rates of change of u(t) and v(t) are clearly proportional to n−2 and would
therefore go to zero in this limit.
Given assumption 1, we may state that, ∀X ∈ {‘R’, ‘F’, ‘E’}:
P(Cxy[t] = ‘R’) = P(Cx′y′ [t] = ‘R’ |Cxy[t] = X) = u(t)
P(Cxy[t] = ‘F’) = P(Cx′y′ [t] = ‘F’ |Cxy[t] = X) = v(t)
P(Cxy[t] = ‘E’) = P(Cx′y′ [t] = ‘E’ |Cxy[t] = X) = 1− u(t)− v(t)
(4.3)
Using (4.3), the expected changes in u(t) and v(t) over a single time interval can
be derived from the transition rule given in Section 4.2.8. Those events that result
in a change δu or δv in u(t) or v(t) are summarised in Table 4.1, along with the
magnitudes of these changes and their probabilities.
From Table 4.1, with reference to assumption 2, mean field difference equations can
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be constructed through considering the expected change in u(t) and v(t):
u(t+ δt) = u(t) +
1
n2
u(t)[κ− κu(t)− (1 + κ)v(t)]
v(t+ δt) = v(t)− 1
n2
v(t)[τ − (ς + τ)u(t)]
(4.4)
In order to transform these difference equations into ODEs, to allow for comparison
with the Lotka-Volterra equations, we must take the limit as δt→ 0. Unfortunately,
such a limit is not meaningful in the context of the original model, since there is
one fixed discrete time increment over which the transition rule operates and the
behaviour of the model is not defined over shorter intervals. Observe that, for such
a limit to exist, we certainly require that the magnitude of the changes in u(t) and
v(t) should be dependent on δt.
We resolve this issue by supposing that the basic time increment of the original
NANIA model is equal to 1. This allows us to rewrite (4.4) as follows:
u(t+ δt)− u(t) = δt
n2
u(t)[κ− κu(t)− (1 + κ)v(t)]
v(t+ δt)− v(t) = − δt
n2
v(t)[τ − (ς + τ)u(t)]
(4.5)
These equations do have a meaningful limiting form as δt→ 0.
So, letting a = κ/n2, b = [1 + κ]/n2, c = τ/n2 and d = [ς + τ ]/n2 and taking the
limit as δt→ 0, these equations become:
u˙ = u(a− bv)− au2
v˙ = −v(c− du)
(4.6)
These equations are identical to the standard Lotka-Volterra equations, save for the
−au2 term. From the derivation of the equations, it can be seen that this term
represents the limitation on rabbit population growth due to overcrowding, since
rabbits cannot reproduce into cells that are already occupied by other rabbits.
In the standard Lotka-Volterra equations, the prey population grows exponentially
in the absence of predators. By contrast, the mean field equations for the IBM
suggest that the rabbit population grows logistically in the absence of foxes, with a
carrying capacity of n2, indicating that the population can no longer increase when
every cell is occupied by a rabbit.
At this stage, it should be reiterated that, while the non-spatial continuous mean
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field model (4.6) has been derived from the NANIA model, the behaviours of the two
models are not equivalent, even in terms of the expected dynamics of the individual
densities u and v. Firstly, we know that the mean field assumptions are not true
in the case of the NANIA model, since there are clearly dependencies between the
states of nearby cells due to the local nature of the transition rule. Secondly, the
NANIA model is discrete and has no true limiting behaviour as δt→ 0. Creating a
continuous time system from the difference equations of (4.4) required that further
assumptions be made about how the dynamics would scale as δt varied.
Therefore, as with all mean field models, (4.6) should be seen as a proposed repre-
sentation of the dynamics of the NANIA model, which may or may not provide a
good match to the true dynamics of the system in any given scenario. However, the
fact that the mean field equations are equivalent to a logistic growth version of the
Lotka-Volterra equations does provide a possible route to understanding why both
models exhibit similar predator-prey population cycles, as observed in Figure 4.5.
4.3.5 Proof of Proposition 4.3.1
For convenience, the proposition is reproduced below:
Proposition 4.3.1. Consider a NANIA model over an n× n lattice L, with n ≥ 2
and parameters κ, ς, τ ∈ (0, 1).
• If using Von Neumann adjacency with either fixed boundaries or periodic
boundaries and an even value of n, then all microstates for which neither
species is extinct intercommunicate except the two microstates for which no
cell is empty and in which no two adjacent cells are occupied by the same
species (denoted “Check Pattern A” and “Check Pattern B”).
• Otherwise, all microstates in which neither species is extinct intercommunicate.
In the former case, the microstates denoted “Check Pattern A” and “Check Pattern
B” communicate with all other microstates that involve mixed populations of rabbits
and foxes. However, no microstate communicates with either of these microstates
and they do not communicate with each other.
For two microstates to communicate, all that is required is that a series of valid
transitions exists to transform the first microstate to the second, and that this series
of transitions would occur with non-zero probability. Beyond this requirement, no
consideration is necessary of how likely such a series might be. To prove communi-
cation between two microstates, it therefore suffices to identify a suitable series of
transitions.
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Figure 4.6: The “factory” arrangement of cells and some associated sequences of tran-
sitions. At each step, the cells in which a transition has occurred are outlined in blue.
Note that, in the two “Generation” sequences, rabbits and foxes may leave the factory
in two possible directions and that the “Fox Generation” sequence must be followed by
the “Refilling” sequence to restore the factory.
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Figure 4.7: Disallowed arrangements for
the location of the factory.
On this basis we present an algorithmic proof of Proposition 4.3.1. The concept
behind the proof has similarities to Wolfram’s proof of universal computation in the
“Rule 110” CA (2002, pp. 675-689), in that we explicitly construct configurations
and dynamics within the model to demonstrate that a desired behaviour is possible.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we present an algorithm that constructs a series of
transitions to transform any microstate that involves a mixed population of foxes
and rabbits into any other such microstate (except in two special cases, which we
consider separately at the end). The algorithm relies on the properties of a par-
ticular 2 × 2 arrangement of cells, which, in the interests of economy, we will call
a “factory”. The factory is illustrated in Figure 4.6, along with several important
sequences of transitions associated with it.
As seen in the figure, a factory is capable of generating fox and rabbit individuals
and restoring itself to its original state (provided that one of the two external cells
into which new individuals will move is empty). It can operate in any of its four
possible orientations and is capable of rotating itself repeatedly through 90◦.
We now set out the algorithm for transforming between microstates with mixed
populations. Note that, whether using Von Neumann or Moore adjacency, all tran-
sitions should be considered to occur exclusively in pairs of orthogonally adjacent
cells. Also, whether using fixed or periodic boundaries, we proceed as if they were
fixed, with no transitions permitted for pairs of adjacent cells straddling the bound-
ary.
Each step of the algorithm is illustrated by a corresponding image in Figures 4.8-4.9.
Consider two microstates x 1,x 2 ∈ Ω (using the definition of (4.1)) of a NANIA
model over an n× n lattice L, with n ≥ 2 and parameters κ, ς, τ ∈ (0, 1), for which
the fox and rabbit populations are both positive. We construct a series of possible
model transitions to transform x 1 into x 2 as follows:
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Step 1. Select the blue box as the location for 
a factory. The red boxes contain disallowed 
arrangements of cells, so are not suitable. 
Step 2. Consider the first microstate. Foxes eat adjacent rabbits, then move to eat the remaining rabbits, 
without reproducing. Only one rabbit is left uneaten, towards the bottom left corner of the lattice. 
Step 3. Foxes die such 
that a single fox and a 
single rabbit remain. 
Step 4. The remaining 
individuals move into 
the blue box. 
Step 5. A factory is 
formed in the blue box. 
Goal. To transform from one microstate to another 
by means of a series of valid transitions. 
Figure 4.8: Visual presentation of the algorithm from the proof of Proposition 4.3.1.
Steps 1-5.
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Step 6. The lattice is 
divided into four zones. 
Step 7. The upper left 
zone is filled to match 
the second microstate. 
Step 8.  The factory rotates and fills the remaining 
zones to match the second microstate. 
Step 9. The factory is altered to 
match the second microstate, 
completing the transformation. 
Figure 4.9: Visual presentation of the algorithm from the proof of Proposition 4.3.1.
Steps 6-9.
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1. Identify a 2 × 2 region of L for which the occupancies of the cells in x 2 do
not form either of the two patterns shown in Figure 4.7. For the time being,
we assume both that such a region exists and, in the case that L has periodic
boundaries, that it does not ‘cross’ the boundary of the lattice. This region
will be used as the location of a factory.
2. Consider a series of transitions of x 1 in which the foxes eat every rabbit (with-
out reproducing) except the one occupying the cell Ci with the lowest index
i (based on the transformation given in Section 4.3.1, roughly speaking, this
is the rabbit that is closest to the bottom left corner of the grid, where the x
coordinate is considered to increase from left to right and the y coordinate is
considered to increase from bottom to top). The only processes that should
be used are predation of rabbits by foxes and fox movement. Given the simple
graph structures employed in the model (and the requirement that n ≥ 2),
this is clearly possible, since it is impossible for the single surviving rabbit to
block access to others.
3. Following these transitions, suppose that the series continues with the death
of every fox except the one occupying the cell Ci with the lowest index i.
Since there is only one rabbit remaining, and since all cells have at least two
neighbours, every fox must be adjacent to an empty cell or to a cell occupied
by another fox, ensuring that this sequence of deaths is possible.
4. At this stage, the only remaining individuals are a single rabbit and a single
fox. Suppose that the series of transitions continues with the rabbit moving
to the lower left corner of the region identified at Step 1, followed by the fox
moving to the lower right corner of this region.
5. Now suppose that the series continues with the construction of a factory in
the region by means of the “Refilling” procedure illustrated in Figure 4.6.
6. Consider the horizontal and vertical lines that intersect at the centre of the
factory. If the effect of any periodic boundaries is ignored, these lines divide
L into four rectangular zones, which may be of unequal size, each of which
includes a single cell of the factory.
7. The factory is able to generate fox and rabbit individuals which may move
out into the upper left zone (see Figure 4.6). Consider, therefore, a series of
transitions in which the appropriate individuals are generated in the factory
to fill this zone such that its occupancy matches that of the corresponding
area in x 2. The zone should be filled row by row, from left to right and from
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top to bottom. In this zone, only the single cell lying in the factory will not
necessarily match the occupancy of x 2.
8. Since the factory is able to rotate (see Figure 4.6), we may consider the series
of transitions in which the factory successively rotates through 90◦ and fills
each of the remaining three zones in the same fashion as described in Step 7.
9. At this stage, only the four cells of the factory may not have the same occu-
pancy as that of x 2. However, it is simple to verify that a factory may be
transformed into any 2 × 2 arrangement of foxes, rabbits and empty cells by
means of a series of transitions applied only to orthogonally adjacent pairs of
these cells, except the two arrangements illustrated in Figure 4.73. Since the
location of the factory was chosen specifically such that the occupancies of
the cells in x 2 did not match either of these two patterns, the series of tran-
sitions may therefore be continued such that the occupancy of the four cells
comprising the factory matches that of the corresponding cells in x 2. The
state of every cell in x 1 has now therefore been transformed to the state of
the corresponding cell in x 2 by means of a series of transitions applied only to
orthogonally adjacent pairs of cells.
At this point, we pause to consider exactly what has been proved. The above al-
gorithm demonstrates that there exists a sequence of transitions to transform any
microstate with a mixed population of foxes and rabbits to any other such microstate
(and therefore that any two such microstates intercommunicate), provided that the
assumption made at Step 1, relating to the second of these microstates, is true.
Since we have only considered transitions on pairs of orthogonally adjacent cells,
this result holds for both Von Neumann and Moore adjacency. Also, since we have
proceeded as if the boundaries were fixed, the result must hold for fixed or periodic
boundaries, since any transitions that can occur in the former case can also occur
in the latter case.
Recall that the assumption made at Step 1 states that it is possible to find a 2× 2
block of the lattice L for which the occupancies of the cells in x 2 do not match either
of the patterns depicted in Figure 4.7. Furthermore, this block was not permitted
to cross the boundary of L, whether or not periodic boundary conditions were in
operation (if this were permitted, it would interfere with Step 6). We have not yet
given any consideration to the conditions under which this assumption is valid or to
the implications of the assumption being false.
3 The proof of this assertion is omitted, since it simply requires a lengthy series of mechanical
manipulations. Given that the factory may be rotated and that individuals may move through
empty cells, 15 separate target arrangements must be considered.
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Figure 4.10: Given a “Check Pattern” microstate for a lattice with odd
side length and periodic boundary conditions, a suitable 2× 2 block for the
location of a factory can be found lying across the boundary, as seen here.
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Figure 4.11: Factories can be transformed into either of the arrangements
depicted in Figure 4.7 by means of valid transitions if using Moore adja-
cency. One example is given here; the other arrangement may be reached
by rotating the factory through 90◦ before performing the above sequence
of transitions.
Consider the first of these issues. It is clear that the only arrangements of foxes and
rabbits across a lattice, such that it is impossible to find a 2× 2 block that does not
look like one of the two images given in Figure 4.7 are those that look like chess-
boards, where there are no empty cells, and no orthogonally adjacent cells containing
individuals of the same species. These are “Check Pattern A” and “Check Pattern
B”, as described in the Proposition (see Figure 4.3). Note that the designations “A”
and “B” are arbitrary and may be applied to the two microstates in either order.
With fixed boundaries, these two microstates do not contain a suitable 2×2 block for
the placement of a factory. The same is true for periodic boundaries in lattices with
an even side length n, even allowing for blocks lying across the boundaries. However,
observe that with periodic boundaries in lattices with an odd side length n, observe
that suitable 2× 2 blocks can nonetheless be found lying across the boundary of the
lattice (see Figure 4.10). In such circumstances, a relabelling of the cells to represent
an appropriate shift in the x or y coordinate axes reduces the situation to which the
algorithm may be applied, and all mixed population microstates intercommunicate.
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Now consider the cases in which the algorithm fails: lattices with fixed boundary
conditions and lattices with periodic boundary conditions and even side-length. In
these cases, it is easy to see that, with Von Neumann adjacency, no microstates
communicate with either of the two “Check Patterns”. In the NANIA model, no
non-null transition exists whose output (in terms of the states of the two selected
cells) includes one fox and one rabbit. However, every pair of orthogonally adjacent
cells in the “Check Patterns” is of this form.
It only remains to consider these same cases, lattices with fixed boundary conditions
and lattices with periodic boundary conditions and even side-length, with Moore ad-
jacency. We observe that, in this case, a factory can be transformed into either of
the disallowed arrangements shown in Figure 4.7, by means of the process depicted
in Figure 4.11. In this case, the algorithm can therefore successfully be applied with
any location chosen for the factory.
This proves the proposition and thus justifies the dynamical structure of the NANIA
model presented in Figure 4.2.
4.4 Generalising the NANIA model
4.4.1 Motivation and aims
Clearly, the NANIA model is just one particular example of a wider family of possi-
ble autonome models that might be defined using similar mechanisms. In specifying
the model, a number of decisions were taken regarding the structure of the space
over which individuals move, the number of species of individual and the ways in
which individuals can and cannot interact, each of which could be generalised to
define a broader family of models.
The NANIA model has some similarities with CAs (see Section 2.3), in that it op-
erates in discrete time over a regular lattice of cells, with each cell able to exhibit
a discrete range of states at each time step. However, it differs from a CA in other
key ways, in that updates are performed asynchronously and stochastically, both in
terms of which pairs of cells are updated at a given time step and in terms of what
the outcome of an update will be.
These features make the NANIA model similar to other kinds of Wolfram’s “simple
programs”, such as randomised versions of “mobile automata” (2002, pp. 71-77),
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“sequential cellular automata” with random updating (p. 1032) or the Eden model
(pp. 331-332). It also has similarities to the predator-prey CA of He et al. (2003)
and could be formulated as a special case of the ecological patch models described by
McKane and Newman (2004) (see Section 3.3.3 for further details of these models).
While CAs have received a large amount of theoretical attention since their
creation, asynchronous stochastic cellular models similar to the NANIA model
have received far less. However, given the links between these models and
others – particularly to ecological patch models, which have been widely applied
in the field of population biology, and to the Eden model, for which there is “no
known way to make a rigorous mathematical analysis” (Wolfram, 2002, p. 332)
– we would argue that a thorough examination of models of this kind would be
equally valuable. Indeed, the asynchronous scheduling of updates in the NANIA
model could make it a better basis for the representation of real systems than CAs,
as argued by Caron-Lormier et al. (2008, see Section 2.2.4).
Like CAs, a generalised version of the NANIA model could also provide an ideal
“paradigm system” (in the sense outlined by Hogeweg (1988), as discussed in
Section 2.3.4) for the investigation of important concepts in complexity theory, since,
according to San Miguel et al. (2012, p. 250):
“Simple models are essential to uncover the basic mechanisms [of complex
systems] and provide insight into fundamental questions.”
In the spirit of this argument, in this section, we isolate those features of the NANIA
model that could be considered to be fundamental from those that we judge to be
arbitrary and we examine the full family of models that result from relaxing the
assumptions that relate to these arbitrary features. In this way, we aim to create a
general model that may provide insights, not just into the NANIA model itself, but
into a far broader range of systems.
4.4.2 A-models: A fundamental generalisation of the NA-
NIA model
The following features of the NANIA model will be taken as fundamental charac-
teristics, to be used as the basis for a broader family of models. Where appro-
priate, to emphasise the points of connection between these models and CAs, we
employ similar notation to that used in the definition of a CA that was presented in
Section 2.3.1.
• The model is spatially explicit, with a specific, fixed, discrete, finite geography.
In the most general case, this geography may be any specified finite graph G,
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which may be directed or undirected. The vertices of G will be referred to as
“cells”.
• Time is discrete and proceeds in steps of size δt.
• There are m species of individual: ‘S’1 , . . . , ‘S’m (in the NANIA model,
m = 2). At any time t a particular cell C may be empty (C[t] = ‘E’) or
occupied by an individual of a particular species (C[t] = ‘S’i). A cell may not
be occupied by more than one individual. The set C = {‘E’ , ‘S’1 , . . . , ‘S’m}
is called the cell state space of the model.
• At each time step, a cell C(I) is selected at random by means of a discrete
uniform distribution over all the cells. A neighbour C(II) of C(I) is then selected
by means of a discrete uniform distribution over the set of neighbours of C(I).
• Cells C(I) and C(II) are then updated according to some deterministic or
stochastic local transition rule Tlocal, which depends only on the current states
of these two cells:
Tlocal : C2 → C2
(C(I)[t], C(II)[t]) 7→ (C(I)[t+ δt], C(II)[t+ δt])
Note that Tlocal is defined as a transition operating on the states of adjacent pairs of
cells. However, in practice, it will be more convenient to consider a global transition
rule T, which operates on the microstates, mapping from Ω to Ω (recall that Ω is
the state space of the model – the set of all possible microstates – as described in
(4.1)). T encompasses the entire updating process, including the selection of the
cells C(I) and C(II) and the subsequent application of the rule Tlocal. In this way,
Tlocal and T are equivalent to the corresponding local and global transition rules for
CAs described in Definition 2.3.1.
The framework described above represents a generalisation of the NANIA model, in
which the lattice over which the individuals move has been replaced with a general
graph G, the number of species of individual has been generalised from 2 to m and
the transition rule for the chosen cells may take any form. We label this family of
models A (“Fraktur A”).
4.4.3 The range of possible transition rules for A-models
We now examine the range of valid local rules Tlocal. For a model in A, any particular
local transition rule Tlocal may be specified by means of a four-dimensional array of
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parameters, A, representing the probabilities of each possible outcome given any
possible pair of initial states:
A =
{
αXY ZW ∈ B : X, Y, Z,W ∈ C and
∑
Z,W∈C
αXY ZW = 1 , ∀X, Y ∈ C
}
B = [0, 1] (the closed unit interval) for stochastic models and B = {0, 1} for deter-
ministic models. αXY ZW represents the probability that Tlocal transforms a given
pair of cell states (X, Y ) ∈ C2 to the pair (Z,W ) ∈ C2.
Since a given local transition rule Tlocal may transform any of the (m+ 1)
2 possible
ordered pairs of cell states in C2 to any other such pair, then, given a set G, there
are clearly (m + 1)2(m+1)
2
distinct deterministic transition rules that correspond to
models in A.
We may also consider the dimension of the parameter space of the stochastic tran-
sition rules for models in A. In this case, each of the (m+ 1)2 ordered pairs (X, Y )
of cell states in C2 has associated with it (m+ 1)2 parameters αXY ZW , representing
the probabilities that such a pair will be transformed to each of the elements of C2.
However, since these probabilities must sum to one, the number of free parameters
associated with the pair (X, Y ) is actually (m+ 1)2− 1 and these parameters lie on
an [(m+ 1)2 − 1]-simplex embedded in R(m+1)2 .
The complete parameter space is a Cartesian product of (m + 1)2 such
[(m+1)2−1]-simplexes, and therefore has (m+1)2 [(m+ 1)2 − 1] = m(m+2)(m+1)2
free dimensions.
4.4.4 Equivalence of microstates in A-models
In analysing the dynamics of a A-model, it should be noted that certain choices
for the underlying geography (the graph G) may introduce a degree of redundancy
into the way in which microstates of the model are described due to any symme-
tries of the graph. Since the existence of such equivalences between microstates
may significantly reduce the scope of possible model behaviours and will therefore
have consequences for any investigation of the model dynamics, we take the time to
examine such equivalences in detail here.
In this section, unless otherwise stated, we consider A-models with m species and
transition rule T over a finite undirected graph G = (V (G), E(G)), where V (G) and
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E(G) are respectively the vertex set and the edge set of G, defined as:
V (G) = {C0, . . . , Cn−1}
E(G) = {{C,D} ⊆ V (G) : C is adjacent to D}
Also, C and D will be used to represent general cells, and the notation N(C) will
be used to denote the open neighbourhood of the cell C (the set of cells adjacent
to C, excluding C itself), as in Section 4.2.3. The state space of the model will be
represented as Ω = {0, . . . ,m}n, with a specific microstate x = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Ω
defined such that xi = 0 indicates that cell Ci takes state ‘E’, while xi = k > 0
indicates that vertex Ci takes state ‘S’k.
Recall that an automorphism of a graph G is a mapping of the vertex set of G to
itself such that vertex adjacencies are preserved. The following definition, adapted
from Bondy and Murty (1976, pp. 5-7), is a formalised version of this:
Definition 4.4.1. Consider a simple graph G.
• An automorphism φ of G is a permutation of the vertices:
φ : V (G) → V (G)
v 7→ φ(v)
such that:
{v, w} ∈ E(G)⇔ {φ(v), φ(w)} ∈ E(G)
• The automorphism group Γ(G) is the permutation group formed by the set
of all automorphisms of G, with the operation of composition.
Note that, since an automorphism φ is a permutation, it has a well defined inverse
φ−1. Also, for the sake of simplicity, for the remainder of this chapter, an automor-
phism φ of the underlying graph G of a particular A-model is considered to act both
as a permutation of the cells {C0 , . . . , Cn−1 } and as the corresponding permutation
of the integers {0 , . . . , n− 1}, such that:
φ(Ci) = Cj ⇔ φ(i) = j , ∀i, j ∈ {0 , . . . , n− 1}
Once we have identified the automorphisms of G, it will be useful to talk about the
effect of automorphisms on the microstates of the system. The following definition
allows us to do this:
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Definition 4.4.2. Consider a A-model with m species and transition rule T over a
finite graph G with n cells.
Given that φ is a specific automorphism of G, the function φˆ is defined in the fol-
lowing way:
φˆ : Ω → Ω
x 7→ φˆ(x)
where φˆ(x) = (xˆ0, . . . , xˆn−1) with xˆi = xφ−1(i) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Since φ−1 is well defined, the function φˆ−1 is also well defined with:
y = φˆ(x )⇔ x = φˆ−1(y)
Using the above terminology, we now define a binary relation on the state space Ω
of the model:
Definition 4.4.3. Consider a A-model with m species and transition rule T over
a finite graph G with n cells. Consider specific microstates of the system x,y ∈ Ω.
The binary relation ∼ on Ω is defined such that x ∼ y if and only if there exists an
automorphism φ of G such that y = φˆ(x).
Observe that ∼ is clearly an equivalence relation. This follows automatically from
the fact that the automorphisms of G form a group. The existence of an identity
automorphism ensures that ∼ is reflexive, the fact that every automorphism has an
inverse ensures that ∼ is symmetric and the fact that Γ(G) is closed under compo-
sition ensures that ∼ is transitive.
The state space Ω of the model may therefore be partitioned into equivalence
classes, each containing microstates that may be transformed from one to another
by means of graph automorphisms. The equivalence class of a particular microstate
x is denoted [x ] and the set of all equivalence classes of ∼ is denoted Ω/∼ .
The following proposition will have important implications for any analysis of the
dynamics of a A-model:
Proposition 4.4.4. Consider a A-model with m species and transition rule T (con-
sidered here as a stochastic mapping from Ω to Ω) over a finite graph G with n cells.
Suppose that x ∈ Ω is the microstate occupied by the system at any given iteration
and let p(x, [y]) represent the probability that T(x) ∈ [y], where T(x) is a discrete
random variable taking values in Ω, which represents the microstate of the system
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after the application of the transition rule T, and y ∈ Ω is any microstate of the
system. Then, for any x1,x2 ∈ Ω:
[x1] = [x2]⇒ p(x1, [y]) = p(x2, [y])
Proof. For the purposes of this proof only, we extend the notation for an open
neighbourhood N(· ) to act as a function on the set of integers {0 , . . . , n − 1} in
the following way. Letting V (G) = {C0 , . . . , Cn−1}, as usual, we define:
N : {0 , . . . , n− 1} → 2{0 , ... , n−1}
i 7→ { j ∈ {0 , . . . , n− 1} : Cj ∈ N(Ci) }
where 2{0 , ... , n−1} is the power set of {0 , . . . , n − 1} (the set of all subsets of the
integers from 0 to n− 1). Observe that N(· ) maps the index of a given cell to the
set of the indices of that cell’s neighbours.
Now, recall that, for a A-model, the transition rule T selects an initial cell C(I) ac-
cording to a uniform random distribution over V (G) and selects a neighbour C(II) of
C(I) according to a uniform random distribution over N(C(I)). Here, C(I) and C(II)
are treated as random variables taking values in V (G).
The probability p(x , [y ]) may therefore be written as follows:
p(x , [y ])
=
∑
z∈[y ]
n−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈N(i)
P(C(I) = Ci) P(C
(II) = Cj |C(I) = Ci) P(T(x ) = z |C(I) = Ci, C(II) = Cj)
=
1
n
∑
z∈[y ]
n−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈N(i)
1
|N(Ci)|P(T(x ) = z | C
(I) = Ci, C
(II) = Cj)
where P(T(x ) = z | C(I) = Ci, C(II) = Cj) denotes the probability of a transition
from x to z , at any iteration at which the system occupies the microstate x , given
particular realisations of the random variables C(I) = Ci and C
(II) = Cj ∈ N(Ci).
Observe that, owing to the way in which the transition rule is defined and given that
C(I) and C(II) must be adjacent, we have that:
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P(T(x ) = z | C(I) = Ci, C(II) = Cj)
=

0 , if ∃k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} \ {i, j} such that xk 6= zk
f(xi, xj, zi, zj) , otherwise.
The key point here is not the form of the function f but the fact that it depends
only on the four cell states that comprise its arguments. From this expression, given
an automorphism φ of G, we derive the following:
P(T(φˆ(x )) = φˆ(z ) | C(I) = φ(Ci), C(II) = φ(Cj))
=

0 , if ∃k′ ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} \ {φ(i), φ(j)} such that xˆk′ 6= zˆk′
f(xˆφ(i), xˆφ(j), zˆφ(i), zˆφ(j)) , otherwise.
=

0 , if ∃k′ ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} \ {φ(i), φ(j)} such that xφ−1(k′) 6= zφ−1(k′)
f(xi, xj, zi, zj) , otherwise.
=

0 , if ∃k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} \ {i, j} such that xk 6= zk [ with k = φ−1(k′) ]
f(xi, xj, zi, zj) , otherwise.
= P(T(x ) = z | C(I) = Ci , C(II) = Cj)
Now, if [x 1] = [x 2], then ∃φ ∈ Γ(G) such that x 2 = φˆ(x 1). We therefore observe
that:
P(T(x 1) = z | C(I) = Ci, C(II) = Cj)
= P(T(x 2) = φˆ(z ) | C(I) = φ(Ci), C(II) = φ(Cj) )
Also, since φ preserves adjacencies, |N(Ci)| = |N(φ(Ci))| for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Therefore:
p(x 1, [y ])
=
1
n
∑
z ′∈[y ]
n−1∑
i′=0
∑
j′∈N(i′)
1
|N(φ(Ci′))|P(T(x 2) = φˆ(z
′) | C(I) = φ(Ci′), C(II) = φ(Cj′) )
Furthermore, letting i = φ(i′), j = φ(j′) and z = φˆ(z ′) and observing that φˆ
operates as a bijection from [y ] to itself, while φ is both a permutation of V (G) and,
since it preserves adjacencies, may also operate as an bijection from N(φ−1(Ci)) to
110
N(Ci), we may write:
p(x 1, [y ]) =
1
n
∑
z∈[y ]
n−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈N(i)
1
|N(Ci)|P(T(x 2) = z | C
(I) = Ci, C
(II) = Cj )
= p(x 2, [y ])
This proves the proposition.
An important implication of this proposition is that if the cells of a A-model differ
only in their adjacencies and their numbering in such a way that the graph G is in-
distinguishable from φ(G) (the graph whose vertices have been relabelled according
to the action of the automorphism φ), then the dynamics of the model do not de-
pend on the precise microstate occupied by the system at a particular iteration, but
rather on the equivalence class of that microstate with respect to the automorphisms
of G. This is because the probability that a single transition will send the system to
any microstate in a particular equivalence class is the same for all microstates in the
current class. In other words, to understand the dynamics of a A-model it suffices
to monitor these equivalence classes, not the precise microstates occupied by the
system. To all intents and purposes, at all times, the system may be considered to
occupy any convenient microstate in its current class.
This result will be of fundamental importance in Chapter 6, in which we take advan-
tage of the equivalences between microstates to transform the model dynamics into
a new space, in order to better examine the relationship between local transitions
and global behaviour.
4.4.5 Example: Equivalent microstates of a one-dimensional
A-model
As an example of the ideas outlined in the previous section, consider the possible
microstates of a single species (i.e. m = 1) A-model, where the underlying graph
G is a one-dimensional ring of n cells C0, . . . , Cn−1 , where cells whose indices differ
by 1 (mod n) are adjacent, such that each cell has precisely two neighbours. For
reasons of convenience, rather than representing the microstates of the model as vec-
tors, they will be represented as periodic binary sequences c = (ci)i∈Z ∈ {0, 1}Z, with
ci = cn+i , ∀i ∈ Z, where ci = 0 ⇔ Ci mod n = ‘E’ and ci = 1 ⇔ Ci mod n = ‘S’.
Models over rings of cells will be investigated in detail in Chapter 5.
Note that these sequences are indexed by the complete set of integers, rather than
only the non-negative integers as would be usual, and are thus infinite in both the
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positive and negative directions. When discussing periodic sequences of this kind,
the following notation will be used:
Definition 4.4.5. Consider XZ, the set of sequences of elements of a set X indexed
by the set of all integers Z. Given an element v = (vi)i∈Z ∈ XZ, the notation:
v = ( . . . , x0 , x1 , x2 , . . . , xu−1 , . . . )
where x0, . . . , xu−1 ∈ X and u ∈ N, indicates that v is a periodic sequence in XZ of
period u (or of period equal to a factor of u if the terms x1, . . . , xu themselves consist
of a repeating subset of elements), with:
vi = xi mod u , ∀i ∈ Z
In this particular model, the set of all microstates will be denoted by Ωn . We also
let U(c) represent the population of c, the number of occupied cells in the model
or (equivalently) the sum over any n consecutive terms of c.
In the scenario considered here, the automorphisms of G are reflections and transla-
tions of the cells (and combinations of these transformations). Formally then, letting
c1 = (c1,i)i∈Z and c2 = (c2,i)i∈Z, the equivalence relation ∼ for c1, c2 ∈ Ωn may be
written:
c1 ∼ c2 ⇔ ∃a ∈ {−1, 1}, b ∈ Z, such that c2,i = c1,ai+b,∀i ∈ Z (4.7)
The equivalence classes that partition Ωn are sets containing all those microstates
that may be transformed into one another by means of translations and reflections
and which are therefore effectively identical from the point of view of the dynamics
of the system, as demonstrated by Proposition 4.4.4.
However, these equivalence classes will not generally be of the same size. Rather,
given a particular microstate c = (ci)i∈Z ∈ Ωn, the number of microstates in its
class may be determined through consideration of its period P (c), which must be
a factor of n, and its chirality R(c) ∈ {0, 1}, which is equal to zero if and only if
there exists a translation that maps c on to its own reflection4:
4 Note that the binary property described as “chirality” is used here purely to distinguish
between those microstates that are chiral (R(c) = 1) and those that are achiral (R(c) = 0), not
between different versions of a particular chiral microstate, as might otherwise be expected.
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R(c) =

0 , if ∃ b ∈ Z, such that c−i = ci+b, ∀i ∈ Z
1 , otherwise.
(4.8)
Having defined these quantities, observe that the number of distinct microstates in
the equivalence class of c is equal to P (c)[1 +R(c)].
To see this, note that, including c itself, the number of distinct microstates that
may be obtained from c by translation is equal to its period P (c), since any trans-
lation of size b ∈ Z is identical in effect to a translation of size b mod P (c). Fur-
thermore, if R(c) = 0 then a reflection of c is identical in effect to one of these
translations, so the total number of microstates in the relevant equivalence class is
equal to P (c) = P (c)[1 +R(c)]. Alternatively, if R = 1 then each of the microstates
obtained by translation may be reflected to create a distinct microstate in the equiv-
alence class, so the total number of microstates in the class is 2P (c), which is again
equal to P (c)[1 +R(c)].
Figure 4.12 depicts the complete set of 13 equivalence classes for this model with
n = 6, depicted as lines of shaded and unshaded cells. Note that in this case, only
one class (Class VI) contains chiral microstates.
Understanding which microstates of the model are essentially equivalent from the
point of view of the transition rule may allow for the creation of simplified represen-
tations of the model dynamics. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
4.4.6 B-models: An individual-focused subfamily of A
Although the family of models A described in Section 4.4.2 does represent the most
general form of a NANIA-like model, it may be argued that certain key properties of
the model have been lost. The NANIA model was described as an individual-based
model, but A includes models that are not consistent with an individual-based in-
terpretation. For example, a model in the family may involve transitions such as
(‘E’, ‘E’)→ (‘S’1, ‘S’2), in which individuals are spontaneously generated from empty
cells. The family has been generalised to such an extent that it has become discon-
nected from its original status as a framework for individual-based modelling.
We therefore propose some alterations to the family to make it more consistent with
an individual-based interpretation. This approach is in line with that of Conway (see
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Figure 4.12: The 13 equivalence classes of the 64 possible microstates of a one-dimensional
single species A-model on a ring of 6 cells. For any two microstates lying in the same class, there
exists a translation, reflection or combination of these transformations (mod 6) mapping from
one to the other. The microstates making up a given equivalence class are therefore effectively
indistinguishable from the point of view of the dynamics of the model.
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Gardner, 1970, p. 120) and Wolfram (1983, p. 603), who each (initially, at least)
reduced the scope of the CAs that they studied through the introduction of various
restrictions on their behaviour, in order to focus on those models whose behaviour
was of most interest.
Suppose that each species ‘S’i has an associated subset Ci of the cell state space C
and consider the following constraints to the local transition rule Tlocal:
1. If the first cell chosen is empty, then no changes are made.
Tlocal : (‘E’, X)→ (‘E’, X) , ∀X ∈ C
2. Otherwise, if the first cell chosen has state ‘S’i and the second has any state
X ∈ C, then four types of transition are possible.
• No change. Tlocal : (‘S’i, X)→ (‘S’i, X)
• The first cell chosen may change to a state in Ci, while the second cell
remains unchanged. Tlocal : (‘S’i, X)→ (Y,X) , for some Y ∈ Ci
• The second cell chosen may change to a state in Ci, while the first cell
remains unchanged. Tlocal : (‘S’i, X)→ (‘S’i, Y ) , for some Y ∈ Ci
• The two chosen cells may exchange states. Tlocal : (‘S’i, X)→ (X, ‘S’i)
The family of models that fulfil these constraints will be labelled B (“Fraktur
B”), a subfamily of A. Note that the first condition prohibits spontaneous gen-
eration of individuals (this is similar to the first of Wolfram’s restrictions), while the
second states that the only transition in which both the chosen cells may change
their state simultaneously is that in which the cells exchange their states. Among
other things, this latter restriction prohibits situations of mutual annihilation, where
Tlocal : (‘S’i, ‘S’j)→ (‘E’, ‘E’).
One reason for imposing these particular constraints is that they enhance the
individual-based interpretation of the model. The permitted transitions may all
be interpreted as actions taken by the individual occupying the first cell to be cho-
sen (with empty cells unable to take actions). An individual may: take no action,
transform its own state, transform the state of a neighbour, or switch places with a
neighbour.
For many model interpretations, including the predator-prey interpretation of the
NANIA model, it may also be sensible to include the following additional constraint:
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• No Metamorphosis Condition:
Ci ⊆ {‘E’, ‘S’i} , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
The No Metamorphosis Condition ensures that transitions do not create individuals
of a species that is not already represented in the two chosen cells.
At first glance, it might appear that the NANIA model is not a true B-model,
because individual movement (as defined in the NANIA model) is not a valid tran-
sition in this family, since it occurs only when the first cell selected is empty (see
Section 4.2). However, it can be shown that the NANIA model is equivalent to a
model in B in a certain sense (the nature of this equivalence will be qualified in
a moment), provided that it is run on a toroidal lattice (or indeed on any regular
graph G) rather than a square one.
Consider the stochastic local transition rule Ulocal for a two species model (where
species 1 and 2 represent rabbits and foxes respectively) defined by the transition
probabilities given in Table 4.2 (where κ, ς, τ ∈ [0, 1] are the parameters of the
NANIA model, as defined in Section 4.2).
Possible transitions
Initial pair Final pair Probability Interpretation
(‘S’1, ‘E’)
(‘S’1, ‘S’1) κ/2 rabbit reproduces
(‘E’, ‘S’1) 1/2 rabbit moves
unchanged otherwise no action
(‘S’2, ‘E’)
(‘E’, ‘E’) τ/2 fox dies
(‘E’, ‘S’2) 1/2 fox moves
unchanged otherwise no action
(‘S’2, ‘S’1)
(‘S’2, ‘E’) (1− ς)/2 fox eats rabbit
(‘S’2, ‘S’2) ς/2 fox eats rabbit and reproduces
unchanged otherwise no action
(‘S’2, ‘S’2)
(‘E’, ‘S’2) τ/2 fox dies
unchanged otherwise no action
other unchanged 1 no action
Table 4.2: Description of the local transition rule Ulocal, which produces a
B-model whose behaviour is effectively equivalent to that of the NANIA model.
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Firstly, we observe that Ulocal satisfies both the conditions required to define a
B-model and the No Metamorphosis Condition. Secondly, for such a model run over
a toroidal lattice, it may be shown (as discussed below) that given this rule, the prob-
ability of any particular transition occurring at a given iteration (for example that a
particular pair of neighbouring cells undergoes the transition (‘S’1, ‘E’)→ (‘S’1, ‘S’1):
rabbit reproduction) is precisely half the probability of the same transition occurring
in the NANIA model. The ‘spare probability’ that results from this model transfor-
mation is all allocated to the outcome that the system remains unchanged.
This means that the B-model over a toroidal lattice defined by the local transition
rule Ulocal has the same dynamics as the NANIA model, but these dynamics progress
at half the speed. This model will be referred to as the B-NANIA model.
To justify the claim about the relationship between the two models, first observe
that the rules of the B-NANIA model are identical to those of the original NANIA
model, but with the relevant probabilities halved, for all transitions except those re-
lating to individual movement. In the original NANIA model, individual movement
occurred automatically if the first cell selected was empty and the second contained
an individual. In the B-NANIA model, movement occurs with probability 1/2 when
the first cell selected is an individual and the second is empty.
Observe that, provided that the graph over which the model is run is regular (such
as a toroidal rectangular lattice), in both the NANIA model and the B-NANIA
model the probability of selecting a particular cell followed by a particular one of its
neighbours, is the same as the probability of picking the same two cells but in the
opposite order. Call this probability p.
In the NANIA model, given a particular microstate, the probability that a particular
individual will move into a particular empty neighbouring cell is equal to p; the
probability of picking the empty cell followed by the cell occupied by the individual
in question. In the B-NANIA model, given the same microstate, the probability of
the same event happening is equal to p/2; the probability of picking the cell occupied
by the individual followed by the empty cell multiplied by 1/2 (the probability of
movement in Ulocal). This demonstrates the claim.
4.4.7 The range of possible transition rules for B-models
We now examine the range of valid local rules Tlocal for B-models. Counting the
number of distinct deterministic transition rules and determining the dimension
of the parameter space of the possible stochastic transition rules for an m-species
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B-model is less straightforward than counting the valid transition rules in A.
Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of the possible transitions.
Initial pair: Number of possible transitions: Number of
First cell Second cell General case No Metamorphosis such pairs
‘E’ any 1 1 m+ 1
‘S’i ‘E’ 2m+ 2 4 m
‘S’i ‘S’i 2m+ 1 3 m
‘S’i ‘S’j (for j 6= i) 2m+ 2 5 m(m− 1)
Table 4.3: Summary of the valid local transitions in a B-model,
with and without the No Metamorphosis Condition.
Consider the second line of the table. It states that, given a B-model with m
species, for each of the m possible initial pairs of the form (‘S’i, ‘E’), there are 2m+2
possible transitions consistent with the constraints of B, of which 4 also fulfil the
No Metamorphosis condition.
From the table we deduce that there are:
(2m+ 2)m(2m+ 1)m(2m+ 2)m(m−1) = [2m(m+ 1)m(2m+ 1)]m
possible deterministic transition rules that satisfy the conditions of B, of which:
4m 3m 5m(m−1) =
[
12× 5(m−1)]m
also satisfy the No Metamorphosis condition.
We may also deduce that the dimension of the parameter space of stochastic tran-
sition rules for B-models is:
m(2m+ 1) +m(2m) +m(m− 1)(2m+ 1) = m2[2m+ 3] ,
while the dimension of the parameter space of those rules that also satisfy the
No Metamorphosis condition is:
3m+ 2m+ 4m(m− 1) = m[4m+ 1] .
As in the case of A-models, the parameter space is a Cartesian product of simplexes,
although in this case, these simplexes do not all have the same dimension.
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Combining these observations with those of Section 4.4.3, we observe that the di-
mension of the parameter space of stochastic transition rules increases like m4 for
A-models, like m3 for B-models and like m2 for B-models that satisfy the No Meta-
morphosis condition. This reduction in the order of magnitude of the rule space will
facilitate a thorough investigation of possible model behaviours in Chapter 5.
4.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced the NANIA model, a predator-prey IBM that
is closely related to the ecological patch models discussed in Section 3.3.3. Through
consideration of the NANIA model as a stochastic process, we have examined its
long term dynamics, identifying two absorbing microstates to which the model is
ultimately guaranteed to evolve. However, we have also observed that, for certain
values of the model parameters, the expected time required to reach these absorbing
states may be so large that, over all practical time scales, the system could instead
be considered to display a form of quasi-stable coexistence between its two species.
Mean field theory suggests that this quasi-stable behaviour may be similar to that
predicted by a form of the Lotka-Volterra equations (see Section 3.3.2), in which
the prey species exhibits logistic (rather than exponential) growth in the absence
of predators. However, while simulations do appear to exhibit behaviour similar
to the coupled population cycles characteristic of the Lotka-Volterra equations (see
Figure 4.5) further work would be required to determine the extent to which the
true model dynamics actually correspond to the mean field equations.
It has been observed that the NANIA model is merely one example of a much
broader range of possible discrete space-time stochastic models that could be spec-
ified. We have defined the most general family of such models, labelled as class
A, before refining this definition to focus on a subclass containing only those mod-
els that are consistent with an individual-based interpretation, labelled as class B.
We have also considered equivalences between the microstates of these models, and
identified the range of possible transition rules that could be applied in such settings.
In Chapter 5, we will build on these concepts, investigating the relationship be-
tween the predictions of mean field theory and the dynamics of a certain family of
B-models, through the performance and analysis of a large number of simulation
experiments. This empirical work will then pave the way for a more theoretical
analysis of the connections between local interactions and global behaviours in such
models in Chapter 6, in line with the research objectives set out in Section 1.5.
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Chapter 5
Categorisation and initial analysis
of the different behavioural
regimes of the one-dimensional,
single species B-model
5.1 Introduction
Having defined B-models in Chapter 4, we now attempt to understand their be-
haviour. In this chapter, as an initial investigation, we take the same approach as
Wolfram (2002) in his investigation of elementary CAs. Specifically, we undertake
a thorough exploration of the parameter space of the valid transition rules in B,
perform simulations for different parameter sets, visualise the results and attempt
to classify the different behavioural types that we observe.
Unfortunately, for models with even a relatively small number of species, the high
dimension of the parameter space (see Section 4.4.7) makes a systematic examina-
tion of the behaviour of the entire family of models impossible. Also, the dynamics
of models over geographies of dimension greater than one (such as two-dimensional
square lattices) is difficult to visualise in two-dimensions in a comprehensive way.
For these reasons, once again in line with the approach of Wolfram, we focus our
analysis on the simplest case, that of models with only one species over a one-
dimensional ring of cells (though the results presented in Sections 5.2.1-5.2.2 are
valid for single species B-models over any geography). A description of models over
rings of cells, together with an explanation of some key notation, can be found in
Section 4.4.5.
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The main focus of our analysis is a comparison between the population dynamics
observed in the simulations and that which is predicted by mean field theory. The
results of this analysis will then lead into a more in-depth investigation of the links
between local transitions and global dynamics in Chapter 6.
5.2 Single species B-models
5.2.1 Summary of possible model transitions
Table 5.1 summarises all possible transitions of a B-model with only one species ‘S’
(recall that the state ‘E’ represents an empty cell).
Initial pair Final pair Probability Interpretation Population change
(‘S’, ‘E’)
(‘E’, ‘E’) α individual dies −1
(‘E’, ‘S’) β individual moves 0
(‘S’, ‘S’) γ individual reproduces +1
unchanged otherwise no action 0
(‘S’, ‘S’)
(‘E’, ‘S’)  individual dies −1
(‘S’, ‘E’) ζ individual eats neighbour −1
unchanged otherwise no action 0
other unchanged 1 no action 0
Table 5.1: All possible local transitions for a single species B-model and
their effects on total population.
From the table, we see that the general B-model over a given graph G is fully defined
by the five-dimensional parameter vector (α, β, γ, , ζ) ∈ [0, 1]5, with the constraints
α + β + γ ≤ 1 and  + ζ ≤ 1. Observe that this is consistent with the results of
Section 4.4.7 on the number of free parameters in a B-model.
Recall that if the geography of a particular model is an undirected regular graph,
then the probability of selecting any particular cell followed by a particular neigh-
bour of that cell is identical to the probability of selecting the same two cells in the
opposite order. Therefore, in such models, the transitions (‘S’, ‘S’) → (‘E’, ‘S’) and
(‘S’, ‘S’) → (‘S’, ‘E’) are equivalent and the behaviour of the model depends on the
parameters  and ζ only through their sum  + ζ. In such cases, the dimension of
the parameter set is therefore reduced to four.
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Since, in this chapter, we will only consider models over regular graphs, without
loss of generality we may replace the parameters  and ζ with the single parameter
η = +ζ. Also, for the sake of simplicity, the different types of transition will hence-
forth be referred to by their corresponding Greek letter (α-transitions, η-transitions,
etc.).
5.2.2 Mean field analysis
Applying the mean field analysis of Section 3.2 to the general one species B-model
(in the same fashion as was demonstrated in Section 4.3.4) yields the following
differential equation for the population density u ∈ [0, 1] of the individuals:
u˙ = (γ − α)u− (γ − α + η)u2 (5.1)
This is an equation of logistic growth (see, for example, Strogatz, 1994, pp. 22-24).
Recall from Section 4.3.4 that the independence assumption necessary for the deriva-
tion of (5.1) requires that the numbers of cells in each state, un and (1− u)n (and
also, by implication, the number of cells itself, n), are sufficiently large. Therefore,
whether or not it is valid to neglect spatial correlations, as is implicit in the mean
field approach, we would not expect the equation to provide a good representation of
the behaviour of the model for situations where the population is close to extinction
or where the underlying graph is too small.
The first thing to notice about equation (5.1) is that the parameter β, which gov-
erns the rate of movement of the individuals, does not appear. This is because the
mean field approach only takes account of processes that affect the total population
density. The consequence of this is that the mean field equation supposes that indi-
vidual movement has no impact on the way in which the population density changes
over time.
Secondly, note that the equation depends on the parameters α and γ only through
the difference γ − α. However, unlike the observation regarding dependence on 
and ζ through the sum  + ζ, which is an intrinsic property of any B-model over
a regular graph (see Section 5.2.1), this observation on the influence of α and γ is
only a property of the mean field equation and not of the underlying model.
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Figure 5.1: Bifurcation diagram showing the stable equilibria (continuous line) and
unstable equilibria (dotted line) of equation (5.1) as the parameter expression (γ − α)/η
varies, for η 6= 0. The equilibria are u∗0 = 0 (red) and u∗1 = (γ − α)/(γ − α + η) (blue).
Note that the density u lies in [0, 1], while (γ − α)/η may take any real value. There is
a constrained transcritical bifurcation at u = 0 when γ = α.
Assuming for the moment that γ − α + η 6= 0, the dynamical system defined by
equation (5.1) has two potential equilibria:
u∗0 = 0 (5.2)
u∗1 =
γ − α
γ − α + η (5.3)
The stability of these equilibria may be analysed by means of a simple local lineari-
sation of the system (see Strogatz, 1994, pp. 24-26), considering the derivative of u˙
with respect to u and evaluating it at each of the fixed points, as follows:
∂u˙
∂u
∣∣∣∣
u=0
= γ − α
∂u˙
∂u
∣∣∣∣
u=u∗1
= α− γ
A negative value of ∂u˙/∂u indicates a stable equilibrium, while a positive value
indicates an unstable equilibrium. Therefore, when γ > α, 0 is a repellor and u∗1 is
an attractor. When γ < α, 0 is an attractor, but u∗1 does not exist since it does not
lie in the range [0, 1] in this case.
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Figure 5.2: Parameter space diagram for equation (5.1). Any point (γ − α, η) in
[−1, 1] × [0, 1] represents a valid choice of parameters. The space is divided into six
regions:
• Region A. γ − α ∈ (0, 1] : 0 a repellor ; u∗1 ∈ (0, 1] an attractor.
• Region B. γ − α = 0 , η ∈ (0, 1] : 0 = u∗1 an attractor.
• Region C. γ − α < 0 , γ − α+ η > 0 : 0 an attractor ; u∗1 /∈ [0, 1].
• Region D. γ − α < 0 , γ − α+ η = 0 : 0 a linear attractor ; u∗1 undefined.
• Region E. γ − α < 0 , γ − α+ η < 0 : 0 an attractor ; u∗1 /∈ [0, 1].
• Region F. γ − α = η = 0 : u˙ = 0 in all cases.
There is therefore a constrained transcritical bifurcation at γ = α, where the two
equilibria exchange their stability. The term “constrained” here is used to indicate
that one of the equilibria (u∗1) only defines a valid population density on one side of
the bifurcation point, so effectively does not exist in its unstable form.
Substituting γ − α = 0 into (5.1) gives the equation u˙ = −ηu2 and we can see that,
in this case, the single equilibrium at u = 0 is stable from above and therefore is an
attractor, since negative densities are impossible.
A bifurcation diagram for the case when η 6= 0 is presented in Figure 5.1.
If γ 6= α and γ − α + η = 0, then equation (5.1) degenerates to the linear form
u˙ = (γ − α)u and the only equilibrium is a linear attractor at u = 0. Finally, if
γ = α and η = 0, then equation (5.1) degenerates to form u˙ = 0 and the density is
constant.
These results are summarised in Figure 5.2.
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5.2.3 Discussion of the mean field equation
At this stage, it should be noted that in the cases in which mean field theory predicts
the existence of an attracting fixed point u∗1 ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. γ > α and η > 0), if α > 0
then the population dynamics of a single species B-model over any finite graph
cannot possibly be well-represented by equation (5.1) over very long periods, even
allowing for stochastic noise. The reasons for this are the same as those discussed
in Section 4.3.3 in relation to the basic NANIA model and its relationship to the
Lotka-Volterra equations.
Like the NANIA model, a single species B-model can be considered a time homo-
geneous Markov chain (see Sections 2.4 and 4.3), where extinction is an absorbing
microstate owing to the constraint of B-models that prohibits the spontaneous gen-
eration of individuals. When α > 0 and η > 0, it is clear that all microstates
communicate with the extinction microstate, since a series of consecutive α and
η-transitions can destroy any continuous block of occupied cells. All microstates
except extinction are therefore transient, since for any such microstate, the prob-
ability of reaching extinction before returning to the current microstate is strictly
positive. Since, for a B-model over a finite graph, there are a finite number of possi-
ble microstates, any such model will eventually reach the extinction microstate with
probability 1, and u∗1 therefore cannot be considered a stable equilibrium.
However, as with our discussion of the NANIA model in Section 4.3.3, for certain
models and initial conditions, sequences of transitions that would lead the system to
extinction may occur with such low probability that the expected time to extinction
is so large as to be irrelevant for all practical purposes. In such situations, it may
therefore be meaningful to talk about situations of convergence to a quasi-stable
positive equilibrium density (up to stochastic noise), which may or may not match
that predicted by the mean field equation.1 In discussing the results of the simu-
lation experiments of Section 5.3, when we talk about the long term persistence of
populations, it this quasi-stability that is meant. Further discussion of the concept
of quasi-stable equilibrium, in the context of ecological patch models, may be found
in McKane and Newman (2004).
As noted in the previous section, the mean field equation (5.1) predicts that indi-
vidual movement, as represented by the parameter β, has no effect on the dynamics
of the population density. However, this is clearly not a realistic expectation.
1 See Figure 5.16 for an example of a B-model in which, strictly speaking, extinction is in-
evitable in the long term, (since α, η > 0), but which nonetheless maintains a population density
far from zero over all practically relevant time intervals.
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The derivation of the mean field equation supposes that, at any given iteration,
individuals are “uniformly” distributed throughout the system (in the sense that
they appear to be distributed according to a simple random sample of the cells). In
reality, since all the processes in the model only effect local changes, there will exist
considerable dependencies between the states of adjacent cells. We may hypothesise
however that higher amounts of individual movement (higher values of β) will lead
to increased dispersal of individuals and therefore a better correspondence between
the results of simulations and the behaviour predicted by the mean field equation.
The results of the simulation experiments described in Section 5.3 will be used to
examine this hypothesis.
5.3 Simulation experiments
5.3.1 Aims
We now describe a set of simulation experiments, whose aims are to understand the
full range of possible dynamical behaviours of the single species B-model and to de-
termine to what extent and under what conditions the mean field equation derived
in Section 5.2.2 provides a good representation of the model dynamics. To achieve
this we must observe the results of simulations of the model for a wide variety of
parameters.
As discussed in Section 5.1, we consider the simplest possible geography G for the
model, a one-dimensional line of n cells, C0 , . . . , Cn−1, whose opposite ends are
connected to form a ring (see Section 4.4.5 for further details of models defined on
rings of cells and related notation). Note that this is a regular graph of degree 2, so
the observation that  and ζ-transitions may be considered equivalent and combined
as η-transitions (taking η = + ζ) will be applied (see Section 5.2.1).
5.3.2 Choosing the model parameters
In order to fully understand the behaviour of the model, it is necessary to perform
simulations with sets of parameters (α, β, γ, η) that explore the full extent of the
parameter space. However, the number of parameter sets that must be considered
may be substantially reduced by means of the following observation.
Given a regular graph G of degree k with n cells, consider the probability that a
particular cell in state ‘S’ and a particular adjacent cell in state ‘E’ undergo the tran-
sition (‘S’, ‘E’)→ (‘E’, ‘E’) in a single iteration. This probability is equal to α/(nk)
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(the probability that the first cell is chosen 1/n, multiplied by the probability that
the neighbour is chosen 1/k, multiplied by the probability of the given transition α).
Assuming that η 6= 0, this probability may be written as [η/(nk)][α/η]. In a similar
way, the probabilities of particular β, γ and η-transitions may respectively be writ-
ten as [η/(nk)][β/η], [η/(nk)][γ/η] and [η/(nk)].
In this way, we see that, if η > 0, the behaviour of the model is fully determined by
the three-dimensional parameter vector (α∗, β∗, γ∗) = η−1(α, β, γ) ∈ [0,∞)3 and a
rate parameter θ = η/(nk). Note particularly that θ does not affect the character of
the dynamics (since, for any particular microstate, changing θ while holding α∗, β∗
and γ∗ constant does not affect the relative probabilities of α, β, γ and η-transitions),
but only the rate at which these dynamics progress.
To understand the character of the dynamics of a single species B-model on a
particular regular graph, it therefore suffices to explore the three-dimensional pa-
rameter space of (α∗, β∗, γ∗) ∈ [0,∞)3 and the three-dimensional parameter space
of (α, β, γ) ∈ [0, 1]3 for the special case when η = 0.
5.3.3 Method
Setting the number of cells n = 1000, simulations were performed of a single species
B-model on a ring of cells for all parameter vectors in the following two sets:
P1 = {(α, β, γ, , ζ) ∈ [0, 1]5 : α, β, γ ∈ P †1 , , ζ = 0}
P2 = {(α, β, γ, , ζ) ∈ [0, 1]5 : α, β, γ ∈ P †2 ,  = 0.08, ζ = 0}
where:
P †1 = {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25}
P †2 = {0, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.16, 0.24, 0.32}
Using the notation of Section 5.3.2, P1 represents the case η = 0, while P2 represents
the case η 6= 0 and corresponds to the set:
{(α∗, β∗, γ∗) : α∗, β∗, γ∗ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 2, 3, 4}}
These values of the parameters were chosen to ensure the consideration of scenarios
in which α, β and γ may be several times greater than η, several times smaller than
η or equal to η.
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Ten simulations of 1.6 million iterations were performed for each set of parameters.
The initial conditions for each simulation were randomly generated, with each cell
independently allocated the state ‘E’ or ‘S’, with equal probability. The complete
state of the model was recorded every 3200 iterations, such that ten sets of 501
states (including the initial conditions), ωi,0 , . . . , ωi,500 , for i ∈ {1 , . . . , 10}, were
recorded for each set of parameter values.
For each state ωij , the corresponding population density is denoted uij , while u¯j and
s¯2j respectively represent the observed mean and variance of the population density,
calculated over the ten independent simulations performed for each set of parameter
values:
u¯j =
1
10
10∑
i=1
uij (5.4)
s¯2j =
1
10
10∑
i=1
(uij − u¯j)2 (5.5)
To examine the behaviour of the 7280 simulations, each was plotted with space on
the horizontal axis and time on the vertical axis, with occupied cells at each it-
eration coloured black and unoccupied cells left blank, such that all 501 recorded
states of each simulation were displayed in a vertical stack. This method allows for
the complete evolution of the system’s behaviour over a particular simulation to be
visualised in a single plot.2
Some examples of the behaviour plots can be seen in Figures 5.3-5.16. The ex-
amples presented in the figures have been specifically chosen to represent and ex-
plain the various distinct types of observed model behaviour, as will be discussed in
Sections 5.3.4-5.3.5.
For each of the 728 sets of parameters under consideration, the dynamics of the
mean population density u¯j , calculated over the ten independent simulations, were
also plotted against time. Where the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2 predicts
the existence of a unique stable equilibrium population density, this was included on
the plots in order to compare the observed dynamics with these theoretical equilibria.
Examples of these plots can be seen in Figures 5.17-5.22. Here, the examples pre-
sented in the Figures have been chosen both to represent a broad range of different
2 This approach is the same as that used by Wolfram (2002) for the visualisation of elementary
CAs. However, in Wolfram’s figures, time proceeds in a downward rather than a upward direction.
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model behaviours and to demonstrate the effect of varying a particular parameter
(or pair of parameters), while others are held constant. These plots are discussed in
more detail in Section 5.3.7.
5.3.4 Results for η = 0
Initially, consider the simulations where η = 0. Note that in these cases, all dynam-
ical activity must occur on the boundaries between regions of occupied and empty
cells (since η-transitions are the only transitions that can occur when both the se-
lected cells are occupied). Continuous blocks of occupied cells remain occupied until
affected by behaviour on their boundary, in the same way that blocks of empty cells
behave for all values of the parameters (owing to the condition of B family models
that prohibits the spontaneous generation of individuals).
Simulations for which α = γ = η = 0 display special behaviour, since the global
population density is conserved in these cases. If β is also equal to 0, there are no
dynamics at all and every iteration reproduces the initial conditions exactly. For
the random uniform initial conditions used here, this results in ‘barcode’ style sim-
ulations (See Figure 5.3). For higher values of β, individual movement results in an
increasing degree of scrambling of the initial conditions, though areas of higher and
lower density in the initial conditions may persist for long periods (See Figure 5.4).
If at least one of α and γ is non-zero, only three possible behaviours may occur and
a very simple rule relates these behaviours to the parameters.
If α > γ, then the death rate is greater than the rate of reproduction on the bound-
aries between blocks of occupied and empty cells, leading to the shrinking of the
blocks of occupied cells, and the system reaches an equilibrium in which all cells are
empty (Figure 5.5).
If α < γ, the opposite behaviour occurs and the system reaches an equilibrium in
which all cells are occupied (Figure 5.6).
If α = γ, then the death rate and the birth rate are perfectly balanced and blocks of
occupied and unoccupied cells tend to be preserved, though their boundaries mean-
der randomly (if β = 0 and if iterations in which no movement occurs are neglected,
this movement is an unbiased random walk), leading to the occasional merging of
blocks, producing a pattern resembling zebra-stripes (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.3: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0, β = 0, γ = 0,  = 0, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
Figure 5.4: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0, β = 0.25, γ = 0,  = 0, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
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Figure 5.5: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.25, β = 0, γ = 0.2,  = 0, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
Figure 5.6: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring of
1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.05, β = 0.05, γ = 0.1,  = 0, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
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Figure 5.7: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.2, β = 0, γ = 0.2,  = 0, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
Figure 5.8: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring of
1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.2, β = 0.25, γ = 0.2,  = 0, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
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Higher values of β result in a ‘feathering’ effect of the boundaries between occupied
and unoccupied cells, but do not have any significant effect on the long-term dynam-
ics of the system (Figure 5.8). If scenarios with β  α, γ were considered, we would
expect more thorough mixing, but we would not expect any fundamental changes
to the behaviour of the system, owing to the simplicity of the processes involved.
5.3.5 Results for η 6= 0
The behaviour of the model in scenarios where η 6= 0 is considerably more complex
to categorise and understand than the behaviour of the model when η = 0. Note
that a summary of the results presented in this section is provided in Figure 5.23,
in the form of four parameter space diagrams (see Section 5.3.8).
Setting aside the special cases where γ = α = 0, in which the system rapidly degener-
ates to a collection of persistent isolated cells, which may be immobile and invariant
if β = 0 (Figure 5.9)3 or mobile and decreasing in number owing to collisions and η-
transitions if β > 0 (Figure 5.10), a continuum of behavioural types can be identified.
First, there are sets of parameters for which the individuals go extinct fairly rapidly,
where α and η-transitions cause clusters of individuals to decay to nothing before
any complex persistent structures can be formed. An example of this behaviour can
be seen in Figure 5.11.
When the chosen parameters are slightly more favourable for individual survival,
simulations may be observed in which small clusters of individuals persist for longer
periods, perhaps enjoying brief periods of growth, before ultimately dying out (see
Figure 5.12).
For still more favourable parameter sets, such clusters become larger and more nu-
merous, some surviving the full 1.6 million iterations of a simulation, although the
isolated nature of the clusters and the observed extinction of similar clusters at ear-
lier iterations suggests that they will not persist in the long term (see Figure 5.13).
As the parameters become ever more conducive to survival, the gaps between such
clusters become smaller and frequent incidences of cluster merging are observed,
such that it is no longer clear whether the population will persist or become extinct
in the long term (see Figure 5.14).
3 Note that the behaviour depicted in Figure 5.9 is not the same as that seen in Figure 5.3. In
Figure 5.9, the system converges rapidly to a state in which no pair of adjacent cells are occupied,
then remains unchanged, whereas in Figure 5.9 there is no change at any iteration.
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Figure 5.9: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0, β = 0, γ = 0,  = 0.08, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
Figure 5.10: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0, β = 0.32, γ = 0,  = 0.08, ζ = 0. The
initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a probability
of 0.5.
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Figure 5.11: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.08, β = 0.06, γ = 0.06,  = 0.08,
ζ = 0. The initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a
probability of 0.5.
Figure 5.12: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.02, β = 0.08, γ = 0.06,  = 0.08,
ζ = 0. The initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a
probability of 0.5.
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Figure 5.13: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.16, β = 0.32, γ = 0.32,  = 0.08,
ζ = 0. The initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a
probability of 0.5.
Figure 5.14: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.06, β = 0.32, γ = 0.16,  = 0.08,
ζ = 0. The initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a
probability of 0.5.
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Figure 5.15: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.06, β = 0.02, γ = 0.24,  = 0.08,
ζ = 0. The initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a
probability of 0.5.
Figure 5.16: 1.6 million iterations of a one-dimensional, one species B-model on a ring
of 1000 cells, with the following parameters: α = 0.08, β = 0.32, γ = 0.32,  = 0.08,
ζ = 0. The initial conditions were generated by setting each cell to be occupied with a
probability of 0.5.
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Ultimately, for parameter sets weighted heavily in favour of individual survival,
rather than systems of separate clusters, simulations begin to resemble a continuous
mass of individuals punctuated by characteristic vertical holes, which may display a
loose ‘tear drop’ shape, wider at the base (earlier iterations) and tapering towards
the top (later iterations) (see Figure 5.15).
In cases where individuals are most prolific, holes are filled rapidly and these verti-
cal ‘tear drop’ shapes are not observed. In these cases, the visualisations resemble a
dense ‘sponge’ of individuals (see Figure 5.16).
The link between these behaviours and the values of the model parameters will be
explored in the remainder of this chapter.
5.3.6 Comparisons with Wolfram’s work on CAs
Before presenting a synthesis of the results of Section 5.3.5, we briefly consider the
similarities between the model visualisations of Figures 5.3-5.16 and the many visual-
isations of CAs presented by Wolfram in A New Kind of Science (2002), particularly
those in Chapter 6 (pp. 223-296), in which he investigates the behaviour of CAs
with random initial conditions, which represents the closest analogue of the work
presented here.
In Figures 5.3-5.16, we can observe behaviour that is visually similar to that which
characterises of each of Wolfram’s four classes of CA (see Section 2.3.3):
• Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.11 display class 1 behaviour (convergence to a uniform
equilibrium);
• Figures 5.3, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 display behaviour resembling that of class 2
CAs (persistent, simple discrete structures);
• Figures 5.4, 5.15 and 5.16 appear to display class 3 behaviour (apparently
random spatial patterns), with the ‘tear drop’ shaped holes of 5.15 being anal-
ogous to the triangular structures seen in many class 3 CAs (see, for example,
Wolfram, 2002, p. 262);
• Figures 5.13 and 5.14 display behaviour resembling that of certain class 4
CAs (complex interacting structures) (see, particularly, Wolfram, 2002, p. 236,
p. 282).
The remaining model, visualised in Figure 5.12, strictly exhibits class 1 behaviour,
although the dynamics are visually similar to those of certain class 4 systems (see,
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for example, the continuous CA labelled “{0.5, 1.13}”, Wolfram, 2002, p. 244).
While Wolfram’s four classes are largely intended to apply to simple deterministic
systems, rather than stochastic models like those in family B, the above observa-
tions are of interest for the following reasons.
Wolfram describes class 4 systems as lying at the boundary between the
trivial ordered behaviour of classes 1 and 2 and the random behaviour of class 3
(pp. 240-242). In the same way, the simulations visualised in Figures 5.13 and 5.14 ,
which display behaviour resembling that of certain class 4 CAs, lie on the boundary
between simulations that rapidly reach extinction, such as that of Figure 5.11, and
those exhibiting dense, apparently random behaviour, such as that of Figure 5.16.
In both the case of Wolfram’s deterministic models and in that of these stochastic
models, the key feature at this boundary appears to be the ability of the underly-
ing local rules to produce some form of global structure, be it through the complex
interacting forms of Wolfram’s deterministic systems or the simpler spatial clusters
of our stochastic models.
Attempting to understand the mechanisms that connect local transitions and global
spatial structure will be the principal aim of Chapter 6.
5.3.7 Population density dynamics
In addition to examining the ‘complete’ visualisations of the model behaviour
provided in Figures 5.3-5.16, we can also plot the dynamics of the observed
population density and visually compare these against the predicted mean field
equilibria (similar approaches are taken by Wolfram (1983, pp. 614-615),
McKane and Newman (2004) and Huet and Deffuant (2008)). Recall that u¯j de-
notes the observed population density at the 3200j th iteration, averaged over ten
independent simulations (see (5.4)).
For the simulations with η = 0, the simple behavioural types identified in Sec-
tion 5.3.4 may also be observed in these density dynamics plots. For example,
Figure 5.17 displays the change in the dynamics as the value of γ − α decreases
from a positive value (0.2) through 0 to a negative value (−0.2), when η = 0, for a
particular value of β. The plots in this figure clearly illustrate the exchange of sta-
bility of the stationary points u∗0 = 0 and u
∗
1 = 1 at the bifurcation value γ −α = 0,
leading to the three possible behaviours previously identified: convergence to 1 when
γ − α > 0, convergence to 0 when γ − α < 0 and no convergence when α = γ, with
the density subject only to random drift in this last case.
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Figure 5.17: The dynamics of the population density over 1.6 million iterations of a
one-dimensional single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells. The plotted value u¯j is
the mean density calculated over ten independent runs, using data from the simulation
experiments described in Section 5.3.3, for various values of the parameters α and γ, with
β = 0.25,  = 0, ζ = 0. Mean densities are plotted at intervals of 3200 iterations, with
the grey region covering the range from the minimum to the maximum density observed
across the ten runs. The dashed pink line denotes the unique stable equilibrium of the
dynamics predicted by the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2, where it exists. In the
third plot, mean field theory predicts that any initial density should be invariant, hence
no unique stable equilibrium is displayed in this case.
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Figure 5.18: The dynamics of the population density over 1.6 million iterations of
a one-dimensional single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells. The plotted value
u¯j is the mean density calculated over ten independent runs, using data from the simu-
lation experiments described in Section 5.3.3, for various values of the parameter β, with
α = 0.1, γ = 0.1,  = 0, ζ = 0. Mean densities are plotted at intervals of 3200 iterations,
with the grey region covering the range from the minimum to the maximum density ob-
served across the ten runs. In all these plots, mean field theory predicts that any initial
density should be invariant, hence no unique stable equilibria are displayed.
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Figure 5.19: The dynamics of the population density over 1.6 million iterations of
a one-dimensional single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells. The plotted value
u¯j is the mean density calculated over ten independent runs, using data from the simu-
lation experiments described in Section 5.3.3, for various values of the parameter β, with
α = 0.04, γ = 0.16,  = 0.08, ζ = 0. Mean densities are plotted at intervals of 3200 itera-
tions, with the grey region covering the range from the minimum to the maximum density
observed across the ten runs. The dashed pink line denotes the unique stable equilibrium
of the dynamics (u∗1 = 0.6) predicted by the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2.
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Figure 5.20: The dynamics of the population density over 1.6 million iterations of
a one-dimensional single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells. The plotted value
u¯j is the mean density calculated over ten independent runs, using data from the simu-
lation experiments described in Section 5.3.3, for various values of the parameter γ, with
α = 0.02, β = 0.32,  = 0.08, ζ = 0. Mean densities are plotted at intervals of 3200
iterations, with the grey region covering the range from the minimum to the maximum
density observed across the ten runs. The dashed pink line denotes the unique stable
equilibrium of the dynamics predicted by the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2.
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Figure 5.21: The dynamics of the population density over 1.6 million iterations of
a one-dimensional single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells. The plotted value
u¯j is the mean density calculated over ten independent runs, using data from the simu-
lation experiments described in Section 5.3.3, for various values of the parameter α, with
β = 0.32, γ = 0.32,  = 0.08, ζ = 0. Mean densities are plotted at intervals of 3200
iterations, with the grey region covering the range from the minimum to the maximum
density observed across the ten runs. The dashed pink line denotes the unique stable
equilibrium of the dynamics predicted by the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2.
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Figure 5.22: The dynamics of the population density over 1.6 million iterations of a
one-dimensional single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells. The plotted value u¯j is
the mean density calculated over ten independent runs, using data from the simulation
experiments described in Section 5.3.3, for various values of the parameters β and γ, with
α = 0,  = 0.08, ζ = 0. Mean densities are plotted at intervals of 3200 iterations, with
the grey region covering the range from the minimum to the maximum density observed
across the ten runs. The dashed pink line denotes the unique stable equilibrium of the
dynamics predicted by the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2.
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The simulations exhibiting this random drift are further explored in Figure 5.18,
which displays the dynamics for simulations with α = γ and η = 0, as β increases
from 0 to 0.25. In all plots, the mean density across the ten runs remains fairly con-
stant, in line with the mean field analysis of Section 5.2.2, which suggests that the
dynamics are governed by the equation u˙ = 0 in such cases. However, the plots show
a large amount of variation between runs, as evidenced by the extent of the grey
regions, which indicate the range between the maximum and minimum observed
densities.
For the sets of parameter values considered in the figure, increasing β seems to
have little impact on the density dynamics, though higher values of β do appear
to be associated with an increase in the spread of the observed densities. This is
to be expected, since the ‘feathering’ discussed in Section 5.3.4, which is associated
with higher values of β, increases the number of potential locations at which α and
γ-transitions may occur, thus accelerating the dynamics and the expected rate of
stochastic divergence of the densities across the ten simulation runs.
Naturally, the behavioural types relating to simulations with η 6= 0, discussed in
Section 5.3.5, cannot be so easily identified from the density dynamics plots, since
they were defined in terms of explicitly spatial features, such as visible clusters,
which are not represented by the density alone. While correspondences can still
be drawn between these behavioural types and the density dynamics plots in these
cases, Figures 5.19-5.22 are perhaps more useful for observing the relationships be-
tween parameters, model dynamics and the mean field equilibria.
For example, Figure 5.19 displays the density dynamics for models with fixed posi-
tive values of α, γ and η, for increasing values of β. The quantity γ − α is positive,
and mean field theory therefore predicts the existence of a positive stable equilibrium
u∗1 (u
∗
1 = 0.6 , in these examples). The density dynamics depicted in the figure are
broadly representative of the dynamics observed in all simulations whose parameters
exhibit these properties.
Firstly, observe that in every plot, the range of the observed dynamics across the
ten runs conducted for each parameter set, represented by the grey region, is con-
centrated relatively closely around the mean density. This implies that the mean
density u¯ provides a fairly good representation of the true model dynamics in these
cases.
Secondly, in each plot, the density seems either to settle to a quasi-stable equilib-
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rium that is significantly below the value predicted by the mean field approach, or
to decay slowly towards u = 0, such that it is impossible to judge by eye whether
the long-term behaviour will be a low-density quasi-stable equilibrium or extinction.
It is clear, however, that as β increases, the long term density approaches the mean
field equilibrium more and more closely.
This last observation suggests that higher values of β may be conducive to dynam-
ics that correspond more closely with those predicted by mean field analysis. An
explanation for this result is provided in Section 5.3.10.
Figure 5.20 illustrates the effect on the density dynamics of varying the value of γ
for fixed positive values of α, β and η. The specific examples chosen are, once again,
broadly representative of the dynamics observed in all simulations with positive val-
ues for these three parameters.
The plots seen in Figure 5.20 are similar to those of Figure 5.19, in that higher values
of the parameter being varied, γ in this case, appear to be associated with a bet-
ter correspondence between the observed density dynamics and the predicted mean
field equilibria. However, in this case, the effect is stronger, with the density tending
fairly rapidly to extinction for smaller values of γ, both where such behaviour is pre-
dicted by the mean field equations (γ = 0, γ = 0.02) and where it is not (γ = 0.04),
and settling to a quasi-stable equilibrium very close to or indistinguishable from the
mean field equilibrium for larger values of γ.
This suggests that, as with β, higher values of γ may be conducive to dynamics that
correspond more closely with those predicted by mean field analysis.
Observe also that, while the range of densities is once again fairly concentrated
around the mean, there is noticeably more variation for the intermediate values of
γ (γ = 0.06 and γ = 0.08) that lie between those for which the density clearly tends
to extinction and those for which it tends to a quasi-stable equilibrium close to the
mean field equilibrium. We return to this observation in a moment.
Figure 5.21 displays the changes in the density dynamics as α increases, for fixed
positive values of β, γ and η. Note that the plots for α = 0.08 and α = 0.16 corre-
spond to the behaviour visualised in Figures 5.16 and 5.13 respectively.
In this figure, we observe an opposite effect to that seen in Figure 5.20, with higher
values of α corresponding to poorer correspondence with the dynamics predicted by
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the mean field equations. Rapid convergence to quasi-stable equilibria close to or
indistinguishable from the mean field equilibria is observed when α is small, while
the system tends to extinction when α exceeds a certain threshold. Note that this
threshold is below the bifurcation value of the mean field equations, α = γ, with
convergence to extinction occurring in some simulations for which the existence of
a positive stable equilibrium is predicted (e.g. in the plot with α = 0.24).
These observations would suggest that higher values of α are somehow not conducive
to dynamics that correspond to those predicted by mean field analysis.
Observe also that, once again, while densities are generally concentrated very closely
around the mean, the simulations depicted in the plot with α = 0.16 exhibit a signif-
icantly greater range of densities across the ten sample runs under consideration. As
before, this parameter value lies between those values for which simulations exhibit
clear convergence to non-zero quasi-stable equilibria and those for which simulations
tend to extinction.
This observation, combined with the similar observation made in relation to
Figure 5.20, suggests that uncertainty about the future evolution of a model of
this kind is greatest when parameters lie near the boundaries of regions of param-
eter space where simulations exhibit qualitatively different dynamical behaviours
(i.e. near bifurcations of the true model dynamics). Note that these boundary zones
are precisely where the clustering behaviour identified in Section 5.3.5 occurs (see
Figures 5.13-5.14). We may hypothesise that the increased range in the densities
observed could relate to variations in the number of clusters that happen to form
and to survive in the course of a particular simulation.
Finally, consider Figure 5.22, which depicts the change in density dynamics as β and
γ are varied, while fixing η > 0 and α = 0. For the sake of simplicity, β = γ in all
plots, though the dynamics presented are representative of the model behaviour for
all simulations with positive β, γ and η and with α = 0.
The plot for which β = γ = 0, in which the density converges to a genuine stable
equilibrium well above the predicted mean field equilibrium at u = 0, corresponds
to the special case where the system rapidly degenerates into a collection of per-
sistent isolated immobile cells, as seen in Figure 5.9. Aside from this exceptional
case, all other plots in Figure 5.22 display similar behaviour, with convergence to the
mean field equilibrium in all cases. Furthermore, the range of densities around the
mean is highly concentrated, with very little stochastic divergence from the average
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behaviour, indicating that the density dynamics are highly predictable in these cases.
The fact that these plots, for which α = 0 and β, γ and η are positive, all display
tight convergence to the mean field equilibria, coupled with the observations on the
effects of increasing α that were made in relation to Figure 5.21, suggests that there
is a fundamental relationship between α-transitions and the validity of mean field
analysis in the single species, one-dimensional B-model. This issue will be revisited
in Section 5.4.1 and examined in detail in Chapter 6.
5.3.8 Mapping the parameter space for η 6= 0
We now seek to understand the link between the values of the model parameters
and the type of behaviour displayed by the system in a more systematic and quan-
titative way than was attempted in Section 5.3.7, for the case η 6= 0. To achieve
this, parameter space diagrams have been created and are presented in Figure 5.23.
The plots were constructed empirically from the results of the simulations for which
η = 0.08, with each plot representing experimental outcomes for a different value of
β; specifically for β ∈ { 0 , η/4 , η , 4η }.
The grey shaded area of each plot represents the region where α ≥ γ in which the
mean field equation (5.1) predicts that u = 0 is the unique stable equilibrium of the
system. In the unshaded region, where α < γ, the mean field equation predicts that
u = 0 is unstable and that there exists a unique stable equilibrium u = u∗1 > 0 ,
defined in equation (5.3).
Each triplet α, β, γ of parameter values considered is represented by a point on the
relevant plot. The shape of the point corresponds to whether or not, for that par-
ticular set of parameters, simulation results were consistent with convergence to a
stable or quasi-stable equilibrium density after the full 1.6 million iterations (up
to a certain amount of stochastic noise). Circular points represent parameter sets
for which convergence was detected in the corresponding simulations, while square
points represent those for which convergence was not detected. The test used to
determine convergence is detailed in Section 5.3.9.
The colour of the points is related to the final mean density of the corresponding
simulations in the following way. Black points indicate that all corresponding simu-
lations had converged to zero density after 1.6 million iterations (necessarily a stable
equilibrium). Points for which the final mean density of the corresponding simula-
tions was between zero and the predicted mean field equilibrium for the relevant
parameters (defined by (5.3)) were coloured on a scale from red for the lowest densi-
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Figure 5.23: Parameter space diagrams for the population dynamics of the one-dimensional
single species B-model on a ring of 1000 cells, derived from the simulation experiments described
in Section 5.3.3. Each point represents ten simulations conducted using the corresponding values
of α, β and γ, with  = 0.08 and ζ = 0 in all cases. A detailed explanation of the plots is provided
in Section 5.3.8.
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ties, to white for densities closest to the mean field equilibrium. Points for which the
final mean density of the corresponding simulations was above the predicted mean
field equilibrium were similarly coloured on a scale from white to blue. A colour bar
for these scales is provided in the figure.
The method of calculating the final mean density differs between those simulations
that had converged and those that had not. For those parameter sets for which
simulations were found to converge to a non-zero equilibrium density, the value de-
termining the colour of the corresponding point is the mean density taken over the
set {uij : i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, j ∈ {380, 385, 390, . . . , 500}}. Note that observations are
taken at intervals of 5 steps (16000 iterations) in order that stochastic noise around
an equilibrium value is uncorrelated. For those parameter sets where convergence
was not detected, the value used to determine the colour was simply the mean den-
sity over all ten corresponding simulations at the final iteration.
Whether or not convergence was detected, parameter sets for which the final mean
density or equilibrium density was calculated to lie within two percent of the mean
field equilibrium density (i.e. points coloured white or very nearly white) are de-
picted with bold borders.
A discussion of the parameter space plots is presented in Section 5.3.10.
5.3.9 Convergence test
To determine whether or not the experimental observations associated with a par-
ticular set of parameters (α, β, γ, , ζ) exhibit convergence to a stable or quasi-stable
equilibrium within the 1.6 million iterations of the corresponding simulations, we
employ a test that assumes a particular model of the data. Specifically, we suppose
that observations made at intervals of 16 000 iterations (every fifth observation for
a given run) may be modelled by the expression:
ui,5k = µ5k + Ni,5k , for i ∈ {1 , . . . , 10}, k ∈ {0 , . . . , 100} (5.6)
where µ5k is the current mean, which is assumed to vary deterministically over the
course of a simulation, but to be identical across the ten repetitions i ∈ {1 , . . . , 10},
and where Ni,5k is a random noise term. For a given set of model parameters, the
noise terms Ni,5k are supposed to be independent and identically distributed, with
Ni,5k ∼ N(0, σ2), for some fixed variance σ2.
An informal observation of the density-time plots provided in Figures 5.17-5.22 sug-
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gests that the assumption of constant variance about a dynamic mean may be rea-
sonable for models with η 6= 0, but not for models with η = 0, in which variation
between the ten runs conducted with each set of parameters (as represented by the
grey region in the plots), appears to grow over time. The convergence test described
here will therefore be applied only to simulations with η 6= 0.
Given this model, to draw a conclusion on whether or not convergence has occurred
in the ten runs associated with a particular set of parameter values, we must de-
termine whether the relevant observations are consistent with the theoretical mean
µ5k being constant for all k ≥ K, where K ∈ {0, . . . , 99} is a positive integer of our
choice, with lower values of K indicating a requirement of more rapid convergence.
This is equivalent to the statement that, from observation 5K onwards, all varia-
tion both between and within runs can be explained as random noise about some
fixed equilibrium value. In what follows, we take K = 50, thus requiring that a
quasi-stable equilibrium is attained by iteration 800 000, the half-way point of the
simulations.
The test that we choose to employ actually verifies a weaker result and therefore
does not strictly guarantee convergence under these conditions. However, it is suf-
ficiently accurate for our purposes and provides a good match to intuition, when
convergence is assessed from density-time plots (such as Figures 5.17-5.22) by eye.
In essence, the test supposes that the mean µ5k remains constant (at a supposed
equilibrium value) across the third quarter of the data k ∈ {50 , . . . , 74} and asks
whether the final observations u1,500 , . . . , u10,500 are consistent with the hypothesis
that the final mean µ500 is also equal to this same value.
The variance σ2 is estimated by s2, the pooled variance of the twenty-five samples
{u1,5k , . . . , u10,5k}, for k ∈ {50, . . . , 74}, about their respective observed means u¯5k :
s2 =
1
250
10∑
i=1
74∑
k=50
(ui,5k − u¯5k)2 = 1
25
74∑
k=50
s25k
In other words, s2 is simply equal to the mean of the observed variances s25k, for
k ∈ { 50 , . . . , 74}.
The potential equilibrium value is estimated by u¯, calculated by:
u¯ =
1
250
10∑
i=1
74∑
k=50
ui,5k =
1
25
74∑
k=50
u¯5k
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Now, if each of the final observations u1,500 , . . . , u10,500 were truly drawn from the
distribution N(u¯, s2), then their observed mean u¯500 should be drawn from the dis-
tribution N(u¯, s2/10). Identification of convergence is therefore identified with the
result of the following two-tailed normal hypothesis test, conducted at the 1% sig-
nificance level, with the null hypothesis corresponding to the conclusion that the
simulations had converged:
Hypothesis Test Given u¯, s2 and u¯500 , consider the random variable
U ∼ N(µ500, σ2) , where σ2 = s2/10 and µ500 is unknown. Suppose that u¯500 is a
particular realisation of U . Our null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:
• H0 : µ500 = u¯
• H1 : µ500 6= u¯
At the 1% significance level, H0 is rejected if and only if:
P [U ∈ (u¯− λ, u¯ + λ) |µ500 = u¯ ] > 0.99
where λ = |u¯500 − u¯|.
Note that the condition of the hypothesis test may be written more simply as:
Φ
(∣∣∣∣√10 ( u¯500 − u¯s
)∣∣∣∣) > 0.995
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
N(0, 1).
As remarked earlier, this test would clearly not be suitable to determine convergent
behaviour in all sequences of the form given in (5.6). In particular, the result of the
test can only be meaningfully identified with convergence if the underlying trend,
represented by the sequence (µ5k)k∈{0,...,100}, can be considered to be monotonic from
observation 5K onward (a condition which may be observed to be satisfied for all
simulations under consideration). We therefore reiterate that the test is intended
only to identify convergence in these particular experiments (and then, only those
for which η 6= 0), essentially in order to automate and render quantifiable a process
that could otherwise have been performed qualitatively by eye.
5.3.10 Discussion of experimental results
In this section, we provide a discussion and synthesis of the results of the simulation
experiments, with a particular focus on the parameter space diagrams of Figure 5.23,
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which were introduced in Section 5.3.8.
The first thing to observe from Figure 5.23 is that, for all values of β under con-
sideration, the black points indicating convergence to zero density extend beyond
the grey region α ≥ γ where such behaviour is predicted by (5.1). This confirms
that the mean field equation does not generally provide a good representation of the
behaviour of the system, as was noted in Section 5.3.7.
To understand why this is, recall the assumptions made in the derivation of mean
field equations outlined in Section 4.3.4. The mean field method assumes that, for
every cell in the system, the probability that a neighbouring cell is occupied is equal
to the current global density u, and that these probabilities may be considered to
be independent for all neighbours and for all cells. In other words, the mean field
equation is associated with perfect mixing of individuals (see Section 3.2.2 for fur-
ther discussion of the interpretations of the mean field assumptions). In the actual
model, for situations where the system is well mixed, the probability that any given
cell contains an individual will be equal to u and may be considered to be broadly
independent of the states of other cells. However, if the system is not well mixed,
there may be considerable clumping of individuals and increased levels of correlation
between the occupancy status of nearby cells.
Intuitively, we might expect the parameter β, which governs the rate of individual
movement, to be associated with good mixing and therefore that simulations with
higher values of β would exhibit behaviour that corresponds more closely to that
predicted by the mean field equation. Figure 5.23 confirms this expectation (as do
the density dynamics plots in Figure 5.19), since increasing the value of β leads both
to more points in the white region converging to values close to the predicted non-
zero mean field equilibrium and to fewer points in this region converging to zero.
However, comparing the plots for β = 0.02 and β = 0.32, we see that the effect
of β is quite weak in comparison with that of the parameters α and γ, with this
sixteen-fold increase in β resulting in only minor changes to simulation behaviours
across the parameter space.
Note the bright blue points at α = γ = 0 in each of the four plots, indicating final
mean densities (or in the case where β = 0, an equilibrium density) above the pre-
dicted mean field equilibrium of u = 0. These points correspond to special cases,
like those seen in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, in which the system is reduced to a set of
isolated occupied cells.
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In each of these special cases, whether or not the plots indicate convergence, the be-
haviour of the system is highly predictable. For β = 0, since there is no movement
(and consequently no mixing), after η-transitions have reduced the system to a set
of non-adjacent cells the density remains unchanged, converging to a value between
0 and the density of the initial condition (Figure 5.9), which is approximately equal
to 0.5 in all experimental simulations. For higher values of β, isolated cells meander
randomly through the system with all but one ultimately being destroyed as the
result of increasingly infrequent collisions and subsequent η-transitions, leading to
(potentially very slow) convergence of the density to u = 1/n (Figure 5.10).
Putting these special cases aside, consider those points representing simulations that
converged to non-zero equilibrium densities. Of these points, a clear distinction can
be made between those where α = 0, for which the corresponding simulations con-
verged almost universally to the mean field equilibrium density, and those where
α > 0, for which the corresponding simulations almost all converged to densities
below the mean field equilibrium.
Since mean field type behaviour is associated with good mixing of occupied and un-
occupied cells, this observation suggests that there is a significant difference between
β, γ and η-transitions on the one hand and α-transitions on the other in terms of
their effect on the mixing of the system. Since the former three transition types are
observed to interact to produce behaviour that corresponds closely to that predicted
by the mean field equation (at least in terms of their equilibrium behaviour), they
seem in some sense to have a positive or neutral effect on individual mixing, while
α-transitions seem to have a negative effect. This concept will be explored further
in Chapter 6.
The final point to note from the figures is the loose collection of points represent-
ing non-convergent simulations, which lie between points indicating convergence to
non-zero equilibria and points indicating convergence to zero. In most cases, the
final mean densities for these points are rather low and direct observation of the
corresponding simulations indicates that they are associated with the formation of
isolated clusters of various densities, like those seen in Figure 5.13. Although there
is insufficient information to draw firm conclusions about the long term behaviour
of such simulations from these results, as discussed in Section 5.3.5, we might hy-
pothesise that such systems would also converge to zero density, as isolated clusters
undergo stochastic extinctions.
In Section 5.3.6, we noted that Wolfram (2002) describes class 4 systems,
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which exhibit complex interacting structures, as lying on the boundary between
class 1 and 2 systems, which display trivial ordered behaviour, and class 3
systems, which display random behaviour. It is interesting to note, therefore, that
the two figures that we identified as displaying behaviour that resembled that of
Wolfram’s class 4 systems, Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14, correspond to parameter sets
( (α, β, γ, , ζ) = (0.16, 0.32, 0.32, 0.08, 0) and (α, β, γ, , ζ) = (0.06, 0.32, 0.16, 0.08, 0) ,
respectively) that lie in or near the boundary zone of parameter space identified in
the previous paragraph, between a region associated with simulations that converge
to 0 (class 1 behaviour) and simulations that converge to a non-zero density (which
produce figures resembling class 3 behaviour).
In this section, we have conducted a set of simulation experiments to attempt to un-
derstand the full range of possible behaviours of the single species, one-dimensional
B-model on a ring of cells. Having assessed the results of these experiments, we have
hypothesised that there is a difference between α-transitions on the one hand and
β, γ and η-transitions on the other, in terms of their effect on individual mixing and
the emergence of spatial clumping at the global scale. This idea will be investigated
further in Section 5.4 and will form the principal focus of Chapter 6.
5.4 Autocorrelation analysis
5.4.1 Concept and methods
In Section 5.3.10, it was observed that β, γ and η-transitions seem to be associated
with good mixing of individuals, while α-transitions seem to be associated with poor
mixing. In this section, we examine what exactly we mean by good mixing and at-
tempt to understand why these transitions might have these effects.
For the purposes of the mean field equation (5.1), the system is well mixed if the
states of the cells can be considered to be independent. In other words, a system
with individual density u should look like the state of each cell has been generated
as the result of an independent Bernoulli trial with parameter u. If the system is
not well mixed - if the individuals display a degree of clumping which would not
be expected from such a process, for example - correlations between the states of
nearby cells may be observed.
The degree of mixing of a particular iteration of a simulation may therefore be ob-
served through consideration of the autocorrelation structure of the binary sequence
c = (ci)i∈Z ∈ {0, 1}Z, derived from the system using the approach described in
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Section 4.4.5 :
ci =

1 , if i ∈ {0, . . . n− 1} and cell i is occupied;
0 , if i ∈ {0, . . . n− 1} and cell i is empty;
ci mod n , if i 6∈ {0, . . . n− 1} .
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient ρX,Y of two random variables
X and Y is defined as:
ρX,Y =
E[(X − µX)(Y − µY )]
σXσY
∈ [−1, 1]
where µX , µY and σX , σY are the expectations and standard deviations of X and
Y .
This correlation coefficient measures the level of linear statistical dependence of
X and Y . If (Xi)i∈Z is a sequence of random variables, the correlation between
Xi and Xi+k is known as the autocorrelation of lag k for the sequence. Note that
this quantity is only well-defined if the joint distribution of Xi and Xi+k is indepen-
dent of i, a property known as second order stationarity (see Upton and Cook, 2011,
pp. 21, 90-93, 371).
For a given set of parameters, α, β, γ, , ζ, with the initialisation used in the sim-
ulation experiments (see Section 5.3.3), the terms of the sequence c corresponding
to the final iteration performed (iteration 1.6 million) are random variables with a
clearly defined joint distribution determined by the rules of a single species B-model.
What is more, second order stationarity is guaranteed by the symmetry of the model
geography with respect to translations of any integer k. It is therefore meaningful
to consider the autocorrelations of c.
It should be noted that, while we are using these autocorrelations to assess the
degree of mixing of individuals in the model at a particular iteration, they do not
provide complete information about the ‘randomness’ of a periodic binary sequence.
A thorough test for randomness should verify that a given sequence or collection of
sequences appears to be consistent with having been generated by a process that
has the property that, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, all possible blocks of black and white
cells of length k are equally likely to be observed at any location (see Wolfram, 2002,
pp. 593-595). However, as a proxy indicator of good mixing, the autocorrelations of
c are sufficient for the current purposes.
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Observe that the mean of the terms representing a single period of a particular
realisation of c is equal to the individual density u, while the corresponding standard
deviation is equal to
√
u(1− u). An empirical measure of the autocorrelation of lag
k for the sequence {ci}i∈Z is hence given by the following formula:
ρ(c, k) =
1
nu(1− u)
n−1∑
i=0
(ci − u)(ci+k − u) = 1
u(1− u)
[
1
n
(
n−1∑
i=0
ci ci+k
)
− u2
]
(5.7)
However, given N independent realisations, with c considered to be a random peri-
odic sequence as described above, an unbiased estimate r(c, k) of the true theoretical
autocorrelation ρ(c, k) of the terms of c may be generated by employing the Bessel
correction (see Upton and Cook, 2011, pp. 401-402), as follows:
r(c, k) =
Nn− 1
Nn
[
1
u¯(1− u¯)
][
1
Nn
(
N−1∑
j=0
n−1∑
i=0
c
(j)
i c
(j)
i+k
)
− u¯2
]
(5.8)
where u¯ is the mean global density over the N realisations, as in Section 5.3.7, and
where the superscript (j) refers to the particular realisation from which a value is
drawn.
5.4.2 Results and discussion
For a given set of parameters α, β, γ, , ζ, plotting r(c, k) for k ∈ {0, . . . , n} with
N = 10 (i.e. calculated over the 10 realisations of the simulation experiments),
allows us to visualise the complete autocorrelation structure of the system. See
Figures 5.24-5.27 (which correspond respectively to the population density dynam-
ics figures, 5.19-5.22) for examples of such plots. Note that for sets of parameters
for which the individuals became extinct in every run, the autocorrelations are un-
defined and cannot be plotted.
The figures are plotted for k ∈ {−n/2, . . . , n/2} rather than {0, . . . , n}, since this
draws attention to the most interesting features, which appear around k = 0.
This shift in the range is valid because the imposed periodicity of c ensures that
r(c, k) = r(c, k+n), ∀k ∈ Z. Also note that r(c, k) is an even function of k owing to
the symmetry of the autocorrelation formula, so the plots are symmetric about k = 0.
Clearly, the true autocorrelation of lag 0 is equal to 1 for all values of the param-
eters, since ρ(c, 0) represents the correlation of every cell with itself. In this case
therefore, Bessel’s correction clearly leads to an underestimate of the autocorrela-
tion: r(c, 0) = (Nn− 1)/Nn. However, since the experimental value of Nn = 10000
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is large, for the purposes of plotting, this discrepancy is negligible.
The plots broadly confirm the observations of Section 5.3.10, regarding the effect of
different transitions on individual mixing. Roughly speaking, the size of the ‘peak’
in the centre of each plot (taken to mean some measure of the area lying between the
central points of the plot and the horizontal axis, rather than the maximum value
of r(c, k), which is constant across all plots) provides information about the degree
of mixing of the individuals after 1.6 million iterations of a simulation with the cor-
responding parameter values, in the sense that these peaks represent correlations in
the occupancy of nearby cells. Flatter plots indicate greater independence of nearby
cells and therefore better mixing of individuals.
For example, the large peak in the centre of the first plot of Figure 5.24 indicates
that, for the specified values of the parameters, the probability that two nearby cells
share the same state after 1.6 million iterations is greater than would be expected if
the states of the cells were generated independently, given the global density of the
system.
However, this effect can be seen to weaken rapidly as the distance between the
two cells increases, with no visible correlation between cells separated by more than
50 units (beyond statistical variation) in any of the plots, indicating that (after
1.6 million iterations) the states of cells separated by greater distances than this
may be considered to be independent, at least for the range of parameters visualised
here. A result of this nature was to be expected, since all transitions in the model
are the result of strictly local interactions.
A rapid comparison of the plots presented in Figures 5.24-5.27 with their counter-
parts in Figures 5.19-5.22 very clearly supports the assertion (first made in
Section 5.3.10) that greater levels of individual mixing, interpreted here to mean
lower local autocorrelations of cell states, are associated with better correspondences
between the observed population density dynamics in a simulation and those pre-
dicted by the mean field equations.
Switching our perspective to a closer analysis of the separate autocorrelation plots,
we see that, for particular values of the other parameters, Figure 5.24 shows that
greater values of β result in better mixing of individuals (lower local autocorre-
lations). Figure 5.25 shows the same effect for increasing values of γ. However,
Figure 5.26 shows that greater values of α result in poorer mixing of individuals,
again for specific values of the other parameters. Note that the plots for α = 0.08
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and α = 0.16 in this figure correspond to the behaviour visualised in Figures 5.16
and 5.13 respectively.
Although plots are only presented for certain sets of parameters, these observations
of the effect of α, β and γ on individual mixing are representative of all sets of
parameters used in the simulation experiments.
Figure 5.27 presents autocorrelation plots with α = 0 and β = γ. Setting aside the
case where α = β = γ = 0, the remaining plots all appear to show practically perfect
individual mixing, with all autocorrelations close to zero. This further confirms the
hypothesis of Section 5.3.10, that provided that β and γ are not too small (relative
to η), when α = 0, β, γ and η-transitions interact to produce near perfect mixing of
individuals, while positive values of α lead to imperfect mixing.
As noted in Section 5.3.7 in relation to Figure 5.22, the first plot of Figure 5.27,
in which α = β = γ = 0, is a special case, corresponding to the behaviour seen in
Figure 5.9. For these parameter values, empty cells never change their state, acting
as barriers through which information cannot pass, thus prohibiting correlations of
any significant length. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 5.27, owing to η-transitions,
a system with these parameter values converges to an equilibrium in which no two
adjacent cells are both occupied, resulting in strong negative autocorrelations of lag
±1, which are clearly visible in the plot. Aside from further weak positive autocor-
relations of lag ±2, there are no other visible correlations in this case.
Figures 5.25 and 5.26 also support the observation made in Section 5.3.10 that
for parameter sets close to the boundary between the region of parameter space in
which simulations converge to states with non-zero individual density and the region
in which simulations converge to extinction, the corresponding model simulations
exhibit high individual clumping. In both figures, the autocorrelation plot with the
largest peak (greatest evidence of clumping) occurs at the transition point between
parameter values for which all simulations resulted in extinction and those for which
this was not the case.
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Figure 5.24: Plots of spatial autocorrelation estimates r(c, k) for the 1.6 millionth
iteration of a one-dimensional single species B-model with 1000 cells, for various values
of the parameter β, with α = 0.04, γ = 0.16,  = 0.08, ζ = 0.0. Autocorrelations were
calculated from ten independent runs following the method of Section 5.4.1, using data
from the simulation experiments described in Section 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.25: Plots of spatial autocorrelation estimates r(c, k) for the 1.6 millionth
iteration of a one-dimensional single species B-model with 1000 cells, for various values
of the parameter γ, with α = 0.02, β = 0.32,  = 0.08, ζ = 0.0. Autocorrelations were
calculated from ten independent runs following the method of Section 5.4.1, using data
from the simulation experiments described in Section 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.26: Plots of spatial autocorrelation estimates r(c, k) for the 1.6 millionth
iteration of a one-dimensional single species B-model with 1000 cells, for various values
of the parameter α, with β = 0.32, γ = 0.32,  = 0.08, ζ = 0.0. Autocorrelations were
calculated from ten independent runs following the method of Section 5.4.1, using data
from the simulation experiments described in Section 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.27: Plots of spatial autocorrelation estimates r(c, k) for the 1.6 millionth
iteration of a one-dimensional single species B-model with 1000 cells, for various values
of the parameters β and γ, with α = 0.00,  = 0.08, ζ = 0.0. Autocorrelations were
calculated from ten independent runs following the method of Section 5.4.1, using data
from the simulation experiments described in Section 5.3.3.
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5.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have undertaken an investigation into the possible behaviours of
the one-dimensional single species B-model.
In Section 5.2, we identified all possible local transitions that can occur in a single
species B-model, presented a mean field analysis of the model (valid over any regular
graph), and analysed the resulting mean field equation.
In Section 5.3, we described a set of simulation experiments that were conducted to
explore the behaviour of the single species B-model over a ring of cells. The results
of these experiments were visualised as space-time diagrams, displaying the com-
plete evolution of particular simulations, which allowed for a complete qualitative
description of possible model behaviours.
In the case of simulations for which η = 0 (where η is the parameter governing the
rate of individual mortality due to overcrowding), the link between model behaviour
and the model parameters was found to be extremely clear, with the equilibrium
behaviour being very well predicted by the mean field equation. However, for simu-
lations with η 6= 0, the situation was less straightforward.
Using the space-time diagrams alongside density-time plots, an empirical map
of the model parameter space and analyses of the autocorrelation structure of
the final microstates of each simulation, treated as periodic binary sequences,
we were able to deduce a link between the observed behaviours, the parameter values
and corresponding transition-types, the level of correspondence with the predictions
of mean field theory and the degree of mixing or clumping of individuals within
the system. Specifically, β-transitions (movement), γ-transitions (reproduction) and
η-transitions (death due to overcrowding) appear to be consistent with homogeneous
individual mixing and with behaviour that is therefore well represented by the mean
field equation. However, α-transitions (death of isolated individuals) appear to lead
to spatially heterogeneous distributions of individuals, producing systems that ex-
hibit visible clumping and whose behaviour is not well represented by the mean field
equations.
In Chapter 6, we look more deeply at the nature of the simple transitions that occur
in single species B-models, in an attempt to understand the fundamental differences
between α-transitions on the one hand and β, γ and η-transitions on the other, which
lead to such significant discrepancies in the character of a system’s global behaviour.
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Chapter 6
Understanding the relationship
between local transitions and
global dynamics in the
one-dimensional, single species
B-model
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, it was observed that (excluding certain special cases) one-dimensional,
single species B-models with α = 0 tended to exhibit population dynamics in line
with the predictions of mean field theory, while models with α > 0 did not. In
the latter case, mean populations at equilibrium were observed to be either lower
than the mean field equilibrium or equal to zero, with the discrepancy between the
observed and predicted equilibria increasing as α was increased relative to the other
parameters.
It was hypothesised that this effect was somehow due to the fact that the combined
effect of β, γ and η-transitions was consistent with good ‘mixing’ of individuals
throughout the model, in the sense that the separate cell states at a given itera-
tion could be considered as realisations of a set of independent Bernoulli random
variables, while α-transitions instead had a negative effect on this mixing, produc-
ing robust local correlations between cell states, which rendered the independence
assumption (vital for the validity of the mean field equations) invalid.
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This hypothesis was supported by the calculation of autocorrelations between cell
states in microstates drawn from experimental simulations (see Section 5.4), which
did indeed show strong local correlations in microstates drawn from simulations with
positive values of α and no such correlations in simulations with α = 0 (once again,
excluding certain special cases).
A version of this phenomenon, in which the precise nature of the local transi-
tions that drive a discrete model may interfere with the progress of the model
towards a state of equilibrium, is discussed in general terms by Wolfram (2002,
pp. 342-351). Wolfram calls into question the value of attempting to explain the
long term behaviour of complex systems in terms of progress towards particular in-
variant or equilibrium states, suggesting that in many cases it is in fact the “effects
of explicit evolution rules” that are the most significant factor in determining long
term patterns of model behaviour. Although Wolfram’s comments are concerned
more with the attainment of static invariant states, rather than the quasi-stable dy-
namic equilibria that we are investigating, they nonetheless provide an interesting
conceptual backdrop for our work.
Of more direct relevance, McKane and Newman (2004, Section IV) noted that cer-
tain types of local transition (specifically, those relating to competition between
species) had an important effect on the extent to which the long term behaviour of
certain ecological patch models – to which, as generalisations of the NANIA model,
B-models are closely related (see Section 4.4.1) – matched the predictions of mean
field theory. However, the authors did not explicitly investigate why these particular
transitions had this effect, merely observing that their inclusion or otherwise affected
the threshold patch size below which model behaviour diverted from the predictions
of mean field theory.
In this chapter, the aim is to go beyond the simple observation of model behaviour, in
an attempt to understand the causal mechanism behind the difference in the effect of
α-transitions relative to β, γ and η-transitions in the one-dimensional, single species
B-model. To achieve this, we will transform the dynamics of the system into another
space and examine the effect of each transition in this new framework. In the new
space, we define a measure of the degree of spatial clumping of individuals and then
use this measure as the basis for an argument as to why the mean field equilibrium
can be considered ‘stable’ when α = 0 and ‘unstable’ when α > 0.
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However, before commencing this work, we examine a much simpler difference be-
tween the various transitions, that of whether or not their effects are immediately
reversible, which serves to provide an intuitive starting point for the more involved
mathematical analysis that follows.
6.2 Reversible and irreversible local transitions
Consider the relationship between the possible transitions of the single species
B-model, as visualised in Figure 6.1. The figure shows that certain of the
transitions may be matched up, such that the effect of the first transition on a
pair of neighbouring cells may be precisely reversed by the other (provided that the
states of the cells are not altered by other transitions in any intervening iterations),
returning the cells to their previous states. Specifically, an η-transition reverses the
effect of a γ-transition and vice versa, while the β-transition may be considered to
be self-inverse.
However, as seen in the figure, α-transitions differ from the other three kinds in
an important respect. Owing to the condition prohibiting the spontaneous
generation of individuals, the α-transition has no inverse in the sense described
above. An α-transition may therefore be seen as a sort of local catastrophe, since
its effect cannot generally be reversed in a single step, but may require a sequence
of other transitions to return the system to the microstate previously occupied.
Such a sequence may necessitate changes to the states of a large number of
other cells, some of which may be far from the original pair. Indeed, the
α-transition is the only one whose effects may be absolutely irreversible
(assuming that α, β, γ, η > 0), since it is the only transition capable of
transforming the system to the equilibrium extinction state in which all cells are
empty.
Through this consideration of the reversibility of local transitions, we may
begin to understand why positive values of the parameters β, γ and η are
consistent with good individual mixing while positive values of α are not.
Although both α and η-transitions result in the same reduction in population
size, and therefore are considered to have an identical effect in simplified
representations such as the basic mean field equations of Section 5.2.2, we see
that their effects on the future evolution of the system may actually be quite
different.
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Intuitively, we might imagine that, since α-transitions are capable of irreversibly
removing isolated individuals from the system, these transitions could create per-
sistent ‘fractures’ in the distribution of individuals, separating them into separate
clumps (such as those observed in Figure 5.14) and thus introducing a degree of
spatial structure to the system that would invalidate the independence assumptions
necessary for the mean field equations to hold.
In some sense, the remainder of this chapter could be considered to be an indirect
formalisation of the argument given above, in which these mechanisms of fracturing
and clump formation are identified and described in detail.
β β γ η α impossible
Figure 6.1: In a single species B-model, each pair of consecutive
cells in the top row can be transformed into the pair immediately be-
low in a single iteration by means of the transformation indicated.
Transformations in the opposite sense are also shown. β, γ and
η-transitions have an inverse transition which returns the pair to its
original state. No such inverse exists for an α-transition.
169
… 
True m
icrostates 
of the system
 
(excluding extinction)  
Integer-sim
plex 
D
ashed ellipses 
represent equivalence 
classes. 
… 
… 
… 
(1, 2, 2, 0, 0) 
(1, 2, 0, 2, 0) 
(1, 2, 0, 0, 2) 
(1, 0, 2, 2, 0) 
(1, 0, 2, 0, 2) 
(1, 0, 0, 2, 2) 
(0, 1, 2, 2, 0) 
(0, 1, 2, 0, 2) 
(0, 1, 0, 2, 2) 
(0, 0, 1, 2, 2) 
 
(…
 , 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, …
) 
(…
 , 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, …
) 
(…
 , 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, …
) 
(…
 , 1 , 2 , 2 , …
) 
(…
 , 2 , 2 , 1 , …
) 
(…
 , 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, …
) 
(…
 , 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, …
) 
(…
 , 2 , 1 , 2 , …
) 
… 
(…
 , 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, …
) 
(…
 , 5 , …
) 
(5, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
(0, 5, 0, 0, 0) 
(0, 0, 5, 0, 0) 
(0, 0, 0, 5, 0) 
(0, 0, 0, 0, 5) 
one-to-one 
correspondence 
one-to-many 
correspondence 
many-to-one 
function 
(…
 , 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, …
) 
(…
 , 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, …
) 
(…
 , 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, …
) 
(…
 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, …
) 
Points of ellipsis  
represent further 
equivalence classes or 
additional elem
ents 
w
ithin a class. 
(                                          ) 
(                                           ) 
(                                           ) 
Periodic binary 
sequences 
 
n 
Periodic integer 
sequences 
n 
F
ig
u
re
6
.2
:
D
ia
g
ram
m
a
tic
rep
resen
tatio
n
of
th
e
rela
tio
n
sh
ip
b
etw
een
th
e
m
icro
sta
tes
o
f
a
sin
g
le
sp
ecies
B
-m
o
d
el
over
a
rin
g
of
n
cells
an
d
th
e
elem
en
ts
o
f
Ω
n
,
Ψ
n
a
n
d
∆
n−
1
a
n
d
of
th
e
relatio
n
sh
ip
s
b
etw
een
th
e
eq
u
iva
len
ce
cla
sses
o
f∼
,
^
a
n
d
_
over
th
ese
sets.
A
lth
ou
gh
n
ot
d
irectly
v
isu
alised
h
ere,
th
e
b
ijection
χ
from
th
e
eq
u
ivalen
ce
cla
sses
of
Ω
n \{0}
to
th
e
eq
u
iva
len
ce
cla
sses
o
f
∆
n−
1
is
im
p
licit
fro
m
th
e
lay
ou
t
of
th
e
eq
u
ivalen
ce
classes
(d
ash
ed
ellip
ses).
170
6.3 Transforming the microstates of a B-model
into a new space
6.3.1 Summary of approach
Up to this point, a particular microstate of the system has been represented by a
periodic binary sequence c = (ci)i∈Z ∈ {0, 1}Z, from which any n consecutive terms
represent the occupancies of every cell in the system. However, in Section 4.4.4, it
was observed that for A-models (of which B-models form a subfamily), if adjacency-
preserving symmetries of the underlying graph of the model are considered to be
indistinguishable, then the dynamics of the system do not depend upon the precise
microstate occupied at a given iteration but rather on the equivalence class of the
microstate with respect to these symmetries.
In this section, we therefore apply a transformation from the state space Ωn to a
space in which the dynamics over the equivalence classes may be more naturally
observed. For reasons of practicality, the sequence of zeros 0 ∈ Ωn is excluded from
this transformation. Note that this exclusion does not present a significant issue,
since 0 represents the state of extinction of all species and there are therefore no
interesting dynamics after this state is reached.
Ultimately, we wish to define a transformation χ from (Ωn \ {0})/∼ , the set of
equivalence classes of the microstates (where ∼ is the relevant equivalence relation,
as defined in Section 4.4.4), to a corresponding set of equivalence classes in a new
space. This will be accomplished by combining two separate mappings, the first
from Ωn \ {0} to a new set called Ψn, the second from Ψn to a third set ∆n−1.
The transformation χ will then be derived from these mappings by demonstrating
that each respects the equivalence classes of ∼ in Ωn \ {0} and the corresponding
equivalence classes in Ψn and ∆
n−1.
6.3.2 Step one: Ωn to Ψn
We first define a function of the following form:
ψ : Ωn \ {0} → Ψn
c = (ci)i∈Z 7→ d = (di)i∈Z
Here, Ωn is the set of periodic binary sequences whose period divides n (see
Section 4.4.5), and Ψn ⊂ NZ is the set of periodic positive integer sequences for
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which there exists a positive integer U ′ such that the sum of any U ′ consecutive
terms is equal to n:
Ψn =
{
(di)i∈Z ∈ NZ : ∃U ′ ∈ N such that
k+U ′−1∑
j=k
dj = n , ∀k ∈ Z
}
(6.1)
Note that (6.1) does not explicitly state that the elements of Ψn are periodic, since
periodicity is implied by the condition that specifies the sum of consecutive terms.
The transformation ψ is defined to operate according to the following rule: ψ trans-
forms c to d such that any U ′ consecutive terms of d correspond to the distances
between the occupied cells of c in the appropriate order, where distance is defined
as the minimum path length in G (the ring of cells). The term d0 corresponds to the
distance between the two occupied cells of c with the smallest non-negative indices.
A simple example of the application of ψ can be found in the first part of
Example 6.3.3.
This rule may be formalised as follows:
Definition 6.3.1. Given c = (ci)i∈Z ∈ Ωn \ {0}, let Ic = (Ij)j∈Z be the sequence
formed from the elements of the set Iˆc = {i ∈ Z : ci = 1}, such that:
. . . < I−2 < I−1 < 0 ≤ I0 < I1 < I2 < . . .
The function ψ : Ωn \ {0} → Ψn is defined such that ψ(c) = d = (di)i∈Z with:
di = Ii+1 − Ii , ∀i ∈ Z
To see that this definition is equivalent to the preceding informal description of ψ,
observe simply that Ic is the sequence of the indices of the non-zero terms of c,
arranged in increasing order, with I0 set equal to the smallest such non-negative
index. As the differences between consecutive indices, the terms of d then clearly
represent the distances between consecutive occupied cells of c, as required.
Note that ψ is not injective, since, for example, all microstates for which U = 1 are
mapped to the same sequence (. . . , n , . . .) ∈ Ψn. Furthermore, we see that the
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sum of any U consecutive terms of d is equal to n, because:
j+U−1∑
i=j
di =
j+U−1∑
i=j
(Ii+1 − Ii) = Ij+U − Ij , ∀j ∈ Z
and Ij+U − Ij = n since c is periodic with period equal to a factor of n and con-
tains precisely U occupied cells in any finite subsequence of length n. This means
that, by definition, the value of U ′ for a particular d = ψ(c) ∈ Ψn is equal to U ,
the total population of a system occupying the microstate c. From this point for-
ward, we therefore exclusively refer to this quantity as the population, denoted by U .
Now, we define an equivalence relation ^ on Ψn that will correspond to the equiva-
lence relation ∼ on Ωn. Since two microstates c1, c2 are considered to be equivalent
if the order of their terms is the same, allowing for translations and reflections, it
is clear that the sequences of distances between consecutive occupied cells in such
microstates, as recorded in ψ(c1) and ψ(c2), will also be the same. It therefore
makes sense to also consider sequences d1,d2 ∈ Ψn to be equivalent if their terms
are the same up to translations and reflections. Specifically, we may adapt (4.7)
from Section 4.4.5:
d1 ^ d2 ⇔ ∃a ∈ {−1, 1}, b ∈ Z, such that d2,i = d1,ai+b, ∀i ∈ Z (6.2)
The fact that ^ is an equivalence relation follows for the same reason that ∼ is
an equivalence relation: it is based on the automorphism group of a ring of n cells,
as discussed in Sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5. As with ∼, given d ∈ Ψn, [d] denotes the
equivalence class of d with respect to ^, while Ψn/^ denotes the set of all equiva-
lence classes of ^.
Observe that ψ respects the equivalence classes of Ωn and of Ψn, in the sense of the
following proposition:
Proposition 6.3.2. If c1, c2 ∈ Ωn \ {0}, then:
c1 ∼ c2 ⇔ ψ(c1) ^ ψ(c2)
Proof. Let d1 = ψ(c1) and d2 = ψ(c2).
Proof of (⇒): By definition:
c1 ∼ c2 ⇔ ∃a ∈ {−1, 1}, b′ ∈ Z, such that c2,i = c1,ai+b′ ,∀i ∈ Z
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Let Ic1 = (I1,j)j∈Z and Ic2 = (I2,j)j∈Z be defined as in 6.3.1. Therefore, Ic2 is an
ordered sequence formed from the elements of the set:
Iˆc2 = {i ∈ Z : c2,i = 1}
= {i ∈ Z : c1,ai+b′ = 1}
= {aj − ab′ ∈ Z : c1,j = 1}
= {aj − ab′ : j ∈ Iˆc1}
= {aI1,j − ab′}j∈Z
To put these terms in order to create Ic2 , we observe that:
I2,i = aI1,k+ai − ab′ , ∀i ∈ Z
where k ∈ Z is chosen such that:
aI1,k − ab′ = min
j∈Z
{aI1,j − ab′ : aI1,j − ab′ ≥ 0}
Now, observe that:
d2,i = I2,i+1 − I2,i , ∀i ∈ Z
= (aI1,k+a(i+1) − ab′)− (aI1,k+ai − ab′) , ∀i ∈ Z
= |I1,k+a(i+1) − I1,k+ai| , ∀i ∈ Z
= I1,ai+b+1 − I1,ai+b , ∀i ∈ Z
= d1,ai+b , ∀i ∈ Z
where b = k + (a− 1)/2.
Therefore, d1 ^ d2, as required.
Proof of (⇐): By definition:
d1 ^ d2 ⇔ ∃a ∈ {−1, 1}, b′ ∈ Z, such that d2,i = d1,ai+b′ , ∀i ∈ Z
Observe that:
Iν,j = Iν,k +
j−1∑
i=k
dν,i , ∀ν ∈ {1, 2} , j, k ∈ Z with k < j
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Therefore, more specifically, for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, we have:
I2,j = I2,−1 +
j−1∑
i=−1
d2,i
= I2,−1 +
j−1∑
i=−1
d1,ai+b′
= I2,−1 +
M(j)∑
l=m(j)
d1,l
= I2,−1 + I1,M(j)+1 − I1,m(j) (6.3)
where:
M(j) = max{b′ − a, b′ + a(j − 1)} = [(a+ 1)/2] j + (b′ − a)
m(j) = min{b′ − a, b′ + a(j − 1)} = [(a− 1)/2] j + (b′ − a)
(6.3) can be rewritten such that only one term on the right hand side depends on j:
I2,j = I2,−1 + aI1,[aj+b′+(1−a)/2] − aI1,[b′+(1−3a)/2] , ∀j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
Now, consider i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and observe that:
c2,i = 1
⇔ i = I2,j′ , for some j′ ∈ {0, . . . , U − 1}
⇔ i = I2,−1 + aI1,[aj′+b′+(1−a)/2] − aI1,[b′+(1−3a)/2] , for some j′ ∈ {0, . . . , U − 1}
⇔ I1,[aj′+b′+(1−a)/2] = ai− aI2,−1 + I1,[b′+(1−3a)/2] , for some j′ ∈ {0, . . . , U − 1}
⇔ I1,j = ai+ b , for some j ∈ {h, . . . , h+ U − 1}
⇔ c1,ai+b = 1
where h = [(a− 1)/2](U − 1) + b′ + (1− a)/2 and b = I1,[b′+(1−3a)/2] − aI2,−1.
It remains only to observe that showing that c2,i = c1,ai+b for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}
is sufficient to demonstrate the equality for all n ∈ Z, since c1 and c2 are periodic
sequences whose periods do not exceed n. Therefore, c1 ∼ c2, as required, which
completes the proof.
The proposition demonstrates that, despite the fact that the function ψ is not a
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bijective map from Ωn \ {0} to Ψn , there nonetheless exists a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the equivalence classes of ∼ in Ωn \ {0} and ^ in Ψn that is based
on ψ.
The following example is an application of the proposition in a specific case.
Example 6.3.3. Consider a single species B-model over a ring of n cells, with state
space Ωn as usual. Let n = 7 and consider the following periodic binary sequences
(recalling the notation introduced in Definition 4.4.5):
c1 = (. . . , 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, . . .)
c2 = (. . . , 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, . . .)
Using the definition of ψ stated above, we have:
d1 = ψ(c1) = (. . . , 2, 1, 4, . . .)
d2 = ψ(c2) = (. . . , 2, 4, 1, . . .)
Observe that d1,i = d2,−i , ∀i ∈ Z (note that the first integer shown in each of the
above sequences is indexed by i = 0). Therefore, by (6.2), d1 ^ d2 and consequently,
by Proposition 6.3.2, we conclude that c1 ∼ c2 ; c1 and c2 lie in the same equivalence
class.
Indeed, this conclusion may be verified directly by observing that c2,i = c1,−i+4 ,
∀i ∈ Z , so c1 ∼ c2 by definition.
6.3.3 Step two: Ψn to ∆
n−1
We now consider a new space ∆n−1, the set of all points with integer coordinates
lying on the regular (n − 1)-simplex embedded in Rn. In other words, ∆n−1 is the
set of all length n vectors of non-negative integers δ whose terms sum to n:
∆n−1 =
{
(δ0, . . . , δn−1) ∈ Zn : δi ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} ,
n−1∑
i=0
δi = n
}
For convenience, we describe this set as an “integer-simplex”.
There exists a natural correspondence between the elements of ∆n−1 and the ele-
ments of Ψn:
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Definition 6.3.4. Given δ = (δ0, . . . , δn−1) ∈ ∆n−1, let U ′′ equal the number of
non-zero terms of δ and J = (J0, . . . , JU ′′−1) be the vector formed from the elements
of the set Jˆ = {j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} : δj 6= 0}, such that:
J0 < . . . < JU ′′−1
The function ξ is defined as follows:
ξ : ∆n−1 → Ψn
δ 7→ d = (di)i∈Z
where di = δJi , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , U ′′ − 1} and dj = dj+U ′′ , ∀j ∈ Z
Observe that, given δ ∈ ∆n−1, the sum of any U ′′ consecutive terms of ξ(δ) is nec-
essarily equal to n, since the terms of δ lie on the n − 1 simplex. So U ′′ plays the
same role as U ′ and therefore also corresponds to the population U of a microstate
and will be referred to as such from this point onward.
The function ξ simply removes any zero terms from the vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 and pro-
duces a sequence d ∈ Ψn by infinitely repeating the remaining terms. Clearly, ξ is
surjective, but not injective; indeed we observe that for each d ∈ Ψn of population
U , there exist precisely
(
n
U
)
distinct vectors δ ∈ ∆n−1 for which ξ(δ) = d, since this
is the number of ways in which the U non-zero terms may be placed in a vector of
length n without changing their order. A one-to-many correspondence from Ψn to
∆n−1 is therefore induced by ξ.
Clearly therefore, there does not exist a true inverse of ξ. However, it will be useful
to define an inverse-like function ξ′ from Ψn to ∆n−1 with the property ξ(ξ′(d)) = d,
∀d ∈ Ψn , which maps sequences in Ψn to representative members of their corre-
sponding equivalence class in ∆n−1:
Definition 6.3.5. Define the function:
ξ′ : Ψn → ∆n−1
d 7→ δ
with δi = di , ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , U − 1} and δi = 0 , ∀i ∈ {U, . . . , n− 1} (unless U = n, in
which case there are no zero terms), where U is the population of d.
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System state 
Representation 1 
Periodic binary sequence 
Representation 3 
n - dimensional vector 
: 
: 
: 
n  cells 
U  occupied cells n – U  unoccupied cells 
Cell indices : 0 1 n – 1 … 2 
: 
Representation 2 
Periodic integer sequence 
Figure 6.3: Example of a particular state of a one-dimensional, single species B-model
on a ring of n cells, of which U are occupied, and of corresponding representations as
a periodic binary sequence c as a periodic integer sequence d and as an n-dimensional
vector δ. The non-zero terms of δ represent the distances between occupied cells of the
system, in order. In this example, n = 10 and U = 4.
Figure 6.3 demonstrates how a particular microstate of the system corresponds to a
periodic sequence c ∈ Ωn, to a periodic sequence d ∈ Ψn via the function ψ and to
a vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 via the function ξ′.
The function ξ and the equivalence relation ^ may be combined to produce an
equivalence relation _ on ∆n−1, in the following way:
Definition 6.3.6. Consider δ1 , δ2 ∈ ∆n−1 and let d1 = ξ(δ1) ∈ Ψn and
d2 = ξ(δ2) ∈ Ψn. The binary relation _ on ∆n−1 is defined such that δ1 _ δ2
if and only if d1 ^ d2.
Definition 6.3.6 has an analogous role to Proposition 6.3.2, in that it guarantees that
ξ respects the equivalence classes of ^ in Ψn and _ in ∆
n−1 in the same way that
ψ respects the equivalence classes of ∼ in Ωn \ {0} and ^ in Ψn. This means that
there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the equivalence classes of Ψn and
∆n−1 based on ξ, which in turn implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the equivalence classes of Ωn \ {0} and ∆n−1. This allows us to make the
following definition.
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Definition 6.3.7. The bijection χ between the equivalence classes of ∼ in Ωn \ {0}
and the equivalence classes of _ in ∆n−1 is defined as follows:
χ : (Ωn \ {0})/∼ → ∆n−1/_
[c] 7→ [ξ′(ψ(c))]
At this point, we pause to present a summary of what has been achieved.
By Proposition 4.4.4, we know that in a A-model (and hence in a B-model), the
dynamics essentially depend only on the equivalence class of a microstate relative
to the automorphisms of the underlying graph and not on the precise microstate
occupied by the system at any given time. In this section, we have shown that for
a single species B-model over a ring of n cells, with state space Ωn, each microstate
of the system (excluding extinction), represented by the periodic sequence c, corre-
sponds to a particular collection of vectors on the integer simplex ∆n−1 (specifically,
c corresponds to the set of all vectors δ ∈ ∆n−1 for which ξ(δ) = ψ(c) ).
We have further shown that there exists an equivalence relation over this integer
simplex such that the equivalence classes in Ωn defined by the automorphism group
correspond exactly with the equivalence classes of this new relation on ∆n−1. There-
fore, the dynamics of the system may be seen as a movement between these equiva-
lence classes on the integer simplex. In other words, we may represent the dynamics
of the system as a point moving around the integer simplex, whose precise location
may be considered to be whichever vector of the appropriate equivalence class that
we find to be most convenient.
A diagrammatic representation of the relationship between a system and the sets
Ωn, Ψn and ∆
n−1 is presented in Figure 6.2.
6.3.4 Cardinalities of equivalence classes
In Section 4.4.5, it was observed that the number of microstates in the equivalence
class [c] ∈ (Ωn \ {0})/∼ is equal to P (c)[1 + R(c)], where P (c) is the period of c
and R(c) is the chirality of c. Observing that a single period of c contains UP (c)/n
occupied cells and that each entry of d = ψ(c) corresponds to a particular occupied
cell, we may conclude that the period of d is given by:
P (d) = UP (c)/n
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We may also observe that the chirality of d (see (4.8)) matches the chirality of c:
R(d) = R(c)
Therefore, following the same logic used to count the number of sequences in the
equivalence class [c] ∈ (Ωn \ {0})/∼, the number of sequences in the equivalence
class [ψ(c)] ∈ Ψn/^ is equal to:
UP (c)[1 +R(c)]/n
As previously observed, each vector d corresponds to precisely
(
n
U
)
distinct vectors
δ ∈ ∆n−1 through the function ξ , so the number of vectors in the equivalence class
[ξ′(ψ(c))] = χ([c]) ∈ ∆n−1/_ is equal to (n
U
)
UP (c)[1 +R(c)]/n or:(
n− 1
U − 1
)
P (c)[1 +R(c)]
Table 6.1 provides a complete summary of these equivalence classes for the case
n = 6, whose microstates are visualised in Figure 4.12.
One important consequence of these results, is that, given U and n, the ratio of the
number of microstates in the equivalence class of c to the number of vectors in the
corresponding equivalence class of ξ′(ψ(c)) is constant for all possible c. This may
be written as:
|[ξ′(ψ(c))]|
|[c]| =
(
n− 1
U − 1
)
, ∀ c ∈
{
c′ ∈ Ωn :
n−1∑
i=0
c′i = U
}
(6.4)
where the notation | · | refers to the cardinality of a given set, as usual.
This result implies that, since all elements of an equivalence class (whether in Ωn or
∆n−1) are interchangeable, if the population U is fixed then each microstate in Ωn
may be considered to correspond to the ‘same number’ of vectors in ∆n−1.
An important consequence of this fact is that a process that selects microstates c
of a particular population U by means of an appropriate random uniform distribu-
tion over Ωn and a process that selects vectors δ of population U by means of an
appropriate random uniform distribution over ∆n−1 will sample their corresponding
equivalence classes (of ∼ and _ respectively) with the same relative frequencies.
This means that, for example, if the initial conditions for a simulation are selected
by means of a uniform distribution over all microstates of a particular population
U , an equivalent effect could be achieved by selecting an initial vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 by
means of a uniform distribution over all such vectors of population U .
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6.4 The dynamics of the transformed model
6.4.1 Introduction
As we have shown, the microstate occupied by the system at any given time may be
represented as an imaginary particle positioned at a point δ of the integer simplex
∆n−1, although the location of this particle need only be defined up to its particular
equivalence class with respect to _. The dynamics of the system are represented
by the movement of this particle around ∆n−1.
In this section, we focus on understanding the characteristics of the model dynamics
in this new space. To do this, we first examine the effect of each of the four tran-
sitions α, β, γ and η on a fixed vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 . We then change our perspective,
considering δ to be a vector random variable, and re-examine the effects of the four
transitions, both with and without the mean field assumptions (see Section 3.2).
Finally, we present partial visualisations of the model dynamics over ∆n−1 and use
these to make some geometric observations on the effects of different transitions.
6.4.2 The effect of particular transitions in ∆n−1
Consider a vector δ = (δ0, . . . , δn−1) ∈ ∆n−1, and recall that the number of non-zero
terms of δ is equal to U , the population of any corresponding microstate in Ωn. The
non-zero terms of δ themselves represent the distances between consecutive occupied
cells of such a corresponding microstate, and the order of these distances is invariant
(up to translation and reflection) between the two representations. Furthermore, the
number of zero terms of δ is equal to the number of unoccupied cells n− U in such
a microstate.
Recall that in a B-model, a transition begins with the selection of a cell by means
of a discrete uniform distribution across all cells, followed by the selection of a
neighbour of this cell by means of a discrete uniform distribution across all such
neighbours. However, for the purposes of the forthcoming analysis, it will be useful
to limit ourselves exclusively to the case in which the right hand neighbour is cho-
sen. Fortunately, since any microstate c+ ∈ Ωn lies in the same equivalence class as
its own reflection c− and these microstates are therefore interchangeable from the
point of view of the dynamics (they may indeed be identical), this limitation may be
made without loss of generality by first deciding, with equal probability, whether to
consider c+ or c−, and then selecting a cell at random from the chosen microstate,
along with its right hand neighbour.
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η-transition 
Death (overcrowding)	  
δi = 1	  
δk + 1	  
δj	  
δj	  
δk	  
η	  
α-transition 
Death (isolation)	  
δi	  δj	  
δj + δi	  
δk	  
δk	  α	  
γ-transition 
Reproduction	  
δi	  
δi – 1	  
δj	  
δj	  
δk	  
δk	  1	  γ	  
β-transition 
Movement	  
δi	  
δi – 1	  
δj	  
δj + 1	  
δk	  
δk	  β	  
:	  
:	  
:	  
:	  
Figure 6.4: The effect of each of the possible transitions in a single species B-model over a ring
of n cells in terms of the entries of a corresponding vector δ ∈ ∆n−1. The initial cell selected by
the transition rule is marked with a star; the selected neighbour is marked with the letter “N”.
Points of ellipsis represent unknown numbers of empty cells (possibly zero) or the continuation of
the microstate beyond the bounds of the diagram.
183
The same transition represented in ∆n−1 may therefore be initiated by choosing
between a vector δ+ representing the current state of the system and its reflection
δ− , with equal probability, and denoting the chosen vector by δ. A term δi is then
selected by means of a discrete uniform distribution over all terms of δ. If δi = 0,
this corresponds to the selection of an unoccupied cell, and the rules of a B-model
dictate that the system remains unchanged. If, however, δi > 0, this corresponds to
the selection of an occupied cell, along with its right hand neighbour.
To go further, if δi = 1, this corresponds to a situation in which the initial cho-
sen cell is both occupied and immediately adjacent to the next occupied cell to its
right. Using the notation of Section 5.2, the chosen pair of cells therefore have states
(‘S’, ‘S’). If, on the other hand, δi > 1, then this corresponds to a situation in which
the initial chosen cell is occupied, but is separated from the next occupied cell to its
right by at least one unoccupied cell. The chosen pair of cells therefore have states
(‘S’, ‘E’).
Supposing that δi > 0, letting δj and δk be the previous and the next non-zero terms
of δi in δ respectively (with the final non-zero term considered to be “previous”
to the first and the first considered to be “next” after the final)1, we are now in
a position to determine the precise effect of each of the transitions α, β, γ and η
in this context. Let δ′α , δ
′
β , δ
′
γ and δ
′
η be vectors that represent the state of the
system following any particular transition of the corresponding type (assuming, in
each case separately, that the configuration of δ is such that a transition of this type
is possible).
First suppose that δi = 1 and therefore that the chosen pair of cells have states
(‘S’, ‘S’). This implies that only an η-transition is possible. Since, in reality, an
η-transition may represent either an  or a ζ-transition (see Section 5.2.1), the final
states of the chosen cells may be either (‘S’, ‘E’) or (‘E’, ‘S’). However, without loss
of generality, we may suppose that an η-transition always has the former effect (the
other possibility would effectively occur if the opposite decision had been made when
choosing between δ+ and δ−).
η-transition : The effect of an η-transition is to change the state of the neighbour-
ing cell from ‘S’ to ‘E’, reducing the population U by 1. In terms of a representation
of the transition in ∆n−1, this means that the two separate entries δi and δk in δ
are replaced in a new vector δ′η by the entries δk + 1 (since the distance from the
1 Note that the special cases in which these three terms are not all distinct are discussed at
the end of this section.
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selected initial cell to its next occupied neighbour has increased by δk) and a zero
entry (since the population of the system has decreased by 1). All other entries of
δ are unchanged in δ′η .
This effect, and those of the other transitions discussed below, is visualised in
Figure 6.4.
Now suppose that δi > 1 and therefore that the chosen pair of cells have states
(‘S’, ‘E’). Consider the following possibilities:
β-transition : The effect of a β-transition is to switch the states of these two cells,
leaving the population U unchanged. In terms of a representation of the transition
in ∆n−1, this means that the two separate entries δj and δi in δ are replaced in δ
′
β
by the entries δj + 1 and δi − 1, since the selected occupied cell has ‘moved to the
right’, thus increasing its distance to the previous occupied cell and decreasing its
distance to the next occupied cell. All other entries of δ are unchanged in δ′β.
γ-transition : The effect of a γ-transition is to change the state of the neighbour-
ing cell from ‘E’ to ‘S’, increasing the population U by 1. In terms of a representation
of the transition in ∆n−1, this means that the entry δj in δ along with a zero entry
(without loss of generality, we may suppose that these terms are consecutive, since
the placement of zero terms does not affect the equivalence class of δ under _) are
replaced in δ′γ by the entries 1 (since the distance from the selected occupied cell
to the next occupied cell is now 1) and δi − 1 (since the distance from the newly
created occupied cell to the next occupied cell is equal to δi − 1). All other entries
of δ are unchanged in δ′γ.
α-transition : The effect of an α-transition is to change the state of the initially
selected cell from ‘S’ to ‘E’, decreasing the population U by 1. In terms of a rep-
resentation of the transition in ∆n−1, this means that the entries δj and δi in δ are
replaced in δ′α by the entries δj + δi (the distance from the previous to the next
occupied cells, the selected occupied cell having been removed) and a zero entry
(since the population of the system has decreased by 1). All other entries of δ are
unchanged in δ′α.
A summary of these results in terms of complete vectors in ∆n−1 is presented below.
In these expressions, standard points of ellipsis represent (possibly empty) sequences
of arbitrary terms, while raised points of ellipsis represent (possibly empty) sequences
of zero terms only. As in the discussion above, in each case, we start from the as-
sumption that the ith term has been selected and found to be non-zero. The previous
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and next non-zero terms are assumed to occupy positions j and k respectively.
β : δ = ( δ0 , . . . , δj−1 , δj , · · · , δi , δi+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
δ′β = ( δ0 , . . . , δj−1 , δj + 1 , · · · , δi − 1 , δi+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
(6.5)
γ : δ = ( δ0 , . . . , δi−2 , 0 , δi , δi+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
δ′γ = ( δ0 , . . . , δi−2 , 1 , δi − 1 , δi+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
(6.6)
η : δ = ( δ0 , . . . , δi−1 , 1 , · · · , δk , δk+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
δ′η = ( δ0 , . . . , δi−1 , 0 , · · · , δk + 1 , δk+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
(6.7)
α : δ = ( δ0 , . . . , δj−1 , δj , · · · , δi , δi+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
δ′α = ( δ0 , . . . , δj−1 , δj +δi , · · · , 0 , δi+1 , . . . , δn−1 )
(6.8)
Each of the above vector descriptions excludes those variables that are not relevant to
the corresponding transition. Specifically, δk is not relevant in α, β or γ-transitions
and δj is not relevant in γ or η-transitions. Observe also that the term δi does not
appear explicitly in the vector description of an η-transition, since this variable is
necessarily equal to 1 in this case (otherwise an η-transition cannot occur). Hence,
δi is represented by the 1 in the first vector of (6.7).
Note that there are certain restrictions on the validity of (6.5)-(6.8), since there exist
vectors δ ∈ ∆n−1 of population U for which not all transitions are possible or for
which the analysis fails for other reasons. Naturally, for the model to function, we
require n > 1. We also require that U > 0, since δ is otherwise undefined. Further-
more, for the β and α analysis to hold, we must have U > 1 (otherwise there is only
one non-zero term and i = j); for the β, γ and α analysis to hold, we must have
U < n (otherwise these transitions are impossible), while for the η analysis to hold,
we must have U > 1 (otherwise η-transitions are impossible).
However, these conditions clearly represent special cases, in which the number
of individuals attains its maximum value or is close to its minimum value.
(6.5)-(6.8) are therefore accurate descriptions of the effects of each of the four pos-
sible transitions in all cases of practical interest.
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6.4.3 Describing transitions in terms of vector random vari-
ables
For the purposes of later work, in which we will consider expectations related to
model transitions, it will be necessary to understand the status of δi, δj and δk in
(6.5), (6.6), (6.7) and (6.8) as random variables.
We note that, given a particular initial vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 , if δ′ represents the vector
that results from a single (non-specific, possibly null) B-model transition applied to
δ, then δ′ is a vector random variable whose distribution over ∆n−1 depends on δ .
δ′α , δ
′
β , δ
′
γ and δ
′
η are also vector random variables dependent on δ, each derived
from the distribution of δ′ by conditioning on different assumptions (specifically, that
an appropriate term and neighbour had been chosen for the corresponding transition
to occur and that this transition did indeed occur).
In this context, given a particular δ ∈ ∆n−1 , we note that the terms labelled δi
that appear in (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8) are identically distributed random variables.
This is because they are all selected from δ by means of an identical procedure (a
discrete uniform random selection across all terms of δ) and are all subject only to
the condition that δi > 1. The δi in these expressions may therefore be considered
to be distributed according to a discrete uniform random selection across all terms
of δ of value greater than 1.
Note that, in (6.7), δi is instead subject to the condition δi = 1, so its value is known,
and it therefore need not be treated as a random variable.
We may go further, and observe that, given a particular δ ∈ ∆n−1 , the joint dis-
tribution of the random variables δi and δj (and hence, given that the δi variables
are identically distributed, also the distribution of δj considered singly) is identical
in the two cases in which they both appear explicitly, (6.5) and (6.8). Again, this
holds because the variables are selected by means of an identical procedure, with δj
being equal to the previous non-zero term to δi in both cases (recalling that δ must
first be selected from between the two vectors δ+ and δ−), subject once again to the
condition that δi > 1. It is clear, however, that δi and δj cannot be considered to be
independent.
Finally, we may observe that, given a particular δ ∈ ∆n−1 as usual, the distribution
of the random variable defined by δk may also be unambiguously described, since it
is always equal to the first non-zero term after the initially selected term, conditional
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on the fact that the initial cell is equal to one (again recalling that δ must first be
selected from between the two vectors δ+ and δ−).
Given n and U , the maxima and minima of each of these random variables may
also be derived from a consideration of the procedures by which they are generated.
For example, since (for those cases in which it appears explicitly) δi is generated by
means of a random uniform selection over all terms of δ greater than or equal to 2,
its minimum possible value is 2 (considered over all possible δ ∈ ∆n−1 ), while its
maximum possible value is n− U + 1, since the sum of the terms must equal n and
there are U − 1 other non-zero terms.
The maxima and minima of each of the variables and of two important combinations
of variables are given in Table 6.2.
Random
variable Minimum Maximum
δi 2 n− U + 1
δj 1 n− U
δk 1 n− U + 1
δj − δi −(n− U) n− U − 2
δiδj 2
⌊
n− U + 2
2
⌋⌈
n− U + 2
2
⌉
Table 6.2: The maximum and minimum values of particular terms of δ and of cer-
tain combinations of these terms, considered as random variables. Note that the vari-
ables used here refer specifically to those mentioned explicitly in the vector descriptions
(6.5)-(6.8). Hence, the row for δk is conditional on the fact that δi = 1 (as in (6.7)) while
all other rows are conditional on the fact that δi > 1 (as in (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8)).
The notation b · c and d · e , used in Table 6.2, represents the floor function (which
returns the greatest integer less than or equal to the argument) and the ceiling
function (which returns the smallest integer greater than or equal to the argument)
respectively.
Most of these results have a very simple derivation. The exception is the maximum
value that may be attained by the product of the random variables δi and δj. To
derive this result, note that δi + δj ≤ n − U + 2 (since there are U − 2 other non-
zero terms, and all such terms must sum to n). Clearly, the maximum value of the
product is attained when this inequality is, in fact an equality. We then have:
δiδj = δi(n− U + 2− δi)
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The maximum of this expression is attained when δi (which must be an integer) is
as close as possible to (n−U+2)/2. This explains the expression given in Table 6.2.
The results of Table 6.2 provide a useful indication of the possible range of certain
key quantities and will be used extensively in Section 6.6.3 when investigating the
effect of different transitions on the clumping of individuals.
6.4.4 Expectations of the terms of δ under the mean field
assumptions
Although a full description of the distributions of δi , δj and δk is not possible without
complete knowledge of the current microstate of the system (up to its equivalence
class, as usual) as represented by δ, under the mean field assumptions it is possible
to write expressions for their expectations in terms of the density of the system
u = U/n. These calculations will later prove useful in analysing the ‘stability’ of
mean field type behaviour in a one-dimensional single species B-model under differ-
ent transitions, discussed in Section 6.6.4.
The mean field approach employed in this section uses the first of the assumptions
presented in our analysis of the NANIA model, in Section 4.3.4. This assumption is
reproduced here, in the context of the single species B-model:
• For a particular time t, the states of all cells may be treated as realisations of
independent identically distributed Bernoulli variables, each with parameter
equal to the current overall density of the system u.
Loosely speaking then, the mean field assumption says that the current microstate
of the system c ∈ Ωn (and thus, by the results of Section 6.3.4, also its represen-
tation δ ∈ ∆n−1) ‘looks like’ it has simply been chosen randomly uniformly across
all possible microstates of density u. However, as stated in Section 4.3.4, for the
assumption to be at all reasonable, we require that n, U and n−U are all sufficiently
large to prevent significant, unavoidable dependencies between cell states over small
neighbourhoods.
Note that the second of the mean field assumptions given in Section 4.3.4 is not
relevant here, since it relates to the continuing evolution of the system, while we are
currently concerned only with the instantaneous expected values of the terms of δ.
As observed in Section 6.4.3, given δ ∈ ∆n−1 representing the current microstate
of the system c ∈ Ωn , δi is a random variable representing a term of δ, randomly
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uniformly selected among all those terms of value greater than 1. We can therefore
write:
E[δi] = E[ δ | δ > 1 ]
where δ represents a random variable corresponding to an unconditional random
uniform selection over all terms of δ. Note that these expectations are only defined
for 0 < u < 1, since u = 1⇒ δ = 1, so the condition δ > 1 cannot be fulfilled, while
δ is not defined when u = 0.
Now:
E[δ] = E[ δ | δ > 1 ] P[δ > 1] + E[ δ | δ = 1 ] P[δ = 1] + E[ δ | δ = 0 ] P[δ = 0]
⇒ 1 = E[δi] (1− P[δ = 1]− P[δ = 0]) + P[δ = 1]
⇒ E[δi] = 1− P[δ = 1]
1− P[δ = 1]− P[δ = 0]
⇒ E[δi] = 1− P[δ = 1]
u− P[δ = 1] (6.9)
Observe that the fact E[δ] = 1, used in the first implication, follows from the fact
that δ has n terms, and that these terms must sum to n.
Up to this point, the mean field assumption has not been used, and equation (6.9) is
valid in all circumstances, no matter what process is used to generate δ. However,
in order to calculate P[δ = 1], a particular distribution for δ must be assumed.
The probability that δ = 1 is the probability that a randomly chosen cell will be both
occupied and immediately adjacent to its next occupied neighbour (looking to the
right, though the direction is arbitrary). The mean field assumption suggests that
the states of the two cells should be considered to be independent, and that P[δ = 1]
should therefore be assumed to be equal to u2, the probability u that the first chosen
cell is occupied multiplied by the probability u that its chosen neighbour is occupied.
Substituting into (6.9) then gives:
E[δi] =
1− u2
u− u2
=
1 + u
u
So if δ represents a particular instantaneous state of a model whose behaviour is
observed to be consistent with that predicted by the mean field equations, we would
expect that the expectation of δi (the mean size of an entry of δ with value greater
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than 1) should be approximately equal to (1 + u)/u . Conversely, given a model
whose instantaneous state, as represented by δ, produces an expectation of δi that
is significantly different from (1 +u)/u , the only possible explanation would be that
the proportion of occupied cells in the corresponding microstate c for which the right
hand neighbour is also occupied is not well approximated by u, since this was the
only assumption made in the derivation of E[δi]. This, in turn would imply that the
mean field assumption was invalid and we would not expect the system to behave
as predicted by the mean field equations.
The derivation of expectations for δj and δk is more simple. δj is a random variable
representing the previous non-zero term to δi in δ while δk is a random variable
representing the next non-zero term following a randomly uniformly selected unit
term of δ. The mean field assumption makes no distinction between these two
situations, since the states of cells are locally modelled as independent variables. In
each case, δj and δk represent the expected number of sequential cells that must be
checked until an occupied cell is found. Such variables clearly follow a geometric
distribution with parameter u. Therefore, the mean field assumptions suggest that:
E[δj] = E[δk] =
1
u
and, moreover, that the variables δi , δj and δk may be considered to be independent.
Clearly, in order for these results to be reasonable, we require that the expected value
1/u is significantly smaller than the total number of unoccupied cells n−U and cer-
tainly much smaller than the total number of cells n, otherwise the dependencies
inherent in considering large numbers of cells simultaneously and the periodicity of
the system would render the analysis invalid in terms of the true model. However,
the earlier requirement that n, U and n− U are large ensures that these conditions
are met.
Again, if δ represents the instantaneous state of a system whose behaviour is ob-
served to be consistent with that predicted by the mean field equations, we would
expect that the true expectations of δj and δk for this particular vector should be
approximately equal to 1/u .
It is worth recalling that mean field analysis naturally represents a significant sim-
plification of the true situation. Even without consideration of correlations between
local cell states that may be generated by the specific dynamics of the model, it is
clear that considering δi and δj to be independent is a bold assumption, since the
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condition that the δm must sum to n and the knowledge that (in the true model)
precisely U of these terms are non-zero clearly means that the larger the particular
value of δi , the smaller the likely value of δj and vice versa. However, the purpose
of this section is not a justification of mean field analysis, but an examination of the
values that we would expect to see for the expectations of the random variables δi ,
δj and δk derived from a vector δ representing the instantaneous state of a B-model
whose behaviour is observed to conform to that predicted by the mean field equa-
tions.
For ease of reference, the expectations of these variables and of those combinations
of random variables that were considered in Table 6.2 are summarised in Table 6.3 .
Note that, the assumption of independence ensures that the expectations of δj − δi
and δiδj may be calculated simply by subtracting and multiplying the separate
expectations of the relevant variables.
Random
variable
Expectation under the
mean field assumptions
δi
1 + u
u
δj
1
u
δk
1
u
δj − δi −1
δiδj
1 + u
u2
Table 6.3: The expectations of particular terms of δ and of certain
combinations of these terms under the mean field assumptions. As in
Table 6.2, the variables used here refer specifically to those mentioned
explicitly in the vector descriptions (6.5)-(6.8). Hence, the row for δk
is conditional on the fact that δi = 1 (as in (6.7)) while all other rows
are conditional on the fact that δi > 1 (as in (6.5), (6.6) and (6.8)).
To summarise, in this section, we have calculated the expected values of certain
quantities of interest derived from the vector δ, representing the microstate of
a one-dimensional single species B-model for which the mean field assumptions
are supposed to be (at least instantaneously) valid. These results will be used in
Section 6.6.4, the final part of this chapter, to draw conclusions linking the different
types of transition with the global dynamics of the model.
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(… , 1, 1, 0, …) 
(… , 1, 0, 1, …) 
(… , 1, 1, 1, …) 
(… , 3, …) 
(… , 2, 1, …) 
(… , 1, 2, …) 
(… , 1, 1, 1, …) (1, 1, 1) 
(3, 0, 0) 
(0, 3, 0) 
(0, 0, 3) 
0 
I 
II 
III 
0 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
I 
II 
III 
Periodic integer 
sequences 
3 
Periodic binary 
sequences 
 
3 
Integer-simplex 
2         
Figure 6.5: The complete set of microstates of a single species B-model over a ring
of n cells and the corresponding elements of Ωn, Ψn and ∆
n−1, for the case n = 3.
The appropriate equivalence classes in each space are labelled with Roman numerals,
such that corresponding classes in different spaces are allocated the same numeral. The
class labelled 0 corresponds to the microstate of population 0 (extinction) and has no
corresponding class in Ψn or ∆
n−1.
6.4.5 Visualising and analysing the dynamics in ∆n−1
We now turn our attention to the dynamics of the one-dimensional single species
B-model, as represented on the integer simplex ∆n−1. Our objective is to gain a
qualitative understanding of how α, β, γ and η-transitions affect the movement of
δ across ∆n−1 through presenting visual representations of these dynamics. These
qualitative observations will then inform the subsequent analytical work pursued in
the remainder of the chapter, particularly in Section 6.6.3, where we examine the
effect of different transitions on individual clumping.
In this section, we will require the following definition, which states that points of
the integer simplex ∆n−1 are considered to be adjacent when the distance between
the points is minimal:
Definition 6.4.1. The points δ1 = (δ1,i)i∈{0,...,n−1} and δ2 = (δ2,i)i∈{0,...,n−1} of the
integer simplex ∆n−1 for some n ∈ N are defined to be adjacent if and only if:
|δ2 − δ1| = min{|δ∗∗ − δ∗| : δ∗ 6= δ∗∗ ∈ ∆n−1} (6.10)
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( 0, 0, 3 ) 
( 3, 0, 0 ) ( 0, 3, 0 ) 
( 2, 0, 1 ) 
( 1, 0, 2 ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 
( 0, 2, 1 ) 
( 1, 2, 0 ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 
( 1, 1, 1 ) 
I I 
I 
III 
β  (movement) 
γ  (reproduction) 
  η  (death - overcrowding) 
Key to Transitions: 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
Figure 6.6: The dynamics of a single species B-model over a ring of 3 cells under the
influence of β, γ and η-transitions, as represented on the integer simplex ∆2. Roman
numerals denote the equivalence classes of the system, corresponding with those enumer-
ated in Figure 6.5. Class 0 (extinction) is omitted, both since the system cannot move
to this class under the influence of β, γ and η-transitions only and since this class does
not correspond to any points on the integer simplex.
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 6.4.2. Given δ1, δ2 ∈ ∆n−1 as defined in Definition 6.4.1, (6.10) holds
if and only if ∃j, k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} such that:
δ2,i =

δ1,i + 1 , i = j
δ1,i − 1 , i = k
δ1,i , otherwise.
To better understand how the dynamics of the system may be represented on the
integer simplex ∆n−1, consider the case n = 3. This case is sufficiently simple that
we can easily list the complete set of true microstates of the system, along with all
the elements of Ωn, Ψn and ∆
n−1, as seen in Figure 6.5.
∆2 is a two-dimensional object - an equilateral triangular lattice embedded in R3 -
and may therefore be easily visualised. Also, using the results of Section 6.4.2, as
part of such a visualisation, we may also indicate the possible effect of the various
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α  (death – isolated) 
Key to Transitions: 
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( 0, 3, 0 ) 
( 2, 0, 1 ) 
( 1, 0, 2 ) ( 0, 1, 2 ) 
( 0, 2, 1 ) 
( 1, 2, 0 ) ( 2, 1, 0 ) 
( 1, 1, 1 ) 
I I 
I 
II 
II 
II II 
II 
II 
III 
EXTINCTION 
EXTINCTION 
EXTINCTION 
Figure 6.7: The dynamics of a single species B-model over a ring of 3 cells under the
influence of α-transitions, as represented on the integer simplex ∆2. Roman numerals
denote the equivalence classes of the system, corresponding with those enumerated in
Figure 6.5.
transitions in terms of movements over this lattice. Figure 6.6 presents such a vi-
sualisation, with arrows representing the possible effects of β, γ and η-transitions
for all microstates of the system. Figure 6.7 presents a similar visualisation, with
arrows representing the possible effects of α-transitions.
Note that, in creating these visualisations, since all elements of an equivalence class
are interchangeable, we have not been concerned with the precise point of ∆2 that
lies at the head of each arrow. Rather, for each point of the integer-simplex, all
equivalence classes to which the system may be transformed from this point under
the influence of a single β, γ, η or α-transition have been identified and the appro-
priate arrows have been drawn to all the closest members of these classes in terms
of the Euclidean distance in R3. In this way, all possible movements of the system
between equivalence classes under the influence of these transitions are represented
in the diagrams.
Note that, for reasons of clarity, situations in which a particular transition may
transform between microstates lying in the same equivalence class have only been
represented by loops where no transition between adjacent points of the integer sim-
plex could convey the same information. For example, all transitions between points
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in Class II could instead have been represented by loops on the appropriate vertices.
The first thing to note from Figure 6.6 is that β, γ and η-transitions correspond ex-
clusively to movements between adjacent points (or, exceptionally, identical points)
on the integer simplex, in the following sense. If there exists a transition of one of
these three types that may transform a microstate in one particular equivalence class
of the system to a microstate in another particular equivalence class of the system,
then there exist two points, one in each of the corresponding equivalence classes of ∆2
that are adjacent (or, exceptionally, identical) on the integer simplex. The exception
concerns the case where a β-transition leaves the equivalence class of a microstate
unchanged and a ‘movement’ from an appropriate point of ∆2 to itself is permitted.
For an example of such a case, see the loops at the corners of the lattice of Figure 6.6.
Indeed, for β, γ and η-transitions, the adjacency property identified above is a gen-
eral result and not specific to the case n = 3, as may be immediately observed by
considering the results of Section 6.4.2. In that section it was demonstrated that
each of the transitions β, γ and η operating on the vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 has the effect of
adding 1 to one term of δ, subtracting 1 from another and leaving all other terms
unchanged (see (6.5), (6.6), (6.7)). However, according to Corollary 6.4.2, points
that are adjacent on the integer simplex are related in precisely this way, so we may
conclude that the effect of any one of these transitions is like a single step between
adjacent points of ∆n−1.
Note, however, that the analysis of Section 6.4.2 requires that U > 1, and hence
does not apply to the exceptional cases of points in Class I, which have population
U = 1 and which are associated with β-transitions represented by loops in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.7 shows that, excluding transitions from points in Class I to extinction,
α-transitions can also be represented as steps between adjacent points of the lattice.
However, this is not a general result. For higher values of n, unlike other transitions,
α-transitions may transform the system between equivalence classes that have no
adjacent points in ∆n−1. This is because, as seen in Section 6.4.2, an α-transition
operating on the vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 has the effect of replacing two terms of δ with a
zero term and a term equal to their sum (see (6.8)). Such a transformation will not
generally correspond to a single step between adjacent points of ∆n−1.
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Figure 6.8: The dynamics of a single species B-model over a ring of 6 cells under the
influence of β, γ and η-transitions, for microstates of population U ≤ 3 , as represented on
a section of the integer simplex ∆5 . Roman numerals denote the equivalence classes of the
system, corresponding with those described in Table 6.1. Class 0 (extinction) is omitted,
both since the system cannot move to this class under the influence of β, γ and η-transitions
only and since this class does not correspond to any points on the integer simplex.
Although the dynamics of models for higher values of n cannot be completely visu-
alised in two dimensions, it is possible to visualise part of the dynamics. Figures 6.8
and 6.9 present visualisations of the dynamics of a B-model with n = 6 over a
section of the integer simplex ∆5. Since ∆5 is a five-dimensional object embedded
in R6, containing vectors of the form δ = ( δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, δ5 ), only points for
which δ3 = δ4 = δ5 = 0 have been considered, producing a two-dimensional slice of
the system.
Since the position of the zero terms of δ is arbitrary and the number of non-zero
terms is equal to the population U of the system, this is equivalent to visualising the
complete dynamics of the system between microstates with populations of less than
or equal to 3. When viewing the figures, it should therefore be remembered that
transitions between the points depicted and points representing states of population
4 or more are not represented.
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Figure 6.9: The dynamics of a single species B-model over a ring of 6 cells under the
influence of α-transitions, for microstates of population U ≤ 3 , as represented on a section
of the integer simplex ∆5 . Roman numerals denote the equivalence classes of the system,
corresponding with those described in Table 6.1.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 starkly support the above comments on the different nature of
β, γ and η as opposed to α-transitions. All the β, γ and η-transitions depicted
appear as movements between adjacent points of ∆5, while many of the possible
α-transitions correspond to much larger steps across the space, and may also induce
extinction.
These informal arguments serve to develop our understanding of the fundamen-
tal difference between these different types of transition and go some way toward
explaining the different effects that they may have on macroscopic features of the
system, as identified in Section 5.3.10. A more quantitative approach to this analysis
will be employed in the following sections.
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6.5 Taking account of the spatial distribution of
individuals in the one-dimensional single spe-
cies B-model
6.5.1 Motivations and discussion
The importance of spatial clumping and its effect on model dynamics has been ac-
knowledged and discussed by a number of authors. For example, in the context of
one-dimensional CAs, Wolfram (2002, pp. 359-360) discusses the processes by which
separate spatial regions, exhibiting distinct cell states or patterns of behaviour, can
grow and merge to produce “nested” patterns; Mirabet et al. (2007) investigate the
ways in which local behavioural rules can affect the formation of “subgroups” of
individuals in ABMs of flocking; while Fibich and Gibori (2010, pp. 1461-1464)
consider the dynamics of an ABM for the adoption of new products in terms of the
expansion and merging of different clusters of individuals, in both one-dimensional
and multi-dimensional cases.
In this section, we introduce a family of measures of clumping that can be used
to analyse the microstates of the one-dimensional single species B-model. These
measures will ultimately allow for a quantitative analysis of the effects of different
transitions on the spatial distribution of individuals in this model, which will be
presented in Section 6.6.
In Section 5.4, autocorrelations were used to build up a picture of the degree of
clumping of the individuals in a system and it was observed that α-transitions seem
to lead to increased individual clumping, invalidating the spatial independence as-
sumptions that are necessary for mean field theory to meaningfully describe the
dynamics of the system. However, describing individual clumping in this way re-
quires many separate measures, each representing an autocorrelation of a different
lag. If possible, to aid analysis and interpretation, it would be preferable to describe
clumping using a single measure.
It should be noted that no such measure could be hoped to completely describe the
distribution of individuals throughout the system; this information could not be use-
fully conveyed by a single number. Instead, any measure will be somewhat heuristic,
in that while it may not give a precise description of the state of the system and how
it will evolve, it may nonetheless provide a useful indication of individual clumping,
suggesting which patterns of behaviour may be considered more likely from a given
microstate. Clearly, since we have shown that the dynamics of the model do not
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depend on the current microstate but on the equivalence class of that state, for such
a measure to be at all meaningful, it must at least be constant over all elements of
an equivalence class.
In discussing individual clumping in the one-dimensional case, we are essentially
interested in the distribution of the sizes of the gaps between occupied cells of a
microstate c ∈ Ωn . If these gaps are all of similar size, then individuals are highly
spread out throughout the system and clumping is low. If, on the other hand, the
distribution of gap sizes is highly uneven, with some gaps much larger than others,
then individual clumping is higher.
It is on this basis that the clumping measures presented in the following section have
been constructed.
6.5.2 Definition and discussion of clumping measures
Consider the following definition:
Definition 6.5.1. Given a vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 and a positive integer U ′ > 1, we define
the clumping measure at population U ′ of δ , denoted ClU ′ [δ], as:
ClU ′ [δ] =
1
n
√√√√ U ′2
U ′ − 1 (Re− Im)

√√√√ 1
U ′
n−1∑
m=0
δ2m −
( n
U ′
)2  (6.11)
where the square root of a real number is taken to refer exclusively to the positive
real or ‘positive’ imaginary root, as appropriate, and where we define the function:
(Re− Im) : C → R
z 7→ Re[z]− Im[z]
If U is the population of δ, then we call ClU [δ] the natural clumping measure
of δ, which will be denoted Cl[δ].
The use of the function (Re− Im) ensures that the clumping measure at population
U ′ is real. Observe also that, since the argument of (Re − Im) in (6.11) is either
purely real or purely imaginary, in this instance, the function is either equal to its
real argument (in the former case) or to i times its purely imaginary argument (oth-
erwise). Furthermore, the sign of ClU ′ [δ] matches that of the argument of the square
root in the function (Re− Im).
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A plot of the function y = (Re − Im)[ √x ], for x ∈ R, and a discussion of its
derivative is provided in Figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10: The function y = (Re − Im)[ √x ] for x ∈ [−1, 1] .
Observe that y =
√
x for all x ≥ 0 and y = −√|x| for all x ≤ 0 . We
therefore have:
d
dx
(
(Re− Im)[ √x ]) = 1
2
√|x| , ∀x 6= 0
In the remainder of this section, we investigate this clumping measure and discuss
the reasoning behind its definition.
We first consider certain conditions under which the function (Re − Im) may be
disregarded, since it is equal to the identity function. For δ ∈ ∆n−1 with population
U , we have that:
1
U ′
n−1∑
m=0
δ2m ≥
(
U
U ′
)(
n
U
)2
=
(
n
U
)(
n
U ′
)
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Hence, if U ≤ U ′, then the use of the function (Re− Im) is not necessary to ensure
that ClU ′ [δ] is real, since:
1
U ′
n−1∑
m=0
δ2m −
( n
U ′
)2
≥ 0
and the argument of (Re− Im) is therefore purely real.
In particular, this implies that the natural clumping measure Cl[δ] is always non-
negative and may be written in the simpler form:
Cl[δ] =
1
n
√√√√ U2
U − 1
√√√√ 1
U
n−1∑
m=0
δ2m −
( n
U
)2
(6.12)
In this case, n/U is equal to the mean of the non-zero terms of δ, since the terms
of any vector on the integer-simplex ∆n−1 must sum to n. Hence, in the case of
the natural clumping measure, the right hand square root of (6.12) is equal to the
empirical standard deviation of the non-zero terms of δ. Since these non-zero terms
represent the sizes of the gaps between individuals in a corresponding microstate of
the system, Cl[δ] is indeed related to the distribution of sizes of these gaps, as desired.
Given n and U ′, since the function (Re − Im)[√x] is strictly increasing in x (see
Figure 6.10), we observe that ClU ′ [δ] attains a maximum (over all δ ∈ ∆n−1) where∑
δ2m attains a maximum. Since the δm must sum to n, this maximum is attained
when one term of δ is equal to n and all other terms are equal to 0. Conversely,
ClU ′ [δ] attains a minimum where
∑
δ2m attains a minimum. This minimum is at-
tained when all terms of δ are equal to 1.
Substituting these maxima and minima into (6.11) and simplifying, we see that:
−1 ≤ −
√
1
U ′ − 1
√
1− U
′
n
≤ ClU ′ [δ] ≤ 1 , ∀U ′ ∈ {2 , . . . , n}
The choice of the multiplier n−1
√
U ′2/(U ′ − 1) in (6.11) is therefore seen to ensure
that ClU ′ [δ] ∈ [−1, 1] , ∀U ′ ∈ {2 , . . . , n} , with values of ClU ′ [δ] below 0 indicating
that the current clumping measure at population U ′ is below the minimal possible
value for a system of population U ′.
The fact that ClU ′ [δ] can only be defined for U
′ > 1 poses no significant problem,
since it is meaningless to talk about the degree of ‘clumping’ of a single individual
in any case.
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It will prove useful to note the following alternative forms of ClU ′ [δ]:
ClU ′ [δ] =
1
n
√√√√ U ′
U ′ − 1 (Re− Im)

√√√√n−1∑
m=0
δ2m − U ′
( n
U ′
)2  (6.13)
=
√√√√ U ′
U ′ − 1 (Re− Im)

√√√√n−1∑
m=0
(
δm
n
)2
− 1
U ′
 (6.14)
As with (6.11), in the case of the natural clumping measure (and, indeed, any case in
which U ≤ U ′), the function (Re− Im) in each of these expressions may be replaced
with the identity function, since its argument is purely real.
We note in passing that in (6.14), if U ′ and each of the δm/n are held constant,
then ClU ′ remains meaningful as n → ∞, demonstrating that the measure could
be extended to a continuous case in which individuals may occupy any point of the
interval [0, 1) .
Verifying that ClU ′ is constant over equivalence classes is straightforward. This
property follows immediately from the observations that any two vectors, δ1 , δ2 ,
that are equivalent under _ may differ only in the arrangement of their terms (see
Section 6.3) and that ClU ′ [δ] is clearly invariant under any permutation of the terms
of δ.
Although it is the natural clumping measure Cl[δ] that will generally be of most
interest, we will also need to consider clumping measures at populations other than
that of the argument δ. The reasons for this will become clear in the following
sections, but essentially it will prove more straightforward to analyse the model
dynamics through tracking changes in all clumping measures ClU ′ [δ] simultaneously
rather than restricting our attention to the natural clumping measure Cl[δ].
6.5.3 A geometric interpretation of the clumping measure
In this section, we examine the natural clumping measure Cl[δ] from a geometric
perspective. This will allow us to understand the relationship between this quantity
and the structure of the integer simplex ∆n−1, providing an intuitive link between
the measures of clumping and the visualisations of the model dynamics over ∆n−1
that were presented in Section 6.4.5.
Returning to (6.12), recall that the natural clumping measure Cl[δ] is defined to
be equal to the empirical standard deviation of the non-zero terms of δ multiplied
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by the factor n−1
√
U2/(U − 1). To understand why this factor has been chosen,
we demonstrate that Cl[δ] has an intuitive geometric interpretation over the integer
simplex ∆n−1.
We will require the following definitions:
Definition 6.5.2. Given a vector δ = (δm)m∈{0,...,n−1} ∈ ∆n−1 of population U :
• The local centre of δ, denoted LC[δ] = (LCm)m∈{0,...,n−1} ∈ Rn , is defined:
LCm =

n
U
, if δm > 0
0 , if δm = 0
• The local extremity of δ, denoted LE[δ] = (LEm)m∈{0,...,n−1} ∈ ∆n−1 , is
defined:
LEm =

n , if m = min{l ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} : δl = max{δ0, . . . , δn−1}}
0 , otherwise.
Observe that, while the local extremity of δ clearly lies on the integer simplex ∆n−1,
the local centre of δ may not, since n/U is not necessarily an integer. Geometrically,
note also that LC[δ] is the closest point to δ in Rn with precisely U non-zero terms,
which sum to n and which are all equal, while LE[δ] is the closest point (or one of
several closest points) to δ in Rn with precisely one non-zero term, which is equal
to n. Equivalently, the local extremity is the closest point of ∆n−1 with population 1.
Given a particular δ ∈ ∆n−1 , consider the Euclidean distance from δ to its local
centre:
|δ − LC[δ]| =
√√√√n−1∑
m=0
(
δm − n
U
)2
1R+ [δm]
=
√√√√n−1∑
m=0
δ2m − 2
n
U
n−1∑
m=0
δm +
n−1∑
m=0
( n
U
)2
1R+ [δm]
=
√√√√n−1∑
m=0
δ2m − 2n
n
U
+ U
( n
U
)2
=
√√√√n−1∑
m=0
δ2m −
n2
U
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Here, 1R+ represents the indicator function of R+ over R:
1R+ : R → {0, 1}
x 7→

1 , x ∈ R+
0 , otherwise
(6.15)
We observe that, for the natural clumping measure Cl[δ], the final square root of
(6.13) is therefore equal to the Euclidean distance in Rn from δ to its local centre
(recalling that the function (Re− Im) may be ignored in this case).
Now consider the Euclidean distance from the local centre to the local extremity of
δ, which may be expressed as follows:
|LE[δ]− LC[δ]| =
√(
n− n
U
)2
+ (U − 1)
(
0− n
U
)2
= n
√
U − 1
U
By comparing with (6.13) once again, we may observe that the natural clumping
measure Cl[δ] is the ratio of the distance from δ to its local centre over the distance
from its local centre to its local extremity:
Cl[δ] =
|δ − LC[δ]|
|LE[δ]− LC[δ]| (6.16)
Figure 6.11 demonstrates this geometric interpretation of the natural clumping mea-
sure for some particular simple examples.
This link between the empirical standard deviation of the gaps between individuals
for a microstate c ∈ Ωn and the geometry of ∆n−1 illustrates why representing the
dynamics of the system over the integer-simplex is appropriate when considering the
degree of clumping of the individuals.
The geometric interpretation of the natural clumping measure also offers an intu-
itive route for understanding the different effects of local transitions on individual
clumping that were observed in Section 5.4. In Section 6.4.5, it was noted that β,
γ and η-transitions correspond to steps between adjacent points of the integer sim-
plex, while α-transitions may correspond to larger steps. Moreover, in the example
visualised in Figure 6.9, we observe that these large steps are directed away from
the local centre and towards the local extremities.
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Figure 6.11: A demonstration of how the natural clumping measure Cl[δ] is related to the
geometry of the integer-simplex, for three microstates with n = 20 and U = 2. The plot depicts
a one-dimensional cross section of ∆19, embedded in R2 (recall that ∆19 is defined as a subset of
R20), for vectors δ for which δ2 = . . . = δ19 = 0. Observe that Cl[δ] (as defined in (6.12)) represents
the Euclidean distance of δ from its ‘local centre’ as a proportion of the distance from the ‘local
centre’ to a nearby ‘local extremity’ of the integer simplex.
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In the context of (6.16), we might therefore surmise that β, γ and η-transitions would
lead to small changes in individual clumping, while α-transitions could instead lead
to sudden large increases. A quantitative argument of this nature will be presented
in Section 6.6.
6.5.4 Remarks on clumping measures
To better understand why α-transitions appear to cause the clumping of individuals
while β, γ and η-transitions do not, we will examine the effect of each transition
on the clumping measures ClU ′ . However, before beginning this analysis, we make
some preliminary observations.
Firstly, it should once again be stressed that, given a particular δ ∈ ∆n−1 of popula-
tion U , although the clumping measure ClU ′ [δ] is defined for all U
′ ∈ {2 , . . . , n },
and while it will prove useful to consider measures for which U ′ 6= U , only the natu-
ral clumping measure has a meaningful intuitive interpretation as a scaled version of
the empirical standard deviation of the gaps between individuals in a corresponding
microstate.
Secondly, it should be noted that the natural clumping measure may only be rea-
sonably used to compare the clumping of individuals between microstates of equal
population. Specifically, given two vectors δ1 and δ2 , with respective populations
U1 and U2 , if U1 = U2 and Cl[δ1] > Cl[δ2] then it is meaningful to state that the
individuals of a microstate corresponding to δ1 are more highly clumped than those
of a microstate corresponding to δ2 , since we know that the empirical standard de-
viation of the gaps separating the individuals is higher in the former case than in
the latter. However, if U1 6= U2, then no such comparison should be made.
Furthermore, comparing vectors with different populations in terms of the empirical
standard deviation of their non-zero terms alone would not be reasonable, because
this quantity is not of interest to us in isolation. Rather, it is intended as a proxy
measure for a concept (individual clumping) which we expect to have a certain in-
fluence on the behaviour of the system. It is clearly not sensible to infer that two
microstates with equal empirical standard deviations of this kind will exhibit similar
behaviour if they do not also have the same population, since we know that the
behaviour of a B-model is strongly influenced by population density.
Bearing this in mind, we will consider the relationship between the dynamics of
the system and the clumping measures ClU ′ from the following perspective. As was
207
observed in Section 6.3, the dynamics may be represented as an imaginary particle
moving around the integer-simplex ∆n−1 . Each position δ occupied by the particle
has a set of n− 1 associated clumping values at different populations:
Cl2[δ] , . . . , Cln[δ]
As discussed above, of these values, only the natural clumping measure
Cl[δ] = ClU [δ], where U is the population of δ , represents a meaningful descrip-
tion of individual clumping in corresponding microstates of the system. However,
all of the measures are well-defined and may be considered to vary as the system
evolves.
Now, to simplify the notation, given δ ∈ ∆n−1 of population U , let:
Σ[δ] =
1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
δ2m
Since the δm must sum to n, we clearly have 0 < Σ[δ] ≤ 1 for all populations
U ∈ { 1 , . . . , n }.
Now, by (6.14):
ClU ′ [δ] =
√
U ′
U ′ − 1 (Re− Im)
[√
Σ[δ]− 1
U ′
]
(6.17)
Once again, as with (6.11), (6.13) and (6.14), when U ′ ≥ U , the function (Re− Im)
in this expression may be replaced with the identity function, since its argument is
purely real.
We observe that, for any fixed U ′ ∈ {2, . . . n} , ClU ′ [δ] is strictly increasing in Σ[δ].
Thus, the degree of clumping of individuals in the system at a particular population
U ′ may be studied by examining the changes in Σ[δ] only. As the system evolves,
the population will vary accordingly, but any time that the population is equal to U ′,
the degree of clumping of the individuals will be determined by the current value of
Σ[δ], with higher values indicating greater clumping. In this sense, the evolution of
Σ[δ] over time determines the degree of clumping of the system at all populations
U ′ ∈ {2, . . . n} .
This perspective will be particularly relevant when discussing the behaviour of the
system around a prospective equilibrium population, since, under the influence of
stochastic noise, we expect the system to repeatedly visit and revisit such equilibria
as it evolves.
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6.6 Using clumping to understand global behaviour
6.6.1 Aims and approach
In this Section, we combine the results presented throughout the chapter to provide
a quantitative answer to the question posed in Section 6.1: why do one-dimensional
single species B-models with α = 0 exhibit population dynamics in line with those
predicted by mean field theory, while models with α > 0 do not?
To achieve this, we first use the results of Section 6.4 on the effect of different tran-
sitions on the vector δ to determine how the clumping measures ClU ′ , defined in
Section 6.5, respond to a particular change in Σ[δ]. We then establish the possible
effects of each of the four transitions on these clumping measures, demonstrating a
quantitative difference in the potential effect of α-transitions as compared with β, γ
and η-transitions.
Finally, we use the results of Section 6.4.4 on the expected values of the terms of
δ in situations in which the mean field equations are valid to demonstrate that the
clumping of the individuals in a model whose microstates are consistent with the
mean field assumptions can, in some sense, be considered to be ‘stable’ when α = 0
and ‘unstable’ when α > 0.
6.6.2 Determining the response of ClU ′[δ] to changes in δ
For fixed U ′ ∈ {2 , . . . , n} and δ ∈ ∆n−1 , let ∆ClU ′ represent the change in ClU ′ [δ]
resulting from a change ∆Σ in Σ[δ]. By (6.17), observing that (Re− Im) distributes
across addition, we have that:
∆ClU ′ =
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
(
(Re− Im)
[√
Σ[δ] + ∆Σ− 1
U ′
−
√
Σ[δ]− 1
U ′
])
(6.18)
We now derive upper and lower bounds on |∆ClU ′| for a particular ∆Σ.
First let:
x = min
{
Σ[δ]− 1
U ′
, Σ[δ] + ∆Σ− 1
U ′
}
Observe that x ∈ (−1, 1− |∆Σ|), and that:
|∆ClU ′ | =
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
(
(Re− Im)
[√
x+ |∆Σ| − √x
])
(6.19)
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Considering ∆Σ to be fixed, we seek upper and lower bounds on |∆ClU ′ | as a func-
tion of x, considering all x in the interval [−1, 1]. Any such bounds will then be
valid for all possible Σ[δ] and ∆Σ .
The gradient of the function (Re − Im)[ √x ] is equal to (2√|x|)−1 , ∀x 6= 0 (see
Figure 6.10). The minimum value of the gradient of this function on the interval
[−1, 1] is therefore equal to 1/2, from which a lower bound on |∆ClU ′| may be simply
derived (given the continuity of |∆ClU ′ | on [−1, 1], when considered as a function of
x only):
|∆ClU ′| ≥ 1
2
√
U ′
U ′ − 1 |∆Σ|
≥ 1
2
|∆Σ| (6.20)
To find an upper bound, we first observe that, for all x ∈ [−1, 1] \ {−|∆Σ|, 0} :
d
dx
|∆ClU ′ | = 1
2
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
((√
|x+ |∆Σ||
)−1
−
(√
|x|
)−1)
(6.21)
Since |∆ClU ′ | is continuous on [−1, 1] (as seen from (6.19)), it must attain a max-
imum for some xmax ∈ [−1, 1]. Furthermore, xmax must fulfil one of the following
conditions:
• xmax is one of the bounds of the interval: xmax = −1 or xmax = 1 ;
• The derivative of |∆ClU ′ | with respect to x is undefined for x = xmax : xmax = 0
or xmax = −|∆Σ| ;
• The derivative of |∆ClU ′ | with respect to x is equal to zero for x = xmax .
We consider each of these cases in turn, substituting the appropriate values into
(6.19), recalling that Σ[δ] ∈ (0, 1] and therefore that |∆Σ| < 1.
When x = −1 :
|∆ClU ′| =
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
(
1−
√
1− |∆Σ|
)
≤
√
U ′
U ′ − 1 |∆Σ|
<
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
√
|∆Σ| (6.22)
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When x = 1 :
|∆ClU ′ | =
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
(√
1 + |∆Σ| − 1
)
≤
√
U ′
U ′ − 1 |∆Σ|
<
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
√
|∆Σ| (6.23)
When x = 0 or x = −|∆Σ| :
|∆ClU ′ | =
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
√
|∆Σ| (6.24)
From (6.21), we see that the derivative of |∆ClU ′ | with respect to x is equal to zero
when:
(
√|x+ |∆Σ||)−1 = (√|x|)−1
⇔ |x+ |∆Σ|| = |x|
So the derivative is equal to zero when:
x = −1
2
|∆Σ| (6.25)
From (6.19), we see that the corresponding value of |∆ClU ′ | is:
|∆ClU ′ | =
√
2
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
√
|∆Σ| (6.26)
A comparison of (6.22), (6.23), (6.24) and (6.26) shows that |∆ClU ′ | is bounded
above, as follows:
|∆ClU ′ | ≤
√
2
√
U ′
U ′ − 1
√
|∆Σ|
≤ 2
√
|∆Σ|
In summary, we have shown that for all U ′ ∈ {2, . . . , n} and δ ∈ ∆n−1 , a change
∆Σ in Σ[δ] (for example, as the result of a transition, transforming δ to δ′) results
in a change ∆ClU ′ in ClU ′ [δ], whose absolute value is bounded in the following way:
1
2
|∆Σ| ≤ |∆ClU ′ | ≤ 2
√
|∆Σ| (6.27)
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6.6.3 The effect of different transitions on Σ[δ] and ClU ′[δ]
We may now determine the potential effect of each type of transition on Σ[δ], em-
ploying the results and notation of Sections 6.4.2-6.4.3. Specifically, given a vector
δ ∈ ∆n−1 representing the current state of the system, we let the following vector
random variables represent the new state of the system, given, respectively, that an
α, β, γ or η-transition occurs:
δ′α =
(
δ′α,0 , . . . , δ
′
α,n−1
)
δ′β =
(
δ′β,0 , . . . , δ
′
β,n−1
)
δ′γ =
(
δ′γ,0 , . . . , δ
′
γ,n−1
)
δ′η =
(
δ′η,0 , . . . , δ
′
η,n−1
)
Component-wise descriptions of these vector random variables and a discussion of the
distributions associated with their separate terms were presented in Sections 6.4.2
and 6.4.3.
We also introduce the following scalar random variables, which represent the poten-
tial change in Σ[δ] and ClU ′ [δ] caused by each of the four transitions:
∆Σα[δ] = Σ[δ
′
α]− Σ[δ]
∆Σβ[δ] = Σ[δ
′
β]− Σ[δ]
∆Σγ[δ] = Σ[δ
′
γ]− Σ[δ]
∆Ση[δ] = Σ[δ
′
η]− Σ[δ]
∆ClU ′α[δ] = ClU ′ [δ
′
α]− ClU ′ [δ]
∆ClU ′β[δ] = ClU ′ [δ
′
β]− ClU ′ [δ]
∆ClU ′γ[δ] = ClU ′ [δ
′
γ]− ClU ′ [δ]
∆ClU ′η[δ] = ClU ′ [δ
′
η]− ClU ′ [δ]
The potential effect of each transition on Σ[δ] may thus be calculated as follows.
Note that the differing range of values of n and U for which the analysis of each
transition is valid are clearly stated in each case (see the end of Section 6.4.2 for
further details of these validity conditions):
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β-transition If n ≥ 3 and 2 ≤ U ≤ n− 1 , we have:
∆Σβ[δ] =
1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(
δ′β,m
)2 − 1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(δm)
2
=
1
n2
[
((δj + 1)
2 + (δi − 1)2)− (δ2j + δ2i )
]
[by (6.5)]
=
2
n2
[δj − δi + 1] (6.28)
∴ |∆Σβ[δ]| ≤ 2
n2
[n− U − 1] (∗) [Table 6.2] (6.29)
<
2
n
, ∀U ∈ { 2 , . . . , n− 1 } (6.30)
γ-transition If n ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ U ≤ n− 1 , we have:
∆Σγ[δ] =
1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(
δ′γ,m
)2 − 1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(δm)
2
=
1
n2
[
(12 + (δi − 1)2)− (02 + δ2i )
]
[by (6.6)]
=
2
n2
[1− δi] (6.31)
∴ |∆Σγ[δ] | ≤ 2
n2
[n− U ] (∗) [Table 6.2] (6.32)
<
2
n
, ∀U ∈ { 1 , . . . , n− 1 } (6.33)
η-transition If n ≥ 2 and 2 ≤ U ≤ n , we have:
∆Ση[δ] =
1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(
δ′η,m
)2 − 1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(δm)
2
=
1
n2
[
(02 + (δk + 1)
2)− (12 + δ2k)
]
[by (6.7)]
=
2
n2
[δk] (6.34)
∴ |∆Ση[δ] | ≤ 2
n2
[n− U + 1] (∗) [Table 6.2] (6.35)
<
2
n
, ∀U ∈ { 2 , . . . , n } (6.36)
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α-transition If n ≥ 3 and 2 ≤ U ≤ n− 1 , we have:
∆Σα[δ] =
1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(
δ′α,m
)2 − 1
n2
n−1∑
m=0
(δm)
2
=
1
n2
[
((δj + δi)
2 + 02)− (δ2j + δ2i )
]
[by (6.8)]
=
2
n2
[δiδj] (6.37)
∴ |∆Σα[δ] | ≤ 2
n2
⌊
n− U + 2
2
⌋⌈
n− U + 2
2
⌉
(∗) [Table 6.2] (6.38)
→ 1
2
as n→∞ , ∀U ∈ { 2 , . . . , n− 1 } (6.39)
Note that, for all valid values of n and U , there exists a vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 and a par-
ticular transition of the appropriate type for which each of the upper bounds marked
‘(∗)’ is actually attained (this follows from the derivation of the values in Table 6.2).
For large systems (i.e. when n 1), this fact is of fundamental importance for the
following reason.
For any valid value of U , the least upper bounds of the maxima of the absolute values
of the random variables ∆Σβ[δ] , ∆Σγ[δ] and ∆Ση[δ] (considered over all possible
vectors δ of population U) all go to 0 as n→∞ (consider (6.30), (6.33) and (6.36)).
However, from (6.39), we see that the least upper bound of the maximum of the
absolute value of the random variable ∆Σα[δ] instead goes to 1/2 as n→∞.
By (6.27), this implies that for all δ ∈ ∆n−1 of any population U ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1},
the maxima of the absolute values of the random variables ∆ClU ′β[δ] , ∆ClU ′γ[δ]
and ∆ClU ′η[δ] go to 0 as n → ∞ , ∀U ′ ∈ {2, . . . , n}. However, by (6.38), (6.39)
and (6.27), there exists a δ ∈ ∆n−1 of population U , such that the maximum of
the absolute value of the random variable ∆ClU ′α[δ] is greater than or equal to
(1/n2) b(n− U + 2)/2c d(n− U + 2)/2e, a quantity which goes to 1/4 as n→∞.
In other words, as the number of cells in a one-dimensional single species B-model
is increased, the maximum possible size of the effect of a single β, γ or η-transition
on all the clumping measures ClU ′ , calculated at any population U
′ ≥ 2, goes to zero.
However, this is not true of α-transitions, which may produce ‘large’ changes in a
clumping measure ClU ′ , even for arbitrarily large systems. What is more, we observe
from (6.37) that this step is always positive; i.e. α-transitions always result in an
increase in individual clumping.
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What is more, if an α-transition causing a large positive change 2/n ∆Σα < 1/2
in Σ[δ] were to occur in this system, we see from (6.30) and (6.33) that it would re-
quire more than n(∆Σα/2) 1 separate β and γ-transitions (η-transitions can only
increase clumping, since, by (6.34), ∆Ση[δ] > 0) to restore Σ[δ] to its previous level
(and, consequently, to restore all clumping measures ClU ′ [δ] to their previous levels),
even without the occurrence of further large α-transitions. Clearly, for systems in
which n is large, this opens the possibility of a series of catastrophic α-transitions
greatly increasing the level of clumping of the system, possibly leading it to a region
of the state space in which large α-transitions are extremely rare or pushing it to-
wards extinction.
These results provide a quantitative analogy of the observations of Section 6.4.3, in
which it was noted that β, γ and η-transitions correspond to steps between adjacent
points of the integer simplex ∆n−1, while α-transitions may correspond to larger
steps across the space.
6.6.4 Clumping measures and the mean field equation
In this section, we discuss the relationship between the clumping measures ClU ′ and
the mean field equation (see Section 5.2.2) in a bid to explain why a one-dimensional,
single species B-model with α = 0 behaves as the equation would predict, while a
model with α 6= 0 does not.
Recall that, given a microstate c ∈ Ωn with population U of a one-dimensional,
single species B-model over n cells, corresponding to a vector δ = ξ′(ψ(c)) ∈ ∆n−1,
the natural clumping measure Cl[δ] is a positive real number in the interval [0, 1]
that describes the degree of clumping of the individuals in c, given the current pop-
ulation U . This is of interest because we expect the degree of individual clumping
to affect the behaviour of the system, since more highly clumped individuals will
interact more frequently. Since the only true ‘interaction’ that is possible in a single
species B-model is the death of an individual due to overcrowding by an adjacent
individual (an η-transition), we expect more highly clumped systems to experience
higher rates of η-transitions (relative to the other possible transition types), which
will lead to a decrease in population density.
The mean field equation for the one-dimensional, single species B-model is based on
the assumption that the states of each cell in the system may locally, at all times,
be treated as independent identically distributed Bernoulli variables with parameter
equal to the system density u = U/n (see Section 6.4.4), and therefore that the
behaviour of the system depends only on the density u (note that this assumption
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directly contradicts the line of argument on the effect of individual clumping given
in the previous paragraph). Clearly, for this assumption to be reasonable, n, U and
n − U must be large, since otherwise knowing the state of a particular cell could
provide significant information about the density of individuals in the remaining
cells, by simple counting arguments.
Loosely, we might also state that the mean field assumption requires that the degree
of clumping of individuals remains broadly constant over time, maintaining a level
at which the states of adjacent cells appear to be independent. If this were not
the case, and the system were to become more clumped over time (or indeed less
clumped, though this situation will not be relevant to our argument), correlations
would be observed between the states of nearby cells and the requirement that cells
be considered locally independent would be invalid.
We will demonstrate that a system occupying the apparent equilibrium described
by the mean field equation, whose individuals are distributed in such a way that
the assumptions necessary for the validity of the equation are consistent with the
current microstate, as represented by the vector δ, may be considered stable under
the influence of β, γ and η-transitions, in the sense that its degree of clumping is
subject only to random drift, but is not stable if α-transitions are also admitted,
since the system will then tend to become systematically more clumped over time.
To see this, first consider some scalar variable p which evolves according to the sys-
tem dynamics (such as, for example, u, U , Σ[δ] or Cl17[δ]). For the sake of clarity,
we will refer to p as a “descriptor”, since we suppose that it describes the current
state of the system in some way.
Observe that, given some vector δ ∈ ∆n−1 representing the current state of the
system, the expected change in p over a single iteration, denoted by ∆p , is described
by the following equation:
E[ ∆p ] = u [ P[ δ > 1 | δ > 0 ] (β E[ ∆pβ ] + γ E[ ∆pγ ] + αE[ ∆pα ])
+ P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ] (η E[ ∆pη ]) ]
(6.40)
In this equation, ∆p is a random variable representing the change in p as a result of
a single transition (possibly null), δ is a random variable representing the result of a
random uniform selection over all terms of δ (see Section 6.4.4), ∆pβ, ∆pγ, ∆pα and
∆pη are random variables representing the change in p resulting from a particular
transition of the given kind, while E refers to the expectation of a random variable,
as usual. We reiterate that the distributions of all these variables are dependent on
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the current state of the system, as represented by the vector δ. Note also that, in
writing (6.40), we have used the fact that P[ δ > 0 ] = u.
Observe that, when p = u, (6.40) becomes:
E[ ∆u ] =
1
n
u [ (γ − α)− P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ] (γ − α + η) ] (6.41)
If we further assume that P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ] = u (equivalent to the mean field as-
sumption that cell states can locally be treated as independent Bernoulli random
variables with parameter u), then (6.41) may be used to derive the mean field equa-
tion (5.1).
However, (6.40) holds for any descriptor p and does not require any assumptions
on δ. In particular, it holds for p = Σ[δ] , a quantity that is directly related to
individual clumping, as discussed in Section 6.5.4, since all clumping measures ClU ′
are strictly increasing in Σ[δ] .
So, using the notation of Section 6.6.3, the results (6.28), (6.31), (6.34) and (6.37),
and letting P = P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ], we have:
E[ ∆Σ ]
= u [(1− P ) (β E[ ∆Σβ ] + γ E[ ∆Σγ ] + αE[ ∆Σα ]) + P (ηE[ ∆Ση ])]
=
2
n2
u [(1− P ) (β E[ δj − δi + 1 ] + γ E[ 1− δi ] + αE[ δjδi ]) + P (ηE[ δk ])]
=
2
n2
u [(1− P ) (β E[ δj − δi ]− γ E[ δi ] + αE[ δjδi ] + β + γ) + P (ηE[ δk ])] (6.42)
Up to this point, no assumptions have been made and (6.42) describes the true
expected change in ∆Σ for any δ ∈ ∆n−1, provided only that the basic validity
conditions of (6.28), (6.31), (6.34) and (6.37) are satisfied, namely that n ≥ 3 and
that 2 ≤ U ≤ n − 1. In general, however, the expectations in (6.42) cannot be
determined without knowledge of δ (up to its equivalence class).
We wish to understand how the clumping of the system would be likely to change if
the distribution of individuals throughout the system were consistent with the mean
field assumptions. As we have discussed, under these assumptions, it is assumed that
P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ] = u, while the various expectations that feature in (6.42) were dis-
cussed in Section 6.4.4, with the appropriate values given in Table 6.3. Substituting
this information into (6.42), we therefore have:
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E[ ∆Σ ] =
2
n2
u
[
(1− u)
(
−β − γ
(
1 + u
u
)
+ α
(
1 + u
u2
)
+ β + γ
)
+ u η
1
u
]
=
2
n2
[
u(γ + η − α)− γ + 1
u
α
]
(6.43)
So, (6.43) describes the expected change in ∆Σ for a B-model in which the dis-
tribution of individuals is, at least instantaneously, consistent with the mean field
assumptions. Now, in this scenario, examine the value of ∆Σ at the non-trivial mean
field equilibrium given in (5.3):
E[ ∆Σ ] =
2
n2
[(
γ − α
γ − α + η
)
(γ + η − α)− γ +
(
γ − α + η
γ − α
)
α
]
=
2
n2
[
α η
γ − α
]
(6.44)
If γ ≤ α , the non-trivial equilibrium of the mean field equation does not exist (u = 0
is the only valid fixed point), while if η = 0 then the non-trivial equilibrium is u = 1
and the behaviour of the system is simple (see Section 5.3.4). So, for the cases of
interest, with η 6= 0 and γ > α , (6.44) shows us that a system whose density is
equal to the non-trivial equilibrium density predicted by the mean field equation
and whose individuals are distributed in such a way as to be consistent with the
mean field assumptions, can only be expected to remain in equilibrium if α = 0.
Otherwise, we would expect to see an increase in the value of Σ[δ], implying an
increase in ClU ′ [δ] at all populations U
′, leading to a likely increase of correlations
between the states of nearby cells and a consequent breakdown in the validity of the
mean field assumptions, at least at iterations when the population density is close
to the predicted mean field ‘equilibrium’.
What, if anything, then can be said about the non-trivial equilibrium density of
a single species B-model with η 6= 0 and γ > α > 0, if it exists? To answer
this question, we return to equation (6.41), which describes the expected change in
the population density u without invoking the mean field assumptions. From this
equation, we see that for a non-trivial equilibrium, in the continuum limit as n→∞,
we must have:
P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ] = γ − α
γ − α + η (6.45)
Note, that the right hand side of this equation is equal to the non-trivial equilibrium
density u∗1 predicted by mean field analysis (see (5.3)).
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Now, our earlier analysis suggests that the degree of clumping in a system with
α > 0 will likely increase above a level which is consistent with the mean field as-
sumptions. This means that we would expect to see correlations developing between
the states of nearby cells. In particular, we would expect that P[ δ = 1 | δ > 0 ],
which represents the probability that a given neighbour of an occupied cell will also
be occupied, would exceed the overall population density u.
Therefore, for a one-dimensional, single species B-model with η 6= 0 and γ > α > 0,
we would expect that the density u at a non-trivial equilibrium should satisfy the
inequality:
u <
γ − α
γ − α + η (6.46)
In other words, we would expect the equilibrium value of u to be less than the value
u∗1 predicted by the mean field equation.
This conclusion is supported by the results of the simulation experiments, as pre-
sented in Figure 5.23, in which many such systems with α > 0 were observed in
which the population converged to an equilibrium value below that predicted by
mean field analysis.
6.7 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have performed a thorough investigation into the fundamental
differences between the effects of the possible transitions in the one-dimensional,
single species B-model. This work built upon the conclusions of Chapter 5, in
which it was observed that, for models with η 6= 0 (models where η = 0 display
very simple behaviour), those with α = 0 exhibited behaviour in line with the
predictions of mean field theory, while those with α 6= 0 did not. Based on a
consideration of space-time plots of the model dynamics and of autocorrelations of
the cell states in microstates drawn from model simulations, it was conjectured that
this difference was due to a propensity of α-transitions to produce spatial clumping in
the distribution of individuals, while β, γ and η-transitions were instead conducive
to good mixing of individuals throughout the system. Our aim was to explain
the causal mechanisms responsible for this difference in the effects of the different
possible transitions.
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As a starting point towards achieving this goal, in Section 6.2, we observed that
β, γ and η-transitions can be considered ‘reversible’, in the sense that any such
transition may be reversed at the next iteration by means of a particular β, γ or
η-transition, operating on the same pair of cells. However, we observed that the
effect of an α-transition cannot, in general, be reversed by a single transition in this
way. Hence, α-transitions can be considered to operate as local catastrophes, whose
effects cannot be easily undone.
In Section 6.3, in order to make further progress with our investigation of the ef-
fects of different transitions, we transformed the microstates of the one-dimensional,
single species B-model into a new space, in which key features of the dynamics
would be easier to observe and analyse. More specifically, rather than representing
microstates as binary vectors (or binary periodic sequences) as would be usual, we
instead chose to represent them as points δ of the integer simplex ∆n−1, whose non-
zero terms represented the distances between consecutive occupied cells of the true
microstates of the system. It was also observed that, in order to comprehensively
represent the dynamics of the system over ∆n−1, it was only necessary to know δ
up to its current equivalence class given translations and reflection of the order of
its terms.
Having defined the relationship between the model state space Ωn and the integer
simplex ∆n−1, in Section 6.4 we examined the precise effect of each of the transi-
tion types, α, β, γ and η, on the terms of the vector δ, representing the current
state of the system. These terms were first considered as fixed quantities and then
as random variables, whose distribution was defined by the stochastic cell-selection
process common to all B-models. The maximum and minimum values of various
key terms and combinations of terms were identified and their expectations were
determined under the mean field assumptions. The effects of the different transition
in ∆n−1 were also visualised in some fairly simple cases, allowing for the important
observation that β, γ and η-transitions correspond to single steps between adjacent
points of the integer simplex, while α-transitions may correspond to much larger
steps between non-adjacent points.
In Section 6.5, we introduced a family of clumping measures ClU ′ [δ] ∈ [−1, 1] re-
lated to the empirical standard deviation of the terms of δ, in order to allow for a
quantitative analysis of the effect of different transitions on the spatial distribution
of individuals throughout the system. The clumping measure for which U ′ is equal
to the current population U was designated the “natural clumping measure”, Cl[δ],
and it was observed that this quantity had a geometrical interpretation as a measure
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of the position of δ relative to other key points of the integer simplex ∆n−1. It was
thus observed that the possible large steps across ∆n−1 induced by α-transitions
would correspond to large increases in individual clumping.
Finally, in Section 6.6, the results of the rest of the chapter were combined to provide
a quantitative answer to the question of why α-transitions alone are incompatible
with the behaviour predicted by the mean field equations. To do this, we deter-
mined the magnitude of the effect of each of the four possible transitions on the
clumping measures ClU ′ [δ]. It was observed that while β, γ and η-transitions gave
rise to changes in ClU ′ [δ] of order not exceeding n
−1/2, α-transitions could induce
similar changes of absolute value approximately equal to 1/4, with the latter always
leading to increases in clumping. This result demonstrated that, for large n, a single
α-transition could cause an increase in clumping that could only be reversed by a
large number of separate β and γ-transitions.
Ultimately, we were able to draw a direct link between mean field analysis and
the clumping measures ClU ′ [δ], demonstrating that a model for which η 6= 0 and
γ > α > 0, whose instantaneous density was equal to the non-trivial equilibrium
predicted by mean field theory u∗1 and whose instantaneous microstate was consis-
tent with the mean field assumptions, would be expected to display an increase in
individual clumping, leading to a corresponding increase in the correlations of local
cell states and a consequent breakdown in the validity of the mean field assump-
tions. We further demonstrated that the equilibrium density of such a system should
be less than u∗1, a conclusion that is confirmed by the experiments conducted in
Chapter 5.
Thinking more broadly about these results and their wider relevance, we suggest
that they should essentially be seen as a proof of concept for further work. Clearly,
the system under consideration, the one-dimensional, single species B-model, is ex-
tremely simple and much of the analysis conducted here has used methods developed
specifically for use with this model. However, we have demonstrated that considering
the dynamics of an individual-based model of this kind from an alternative math-
ematical perspective (in this case, through transformation to a new space in which
individual clumping could be more easily analysed and in which key equivalence
classes of the microstates could be tracked geometrically) can be fruitful in terms of
determining the mechanisms linking local interactions with global behaviour, a key
goal in the field of agent-based and individual-based modelling and of complexity
science more generally, as discussed in Section 2.2.8. Moreover, as a special case of
the ecological patch models discussed in Section 3.3.3, B-models are an important
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focus of study in their own right, since any theoretical results derived from these
systems could ultimately allow for a deeper understanding of the real world systems
that such patch models are used to represent.
In the next part of this thesis, we take on a new perspective, moving from a con-
sideration of individuals as simple automata to an examination of individuals as
decision-making agents. Rather than investigating the impact that spatial factors,
such as individual clumping, can have on the global behaviour of an IBM, we in-
stead consider the relationship between the structure of a space and the relative
strategic value of the points within it, from the point of view of a particular indi-
vidual. This shift in focus also necessitates a change of modelling paradigm, from
individual-based modelling to game theory.
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Part III
A general framework for static,
spatially explicit games of search
and concealment
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Chapter 7
Background and motivation
The material in Chapters 7-9 is adapted from the article Static search games played
over graphs and general metric spaces, published in the European Journal of Oper-
ational Research (Ole´ron Evans and Bishop, 2013).
Please note that, beyond the use of standard mathematical symbols, there is no
crossover of notation between Parts II and III.
7.1 Introduction to Part III
In Part II, we considered a simple IBM to analyse the ways in which local interactions
between individuals influenced the character of the global behaviour of a particular
system. The key feature underlying this analysis was spatial structure. In the con-
clusions to Part II, presented at the end of Chapter 6, it was the crucial influence of
different local transitions on the spatial distribution of individuals throughout the
system that was seen to determine whether or not the global dynamics would be in
line with the predictions of mean field theory.
In Part III, we change our perspective. Rather than seeking to understand how local
interactions influence behaviour over a given geography, we consider a scenario in
which individual behaviour may be controlled and where the key is to determine how
different spatial structures will influence the strategy employed when attempting to
optimise this behaviour. While the individuals in the previous model were essen-
tially just parts of an aggregated stochastic automaton, we now examine individuals
that possess genuine agency, using game theory to study a connection between local
spatial structure and global strategy.
To achieve this, we will define a general search and concealment game that takes
full account of the spatial structure of the set over which it is played. The game is
224
static in the sense that players do not move, but deploy simultaneously at particular
spatial points and receive payoffs based on their relative positions. In this way, the
Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG) provides a theoretical foundation for the study
of the relative strategic value of different positions in a geography. Using the theory
of metric spaces, we model situations in which the searching player may simultane-
ously search multiple locations based on concepts of distance or adjacency relative
to the point at which they are deployed.
The SSSG was inspired by the “geometric games” of Ruckle (1983) and particularly
by White’s “games of strategy on trees” (1994), of which this work may be seen as a
significant generalisation. However, while the SSSG certainly builds upon previous
work, its simplicity and generality together with its explicit consideration of spatial
structure set it apart from much of the literature (see Section 7.3 for a detailed
review of related work) and lend it the versatility to describe games over a huge
variety of different spaces. The primary contributions of this work are therefore to
both propose a highly general model of spatial search and concealment situations,
which unites several other games presented in the literature (see Section 8.2.2), and
to present new propositions and approaches for the strategic analysis of such sce-
narios.
While the approach presented here is theoretical in nature, the SSSG provides a
framework for the analysis of a diverse range of operational research questions.
Aside from explicit search and concealment scenarios, the game may be used to
model situations in which some structure or region must be protected against ‘at-
tacks’ that could arise at any spatial point; for example, the deployment of security
personnel to protect cities against terrorist attacks or outbreaks of rioting, security
software scanning computer networks to eliminate threats, the defence of shipping
lanes against piracy, the protection of a rail network against cable theft or the de-
ployment of stewards at public events to respond to emergency situations.
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of all necessary game theoretic concepts
and a review of the literature on games of search and security. Then, in Chapter 8,
we formally define the SSSG, examine its relationship to other games in the litera-
ture and present some initial propositions relating to its strategies. We then restrict
our attention to the case of the SSSG played on a graph (the “Graph Search Game”
or GSG) and identify upper and lower bounds on the value of such games.
Chapter 9 explores several different methods for the analysis and solution of GSGs,
starting with an algorithmic approach that employs the iterated elimination of dom-
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inated strategies, with a particular focus on games played on trees. Further results
include a way to simplify GSGs through consideration of graph automorphisms and
an examination of a particular type of strategy for such games, which we describe as
an “equal oddments strategy”. The concept of an equal oddments strategy is then
used to find analytic solutions for a particular family of GSGs.
Finally, Chapter 10 extends the SSSG to encompass situations in which the points
of the underlying geography can be assigned non-uniform values. This extension is
used to determine strategies of optimal random patrol for a player attempting to
protect a particular space from an infiltrator.
7.2 Game theoretic concepts
The definitions and notation relating to game theory used in this section are adapted
from Blackwell and Girshick (1979) and Morris (1994).
When discussing two-player games, we assume the following definition:
Definition 7.2.1. A two-player game in normal form between Players A and
B, consists of:
• strategy sets ΣA,ΣB
• payoff functions pA, pB, with:
pA : ΣA × ΣB → R
pB : ΣA × ΣB → R
If the payoffs are such that for some constant c:
pA(x, y) + pB(x, y) = c , ∀x ∈ ΣA, ∀y ∈ ΣB
then the game is described as a constant-sum game.
The game is played by Players A and B simultaneously choosing strategies (de-
scribed as pure strategies in cases where there may be any ambiguity with mixed
strategies, described below) from their respective strategy sets x ∈ ΣA, y ∈ ΣB and
receiving payoffs pA(x, y), pB(x, y). The objective of each player is to maximise their
payoff.
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If ΣA and ΣB are finite, with:
ΣA = {x1, . . . , xκA}
ΣB = {y1, . . . , yκB}
(7.1)
for some positive integers κA, κB, then it is often convenient to collect the payoffs
to each player in payoff matrices:
PA =
(
pA(xi, yj)
)
i∈{1,...,κA},j∈{1,...,κB}
PB =
(
pB(xj, yi)
)
i∈{1,...,κB},j∈{1,...,κA}
(7.2)
Note that, as defined here, the rows of each matrix correspond to the strategies of
the player receiving the relevant payoffs, while the columns correspond to the strate-
gies of their opponent.
In certain circumstances, we may allow players to adopt mixed strategies, whereby
they choose their pure strategy according to a specified probability distribution.
If the strategy sets are finite, as given in (7.1), the mixed strategies σA, σB can
simultaneously be regarded as vectors:
σA = (σA[x1], . . . , σA[xκA ]) ∈ [0, 1]κA
σB = (σB[y1], . . . , σB[yκB ]) ∈ [0, 1]κB
and as functions, which allocate probabilities to pure strategies:
σA : ΣA → [0, 1]
x 7→ σA[x]
σB : ΣB → [0, 1]
y 7→ σB[y]
∑
x∈ΣA
σA[x] =
∑
y∈ΣB
σB[y] = 1
The following definitions relate to the maximum expected payoff that players can
guarantee themselves through careful choice of their mixed strategies:
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Definition 7.2.2. Given a two-player game, the values of the game uA, uB to
Players A and B respectively, are defined as:
• uA = maxτ A minτ B E[pA(τA, τB)]
• uB = maxτ B minτ A E[pB(τA, τB)]
where τA and τB range across all possible mixed strategies for Players A and B
respectively and
E[pA(τA, τB)]
E[pB(τA, τB)]
represent the expected payoffs to each player, given that they respectively adopt mixed
(or pure) strategies τA and τB.
Definition 7.2.3. Given a two-player constant-sum game, where the payoffs sum
to c ∈ R, mixed strategies σA, σB for Players A and B are described as optimal
mixed strategies (OMSs) if and only if:
• min
τ B
E[pA(σA, τB)] = uA
• min
τ A
E[pB(τA,σB)] = uB
where τA and τB range across all possible mixed strategies for Players A and B
respectively.1
For a constant-sum game, where the payoffs sum to c ∈ R, we have:
uA + uB = c (7.3)
Also, provided that ΣA and ΣB are finite, OMSs are guaranteed to exist for both
players.
Both of these facts are consequences of the Minimax Theorem (see Morris, 1994,
p. 102).
Given a constant-sum two-player game with finite strategy sets, a solution of the
game comprises OMSs σA, σB and values uA, uB for each player.
The following definition allows for a crude comparison of the efficacy of different
strategies.
1 Note that, under this definition, it is possible for a mixed strategy to be simultaneously opti-
mal and inadmissible (weakly dominated by some other strategy, in the sense of Definition 7.2.4).
While some authors restrict the definition of an optimal mixed strategy to prohibit such cases, we
follow the example of Morris (1994, p. 44), who does not.
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Definition 7.2.4. Consider a two-player game with strategy sets ΣA, ΣB and payoff
functions pA, pB. Given particular pure strategies x1, x2 ∈ ΣA for Player A, we
have:
• x2 very weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
pA(x2, y) ≥ pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB
• x2 weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
pA(x2, y) ≥ pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB
and ∃y∗ ∈ ΣB such that:
pA(x2, y
∗) > pA(x1, y∗)
• x2 strictly dominates x1 if and only if:
pA(x2, y) > pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB
• x2 is equivalent to x1 if and only if:
pA(x2, y) = pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB
Since the designation of the players as A and B is arbitrary, obtaining corresponding
definitions of strategic dominance and equivalence for Player B is simply a matter
of relabelling.
Note that weak dominance, strict dominance and equivalence are all special cases
of very weak dominance. Also, strict dominance is a special case of weak dominance.
In the work presented in the following chapters, weak dominance is of most rele-
vance. Therefore, for reasons of clarity, the terms “dominance” and “dominated
strategies” will be used to refer to weak dominance unless otherwise stated.
Since a player aims to maximise his or her payoff, we would intuitively expect that
they should not play any dominated strategies. Indeed, it is known that any strategy
that is strictly dominated by some other strategy must be allocated zero probability
in an OMS (see, for example, Theorem 2.9 in Morris, 1994, p. 49), though this is
not necessarily true of weakly or very weakly dominated strategies.
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For a general definition of dominance in game theory, see Leyton-Brown and Shoham
(2008, pp. 20-23), from which the above definition was adapted.
7.3 Games of search and security: A review
7.3.1 Simple search games
Games of search and concealment, in which one player attempts to hide themselves
or to conceal some substance in a specified space while another player attempts
to locate or capture the player or substance, have been widely studied. One of the
simplest search games is the well-known high-low number guessing game in which
one player chooses an integer in a given range, while the other player makes a se-
quence of guesses to identify it, each time being informed whether the guess was too
high or too low (Gal, 1974). Continuous versions of the game have also been studied
(Gal, 1978; Baston and Bostock, 1985; Alpern, 1985).
Another simple search game involves one player attempting to locate an object
that the opposing player has hidden at a location chosen from a finite or countably
infinite set with no spatial structure (except a possible ordering). Variants of these
games include examples where the searching player has some chance of overlooking
the object despite searching the correct location (Neuts, 1963; Subelman, 1981) or
where the searcher must simultaneously avoid the location of a second hidden object
(Ruckle, 1990).
7.3.2 Search games with immobile targets
A more complicated class of search games is that in which the searching player
is mobile and their target is immobile, with payoffs to each player typically
(though not universally) being dependent on the amount of time that elapses
(or the distance travelled) before the target is located. Such games have been
examined over many different types of graph (Anderson and Aramendia, 1990;
Reijnierse and Potters, 1993; Kikuta and Ruckle, 1994; Buyang, 1995; Pavlovic´, 1995;
Kikuta, 2004; Alpern, 2008, 2010), though in the most general case the space may
be a continuous region (Gal, 1979). While the starting position of the searching
player is often fixed, games in which the searching player can choose their position
have also been studied (Alpern et al., 2008a; Dagan and Gal, 2008), as have games
with multiple searchers (Alpern and Reyniers, 1994; Alpern and Howard, 2000).
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7.3.3 Accumulation games
Accumulation games are an extension of the above concept in which there may be
many hidden objects (Kikuta and Ruckle, 1997) or in which hidden objects are
replaced with some continuous material that the hiding player can distribute across
a set of discrete locations (Kikuta and Ruckle, 2002; Zoroa et al., 2004) or across
a continuous space (Ruckle and Kikuta, 2000). The payoffs in these games are
typically dependent on the number of objects or the quantity of material that the
searching player is able to locate.
7.3.4 Search games with mobile targets
Adding a further layer of complication, there is the class of search game in which both
the searching player and the hiding player are mobile, including so-called “princess
and monster” games. Again, the payoffs in such games are typically dependent on
the amount of time that elapses before the hiding player is captured and players
are typically ‘invisible’ to each other, only becoming aware of the location of their
opponent at the moment of capture.
Such games have been considered over continuous one-dimensional spaces such as
the circle (Alpern, 1974) and the unit interval (Alpern et al., 2008b), over contin-
uous graphs or networks (Alpern and Asic, 1986; Anderson and Aramendia, 1992;
Alpern and Asic, 1985) and over continuous two-dimensional spaces (Foreman, 1977;
Garnaev, 1991; Chkhartishvili and Shikin, 1995). In the latter case, it is necessary
to introduce the concept of a detection radius, with a capture occurring if the dis-
tance between the players drops below this value. In some cases, the probability of
capture is allowed to vary based on the distance between the players (Garnaev, 1992).
Analyses of search games over discrete spaces in which both searcher and hider are
mobile have tended to consider spatial structure in only a very limited way. While
this structure may determine the freedom of movement of the players, very little
work has been done to introduce an analogous concept to the detection radius to
such games. Generally, players move sequentially and may only move to locations
that are sufficiently close to their current position (e.g. Eagle and Washburn, 1991),
though variants have been considered in which either the searching player
(Zoroa et al., 2012) or the hiding player (Thomas and Washburn, 1991) has the
freedom to move to any location regardless of adjacency or distance.
Further variations on the search game with mobile searcher and hider include games
in which the searching player follows a predetermined path and must decide how
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thoroughly to search each location visited (Hohzaki and Iida, 2000), games in which
the searching player must intercept an opponent attempting to move from a given
start point to a given end point (Alpern, 1992) and games with a variegated envi-
ronment and the possibility that the hiding player will be betrayed by ‘citizens’ of
the space (Owen and McCormick, 2008). Such games have also been used to model
predator-prey interactions (Alpern et al., 2011a).
7.3.5 Allocation games
Allocation games are a related concept, in which the searching player does not
move around the space individually, but rather distributes ‘search resources’ to locate
the mobile hiding player. Such games may include false information (Hohzaki, 2007)
and may incorporate spatial structure by allowing the influence of resources
to spread across space (“reachability”), an area which has seen “little research”
(Hohzaki, 2008).
Variations on this idea include situations in which searching resources are deployed
sequentially (Dendris et al., 1997) or in which both players distribute resources to
respectively locate or protect a hidden object (Baston and Garnaev, 2000). Cooper-
ative allocation games, in which multiple players combine their searching resources
to locate a moving target, have also been considered (Hohzaki, 2009).
7.3.6 Rendez-vous games
Rendez-vous games are a parallel concept to games with mobile searching and hid-
ing players, the difference being that these games are cooperative, with both players
wishing to locate the other as soon as possible (see Alpern, 2002, for an overview).
Typically, in a rendez-vous game, the structure of the space is known to all, with
consideration given to the amount of information available to players regarding their
relative positions, and their ability to distinguish between symmetries of the space
(whether they have a common understanding of “North”, for example).
Rendez-vous games have been studied over various continuous one-dimensional
spaces, such as the line (Alpern and Gal, 1995; Lim and Alpern, 1996; Alpern and
Beck, 2000) and the circle (Alpern, 2000), over continuous two-dimensional spaces,
such as the plane (Kikuta and Ruckle, 2010) or a general compact metric space
(Alpern, 1995) and over discrete spaces, such as lattices (Alpern and Baston, 2005;
Ruckle, 2007) and other graphs (Alpern et al., 1999). Costs may also be introduced
for movement and examination of particular locations (Kikuta and Ruckle, 2007).
232
Work has also been done on ‘hybrid’ games of search and rendez-vous, where,
for example, two individuals attempt to meet without being located by a third
(Alpern and Lim, 1998) or where the searching player does not know whether the oth-
er player is attempting to rendez-vous or to evade capture (Alpern and Gal, 2002).
7.3.7 Security games
Security games are used to model situations in which some public resource (e.g.
airports, transport infrastructure, power facilities) must be protected from attack
with limited defensive resources. A good introduction to the topic is provided by
Tambe (2012).
Such situations tend to be modelled as Stackelberg games, where it is assumed that
the defensive player first commits to some strategy to protect the vulnerable sites
and that this strategy is observed by the attacking player, who then chooses an op-
timal response (Tambe, 2012, pp. 4-8). Stackelberg-type security games related to
the mobile-searcher-immobile-hider games of Section 7.3.2 have also been proposed
to examine optimal patrolling strategies (Alpern et al., 2011b; Basilico et al., 2012).
A related concept is that of the much studied Colonel Blotto game, in which
two players must simultaneously distribute a fixed quantity of discrete or contin-
uous resources across a number of sites, each site being ‘won’ by the player who
distributed the greater quantity of resources to it, with payoffs determined by the
number of sites that each player wins (see Roberson, 2006). The many extensions
of the Colonel Blotto game have included asymmetric versions (Tofias et al., 2007;
Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2012), examples in which resources are allocated
to battlefields sequentially rather than simultaneously (Powell, 2009) and examples
in which defensive resources are heterogeneous (Cohen, 1966).
Though the deployment sites in such models are often assumed to be wholly separate,
with events at one location having no effect on events at other locations, certain se-
curity games and Colonel Blotto-type games with strategically interdependent sites
have been considered. For example, Shubik and Weber (1981) introduce the con-
cept of a “characteristic function” for such games, which allocates values to subsets
of the sites, thus allowing interdependencies to be captured. Other approaches to
modelling such interdependence include an extension of the Colonel Blotto game
in which a successful attack on a “radar site” ensures the success of attacks on
other sites (Grometstein and Shoham, 1989), while Hausken (2010, 2011) discusses
a classification of the underlying infrastructures of security games based on the
interdependence of their sites (series, parallel, complex, ...) and Powell (2007) anal-
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yses the relative value of defending borders over protecting strategic targets directly.
Though analyses of interdependence in security games and Blotto games may be
quite general (that of Shubik and Weber, for example), interdependence that arises
explicitly from the spatial structure of the deployment sites has not been considered
in a general setting.
7.3.8 Geometric games
One of the most general and theoretical analyses of search and concealment type
situations is Ruckle’s Geometric games and their applications (1983). In this book,
the author defines a geometric game as a two-player zero-sum game (with players
called “RED” and “BLUE”) played over a given set S, where the strategy sets for
each player ΣRED, ΣBLUE are subsets of the power set P(S) (the set of subsets of S).
Pure strategies for each player are therefore subsets R,B ⊆ S. The payoff to each
player is a function ofR andB, typically depending directly on the intersectionR∩B.
This concept of a geometric game allows Ruckle to model a wide variety of situa-
tions of search, ambush and pursuit, as well as a range of abstract games, taking
full consideration of the structure of the space S over which the games are played.
Most published work based on Ruckle’s ideas (e.g. Baston et al., 1989; Zoroa and
Zoroa, 1993; Zoroa et al., 1999a, Zoroa et al., 1999b, 2001, 2003; Alpern et al., 2009,
2010) has focused on specific examples of geometric games, rather than on general
results.
7.4 Motivation for the Static Spatial Search Game
Much of the literature on search games and related concepts has focused on analysing
specific games, rather than attempting to present general frameworks for such situ-
ations and identifying more broadly applicable results. While spatial structure may
be considered for games in which players are mobile, the geography of the space over
which games are played is often given little or limited consideration, particularly in
the literature on security games. The concept of “reachability”, as described by
Hohzaki (2008), in which a searcher or searching resource deployed at a point has
influence over a local neighbourhood, has received very little attention. Games that
concentrate purely on the strategic value of a player’s chosen position in a space,
rather than on strategies for moving through the space for the purposes of search or
rendez-vous, have also seen little research, at least since the work of Ruckle (1983).
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Chapter 8
Defining and analysing spatial
games
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, taking into account the conclusions discussed in Section 7.4, we
focus on the third of our research objectives (see Section 1.5), defining a general
game that forms a basis for modelling situations of static search and concealment
over regions with spatial structure. We examine the concepts of strategic dominance
and equivalence in the context of this game, before focusing on the more specific
case of games played over graphs. Methods to simplify the analysis of these games
are presented and upper and lower bounds on the value of the game to each player
are identified.
8.2 The Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG)
The definitions and notation relating to metric spaces used in this section are from
Sutherland (1975), pp. 19-44.
8.2.1 Definition of the SSSG
The Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG) is a two-player game played over a metric
space M = (Ω, d), where Ω is a set of points x and d : Ω×Ω→ [0,∞) is the metric
or distance, which has the standard properties:
(M1) d(x, y) ≥ 0 ; d(x, y) = 0⇔ x = y
(M2) d(x, y) = d(y, x) , ∀x, y ∈ Ω
(M3) d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z) , ∀x, y, z ∈ Ω
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Figure 8.1: The Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG).
Players deploy simultaneously at points in some metric space Ω. Suppose
Player A deploys at x and can search all points within a radius r. Player B
loses the game if deployed at y, but wins if deployed at z. A win results
in a payoff of 1; a loss results in a payoff of 0.
The metric d reflects the spatial structure of Ω. In Rn, d may be the Euclidean
distance, while in a graph d may be the length of the shortest path connecting two
points. However, depending on the interpretation of the game, d could also rep-
resent an abstract distance, indicating dissimilarity, difficulty of communication or
perceived costs.
In specific cases, it may be sensible to relax some of these conditions. For example,
in a graph that is not connected, we could allow infinite distances between vertices
that are not joined by a path (yielding an extended metric). Alternatively, to repre-
sent a directed graph, we may wish to ignore the symmetry condition (M2) (yielding
a quasi-metric; see Steen and Seebach Jr., 1970). However, for the sake of simplicity,
we do not consider such cases at this time.
We define a non-negative real number r called the detection radius and use the
notation Br[x] to designate the closed ball centred on x:
Br[x] = {y ∈ Ω : d(x, y) ≤ r}
The strategies for Player A (the searching player) and Player B (the concealing
player) are specific points of Ω at which they may choose to deploy. In a single play
of the game, each player simultaneously picks a point xA, xB from their own strategy
set, ΣA,ΣB ⊆ Ω.
236
For the sake of clarity, from this point forward, we use masculine pronouns to refer
to Player A and feminine pronouns to refer to Player B.
We define the payoff functions for Player A and Player B respectively as:
pA(xA, xB) =

1 , xB ∈ Br[xA];
0 , otherwise.
pB(xA, xB) =1− pA(xA, xB)
This is a constant-sum game and can be analysed accordingly.
In interpreting the game, we imagine that Player B chooses to hide somewhere in
Ω, while Player A attempts to locate his opponent. To do this, Player A selects a
point of Ω and searches a neighbourhood of this point. If Player B’s hiding place
falls within the detection radius of Player A’s chosen point, the attempt to hide is
unsuccessful and Player B is located. Otherwise, Player B remains undetected.
The game is illustrated in Figure 8.1.
8.2.2 The SSSG and other games
As mentioned in Section 7.1, the main sources of inspiration for the SSSG were
Geometric games and applications (Ruckle, 1983) and, more particularly, Games
of strategy on trees (White, 1994). Indeed the SSSG could be seen as occupying a
middle-ground between the extremely abstract formulation of Ruckle’s “geometric
games” and the quite specific family of games studied by White.
It should be noted that the SSSG is not strictly a geometric game by Ruckle’s defi-
nition (1983, p. 2), since it is not zero-sum. However, it could be transformed into
a zero-sum game without altering the subsequent analysis, simply by subtracting 1
2
from all payoffs. The decision that all payoffs should be 0 or 1 has been taken to
ensure the clarity of the payoff matrices considered later.
Given this proviso, certain of Ruckle’s geometric games can be formulated as partic-
ular cases of the SSSG. For example, if transformed to a zero-sum game as described,
game AAGV (Ruckle, 1983 p. 86; adapted from Arnold, 1962) is an example of the
SSSG, with Ω = [0, 1] ⊂ R, ΣA = ΣB = Ω and d(x, y) = |x− y|.
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Similarly, White’s “games of strategy on trees” (1994) may be seen to be examples
of the SSSG, where Ω is the set of vertices of a tree, ΣA = ΣB = Ω, r = 1 and d is
the length of the shortest path between two vertices.
A game that demonstrates the potential complexity that can arise from apparently
simple cases of the SSSG is the “Cookie-Cutter” game (or the “Hiding in a Disc”
game), in which Player A chooses a point in a disc of unit radius and Player B
simultaneously places a circular ‘cookie-cutter’ centred at any point of the disc,
winning the game if Player A’s point lies within the ‘cookie-cutter’. Given appro-
priate payoffs, this game is an example of the SSSG, where Ω is the closed unit disc,
ΣA = ΣB = Ω and d(x,y) = |x− y|.
The particular case of this game with r = 1/2 was originally proposed by Gale and
Glassey (1974), for which OMSs were presented by Evans (1975). The game was
extended to all r > 0 by Bordelon (1975), who proposed OMSs for all r > 1/2, but
these results were disputed by Ruckle (1983, p. 108). Ruckle’s disproof was dis-
puted in turn by Danskin (1990), who showed that Bordelon’s results were correct
for some values of r > 1/2, though false in general. Despite the apparent simplicity
of the problem, Danskin was only able to find OMSs for a small range of values of
r around r = 1/2 and for all r ≥ √2/2, thus illustrating the hidden complexity of
many games of this form.
A particularly simple example of a game that can be represented as an SSSG is
“Matching Pennies” (see Blackwell and Girshick, 1979, p. 13), in which Players A
and B simultaneously call “Heads” or “Tails”, with Player A receiving a payoff of 1
if the calls are the same and −1 otherwise, and Player B receiving a payoff of −1 if
the calls are the same and 1 otherwise. Taking ΣA = ΣB = Ω = {“Heads”, “Tails”},
r = 0, with d as any valid metric, this is an SSSG, again with the proviso that the
payoffs must be transformed appropriately.
A more complicated example of a game that can be represented as an SSSG is the
graph security game of Mavronicolas et al. (2008) if the number of attackers is re-
stricted to one. This game is played over an undirected graph G = (V (G), E(G))
with one defender and (in general) multiple attackers.1 Simultaneously, the defender
chooses an edge and the attackers each choose a vertex. The defender receives a pay-
off equal to the number of attackers who choose vertices incident to his chosen edge.
Each attacker receives a payoff equal to 0 if their chosen vertex is incident to the
1 Here (and throughout Part III), V (G) and E(G) respectively represent the vertex set and
the edge set of G, as defined in Section 4.4.4.
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defender’s edge and 1 otherwise.
Consider the graph G′ obtained by inserting a new vertex at the midpoint of each
of the edges of G. Let the set of new vertices created in this way be denoted V (G′)∗
while the complete vertex set V (G′) includes both the new vertices and the original
vertices. With the defender as Player A, a single attacker as Player B, Ω = V (G′),
ΣA = V (G
′)∗, ΣB = V (G), r = 1 and with d as the length of the shortest path
between two vertices in G′, this game is also an example of the SSSG.
The SSSG provides a framework that unites all of these games and allows for a
general consideration of the relative strategic values of the different points of a
space. It implicitly encompasses the concepts of reachability, interdependence based
on spatial structure and the detection radius, as discussed in Section 7.3.
8.2.3 The SSSG with finite strategy sets
Consider an example of the SSSG in which the strategy sets ΣA, ΣB are finite. One
of the simplest possible mixed strategies available to each player in such a case is the
mixed strategy that allocates equal probabilities to all points in a player’s strategy
set. We denote these mixed strategies by ρA and ρB for Players A and B respectively.
The following proposition establishes a sufficient condition for ρA, ρB to be OMSs:
Proposition 8.2.1. Consider the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with finite
strategy sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d. If there exists a positive integer χ such that:
|Br[xA] ∩ ΣB| = χ , ∀xA ∈ ΣA
|Br[xB] ∩ ΣA| = χ , ∀xB ∈ ΣB
(8.1)
then ρA, ρB are OMSs for Players A and B respectively and χ|ΣA|−1 = χ|ΣB|−1 = u
is the value of the game to Player A.
Proof. Suppose that Player A employs the mixed strategy ρA which allocates a uni-
form probability of |ΣA|−1 to all points xA ∈ ΣA. In a particular play of the game,
suppose that Player B deploys at point xB ∈ ΣB.
In this situation, since |Br[xB]∩ΣA| = χ, the expected payoff to Player A is χ|ΣA|−1,
the probability that Player A’s point xA lies in Br[xB]. Therefore, for any mixed
strategy σB for Player B:
E[pA(ρA,σB)] = χ|ΣA|−1
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and thus:
u = max
σA
min
σB
E [pA(σA,σB)] ≥ χ|ΣA|−1 (8.2)
Now suppose that Player B employs the mixed strategy ρB which allocates a uni-
form probability of |ΣB|−1 to all points xB ∈ ΣB. In a particular play of the game,
suppose that Player A deploys at point xA ∈ ΣA.
In this situation, since |Br[xA]∩ΣB| = χ, the expected payoff to Player A is χ|ΣB|−1,
the probability that Player B’s point xB lies in Br[xA]. Therefore, for any mixed
strategy σA for Player A:
E[pA(σA,ρB)] = χ|ΣB|−1
and thus:
u = max
σA
min
σB
E [pA(σA,σB)] ≤ χ|ΣB|−1 (8.3)
Now, (8.1) together with the symmetric property of the distance (M2) imply that
χ|ΣA| = χ|ΣB| and thus that |ΣA| = |ΣB|. By (8.2) and (8.3), we therefore have:
|ΣA|−1 ≤ u ≤ |ΣB|−1 ⇒ u = |ΣA|−1 = |ΣB|−1
and ρA, ρB are OMSs, by Definition 7.2.3.
8.2.4 Dominance and equivalence in the SSSG
We can now examine strategic dominance and equivalence (see Definition 7.2.4) in
the context of the SSSG using the notation established in Section 8.2.
Proposition 8.2.2. Consider the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with strategy
sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d. For strategies x1, x2 ∈ ΣA, x1 6= x2, for Player A:
• x2 very weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
(Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) ⊆ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB)
• x2 weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
(Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) ⊂ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB)
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• x2 strictly dominates x1 if and only if:
(Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) = ∅
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣB) = ΣB
• x2 is equivalent to x1 if and only if:
(Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) = (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB)
This proposition states that for Player A:
• x2 very weakly dominates x1 if and only if, when deployed at x2, Player A can
search every potential location of Player B that could be searched from x1.
• This dominance is weak if there exist potential locations of Player B that can
be searched from x2 but that cannot be searched from x1 (inclusion is strict).
• Strict dominance only occurs in the trivial case in which no potential locations
of Player B can be searched from x1 while every potential location of Player B
can be searched from x2.
• x2 and x1 are equivalent if and only if precisely the same set of potential
locations of Player B can be searched from both points.
Proof. We consider each of the four parts of Definition 7.2.4 and show that, in
the context of the SSSG, they are equivalent to the corresponding statements of
Proposition 8.2.2. Recall that pA takes values in {0, 1}.
• Very weak dominance
pA(x2, y) ≥ pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB (∗)
⇔ [pA(x1, y) = 1⇒ pA(x2, y) = 1] , ∀y ∈ ΣB
⇔ [y ∈ Br[x1]⇒ y ∈ Br[x2]] , ∀y ∈ ΣB
⇔ (Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) ⊆ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB) (∗∗)
• Weak dominance
Since (∗)⇔ (∗∗), it suffices to observe that, if (∗∗) is assumed to be true:
∃y∗ ∈ ΣB : pA(x2, y∗) > pA(x1, y∗)
⇔ ∃y∗ ∈ ΣB : y∗ ∈ Br[x2] and y∗ 6∈ Br[x1]
⇔ (Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) ⊂ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB) [by (∗∗)]
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• Strict dominance
pA(x2, y) > pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB
⇔ y ∈ Br[x2] and y 6∈ Br[x1] , ∀y ∈ ΣB
⇔

(Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) = ∅ ,
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣB) = ΣB
• Equivalence
pA(x2, y) = pA(x1, y) , ∀y ∈ ΣB
⇔ [y ∈ Br[x2]⇔ y ∈ Br[x1]] , ∀y ∈ ΣB
⇔ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB) = (Br[x1] ∩ ΣB)
We now consider dominance and equivalence for Player B:
Proposition 8.2.3. Consider the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with strategy
sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d. For strategies x1, x2 ∈ ΣB, x1 6= x2, for Player B:
• x2 very weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
[x2 ∈ Br[y]⇒ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
• x2 weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
[x2 ∈ Br[y]⇒ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
and ∃y∗ ∈ ΣA such that:
x1 ∈ Br[y∗] and x2 6∈ Br[y∗]
• x2 strictly dominates x1 if and only if:
x1 ∈ Br[y] and x2 6∈ Br[y] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
• x2 is equivalent to x1 if and only if:
[x2 ∈ Br[y]⇔ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
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This proposition states that for Player B:
• x2 very weakly dominates x1 if and only if, wherever Player A deploys, if he
can search x2 then he can also search x1.
• This dominance is weak if there exists a position for Player A from which he
can search x1 but cannot search x2.
• Strict dominance only occurs in the trivial case in which, wherever Player A
deploys, he can search x1 but cannot search x2.
• x2 and x1 are equivalent if and only if, wherever Player A deploys, he can
search x2 if and only if he can search x1.
Proof. We consider each of the four parts of Definition 7.2.4 and show that, in
the context of the SSSG, they are equivalent to the corresponding statements of
Proposition 8.2.3. Recall that pB also takes values in {0, 1}.
• Very weak dominance
pB(y, x2) ≥ pB(y, x1) , ∀y ∈ ΣA (∗)
⇔ [pB(y, x1) = 1⇒ pB(y, x2) = 1] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
⇔ [x1 6∈ Br[y]⇒ x2 6∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
⇔ [x2 ∈ Br[y]⇒ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA (∗∗)
• Weak dominance
Since (∗)⇔ (∗∗), it suffices to observe that:
∃y∗ ∈ ΣA : pB(y∗, x2) > pB(y∗, x1)
⇔ ∃y∗ ∈ ΣA : x1 ∈ Br[y∗] and x2 6∈ Br[y∗]
• Strict dominance
pB(y, x2) > pB(y, x1) , ∀y ∈ ΣA
⇔ x1 ∈ Br[y] and x2 6∈ Br[y] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
• Equivalence
pB(y, x2) = pB(y, x1) , ∀y ∈ ΣA
⇔ [x2 ∈ Br[y]⇔ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
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The necessary and sufficient conditions for dominance and equivalence for Player B
established in Proposition 8.2.3 can be shown to be equivalent to a simpler set of
conditions, clearly analogous to those relating to dominance and equivalence for
Player A seen in Proposition 8.2.2:
Proposition 8.2.4. Consider the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with strategy
sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d. For strategies x1, x2 ∈ ΣB, x1 6= x2, for Player B:
• x2 very weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) ⊆ (Br[x1] ∩ ΣA)
• x2 weakly dominates x1 if and only if:
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) ⊂ (Br[x1] ∩ ΣA)
• x2 strictly dominates x1 if and only if:
(Br[x1] ∩ ΣA) = ΣA
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) = ∅
• x2 is equivalent to x1 if and only if:
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) = (Br[x1] ∩ ΣA)
Proof. We consider each of the four statements of Proposition 8.2.3 (which has
already been proven) and show that they are equivalent to the corresponding state-
ments of Proposition 8.2.4.
• Very weak dominance
[x2 ∈ Br[y]⇒ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA (∗)
⇔ [y ∈ Br[x2]⇒ y ∈ Br[x1]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA [by (M2)]
⇔ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) ⊆ (Br[x1] ∩ ΣA) (∗∗)
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• Weak dominance
Since (∗)⇔ (∗∗), it suffices to observe that, if (∗∗) is assumed to be true:
∃z ∈ ΣA : x1 ∈ Br[z] and x2 6∈ Br[z]
⇔ ∃z ∈ ΣA : z ∈ Br[x1] and z /∈ Br[x2] [by (M2)]
⇔ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) ⊂ (Br[x1] ∩ ΣA) [by (∗∗)]
• Strict dominance
x1 ∈ Br[y] and x2 6∈ Br[y] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
⇔ y ∈ Br[x1] and y 6∈ Br[x2] , ∀y ∈ ΣA [by (M2)]
⇔

(Br[x1] ∩ ΣA) = ΣA ,
(Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) = ∅
• Equivalence
[x2 ∈ Br[y]⇔ x1 ∈ Br[y]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA
⇔ [y ∈ Br[x2]⇔ y ∈ Br[x1]] , ∀y ∈ ΣA [by (M2)]
⇔ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣA) = (Br[x1] ∩ ΣA)
While Proposition 8.2.4 is apparently simpler than Proposition 8.2.3, note that every
part of its proof depends on the symmetric property of the distance (M2). If this
condition were to be relaxed, as discussed in Section 8.2.1, Proposition 8.2.4 would
not be valid and dominance and equivalence for Player B would have to be analysed
on the basis of Proposition 8.2.3.
Definition 8.2.5. Consider the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with strategy
sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d. For Player A or Player B, a subset of their strategy set
Σˆ ⊆ ΣA or Σˆ ⊆ ΣB exhibits pairwise equivalence if and only if x is equivalent to
y, ∀x, y ∈ Σˆ.
We conclude that a subset Σˆ ⊆ ΣA or Σˆ ⊆ ΣB exhibiting pairwise equivalence can
be reduced to any singleton {xˆ} ⊆ Σˆ without altering the analysis of the game.
Since all points in Σˆ are equivalent, a player would neither gain nor lose by playing
another point in the set over xˆ.
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The following proposition states that if x2 very weakly dominates x1 for Player A
(and x1 is adjacent to at least one potential location for Player B), then the distance
between the two points must be no greater than 2r.
Proposition 8.2.6. For the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with strategy
sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d, if x2 very weakly dominates x1 for Player A and
Br[x1] ∩ ΣB 6= ∅, then x2 ∈ B2r[x1] ∩ ΣA.
Proof. If x2 very weakly dominates x1 for Player A and Br[x1] ∩ ΣB 6= ∅, then:
∅ 6= (Br[x1] ∩ ΣB) ⊆ (Br[x2] ∩ ΣB) [by 8.2.2]
⇒ ∃ y ∈ Br[x1] ∩Br[x2]
⇒ d(x1, y) ≤ r and d(x2, y) ≤ r
⇒ d(x1, x2) ≤ 2r [by (M2), (M3)]
⇒ x2 ∈ B2r[x1] ∩ ΣA
The condition that Br[x1] ∩ ΣB 6= ∅ simply removes trivial strategies that are very
weakly dominated by every other strategy.
An analogous result holds for Player B. The proof is similar to that of 8.2.6 and is
therefore omitted:
Proposition 8.2.7. For the SSSG played over a metric space Ω, with strategy
sets ΣA, ΣB and distance d, if x2 very weakly dominates x1 for Player B and
Br[x2] ∩ ΣA 6= ∅, then x2 ∈ B2r[x1] ∩ ΣB.
In this case, the condition that Br[x2]∩ΣA 6= ∅ removes strategies that very weakly
dominate every other strategy.
Note that both of these propositions depend on the symmetric property of the dis-
tance (M2) and the triangle inequality (M3) (see Section 8.2.1).
8.2.5 Iterated elimination of dominated strategies
The concepts of dominance and equivalence provide us with a method for reduc-
ing the SSSG through an iterative process of removing dominated strategies from
ΣA and ΣB, reducing pairwise equivalent subsets to singletons and reassessing
dominance in the new strategy sets. This is known as the iterated elimination
of dominated strategies (IEDS) (see, for example, Berwanger, 2007; Bo¨rgers, 1992;
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Dufwenberg and Stegeman, 2002). Given any game, the aim of IEDS is to iden-
tify a simplified game, whose solutions are also solutions of the complete game.
These solutions can then be identified using standard techniques (see, for example,
Morris, 1994, pp. 99-114). The application of this method to games played over
graphs is discussed in Section 9.2.
It should be noted that because we are considering weak rather than strict dom-
inance, IEDS may not be suitable for identifying all the solutions of a particular
game. The results of this form of IEDS are dependent on the order in which dom-
inated strategies are removed (Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008, pp. 20-23) and
some solutions may be lost. It is also necessary to observe that, while IEDS has
been shown to be valid for games with finitely many possible strategies, for games
with infinitely many possible strategies the process may fail (Berwanger, 2007). In-
deed, such infinite games may not have solutions (Ruckle, 1983, p. 10).
However, although IEDS is not guaranteed to produce OMSs for the SSSG in
such cases, given a pair of mixed strategies σA, σB obtained by this method, it
is straightforward to check whether or not they are optimal by verifying that, for
some u ∈ [0, 1], we have:
inf
x∈ΣB
E[pA(σA, x)] = u
inf
y∈ΣA
E[pB(y,σB)] = 1− u
(8.4)
where u is the value of the game to Player A.
This method is described by Blackwell and Girshick (1979, p. 65) and used exten-
sively by Ruckle (1983, the method is introduced on pp. 8-9) to verify proposed
OMSs for geometric games.
8.3 The Graph Search Game (GSG)
The definitions and notation relating to graph theory used in this section are adapted
from Bondy and Murty (1976).
8.3.1 Definition of the GSG
Consider a simple graph G, characterised by the symmetric adjacency matrix
M = (aij), with a set of κ vertices:
V (G) = {v1, ..., vκ}
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and a set of edges:
E(G) = {{vi, vj} : vi, vj ∈ V (G) and aij = 1}
We suppose that G is connected, to ensure that the metric space axioms are fulfilled,
but this assumption could be relaxed if we allowed for infinite distances between ver-
tices. We also suppose that all edges of G have unit weight.
The Graph Search Game (GSG) G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r) over a finite graph G is defined
to be an example of the SSSG, with Ω = V (G), ∅ 6= ΣA,ΣB ⊆ V (G), r a positive
real number, and the distance function dG(v, w) for v, w ∈ V (G), v 6= w, defined to
be the length of the shortest path from v to w in G. We also define dG(v, v) = 0,
∀v ∈ V (G). The assumption that G is undirected ensures that the symmetry con-
dition dG(v, w) = dG(w, v) holds ∀v, w ∈ V (G).
Setting r = 1, we have that Br[v], the zone that can be searched by Player A when
deployed at v, is the closed neighbourhood N [v] of v, the set of all vertices adjacent
to v united with {v} itself.
  
Figure 8.2: The Graph Search Game (GSG).
Players deploy simultaneously at vertices of the graph. Suppose that Player A
deploys at the vertex marked w. If r = 1, Player B loses the game if she
deploys at any of the vertices marked w or x, but wins if she deploys at any of
the vertices marked y or z. If r = 2, Player B loses the game if she deploys at
any of the vertices marked w, x or y, but wins if she deploys at either of the
vertices marked z. A win results in a payoff of 1; a loss results in a payoff of 0.
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The game proceeds by Player A choosing a vertex vA ∈ ΣA and Player B simulta-
neously choosing a vertex vB ∈ ΣB. The payoff functions are:
pA(vA, vB) =

1 , if vA and vB are equal or adjacent;
0 , otherwise.
pB(vA, vB) = 1− pA(vA, vB)
In this game, the pure strategies for each player are particular vertices. In the follow-
ing analysis, we use the words “strategy” and “vertex” interchangeably, depending
on the context.
The GSG is illustrated in Figure 8.2:
8.3.2 The GSG with r 6= 1
The restriction to r = 1 is not a significant constraint, since any GSG can be reduced
to this case by means of a minor alteration.
For situations with r 6= 1, we can define:
G′ = (V (G), E(G′))
such that:
E(G′) = {{vi, vj} : vi, vj ∈ V (G) and 1 ≤ dG(vi, vj) ≤ r}
and apply our analysis to G′ with r = 1.
Equivalently, if r ∈ N \ {1}, we can replace the adjacency matrix M = (aij) of G
with M′ = (a′ij), where:
a′ij =

0 , if bij = 0 or i = j
1 , otherwise.
with (bij) =
∑r
q=1 M
q, the matrix which shows the number of paths in G of length
no greater than r connecting vi to vj.
It therefore suffices to exclusively study GSGs with r = 1, since these methods for
redefining G ensure that such analysis will be applicable to games for any r ∈ N.
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8.3.3 Preliminary observations
Analysis of the GSG requires the statement of some preliminary results and defini-
tions. For these results, we use the following notation:
• NA[v] = N [v] ∩ ΣA
The set of all potential positions for Player A in N [v].
• NB[v] = N [v] ∩ ΣB
The set of all potential positions for Player B in N [v].
• α[v] = |NA[v]|
The number of potential positions for Player A in N [v].
• β[v] = |NB[v]|
The number of potential positions for Player B in N [v].
• ∆(G) = max
w∈V (G)
[deg(w)]
The maximum degree of the vertices of G.
• δ(G) = min
w∈V (G)
[deg(w)]
The minimum degree of the vertices of G.
The following proposition states that if Player A can search a globally maximal
number of potential positions for Player B from a vertex v, then v is not dominated
by any other vertex and is only equivalent to those vertices which have the same
closed neighbourhood as v. In a graph in which all vertices have a distinct closed
neighbourhood, such as a rectangular grid graph, such a vertex v cannot be very
weakly dominated by any other vertex.
Proposition 8.3.1. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, consider a vertex
v ∈ ΣA and the subset Σ(v)A = {z ∈ ΣA : N [z] = N [v]}. We have that if:
β[v] = ∆(G) + 1 (8.5)
then:
(i) Σ
(v)
A exhibits pairwise equivalence for Player A;
(ii) v is not very weakly dominated for Player A by any strategy in ΣA \ Σ(v)A .
Proof. To prove (i), observe that for all w1, w2 ∈ Σ(v)A , N [w1] = N [w2]. Hence,
NB[w1] = NB[w2] and therefore w1 is equivalent to w2 for Player A, so Σ
(v)
A exhibits
pairwise equivalence for Player A.
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To prove (ii), suppose for a contradiction that v satisfies (8.5) and is very weakly
dominated by vˆ ∈ ΣA \ Σ(v)A .
Observe also that:
If β[w] = ∆(G) + 1, for some w ∈ V (G) ,
then NB[w] = N [w] .
(8.6)
and note that ∆(G) + 1 is an upper bound for β[w].
Now, we have that:
NB[v] ⊆ NB[vˆ] [by very weak dominance]
⇒ ∆(G) + 1 ≤ β[vˆ] ≤ |N [vˆ]| [by (8.5)]
⇒ ∆(G) + 1 ≤ β[vˆ] ≤ ∆(G) + 1
⇒ ∆(G) + 1 = β[v] = β[vˆ]
⇒ NB[v] = NB[vˆ] [since NB[v] ⊆ NB[vˆ]]
⇒ N [v] = N [vˆ] [by (8.6)]
⇒ vˆ ∈ Σ(v)A
This is a contradiction, since we supposed that vˆ ∈ ΣA \ Σ(v)A .
The next proposition is a stronger result. It states that, for Player A, given a vertex
v that is known not to be very weakly dominated by any vertices outside of a certain
subset S, if Player A can search strictly more potential hiding places for Player B
when deployed at v than could be searched from any other vertex in S, then v is
not very weakly dominated by any other vertex.
Proposition 8.3.2. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, consider a vertex
v ∈ ΣA. Let S ⊆ ΣA be such that v ∈ S and such that ΣA \ S contains no vertices
that very weakly dominate v for Player A. We have that if:
β[v] > max
w∈S\{v}
(β[w]) (8.7)
then v is not very weakly dominated for Player A by any other strategy in ΣA.
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose that v satisfies (8.7) and is very weakly domi-
nated by vˆ ∈ ΣA for Player A. We must have that vˆ ∈ S, since vertices outside S
cannot very weakly dominate v.
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From the very weak dominance, we have:
NB[v] ⊆ NB[vˆ]
⇒ max
w∈S\{v}
(β[w]) < β[v] ≤ β[vˆ] [by (8.7)]
This is a contradiction, since vˆ ∈ S \ {v}.
The following proposition is a restatement of Proposition 8.2.6, reformulated in the
context of the GSG. It states that any vertex that very weakly dominates v for
Player A can be no more than 2 steps away from v on the graph. Its proof is
identical to that of Proposition 8.2.6 and is thus omitted.
Proposition 8.3.3. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, if w very weakly
dominates v for Player A and NB[v] 6= ∅, then:
w ∈ B2[v] ∩ ΣA
Corollary 8.3.4. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, consider a vertex
v ∈ ΣA. We have that if:
β[v] > max
w∈S′
(β[w])
where:
S ′ = B2[v] ∩ ΣA \ {v}
then v is not very weakly dominated for Player A by any other strategy.
Proof. This follows directly from Propositions 8.3.2 and 8.3.3, where the set S from
Proposition 8.3.3 is defined as:
S = B2[v] ∩ ΣA
The corollary states that any vertex from which Player A can search strictly more
potential hiding places for Player B than could be searched from any other valid
vertex lying no more than two steps away, cannot be very weakly dominated by any
other vertex. These results allow us to considerably narrow down our search for
dominated and equivalent vertices.
Analogous results to Propositions 8.3.2 and 8.3.3 and Corollary 8.3.4 hold for very
weak dominance for Player B. The proofs of these results are similar to those
presented above and are thus omitted.
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Proposition 8.3.5. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, consider a vertex
v ∈ ΣB. Let S ⊆ ΣB be such that v ∈ S and such that ΣB \ S contains no vertices
that very weakly dominate v for Player B. We have that if:
α[v] < min
w∈S\{v}
(α[w])
then v is not very weakly dominated for Player B by any other strategy in ΣB.
Proposition 8.3.6. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, if w very weakly
dominates v for Player B and NA[w] 6= ∅, then:
w ∈ B2[v] ∩ ΣB
Corollary 8.3.7. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, consider a vertex
v ∈ ΣB, α[v] 6= 0. We have that if:
α[v] < min
w∈S′
(α[w])
where:
S ′ = B2[v] ∩ ΣB \ {v}
then v is not very weakly dominated for Player B by any other strategy.
8.3.4 Bounds on the value of the GSG
A first step in the analysis of a particular GSG is to determine lower and upper
bounds on the values of the game (see Definition 7.2.2).
Recall that for a two-player constant-sum game, it makes sense to restrict discussion
to the value to Player A, since this also determines the value to Player B through
the condition that the sum of the two values is a fixed constant (see (7.3)).
Proposition 8.3.8. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1, let u represent
the value to Player A. u is bounded as follows:
min
v∈ΣB
α[v]
|ΣA| ≤ u ≤ maxv∈ΣA
β[v]
|ΣB|
Note that in the case where ΣA = ΣB = V (G), these inequalities become:
δ(G) + 1
|V (G)| ≤ u ≤
∆(G) + 1
|V (G)| (8.8)
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The proposition derives from a consideration of ρA and ρB, defined in Section 8.2.3
as the mixed strategies that allocate equal probabilities to all vertices in a player’s
strategy set. If Player A employs mixed strategy ρA, then Player B can do no better
than to deploy at the vertex whose closed neighbourhood contains the fewest possible
vertices in ΣA. The value of the game to Player A cannot therefore be less than the
sum of the probabilities that ρA assigns to these vertices. This reasoning produces
the left hand inequality. The right hand inequality follows in a similar fashion from
an analysis of ρB as a strategy for Player B. A formal proof follows:
Proof. Suppose that Player A employs the mixed strategy ρA which allocates a uni-
form probability of |ΣA|−1 to all vertices w ∈ ΣA. In a particular play of the game,
suppose that Player B deploys at vertex v ∈ ΣB.
In this situation, the expected payoff to Player A is α[v]|ΣA|−1. Therefore, for any
mixed strategy σB for Player B:
E[pA(ρA,σB)] ≥ min
v∈ΣB
α[v]
|ΣA|
and thus:
u = max
σA
min
σB
E [pA(σA,σB)] ≥ min
v∈ΣB
α[v]
|ΣA|
The proof of the right hand inequality is similar.
The following corollary is a consequence of (8.8):
Corollary 8.3.9. Consider the GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
where G = (V (G), E(G)) is a regular graph of degree D, ΣA = ΣB = V (G), r = 1
and let u be the value of G to Player A. Then:
• u = (D + 1)/|V (G)|
• The strategy ρ that allocates a uniform probability of |V (G)|−1 to all vertices,
is an OMS for both players.
u can also be bounded in a different way:
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Proposition 8.3.10. For the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r) with r = 1, let u represent
the value to Player A and:
W =
{
W ′ ⊆ ΣA :
⋃
w∈W ′
N [w] ⊇ ΣB
}
Z = {Z ′ ⊆ ΣB : dG(z1, z2) > 2,∀z1, z2 ∈ Z ′}
Then u is bounded as follows:[
min
W ′∈W
|W ′|
]−1
≤ u ≤
[
max
Z′∈Z
|Z ′|
]−1
The left hand inequality is derived from consideration of the mixed strategy τA for
Player A that allocates uniform probabilities to a minimal subset of vertices whose
closed neighbourhoods cover ΣB.
The right hand inequality is derived from consideration of the mixed strategy τB for
Player B that allocates uniform probabilities to a maximal subset of vertices with
the property that no two vertices are connected by a path of length less than 3.
Proof. First consider the left hand inequality.
Consider a subset of vertices W ′ ∈ W of minimum cardinality. Suppose that
Player A employs the mixed strategy τA that allocates uniform probability |W ′|−1
to vertices w ∈ W ′ and zero probability to all other vertices.
In a particular play of the game, suppose that Player B deploys at vertex v ∈ ΣB.
Since W ′ ∈ W , we have: ⋃
w∈W ′
N [w] ⊇ ΣB
Therefore ∃w′ ∈ W ′ such that v ∈ N [w′]. Since τA allocates a probability of |W ′|−1
to w′, the expected payoff to Player A is greater than or equal to |W ′|−1. Therefore,
for any mixed strategy σB for Player B:
E[pA(τA,σB)] ≥
[
min
W ′∈W
|W ′|
]−1
and thus:
u = max
σA
min
σB
E [pA(σA,σB)] ≥
[
min
W ′∈W
|W ′|
]−1
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Now consider the right hand inequality.
Consider a subset of vertices Z ′ ∈ Z of maximum cardinality. Suppose that Player B
employs the mixed strategy τB that allocates uniform probability |Z ′|−1 to vertices
v ∈ Z ′ and zero probability to all other vertices.
In a particular play of the game, suppose that Player A deploys at vertex w ∈ ΣA.
Since dG(z1, z2) > 2, ∀z1, z2 ∈ Z ′, we clearly have that:
|N [w] ∩ Z ′| ≤ 1
So, in this situation, the expected payoff to Player A is less than or equal to |Z ′|−1.
Therefore, for any mixed strategy σA for Player A:
E[pA(σA, τB)] ≤
[
max
Z′∈Z
|Z ′|
]−1
and thus:
u = max
σA
min
σB
E [pA(σA,σB)] ≤
[
max
Z′∈Z
|Z ′|
]−1
Following these results, we label the bounds on u as follows:
• LB1 = min
v∈ΣB
α[v]
|ΣA|
• LB2 =
[
min
W ′∈W
|W ′|
]−1
• UB1 = max
v∈ΣA
β[v]
|ΣB|
• UB2 =
[
max
Z′∈Z
|Z ′|
]−1
For a particular GSG, each of these bounds may or may not be attained. For exam-
ple, consider the four graphs shown in Figure 8.3. In each case, consider the GSG
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r) with ΣA = ΣB = V (G) and r = 1. For such small graphs, OMSs
are easy to calculate (for example, using the method described by Morris (1994),
pp. 99-114). Table 8.1 summarises the OMSs, the true values of u (the value of G
to Player A) and the values of the bounds for each of the four games.
It should be noted that while LB1 and UB1 will generally be easy to calculate, LB2
and UB2 may not be, since the minimal and maximal cardinalities of W
′ ∈ W and
Z ′ ∈ Z respectively may be difficult to determine.
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Figure 8.3: Four simple graphs. Solutions of GSGs played over these graphs
and the values of the four bounds LB1, LB2, UB1, UB2 are summarised in
Table 8.1.
 Optimal strategies 
 Player A Player B 
  Bounds  Probability allocated to each vertex marked… 
Graph u LB1 LB2 UB1 UB2 X Y Z X Y Z 
a 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.25 N/A N/A 0.25 N/A N/A 
b 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.00 0.50 N/A 0.50 0.00 N/A 
c 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 N/A 0.33 0.00 N/A 
d 0.40 0.33 0.33 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.00 
Table 8.1: Summary of the values of bounds LB1, LB2, UB1, UB2, the true
values u to Player A and examples of OMSs for each player for GSGs played
over the four graphs shown in Figure 8.3, with ΣA = ΣB = V (G) and r = 1.
Shaded cells indicate that the relevant bounds are attained. All figures are
rounded to two decimal places.
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8.4 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have defined the SSSG, a general, explicitly spatial game for the
modelling of search and concealment scenarios. In line with the research objectives
set out in Section 1.5, we have demonstrated that the SSSG provides a framework
to unite other games presented in the literature and we have derived some initial
results on the OMSs of the game and on the values of the game to each player,
focusing particularly on games with finite strategy sets and on the special case of
the SSSG played over a graph, the Graph Search Game (GSG).
In Chapter 9, we will present a number of additional methods to identify the OMSs
of a GSG, including an algorithm based on the iterated elimination of dominated
strategies, a technique for exploiting symmetries of the graph over which a game is
played and a means of identifying exact solutions for games played over a particular
family of graphs.
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Chapter 9
Methods for solving GSGs
9.1 Introduction
In Chapters 7 and 8, we first discussed the background and motivations for the
SSSG and then defined the game, first in its most general form, over a metric space,
then over a graph. Certain initial results were also presented, relating to games
with finite strategy sets (which include all games on finite graphs) in Section 8.2.3,
concepts of strategic dominance and equivalence in Sections 8.2.4 and 8.3.3, GSGs
with non-unit detection radius in Section 8.3.2 and upper and lower bounds on the
values of the GSG in Section 8.3.4.
In this chapter, we present some broader methods and concepts for simplifying and
analysing GSGs. The first of these concerns the specification of an algorithm that
applies the IEDS procedure (see Section 8.2.5) in the context of the GSG; the second
involves a method to exploit the automorphisms of a graph to reduce the complexity
of a corresponding game; while the third relates to the identification of a specific
form of mixed strategy, labelled an “equal oddments strategy”, which, if it exists for
a particular graph, must be optimal for both players.
The latter two concepts are combined to present a general method for the solution
of a particular family of graphs, which we call “poly-level graphs”.
9.2 Simplifying GSGs algorithmically
9.2.1 An IEDS algorithm for the GSG
The results of Section 8.2.4 and Section 8.3.3 allow for the creation of an IEDS
algorithm (see Section 8.2.5) for the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r). Since the game has
finitely many strategies, this approach is always a valid method for finding a solu-
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tion of the game (though it may not identify all OMSs), as discussed in Section 8.2.5.
The algorithm identifies vertices that may be very weakly dominated for Player A
or Player B and checks for dominance and equivalence over a small subset of their
surrounding vertices. Very weakly dominated vertices are eliminated and the strat-
egy sets for the players are iteratively reduced, forming sequences (ΣA,K)K∈N∪{0}
and (ΣB,K)K∈N∪{0} of subsets of ΣA and ΣB respectively, until there is no dominance
or equivalence in the remaining vertices. The aim is to simplify the game as far as
possible, such that OMSs can be more easily identified.
The explicit identification of vertices that cannot be dominated and the subsequent
restriction of the set of vertices that should be examined when searching for domi-
nance of a given vertex are intended to facilitate the creation of an efficient computer
program to apply IEDS in the GSG. An application of the algorithm in a very simple
case is presented in Section 9.2.4.
For the purpose of iteration, our existing notation is extended as follows:
NA,K [v] = N [v] ∩ ΣA,K
NB,K [v] = N [v] ∩ ΣB,K
αK [v] = |NA,K [v]|
βK [v] = |NB,K [v]|
Step One: Transformation of G to G′
If r 6= 1, we transform G to G′ using the method outlined in Section 8.3.2.
We then set the iteration variable K = 0 and define:
ΣA,0 = ΣA
ΣB,0 = ΣB
Step Two: Identify vertices that cannot be very weakly dom-
inated for Player A
By Propositions 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 and Corollary 8.3.4, in a graph in which all vertices
have a distinct closed neighbourhood, a vertex v for which:
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βK [v] = ∆(G) + 1
or NB,K [v] 6= ∅ and B2[v] ∩ ΣA,K = {v}
or βK [v] > max
w∈S′(v)
(βK [w])
where:
S ′(v) = B2[v] ∩ ΣA,K \ {v}
cannot be very weakly dominated for Player A by any other vertex. We need not
therefore consider such vertices when looking for dominated or equivalent strategies.
Formally, we define a reduced set of strategies for Player A:
Σ−A,K = ΣA,K \
[
C
(0)
A,K ∪ C(1)A,K ∪ C(2)A,K
]
with:
C
(0)
A,K = {v ∈ ΣA,K : βK [v] = ∆(G) + 1}
C
(1)
A,K = {v ∈ ΣA,K : NB,K [v] 6= ∅ ; B2[v] ∩ ΣA,K = {v}}
C
(2)
A,K =
{
v ∈ ΣA,K : βK [v] > max
w∈S′(v)
(βK [w])
}
For a graph in which two vertices may have the same closed neighbourhood,
Proposition 8.3.1 is not used, and we instead define:
Σ−A,K = ΣA,K \
[
C
(1)
A,K ∪ C(2)A,K
]
Step Three: Eliminate very weakly dominated vertices for
Player A
Now we must look for very weakly dominated vertices for Player A in Σ−A,K .
Vertices v ∈ ΣA,K for which NB,K [v] = ∅ are dominated automatically by any ver-
tex w ∈ ΣA,K for which NB,K [w] 6= ∅, while Proposition 8.3.3 states that for each
v ∈ Σ−A,K with NB,K [v] 6= ∅ we need only look for vertices that very weakly dominate
v in B2[v] ∩ ΣA,K .
Vertices are checked sequentially according to some predetermined ordering and very
weakly dominated vertices are removed and are not considered when searching for
dominance and equivalence of any remaining vertices. Sequential checking and the
immediate removal of identified vertices ensure that pairwise equivalent subsets are
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not eliminated from ΣA,K in their entirety, but rather reduced to singletons as re-
quired.
Let the set of very weakly dominated vertices identified in this way be denoted as
ΨA,K .
Formally, we define a new strategy set for Player A:
ΣA,K+1 = ΣA,K \ΨA,K
Note that in the trivial case where NB,K [v] = ∅, ∀v ∈ ΣA,K , all vertices under
consideration are equivalent for Player A, so we choose any vertex v¯ ∈ ΣA,K , define
ΣA,K+1 = {v¯}, ΨA,K = ΣA,K \ {v¯} and continue to Step Four. This ensures that
ΣA,K+1 is not empty.
Step Four: Identify vertices that cannot be very weakly dom-
inated for Player B
In a similar fashion to Step Two, we use Proposition 8.3.6 and Corollary 8.3.7 to
define a reduced set of strategies for Player B, removing those strategies that cannot
be very weakly dominated:
Σ−B,K = ΣB,K \
[
C
(1)
B,K ∪ C(2)B,K
]
with:
C
(1)
B,K = {v ∈ ΣB,K : NA,K+1[v] 6= ∅ ; B2[v] ∩ ΣB,K = {v}}
C
(2)
B,K =
{
v ∈ ΣB,K : αK+1[v] < min
w∈S′′(v)
(αK+1[w])
}
where:
S ′′(v) = B2[v] ∩ ΣB,K \ {v}
However, in the trivial case where ∃v∗ ∈ ΣB,K with NA,K+1[v∗] = ∅, observe that v∗
(which need not be unique) very weakly dominates every other vertex for Player B,
so we define Σ−B,K = ΣB,K and continue to Step Five.
Note the use of NA,K+1[v] and αK+1[v] rather than NA,K [v] and αK [v] at this step.
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Step Five: Eliminate very weakly dominated vertices for
Player B
Now we must look for very weakly dominated vertices for Player B in Σ−B,K .
If ∃v∗ ∈ Σ−B,K with NA,K+1[v∗] = ∅ then v∗ very weakly dominates every other vertex
for Player B, as discussed, so we define ΣB,K+1 = {v∗}, ΨB,K = ΣB,K \ {v∗} and
continue to Step Six.
Otherwise, Proposition 8.3.6 states that for each v ∈ Σ−B,K we need only look for
vertices that very weakly dominate v in B2[v] ∩ ΣB,K .
Vertices are checked sequentially and very weakly dominated vertices are removed
and are not considered when searching for dominance and equivalence of any re-
maining vertices.
Let the set of very weakly dominated vertices identified in this way be denoted as
ΨB,K .
Formally, we define a new strategy set for Player B:
ΣB,K+1 = ΣB,K \ΨB,K
Step Six: Condition for continued iteration
If no very weakly dominated vertices were identified at Step Three and Step Five
(ΨA,K = ΨB,K = ∅), then no further pure strategy dominance or equivalence exists.
In this case, proceed to Step Seven. Otherwise, increase the iteration variable K by
one and return to Step Two.
Step Seven: Find OMSs for the simplified game
Construct the payoff matrix for the simplified game defined by the strategy sets
ΣA,K , ΣB,K . If OMSs for this game can be found (for example, using the method
described by Morris (1994), pp. 99-114), they are OMSs for the complete GSG (see
Morris (1994), pp. 48-49; Berwanger (2007), p. 2).
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9.2.2 Termination and efficiency of the algorithm
Note that this algorithm must terminate for some K ∈ N ∪ {0}. The condition for
continued iteration (Step Six ) is only fulfilled if new pure strategy dominance or
equivalence is identified and this necessarily results in the elimination of strategies
from one player’s strategy set. Also, the GSG has been defined on graphs with a
finite set of κ vertices, which implies that ΣA,0 and ΣB,0 are finite sets. Therefore
the integer sequence:
( |ΣA,K |+ |ΣB,K | )K∈N∪{0} (9.1)
is strictly decreasing and positive, and so must terminate for some K = K ′ ∈ N∪{0}.
Though a thorough investigation of the computational complexity of the algorithm
is beyond the scope of this current work (and would depend to some extent on its
precise implementation), a crude measure of the algorithm’s efficiency can be deter-
mined by considering the number of pairs of vertices that must be tested for very
weak dominance before the algorithm terminates. Given a GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
with |V (G)| = κ, an (extremely conservative) upper bound for this number can be
determined as follows.
At each of Steps Three and Five, a particular vertex can be tested against no more
than κ−1 other vertices. Therefore, the number of vertex pairs tested for very weak
dominance at a single iteration certainly does not exceed 2κ2. Also, since (9.1) is a
strictly decreasing positive sequence and |ΣA,0|, |ΣB,0| ≤ κ, the number of iterations
clearly cannot exceed 2κ. Therefore, for any GSG, the total number of vertex pairs
that must be tested for very weak dominance before the algorithm terminates will
not exceed a cubic function of the number of vertices κ.
Alternatively, since the algorithm only tests vertex pairs for very weak dominance if
the distance between them is less than 3, at each of Steps Three and Five, a particu-
lar vertex will be tested against no more than ∆(G′)2 other vertices (where ∆(G′) is
the maximum degree of the vertices of the graph after the completion of Step One).
Therefore, the number of vertex pairs tested in a single iteration certainly does not
exceed 2∆(G′)2κ. Again using the fact that the number of iterations cannot exceed
2κ, we may conclude that, for any GSG, the total number of vertex pairs tested
before termination will not exceed a quadratic function of ∆(G′)κ.
Which of these bounds is more useful will depend on the structure of the graphs
under consideration.
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9.2.3 The algorithm applied to games on trees
In this section and the next, we demonstrate that the algorithm of Section 9.2.1
offers a distinct advantage over the method proposed by White (1994) for solving
games played on trees (with r = 1).1 Proposition 9.2.2 establishes that the algorithm
always succeeds in reducing games of this type to cases that are trivially simple to
solve, while Section 9.2.4 presents a simple example which shows that the algorithm
can also be applied to games on graphs that are not trees. Also note that White
exclusively considers situations where ΣA = ΣB = V (G), while the algorithm pre-
sented here is not restricted to such cases.
As in Section 8.2.3, let ρA and ρB represent the mixed strategies for each player
that allocate equal probabilities to all vertices in their strategy set. The following
proposition is a restatement of Proposition 8.2.1 in the context of the GSG, with
χ = 1.
Proposition 9.2.1. Consider the GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
with r = 1. If we have:
α[v] = 1 , ∀v ∈ ΣB
β[w] = 1 , ∀w ∈ ΣA
then ρA and ρB are OMSs for Players A and B respectively and |ΣA|−1 = |ΣB|−1 = u
is the value of the game to Player A.
The following proposition states that, for GSGs on trees with r = 1, either the value
of the game to Player A is zero and analysis of the game is trivial or the algorithm
of Section 9.2.1 reduces the game to the form given in Proposition 9.2.1, for which
ρA and ρB have been shown to be OMSs.
1 Recall that a tree is a graph in which there is a unique path between any pair of vertices.
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Proposition 9.2.2. Consider the GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
where G is a tree and r = 1. When applied to G, the algorithm of Section 9.2.1
terminates for some K = K ′ ∈ N ∪ {0}, such that:
• Either:
ΣA,K′ = {w} , βK′ [w] = 0
ΣB,K′ = {v} , αK′ [v] = 0
and u, the value of the game to Player A, is 0;
• Or:
αK′ [v] = 1 , ∀v ∈ ΣB,K′
βK′ [w] = 1 , ∀w ∈ ΣA,K′
and thus, by Proposition 9.2.1, the mixed strategies ρA,K′ and ρB,K′, which
allocate equal probabilities to all vertices in the players’ respective strategy sets
ΣA,K′ and ΣB,K′, are OMSs and the value of the game to Player A is:
u = |ΣA,K′ |−1 = |ΣB,K′ |−1
Owing to its length and complexity, the proof of this proposition is presented sepa-
rately in Section 9.2.5.
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9.2.4 An application of the algorithm
A computer program was written in Python (Python Software Foundation, 2012)
using NumPy (Numpy Developers, 2012) to implement the algorithm described in
Section 9.2.1.
The single example presented here is clearly very simple and is included purely to
demonstrate that the algorithm can be applied to games on graphs other than trees,
though the extent to which it is able to simplify such games varies greatly. Note
particularly that this example has r 6= 1 and ΣA 6= ΣB.
Consider the GSG G∗ = (G∗,ΣA,ΣB, r), where r = 2 and G∗ is the graph over 14
vertices v0 to v13 defined by the adjacency matrix:
M =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

and where:
ΣA = V (G
∗)
ΣB = {v0, v1, v2, v5, v6, v8, v10, v11, v12, v13}
The graph G∗ is shown in Figure 9.1.
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Figure 9.1: The graph G∗. Square vertices lie in ΣA only, while
circular vertices lie in ΣA ∩ ΣB.
At Step One, using the method of Section 8.3.2, the adjacency matrix M is replaced
with an alternative adjacency matrix M′, which represents a graph G∗′ in which all
vertices separated by no more than r = 2 steps in G∗ are connected by an edge:
M′ =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0

At the first iteration of Steps Two to Five, v0 (very weakly dominated by v7), v2 , v3 ,
v4 , v5 , v6 (by v1), v9 (by v8), v10 , v11 and v12 (by v1) are eliminated for Player A,
and v1 (very weakly dominated by v0), v5 (by v10), v8 (by v0), v10 (by v11), v11 (by
v12) and v13 (by v0) are eliminated for Player B, in that order.
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At the second iteration, no further dominance is identified, so the algorithm proceeds
to Step Seven. By this stage, the game has been reduced to the following case:
• Remaining strategies for Player A: v1 , v7 , v8 , v13
• Remaining strategies for Player B: v0 , v2 , v6 , v12
• Payoff matrix (for Player A):
Player B
v0 v2 v6 v12
Player A
v1
v7
v8
v13

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

Calculating the OMSs from this matrix is simple, for example, using the method
described by Morris (1994, pp. 99-114). Alternatively, observe that we may apply
Proposition 8.2.1 to this reduced game, setting χ = 3.
An OMS for Player A is to play vertices v1 , v7 , v8 , v13 , each with probability 0.25;
an OMS for Player B is to play vertices v0 , v2 , v6 , v12 , each with probability 0.25.
The value of the game to Player A is 0.75.
9.2.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2.2
We reproduce the proposition here for ease of reference:
Proposition 9.2.2. Consider the GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
where G is a tree and r = 1. When applied to G, the algorithm of Section 9.2.1
terminates for some K = K ′ ∈ N ∪ {0}, such that:
• Either:
ΣA,K′ = {w} , βK′ [w] = 0
ΣB,K′ = {v} , αK′ [v] = 0
and u, the value of the game to Player A, is 0;
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• Or:
αK′ [v] = 1 , ∀v ∈ ΣB,K′
βK′ [w] = 1 , ∀w ∈ ΣA,K′
and thus, by Proposition 9.2.1, the mixed strategies ρA,K′ and ρB,K′, which
allocate equal probabilities to all vertices in the players’ respective strategy sets
ΣA,K′ and ΣB,K′, are OMSs and the value of the game to Player A is:
u = |ΣA,K′ |−1 = |ΣB,K′ |−1
The proof of this proposition will require some additional terminology.
As we know, a tree is a graph in which there is a unique path between any pair of
vertices. Therefore, if G is a tree, we may designate a vertex t ∈ V (G) as the “root”
of G, such that any vertex v 6= t has precisely one neighbour vp (the “parent” of v)
for which:
dG(t, vp) = dG(t, v)− 1
For any other neighbour vc of v (a “child” of v) we have:
dG(t, vc) = dG(t, v) + 1
We now prove Proposition 9.2.2.
Proof. To derive a contradiction, assume that, when applied to G, the algorithm of
Section 9.2.1 terminates for some K = K ′ ∈ N ∪ {0} for which at least one of the
following two conditions holds:
• ∃v′ ∈ ΣB,K′ such that αK′ [v′] > 1
• ∃w′ ∈ ΣA,K′ such that βK′ [w′] > 1
We will demonstrate that this assumption is false by identifying two vertices in ΣA,K′
or ΣB,K′ , one of which very weakly dominates the other for the appropriate player.
This will be a contradiction, since the algorithm only terminates when no dominance
or equivalence can be found in the reduced strategy sets.
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Define the following subsets of V (G):
S1 = {s ∈ ΣB,K′ : αK′ [s] > 1}
S2 = {s ∈ ΣA,K′ : βK′ [s] > 1}
S = S1 ∪ S2
Now choose a vertex t ∈ V (G) to designate as the root of G and let s′ ∈ S be such
that:
dG(t, s
′) = max
s∈S
[dG(t, s)] (9.2)
Since S = S1 ∪ S2 there are two possible (non-mutually exclusive) cases: s′ ∈ S1 or
s′ ∈ S2.
If s′ ∈ S1 then s′ ∈ ΣB,K′ and at least two vertices in NK′ [s′] lie in ΣA,K′ . We
consider two possible scenarios.
• First, suppose that at least one of the children of s′ lies in ΣA,K′ . So, since
s′ ∈ S1, there exist distinct s1, s2 ∈ NA,K′ [s′] such that:
dG(t, s1) ≤ dG(t, s2) = dG(t, s′) + 1 (9.3)
Observe that neither s2 nor any of its children lies in ΣB,K′ , since this would
imply that s2 ∈ S2 ∈ S, which is a contradiction by (9.2) and (9.3). Therefore:
NB,K′ [s2] = {s′} ⊆ NB,K′ [s1]
which means that s1 very weakly dominates s2 for Player A, by Proposi-
tion 8.2.2.
• Now suppose that none of the children of s′ lies in ΣA,K′ . Since s′ ∈ S1, this
means that s′ and its parent both lie in ΣA,K′ . i.e. there exist s1, s2 ∈ NA,K′ [s′]
(where s2 = s
′) such that:
dG(t, s1) < dG(t, s2) = dG(t, s
′)
If none of the children of s2 lies in ΣB,K′ , then:
NB,K′ [s2] ⊆ NB,K′ [s1]
which means that s1 very weakly dominates s2 for Player A, by Proposi-
tion 8.2.2.
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Otherwise, at least one child of s2 lies in ΣB,K′ . Call this child s
′′ and note
that:
dG(t, s
′′) = dG(t, s′) + 1 (9.4)
Observe that neither s′′ nor any of its children lies in ΣA,K′ , since this would
imply that s′′ ∈ S1 ∈ S, which is a contradiction by (9.2) and (9.4). Therefore:
NA,K′ [s
′′] = {s′} ⊆ NA,K′ [s′]
which means that s′′ very weakly dominates s′ for Player B, by Proposi-
tion 8.2.4.
So if s′ ∈ S1, in both possible scenarios, we have identified very weak dominance
in one of the strategy sets ΣA,K′ or ΣB,K′ . In the case where s
′ ∈ S2, very weak
dominance can also be identified by following very similar logic (the complete proof
is omitted). As previously discussed, this is a contradiction and thus our initial
assumption was false. Therefore:
αK′ [v] ≤ 1 , ∀v ∈ ΣB,K′
βK′ [w] ≤ 1 , ∀w ∈ ΣA,K′
(9.5)
To complete the proof, note that:
• Any vertex w ∈ ΣA,K′ for Player A such that βK′ [w] = 0 is clearly very weakly
dominated by any other vertex for Player A.
• Any vertex v ∈ ΣB,K′ for Player B such that αK′ [v] = 0 clearly very weakly
dominates any other vertex for Player B.
• Statements (∗) and (∗∗) are equivalent:
[αK′ [v] = 0 ; ∀v ∈ ΣB,K′ ] (∗)
[βK′ [w] = 0 ; ∀w ∈ ΣA,K′ ] (∗∗)
• Since the algorithm has terminated, no very weak dominance exists in ΣA,K′
or ΣB,K′ .
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These facts, combined with (9.5) imply that:
• Either:
ΣA,K′ = {w} , βK′ [w] = 0
ΣB,K′ = {v} , αK′ [v] = 0
and u, the value of the game to Player A, is clearly 0;
• Or:
αK′ [v] = 1 , ∀v ∈ ΣB,K′
βK′ [w] = 1 , ∀w ∈ ΣA,K′
and, by Proposition 9.2.1, ρA,K′ and ρB,K′ are OMSs for each player and the
value of the game to Player A is:
u = |ΣA,K′ |−1 = |ΣB,K′ |−1
This proves the proposition.
9.3 Further methods for analysing GSGs
9.3.1 Exploiting the automorphisms of the GSG
The definitions and notation relating to group theory used in this section are from
Neumann et al. (1994).
An automorphism of a graph G = (V (G), E(G)) is a mapping of the graph
to itself, which preserves adjacencies. The following definition is adapted from
Bondy and Murty (1976), pp. 5-7:
Definition 9.3.1. Consider a simple graph G = (V (G), E(G)).
• An automorphism φ of G is a permutation of the vertices:
φ : V (G) → V (G)
v 7→ φ(v)
such that:
{v, w} ∈ E(G)⇔ {φ(v), φ(w)} ∈ E(G)
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• The automorphism group Γ(G) is the permutation group formed by the set
of all automorphisms of G, with the operation of composition.
• The orbit OH [v] of a vertex v ∈ V (G) under a subgroup H ≤ Γ(G) is the set:
OH [v] = {w ∈ V (G) : ∃φ ∈ H with φ(v) = w}
The orbits of the vertices of G under H form a partition of V (G).
Note that this definition is valid for simple graphs. For more general graphs, which
may include directed edges, loops, or multiple edges connecting the same vertices, a
permutation of the edges also needs to be specified.
We extend the concept of a graph automorphism to that of a graph game automor-
phism, an automorphism of the graph that also preserves the strategic status of the
vertices:
Definition 9.3.2. Consider a GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
with r = 1. A graph game automorphism φ of G is an automorphism of G,
such that:
• v ∈ ΣA ⇔ φ(v) ∈ ΣA , ∀v ∈ V (G)
• v ∈ ΣB ⇔ φ(v) ∈ ΣB , ∀v ∈ V (G)
We can also define automorphism groups and vertex orbits in terms of graph game
automorphisms:
Proposition 9.3.3. Consider a GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
with r = 1.
• The set of all graph game automorphisms of G, with the operation of compo-
sition, forms a subgroup Γ(G) (the graph game automorphism group) of
Γ(G).
• The orbits of the vertices of G under any subgroup H ≤ Γ(G) form a partition
of V (G).
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For Γ(G) to be a subgroup of Γ(G), we require that Γ(G) is closed under composi-
tion, contains the identity and contains an inverse for every element. Since the only
restriction on Γ(G) is that ΣA,ΣB are invariant under its elements, these conditions
are clearly satisfied. The second part of the proposition is true of any permutation
group.
The following proposition describes a relationship between certain OMSs of G and
the graph game automorphism group Γ(G).
Proposition 9.3.4. Consider a GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
with V (G) = {v1, . . . , vκ} and r = 1. Let O[v] denote the orbit of v under some
subgroup H of the graph game automorphism group Γ(G).
There exists a pair of OMSs:
σA = (σA[v1], . . . , σA[vκ])
σB = (σB[v1], . . . , σB[vκ])
where σA and σB respectively allocate probabilities σA[vi] and σB[vi] to vertex vi ,
such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}:
O[vi] = O[vj]⇒

σA[vi] = σA[vj]
σB[vi] = σB[vj]
(9.6)
Note that in particular the proposition is true for H = Γ(G).
In order to avoid interrupting the thread of this section, the lengthy proof of
Proposition 9.3.4 is presented separately in Section 9.3.4.
Proposition 9.3.4 implies that, when looking for OMSs for a GSG G, it suffices to
consider those strategies that allocate equal probability to all vertices lying in the
same orbit under graph game automorphisms. For graphs with high numbers of
symmetries, this can significantly simplify the analysis of the game.
Furthermore, the fact that the proposition is valid for any subgroup H ≤ Γ(G) en-
sures that even if not all graph game automorphisms of G are known, to find a pair of
OMSs, it is sufficient to restrict consideration to those strategies that allocate equal
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probability to all vertices lying in the same orbit under the subgroup generated by
those graph game automorphisms that can be identified.
Note that, though stated and proved in a different setting, this proposition is strongly
related to Zoroa and Zoroa’s Theorem 2.1 (1993, pp. 526-528), which relates to
games played over sets that admit certain transformations. However, Zoroa and
Zoroa require that the transformations considered be commutative, which is not
necessarily true of the automorphisms of a graph.
9.3.2 Example: Using automorphisms to find solutions of G
Consider the GSG G = (G5,5,ΣA,ΣB, r), where G5,5 is the 5 × 5 rectangular grid
graph depicted in Figure 9.2, ΣA = ΣB = V (G5,5) and r = 1. Each player has 25
possible pure strategies: V (G5,5) = {v1, . . . , v25}.
Note that since both Players may deploy at any vertex, Γ(G) = Γ(G5,5), so we
consider all automorphisms of G5,5. These automorphisms are rotations through
multiples of pi/2, reflection about a vertical axis and compositions of these trans-
formations. The vertices can be partitioned into six orbits, which we denote as
O(i) , i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The vertices belonging to each orbit are indicated in Fig-
ure 9.2.
1 1 
1 1 
2 3 2 
2 4 5 4 2 
3 5 6 5 3 
2 4 5 4 2 
2 3 2 
Figure 9.2: The 5 × 5 rectangular grid graph G5,5 . Vertices
marked i belong to orbit O(i) under Γ(G5,5).
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By Proposition 9.3.4, there exist OMSs σA, σB for Players A and B, which allocate
the same probability to all vertices lying in the same orbit. Let ω
(i)
A and ω
(i)
B be the
respective probabilities that σA and σB allocate to individual vertices in orbit O(i),
and define:
Ai = |O(i)|ω(i)A , Bi = |O(i)|ω(i)B , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} (9.7)
Observe that:
6∑
i=1
Ai =
6∑
i=1
Bi = 1
Ai and Bi represent the total probability that σA and σB respectively allocate to
all vertices in orbit O(i).
Let σ(1), . . . ,σ(6) be the mixed strategies (for either player), which allocate uniform
probability to all vertices in the corresponding orbit and zero probability to other
vertices:
σ(i) = (σ(i)[v1], . . . , σ
(i)[v25])
with:
σ(i)[vj] =

|O(i)|−1 , vj ∈ O(i)
0 , otherwise.
We see that σA and σB are linear combinations of the σ
(i), weighted by the orbit
probabilities Ai and Bi:
σA =
6∑
i=1
Aiσ
(i) , σB =
6∑
i=1
Biσ
(i)
This observation allows us to take a different perspective on the problem. Suppose
that we treat the σ(i) as if they were pure strategies. The following strategies would
be optimal strategies of such a game:
τA = (τA[σ
(1)], . . . , τA[σ
(6)])
τB = (τB[σ
(1)], . . . , τB[σ
(6)])
with:
τA[σ
(i)] = Ai , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}
τB[σ
(i)] = Bi , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}
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To find these OMSs, we analyse the matrix of expected payoffs to Player A for each
of these six strategies against one another:
Player B
σ(1) σ(2) σ(3) σ(4) σ(5) σ(6)
Player A
σ(1)
σ(2)
σ(3)
σ(4)
σ(5)
σ(6)

1/4 1/4 0 0 0 0
1/4 1/8 1/4 1/4 0 0
0 1/4 1/4 0 1/4 0
0 1/4 0 1/4 1/2 0
0 0 1/4 1/2 1/4 1
0 0 0 0 1 1

The OMSs τA and τB can be computed from this payoff matrix using standard
methods (see, for example, Morris (1994), pp. 99-114), giving:
(A1, . . . , A6) = 69
−1(16, 28, 10, 4, 6, 5)
(B1, . . . , B6) = 69
−1(16, 28, 10, 4, 6, 5)
Using (9.7) we then find:
(
ω
(1)
A , . . . , ω
(6)
A
)
= 138−1(8, 7, 5, 2, 3, 10)(
ω
(1)
B , . . . , ω
(6)
B
)
= 138−1(8, 7, 5, 2, 3, 10)
This fully determines the OMSs σA and σB for G. These OMSs are illustrated in
Figure 9.3.
Note that by identifying the six orbits of V (G) under graph game automorphisms of
G, rather than solving a game with a 25× 25 payoff matrix, we needed only to solve
a game with a 6× 6 payoff matrix. A similar method could be applied to any GSG
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r) with r = 1, for which non-trivial graph game automorphisms
can be found.
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8 7 5 7 8 
7 2 3 2 7 
5 3 10 3 5 
7 2 3 2 7 
8 7 5 7 8 
Figure 9.3: Probability oddments (integer values proportional to the probabilities)
allocated to each vertex of G5,5 by the (identical) OMSs σA and σB for the GSG
G = (G5,5,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1 and ΣA = ΣB = V (G5,5). Darker shading
indicates lower probability oddments.
0 0 
0 0 
8 
8 
8 
8 8 
8 
8 
8 
3 3 
3 
3 
3 3 
3 
3 
5 5 
5 5 
2 2 
2 
2 
2 2 
2 
2 4 4 
4 4 
9 9 
9 9 
3 
3 
3 
3 3 
3 
3 
3 
4 4 
4 
4 
4 4 
4 
4 
0 0 
0 0 
5 5 
5 
5 
5 5 
5 
5 2 2 
2 2 
Figure 9.4: Probability oddments allocated to each vertex of G6,6 by the OMSs
σA and σB for the GSG G = (G6,6,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1 and ΣA = ΣB = V (G6,6).
Darker shading indicates lower probability oddments.
279
9.3.3 Equal oddments strategies
The example of the GSG G played over the 5× 5 rectangular grid G5,5 exhibits two
curious and related properties.
Firstly, and most obviously, the OMSs that were calculated for each player are iden-
tical σA = σB = σ. This means that the OMS for Player A allocates identical
probabilities to the vertices of G5,5 as does the OMS for Player B (though these
OMSs need not be unique). Given the interpretation of the game, this is a surpris-
ing result. Player B is attempting to hide from Player A, so we might have expected
that her best mixed strategy would involve avoiding vertices at which Player A was
more likely to deploy.
Note that the method of Section 9.3.1 does not produce identical OMSs for all
graphs, nor for all grid graphs. For example, when applied to the 6 × 6 grid graph
G6,6, the method produces distinct OMSs σA, σB (see Figure 9.4) that appear to
be more consistent with our intuition, in that vertices to which σA allocates fairly
high probability seem to be allocated fairly low probability by σB and vice-versa.
Secondly, in Figure 9.3, observe that for all vertices v ∈ V (G5,5), the sum of the
probability oddments allocated by σ to the vertices in the closed neighbourhood
N [v] is equal to 22. Formally, we make the following definition:
Definition 9.3.5. Given a GSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), for which r = 1 and
ΣA = ΣB = V (G) = {v1, . . . , vκ}, an equal oddments strategy σ is a vector:
σ = (σ[v1], . . . , σ[vκ])
with:
0 ≤ σ[vi] ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , κ} (9.8)
κ∑
i=1
σ[vi] = 1 (9.9)
such that: ∑
w∈N [vj ]
σ[w] = u , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} (9.10)
For some u ∈ R. We call u the neighbourhood sum of σ.
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The following proposition links those situations in which Players A and B have
identical OMSs with the existence of equal oddments strategies.
Proposition 9.3.6. Given a GSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), for which r = 1 and
ΣA = ΣB = V (G), then the following statements are equivalent:
• σ is an equal oddments strategy of G with neighbourhood sum u ∈ R.
• σ is an OMS of G for both players and u ∈ R is the value of the game to
Player A.
Proof. Suppose that σ is an equal oddments strategy of G with neighbourhood sum
u ∈ R. Observe that for all pure strategies v ∈ V (G) for either player, we have:
E[pA(v,σ)] = u
E[pB(σ, v)] = 1− u
Therefore, by (8.4), σ is an OMS of G for both players and u is the value of the
game to Player A.
To prove the opposite implication, suppose that σ is an OMS of G for both players
and that u is the value of the game to Player A. Let:
V (G) = {v1, . . . , vκ}
σ = (σ[v1], . . . , σ[vκ])
Also let:
m− = min
v∈V (G)
 ∑
w∈N [v]
σ[w]

m+ = max
v∈V (G)
 ∑
w∈N [v]
σ[w]

and let v−, v+ be vertices for which this minimum and maximum are respectively
attained.
Assume (to derive a contradiction) that σ is not an equal oddments strategy. Then:
m− < m+ (9.11)
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Therefore:
m+ = E[pA(v+,σ)] ≥ E[pA(σ,σ)] = u
1−m− = E[pB(σ, v−)] ≥ E[pB(σ,σ)] = 1− u
Since σ is an OMS, the above inequalities must be equalities. Specifically:
m− = m+ = u
This contradicts (9.11). Therefore σ is an equal oddments strategy.
Proposition 9.3.6 means that, given a GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1 and
ΣA = ΣB = V (G), if we can find a distribution of positive real numbers across the
vertices such that the sum of these numbers in any closed neighbourhood is equal to
a constant, and we scale these numbers to produce a valid probability distribution
across the vertices, this distribution defines a mixed strategy that is optimal for both
players. This offers an alternative approach to proving Corollary 8.3.9 on OMSs for
GSGs played over regular graphs, since the mixed strategy ρ, as defined in the
corollary, is clearly an equal oddments strategy.
9.3.4 Proof of Proposition 9.3.4
The definitions and notation relating to group theory used in this section are from
Neumann et al. (1994). The proof requires the orbit-stabilizer theorem (adapted
from Neumann et al., 1994, p. 62):
Theorem 9.3.7. Orbit-Stabilizer Theorem
Given a group Γ, which acts on a finite set X:
|StabΓ(x)| = |Γ||OΓ[x]| , ∀x ∈ X
where OΓ[x] is the orbit of x under the action of Γ, and StabΓ(x) is the stabilizer
of x under Γ:
StabΓ(x) = {g ∈ Γ : gx = x}
To prove Proposition 9.3.4, we will use the following corollary of the theorem. It
states that if two vertices v, w of a GSG lie in the same orbit with respect to graph
game automorphisms, then the number of graph game automorphisms that map v
to some other vertex z is the same as the number that map w to z.
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Corollary 9.3.8. Consider a subgroup H of the graph game automorphism group
Γ(G) for the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r), with r = 1 and let O[v] be the orbit of
v ∈ V (G) under H.
Then, for all v, w, z ∈ V (G), we have:
O[v] = O[w]
⇒ |H[v, z]| = |H[w, z]| =

|H|
|O[v]| , z ∈ O[v]
0 , z /∈ O[v]
where we define:
H[v, z] = {φ ∈ H : φ(v) = z}
Proof. Clearly, if O[v] = O[w] and z /∈ O[v] then by the definition of an orbit under
H, we have that:
|H[v, z]| = |H[w, z]| = 0
We claim that in the case where z ∈ O[v], we have:
H[v, z] = ψv,zStabH(v) (9.12)
where ψv,z ∈ H is any graph game automorphism in H such that ψv,z(v) = z and
ψv,zStabH(v) is the left coset of StabH(v) in H containing ψv,z:
ψv,zStabH(v) = {ψv,z ◦ φ ∈ H : φ ∈ StabH(v)}
where ◦ represents the operation of composition.
To justify the claim, we first observe that:
ψ ∈ ψv,zStabH(v)⇒ ψ ∈ H[v, z]
because:
ψ ∈ ψv,zStabH(v)
⇒ ψ(v) = ψv,z(φ(v)) , φ(v) ∈ StabH(v)
= ψv,z(v)
= z
⇒ ψ ∈ H[v, z]
283
We also observe that:
ψ ∈ H[v, z]⇒ ψ ∈ ψv,zStabH(v)
because:
ψ ∈ H[v, z]
⇒ ψ = ψv,z ◦ (ψ−1v,z ◦ ψ)
and:
ψ−1v,z(ψ(v)) = ψ
−1
v,z(z) = v
so:
ψ−1v,z ◦ ψ ∈ StabH(v)
and therefore:
ψ ∈ ψv,zStabH(v)
This demonstrates the claim (9.12).
Now, combining this result with a standard result about cosets (Neumann et al.,
1994, p. 3) gives us that:
|H[v, z]| = |ψv,zStabH(v)| = |StabH(v)|
So by the orbit-stabilizer theorem:
|H[v, z]| = |H||O[v]|
Clearly, bearing in mind that |O[v]| = |O[w]|, identical logic could be employed to
demonstrate that:
|H[w, z]| = |H||O[v]|
This proves the corollary.
We now prove Proposition 9.3.4, reproduced here for ease of reference:
Proposition 9.3.4. Consider a GSG:
G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r)
with V (G) = {v1, . . . , vκ} and r = 1. Let O[v] denote the orbit of v under some
subgroup H of the graph game automorphism group Γ(G).
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There exists a pair of OMSs:
σA = (σA[v1], . . . , σA[vκ])
σB = (σB[v1], . . . , σB[vκ])
where σA and σB respectively allocate probabilities σA[vi] and σB[vi] to vertex vi ,
such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}:
O[vi] = O[vj]⇒

σA[vi] = σA[vj]
σB[vi] = σB[vj]
(9.6)
Proof. Let τA,τB be any OMSs for Players A and B:
τA = (τA[v1], . . . , τA[vκ])
τB = (τB[v1], . . . , τB[vκ])
Given φ ∈ H, let:
τA,φ = (τA[φ(v1)], . . . , τA[φ(vκ)])
τB,φ = (τB[φ(v1)], . . . , τB[φ(vκ)])
So τA,φ, τB,φ are the mixed strategies that respectively allocate probabilities τA[φ(vi)]
and τB[φ(vi)] to vertex vi, for all i ∈ {1 . . . , κ}.
We first show that if τA is an OMS for Player A, then τA,φ is also an OMS for
Player A, for all φ ∈ H.
For a particular φ ∈ H, consider the graph G′ = (V (G′), E(G′)) and the sets Σ′A,Σ′B
constructed by relabelling the vertices of G such that:
vi 7→ φ−1(vi) , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}
τA,φ and τB,φ are clearly OMSs for the resulting game G
′ = (G′,Σ′A,Σ
′
B, r).
However, since φ ∈ H ≤ Γ(G), ΣA, ΣB are invariant under φ (see Definition 9.3.2)
and thus:
Σ′A = ΣA , Σ
′
B = ΣB
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Also, because φ is an automorphism, we have:
V (G′) = V (G) , E(G′) = E(G)
Therefore G′ = G and so τA,φ and τB,φ are OMSs of G for Players A and B respec-
tively, as required.
Now, let:
σA =
1
|H|
∑
φ∈H
τA,φ
σB =
1
|H|
∑
φ∈H
τB,φ
These mixed strategies are OMSs for G, because any weighted average of OMSs is
itself an OMS.
It remains to prove that σA and σB satisfy Property (9.6). Observe that, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}:
σA[vi] =
1
|H|
κ∑
j=1
|H[vi, vj]| τA[vj]
σB[vi] =
1
|H|
κ∑
j=1
|H[vi, vj]| τB[vj]
(9.13)
where H[vi, vj] is defined as in Corollary 9.3.8.
Using the corollary, (9.13) can be rewritten as follows, ∀v ∈ V (G):
σA[v] =
1
|O[v]|
∑
w∈O[v]
τA[w]
σB[v] =
1
|O[v]|
∑
w∈O[v]
τB[w]
This demonstrates that σA and σB satisfy Property (9.6) and thus proves
Proposition 9.3.4.
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9.4 Games on poly-level graphs
9.4.1 Poly-level graphs
The concepts discussed in Section 9.3 suggest a potential approach for finding gen-
eral expressions for the OMSs of GSGs played over certain families of graphs. To
demonstrate this approach, we consider GSGs played over a specific family of graphs,
which we describe as poly-level graphs. The vertices in such graphs are arranged
in levels and each vertex exhibits a local structural similarity in the way that it is
connected to other vertices in its own level and to those in the levels above and
below.
Definition 9.4.1. A graph G = (V (G), E(G)) is called a poly-level graph if and
only if the vertices can be partitioned into h subsets L1, L2, . . . , Lh ⊆ V (G) called
levels, with |Li| = ci, such that each vertex in Li is adjacent to precisely:
• j other vertices in Li (the intradegree) ;
• k vertices in Li+1 (the superdegree), for i 6= h ;
• l vertices in Li−1 (the subdegree), for i 6= 1 ;
• 0 vertices in any other level.
where j is a non-negative integer and h, k, l, c1, . . . , ch are positive integers.
Figure 9.5 provides a visual representation of a general poly-level graph, while
Figures 9.6-9.10 show specific examples of such graphs. In each example, vertices
in L1 are coloured black, with higher levels being indicated by progressively lighter
shades.
.	  .	  .	  
j	

k	

j	
 j	

k	
 k	

l	
 l	
l	

c1	
 c2	
 ch	

L 1	
 L 2	
 L h	

Figure 9.5: Visual representation of a poly-level graph. ci represents the number of
vertices in level Li ; j,k and l represent the number of edges connecting a single vertex
in the level at the tail of the arrow to vertices in the level at the head of the arrow.
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Figure 9.6: Poly-level graph with h = 4, j = 2, k = 1, l = 1, c1 = 4.
Figure 9.7: Poly-level graph with h = 3, j = 2, k = 2, l = 1, c1 = 3.
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  Figure 9.8: Poly-level graph with h = 2, j = 3, k = 1, l = 2, c1 = 16.
Figure 9.9: Two topologically different poly-level graphs with identical
parameters h = 2, j = 1, k = 2, l = 1, c1 = 2.
a) b) 
Figure 9.10: A poly-level graph that admits two different sets of parameters:
a) h = 3, j = 1, k = 1, l = 1, c1 = 2
b) h = 2, j = 1, k = 2, l = 1, c1 = 2
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The appearance of a poly-level graph may be highly symmetric (Figures 9.6 and
9.7) or quite irregular (Figure 9.8). Also, two poly-level graphs with the same
parameters may be topologically quite different (Figure 9.9), while the parameters
used to describe a particular poly-level graph are generally not unique (Figure 9.10).
Note that it suffices to specify the number of vertices c1 in L1 to determine the num-
ber of vertices ci in any level Li, as established in the following simple proposition:
Proposition 9.4.2. Given a poly-level graph G, with levels L1, . . . , Lh, superdegree
k, subdegree l and |Li| = ci, we have:
ci = (kl
−1)i−1c1 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h}
Proof. The number of edges linking vertices in Li to vertices in Li+1 can be expressed
in two forms, which must be equal:
lci = kci−1 , ∀i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , h}
Thus, the ci form a geometric progression with common ratio kl
−1 and the proposi-
tion follows immediately.
The following proposition establishes two intuitively obvious constraints on the pa-
rameters of a poly-level graph.
Proposition 9.4.3. Given a poly-level graph G, with levels L1, . . . , Lh, intradegree
j, superdegree k, subdegree l and |Li| = ci, we have that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h}:
(a) (kl−1)i−1c1 ∈ Z
(b) (kl−1)i−1c1 ≥ j + 1
These constraints arise immediately from the fact that the number of vertices ci in
any level Li (replaced in Proposition 9.4.3 by the expression from Proposition 9.4.2)
must (a) be an integer and (b) exceed the intradegree j.
9.4.2 Equal oddments solutions on poly-level graphs
Given a poly-level graph G, from Section 9.3.3, we know that if there exists a proba-
bility distribution across the vertices of the graph such that the sum of the probabili-
ties in any closed neighbourhood is equal to some constant u ∈ (0, 1], then this prob-
ability distribution defines an OMS for both players for the game G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r),
with r = 1, ΣA = ΣB = V (G), and the value of the game to Player A is u.
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Suppose that such a distribution exists, and suppose that this distribution allocates
an equal probability ωi to each vertex in level Li. Through consideration of the
structure of the graph, we can write the following equations, which must hold for all
i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , h− 1}:
(j + 1)ω1 + kω2 = u
lωh−1 + (j + 1)ωh = u
lωi−1 + (j + 1)ωi + kωi+1 = u

(9.14)
We also have the following constraints, to ensure that the ωi define a valid probability
distribution:
h∑
i=1
ωici = 1 (9.15)
ωi ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} (9.16)
Note that it is not necessary to explicitly include the constraint ωi ≤ 1, since this is
implied by (9.15) and (9.16).
We now perform the change of variables:
wi = u
−1(j + k + l + 1)ωi , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h} (9.17)
and introduce additional unknowns wi, ∀i ∈ Z.
The question of finding a function ωi of i that satisfies (9.14), (9.15) and (9.16) can
be reformulated as follows:
• Given a non-negative integer j and positive integers h, k, l, c1 satisfying the
conditions of Proposition 9.4.3, find a function wi of i, such that, ∀i ∈ Z:
lwi−1 + (j + 1)wi + kwi+1 = j + k + l + 1 (9.18)
• Subject to the boundary conditions:
w0 = wh+1 = 0 (9.19)
• With the constraint:
wi ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} (9.20)
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If suitable wi can be found, an equal oddments solution is then given by:
u = c1
−1(j + k + l + 1)
[
h∑
i=1
(kl−1)i−1wi
]−1
(9.21)
ωi = wiu(j + k + l + 1)
−1 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , h} (9.22)
Applying the change of variables (9.17): (9.18) and (9.19) are derived from (9.14);
(9.20) is derived from (9.16); (9.21) is derived from (9.15) and Proposition 9.4.2,
while (9.22) is immediate.
9.4.3 Exact solutions
To find a solution to the problem, let:
wi = w
GS
i + w
PS
i
where wPSi is any particular solution of (9.18), and w
GS
i is the most general solution
of the homogeneous difference equation:
lwi−1 + (j + 1)wi + kwi+1 = 0 , ∀i ∈ Z (9.23)
An obvious candidate for the particular solution is:
wPSi = 1
For wGSi , there are three cases to consider:
Case 1: (j + 1)2 > 4kl
Look for a solution of the form:
wGSi = A+ν+
i + A−ν−i
where A+, A− are arbitrary constants and ν+, ν− are unknown constants to be de-
termined. Substituting into (9.23), we find:
ν± =
−(j + 1)±√(j + 1)2 − 4kl
2k
So:
wi = A+ν+
i + A−ν−i + 1
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Applying the boundary conditions gives:
A+ + A− = −1
A+ν+
h+1 + A−ν−h+1 = −1
which can be solved to give:
A+ =
1− ν−h+1
ν−h+1 − ν+h+1
A− =
1− ν+h+1
ν+h+1 − ν−h+1
Note that in this case, ν+ 6= ν−, and therefore A+ and A− both exist.
Case 2: (j + 1)2 = 4kl
Look for a solution of the form:
wGSi = (A+ iB)ν
i
where A,B are arbitrary constants and ν is an unknown constant to be determined.
Substituting into (9.23), we find:
ν = −j + 1
2k
So:
wi = (A+ iB)ν
i + 1
Applying the boundary conditions gives:
A = −1
B =
1− ν−[h+1]
h+ 1
Again, A and B exist for all values of the parameters.
Case 3: (j + 1)2 < 4kl
Look for a solution of the form:
wGSi = ν
i[P cos(θi) +Q sin(θi)]
where P,Q are arbitrary constants and ν, θ are unknown constants to be determined.
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Substituting into (9.23), we find:
ν =
√
l/k (9.24)
θ = arg
[
−(j + 1) + i
√
4kl − (j + 1)2
]
(9.25)
So:
wi = ν
i[P cos(θi) +Q sin(θi)] + 1
Provided that θ[h + 1] is not an integer multiple of pi, applying the boundary con-
ditions gives:
P = −1
Q =
cos(θ[h+ 1])− ν−[h+1]
sin(θ[h+ 1])
If θ[h+1] is an integer multiple of pi then no values of P and Q can be found to satisfy
the boundary conditions (9.19) and no solution wi exists, except in the particular
case where θ[h + 1] is an even multiple of pi and k = l. In the latter instance, the
boundary conditions are satisfied for all values of Q, with P = −1, identifying an
infinite family of possible solutions.
9.4.4 Review of key results
To summarise the results of this section, given any poly-level graph G with suitable
parameters h, j, k, l, c1, we have found wi satisfying (9.18) and (9.19) in all cases ex-
cept where (j+1)2 < 4kl and θ[h+1] is an integer multiple of pi (barring the special
case where θ[h+1] is an even multiple of pi and k = l), where θ is defined as in (9.25).
Note that the non-existence of such a wi in the specific cases mentioned does not
necessarily imply that no equal oddments strategy exists for the corresponding GSG,
simply that any such strategy cannot be expressed as the solution to a difference
equation of the form discussed.
Where such a wi does exist, it remains to check whether constraint (9.20) is satisfied.
If so, then there exists an equal oddments solution to the GSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r),
with r = 1 and ΣA = ΣB = V (G), defined by (9.21) and (9.22), which allocates a
probability of ωi to each vertex in level Li. By Proposition 9.3.6, this equal odd-
ments solution is an OMS of G for both players.
Table 9.1 summarises the equal oddments strategies for the graphs shown in
Figures 9.6-9.8.
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 Poly-level graph parameters Equal oddments solution Game values 
Figure h j k l c1 ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 uA uB 
9.6 4 2 1 1 4 3/40 1/20 1/20 3/40 11/40 29/40 
9.7 3 2 2 1 3 1/15 0 1/15 N/A 1/5 4/5 
9.8 2 3 1 2 16 3/64 1/32 N/A N/A 7/32 25/32 
Table 9.1: Table detailing the equal oddments solutions of the poly-level graphs shown
in Figures 9.6-9.8. ωi is the probability that the equal oddments strategy (an OMS for
both players) allocates to each vertex in level Li.
In this section, we have demonstrated that the concepts outlined in Section 9.3 may
be used to find general expressions for OMSs of GSGs played over a particular family
of graphs. It may therefore be possible to use or adapt this approach to seek OMSs
for GSGs played over other families of graphs, thus suggesting a potentially valuable
focus for future work.
9.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented a number of methods to facilitate the identification
of OMSs in the GSG. These have included the presentation of an IEDS algorithm,
which was demonstrated to be particularly effective when applied to games played
on trees; a method for exploiting the symmetries of the underlying graph of a GSG;
the identification of a particular family of strategies, known as “equal oddments
strategies”, and a proof that such strategies are always OMSs for both players; and
the derivation of exact solutions for games played over a particular family of graphs,
known as “poly-level graphs”.
In Chapter 10, we will present two major extensions to the SSSG, with the aim
of increasing its flexibility and relevance to real world problems. The first involves
the consideration of situations in which not all points of the game geography are
of equal value to the players, while the second relaxes the constraint that players
must deploy at a fixed location, instead allowing Player A to move around the space
according to a predetermined stochastic patrol strategy.
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Chapter 10
Extensions and adaptations of the
SSSG
10.1 Introduction
A key limitation of the SSSG, as described in the preceding chapters, is that it as-
sumes that all points of the game geography Ω are of equal importance. However,
in real life applications, this will not necessarily be the case.
For example, if Ω were intended to model the commercial centre of a city, with
Player A representing a police unit attempting to protect the area from a group of
looters, represented by Player B, it would be reasonable to assume that the value of
property at different points of Ω may vary. A jeweller’s would have a higher value
to looters, and consequently to police, than an abandoned building.
Additionally, in many situations, the assumption that Players A and B deploy si-
multaneously at particular points and remain there is not appropriate.
For example, suppose that Ω represents the physical space in which a large public
event is being held, such as the route of a parade and the surrounding streets, with
Player A representing a security unit tasked with protecting the event from a ter-
rorist, represented by Player B. In this instance, while it may indeed be reasonable
to model Player B as deploying directly and instantaneously at a particular point,
as in the SSSG, for Player A, the situation is quite different. Since Player A does
not know exactly when Player B will deploy, the strategy of choosing a particular
point and remaining there indefinitely would potentially be unwise. If Player B were
able to observe Player A’s location before her deployment, she could simply select a
point outside Player A’s detection radius, guaranteeing herself the maximum possi-
ble payoff.
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In this scenario, it may be more appropriate to allow Player A to choose a particular
strategy of patrol through the space. Player B could then be allowed to observe this
strategy before deciding on a point at which to deploy. This interpretation trans-
forms the SSSG into something akin to a Stackelberg security game, as discussed in
Section 7.3.7, and examined in a wide variety of scenarios by Tambe (2012). How-
ever, the extended SSSG that we will discuss in Section 10.4 is distinct from the vast
majority of games of this kind in that it maintains its spatially explicit nature, with
Player A’s ability to intercept Player B being dependent on the spatial structure of
Ω, rather than simply on whether the two players occupy the same precise location.
The twin aims of this chapter are therefore to extend the SSSG for use over spaces of
non-uniform value and, in the case of games played over graphs, to use the extended
model to analyse situations in which Player A does not deploy at a particular vertex,
but rather must patrol through the space in an unpredictable manner, in an attempt
to intercept Player B, who may deploy at any time and at any vertex in her strategy
set. One important outcome of this work will be the development of a method to
derive strategies of optimal random patrol through consideration of the OMSs (for
Player A) of an appropriate static game, by carefully specifying the probabilities of
moving between vertices and the dwell times at each vertex.
10.2 Games over spaces of non-uniform value
10.2.1 The Extended SSSG (ESSSG)
We begin by extending the SSSG to incorporate information about the different
values of the points of Ω, as discussed in Section 10.1.
The Extended SSSG (ESSSG) for spaces of non-uniform value is a two-player game
played over a metric space M = (Ω, d), as before. However, this new form of the
game includes a value function γ, which assigns a non-negative real number to each
point of Ω:
γ : Ω → R+ ∪ {0}
x 7→ γ(x)
(10.1)
Once again, each player chooses a point xA, xB from their own strategy set,
ΣA,ΣB ∈ Ω. The detection radius r and the closed ball Br[x] are defined as in
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the standard SSSG, but the payoff functions are different:
pA(xA, xB) =

0 , xB ∈ Br[xA];
−γ(xB) , otherwise.
(10.2)
pB(xA, xB) =

0 , xB ∈ Br[xA];
γ(xB) , otherwise.
(10.3)
In other words, if the distance d(xA, xB) between the positions at which the players
deploy is less than or equal to the detection radius r, Player A catches Player B
and both players receive a payoff of 0. Otherwise, if the distance is greater than the
detection radius, Player B successfully evades Player A and receives a payoff equal
to the value γ(xB) of the point at which she has deployed, while Player A receives a
negative payoff of the same absolute value.
Note that, unlike the original SSSG, the extended version is a true zero-sum game,
since the total of the players’ payoffs is always zero. Note also that these payoff
functions implicitly assume that Player A gains nothing from capturing Player B,
and that there is no cost to Player B of being captured. While this assumption is po-
tentially unrealistic, provided that the sum of the payoffs remains constant, it could
effectively be relaxed without affecting the essential structure of the game by means
of a simple alteration to γ; for example, by adding a constant to the zero payoff of
Player A and subtracting the same constant from the zero payoff of Player B.
In this version of the game, rather than attempting to maximise his chance of catch-
ing Player B, we may imagine that Player A is attempting to minimise the damage
γ(xB) that Player B is able to cause, while Player B simultaneously attempts to
maximise the value of this damage. This interpretation would correspond, for ex-
ample, to a scenario of counter-terrorism, in which Player A represented a security
unit attempting to protect some area, represented by Ω, from an attack by a terrorist
unit, represented by Player B.
10.2.2 The Extended GSG (EGSG)
Consider a simple graph G, with the symmetric adjacency matrix M = (aij), a finite
set of κ vertices:
V (G) = {v1, ..., vκ} (10.4)
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and a set of edges:
E(G) = {{vi, vj} : vi, vj ∈ V (G) and aij = 1}
with an associated value function:
γ : V (G) → R+ ∪ {0}
v 7→ γ(v)
The Extended Graph Search Game (EGSG) G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ) is defined to be an
example of the ESSSG with Ω = V (G), ∅ 6= ΣA,ΣB ⊆ V (G), r a positive real num-
ber, value function γ, and the distance function dG(v, w) for v, w ∈ V (G), v 6= w,
defined to be the length of the shortest path from v to w in G.
For convenience, we also let γ be a column vector of the values assigned by γ to the
vertices of G:
γ = [γ(v1), . . . , γ(vκ)]
>
and we let m[γ] designate the maximum of the value function across V (G):
m[γ] = max
v∈V (G)
[γ(v)]
Without loss of generality, it suffices to consider games with r = 1, since all other
games can be reduced to this case. This result was demonstrated in Section 8.3.2,
in the case of the basic GSG, and is unaffected by the introduction of the value
function γ.
10.3 Optimal mixed strategies of games over
spaces of non-uniform value
10.3.1 Initial discussion
Having defined the EGSG, we now consider how we might go about identifying good
strategies for this game for each player. We begin by constructing explicit expres-
sions for the expected payoffs of the game in terms of the value function γ and other
known objects, before going on to consider the structure of the payoff matrix in
Section 10.3.2, in order to facilitate the identification of OMSs. In Section 10.3.3,
we discuss how the value of a general mixed strategy can be assessed in cases where
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OMSs cannot be identified, and, in Section 10.3.4, we present a proposition that
allows for the simplification of an EGSG through consideration of its vertex values.
Here, and in all that follows, the notation 1S will be used to refer to the indicator
function1 of some subset S ⊆ V (G):
1S : V (G) → {0, 1}
v 7→

1 , v ∈ S
0 , otherwise
(10.5)
Consider the expected payoff to Player A if he uses the mixed strategy τA and
Player B deploys at vertex vB. In the following expression, the point vA at which
Player A deploys is temporarily considered to be a discrete random variable, which
takes values in ΣA according to the distribution defined by τA:
E[pA(τA, vB)] = −
∑
w∈ΣA
γ(vB) 1V (G)\N [w][vB] P [vA = w]
= − γ(vB)
∑
w∈ΣA\N [vB]
τA[w] (10.6)
Therefore, the expected payoff to Player A if he uses the mixed strategy τA and
Player B uses the mixed strategy τB is:
E[pA(τA, τB)] = −
∑
v ∈ΣB
∑
w∈ΣA\N [v]
γ(v) τA[w] τB[v] (10.7)
Now consider the expected payoff to Player B if she uses the mixed strategy τB and
Player A deploys at vertex vA (no longer considered to be a random variable). In
this expression, the point vB at which Player B deploys is considered to be a discrete
random variable, which takes values in ΣB according to the distribution defined by
τB.
E[pB(vA, τB)] =
∑
w∈ΣB
γ(w) 1V (G)\N [vA][w] P [vB = w]
=
∑
w∈ΣB\N [vA]
γ(w) τB[w] (10.8)
Therefore, the expected payoff to Player B if she uses the mixed strategy τB and
1 Compare with (6.15), in Part II, where indicator functions were defined over R.
300
Player A uses the mixed strategy τA is:
E[pB(τA, τB)] =
∑
v ∈ΣA
∑
w∈ΣB\N [v]
γ(w) τA[v] τB[w] (10.9)
Note that, since the game is zero-sum, the absolute values of (10.7) and (10.9) are
equal.
As discussed in Section 7.2, the concept of an OMS for Player A is that he attempts
to choose τA to maximise the minimum of (10.7) over all possible τB. Similarly, the
concept of an OMS for Player B is that she attempts to choose τB to maximise the
minimum of (10.9) over all possible τA. In this way, each player chooses a mixed
strategy so as to optimise their own personal worst case scenario (in terms of payoff).
However, as mentioned in Section 8.2.5, it actually suffices to consider these min-
ima over all possible pure strategies of the opponent, rather than across all possible
mixed strategies (Morris 1994, pp. 46-47). Finding OMSs of the game for each
player is therefore equivalent to solving two optimisation problems: finding τA to
maximise the minimum of (10.6) across all vB ∈ ΣB and finding τB to maximise the
minimum of (10.8) across all vA ∈ ΣA.
Alternatively, if mixed strategies σA, σB for Players A and B can be found for which
these minima sum to zero:
• min
vB ∈ ΣB
E[pA(σA, vB)] = −u
• min
vA ∈ ΣA
E[pB(vA,σB)] = u
then σA and σB are OMSs for each player (Blackwell and Girshick 1979, p. 65) and
u is known as the value of the game to Player B (and −u is the value of the game
to Player A).
Recall also that if the strategy sets ΣA and ΣB are finite, OMSs are guaranteed to
exist for both players (a consequence of the Minimax Theorem, Morris 1994, p102).
The EGSG G clearly satisfies this condition, so OMSs for G must exist for Players A
and B.
10.3.2 Identifying payoff matrices for the EGSG
In the previous section, we explicitly described the expressions that must be min-
imised in order to identify the OMSs of a particular EGSG, G. We now seek to
establish the form of the payoff matrix of this game for Player A (as the row player)
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in terms of the known objects M (the adjacency matrix of G), ΣA, ΣB and γ. If
the form of this matrix were known, standard game theoretic methods could be
employed (see, for example, Morris, 1994, pp. 99-114), thus offering an alternative
route to identify the OMSs.
To determine the form of the matrix, we first consider the simpler game
G∗ = (G, V (G), V (G), r, γ), derived from G by setting ΣA = ΣB = V (G). In this
restricted case, defining the payoff matrix, which we designate as P∗, is straightfor-
ward:
P∗ = − [Jκ − (M + Iκ)] diag(γ) (10.10)
Here, Iκ is the κ× κ identity matrix, Jκ is a κ× κ matrix of ones and diag(γ) is a
diagonal matrix formed from the terms of γ:
diag(γ) = (δij γ(vi))i,j∈{1,...,κ}
where δij is the Kronecker delta:
δij =

1 if i = j ;
0 otherwise.
(10.11)
To see that (10.10) is true, observe that [Jκ − (M + Iκ)] is effectively an “anti-
adjacency matrix” of G (derived from the adjacency matrix by switching the zeros
and ones, but still with zeros on the leading diagonal), which corresponds to the fact
that non-zero payoffs are only awarded when players deploy at non-adjacent (and
non-identical) vertices. Post-multiplying by diag(γ) ensures that positive entries
are equal to the value of the vertex at which Player B (the column player) deploys,
while the negation is due to the fact that payoffs to Player A are always non-positive.
Observe also that, since the game is zero-sum, the payoff matrix for Player B is
equal to −P∗> (now with Player B as the row player).
For the more general situation in which ΣA and ΣB are not both equal to V (G), a
suitable expression for the payoff matrix is a little more difficult to write explicitly.
The apparently straightforward approach of deleting those rows and columns of M
and of γ that relate to vertices that do not feature in the strategy set of a particular
player is undesirable, since, under this approach, the simple correspondence between
rows and vertices would be lost. This would make it both more inconvenient to work
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further with the resulting mixed strategies and more difficult to relate them to the
geography of the space.
For these reasons, we prefer not to reduce the size of the payoff matrix, but rather
to replace those rows and columns that relate to invalid strategies for the appro-
priate player with alternative rows and columns, such that the OMSs of the game
are unchanged. To do this, we make use of the fact that a pure strategy that is
strictly dominated by some other pure strategy must be allocated zero probability
in an OMS (see Section 7.2). Therefore, by replacing those rows of P∗ that relate to
vertices that are not in ΣA with rows that are strictly dominated by all remaining
rows, the OMSs for Player A of the game defined by the resulting payoff matrix
must be identical to those of the EGSG G. Performing an equivalent procedure for
the columns of P∗ yields the payoff matrix P (for Player A) of a game whose OMSs
match those of the EGSG for both players.
More specifically, we adopt the following procedure. Given an EGSG G, with strat-
egy sets ∅ 6= ΣA,ΣB ⊆ V (G) = {v1, . . . , vκ} and fixing an arbitrary  > 0, those
rows of P∗ (defined in (10.10)) that correspond to vertices that do not appear in
ΣA are replaced with rows containing the value −m[γ] − , which is less than the
minimum possible payoff to Player A. Similarly, those columns of P∗ that corre-
spond to vertices that do not appear in ΣB are replaced with columns containing
the value , whose negative is less than the minimum possible payoff to Player B.
The intersections of such rows and columns are allocated the value −m[γ]/2.
The entry-wise relationship between P∗ = (p∗ij)i,j∈{1,...,κ} and P = (pij)i,j∈{1,...,κ} is
summarised below:
pij =

p∗ij , if vi ∈ ΣA and vj ∈ ΣB ;
−m[γ]−  , if vi /∈ ΣA and vj ∈ ΣB ;
 , if vi ∈ ΣA and vj /∈ ΣB ;
−m[γ]/2 , if vi /∈ ΣA and vj /∈ ΣB .
(10.12)
Given (10.12), we now prove the assertion that the rows and columns of P that cor-
respond respectively to invalid strategies for Players A and B are strictly dominated
by all rows and columns that correspond to valid strategies.
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Proposition 10.3.1. Consider an EGSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ) with r = 1 and let
P∗ = (p∗ij)i,j∈{1,...,κ} and P = (pij)i,j∈{1,...,κ} be defined as in (10.10) and (10.12).
If P is taken to be the payoff matrix of a zero-sum game (whose entries represent
payoffs to the row player), then, identifying rows and columns with pure strategies
for each player as usual, we have:
1. vi ∈ ΣA, vj /∈ ΣA ⇒ Row i strictly dominates row j.
2. vi ∈ ΣB, vj /∈ ΣB ⇒ Column i strictly dominates column j.
Proof. Let G∗ designate the EGSG derived from G by replacing the strategy sets ΣA
and ΣB with V (G): G
∗ = (G, V (G), V (G), r, γ). By construction, P∗ is the payoff
matrix of G∗, with Player A as the row player.
Proof of statement 1: Suppose that vi ∈ ΣA and vj /∈ ΣA. To prove statement 1, we
require that:
pik > pjk , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , κ}
There are two cases to consider. Firstly, suppose that vk ∈ ΣB. Then by (10.12),
pik = p
∗
ik and pjk = −m[γ] − . Since p∗ik = pA(vi, vk) in the EGSG G∗, where pA
is the payoff function for Player A, as defined in (10.2), we have that p∗ik = 0 or
p∗ik = −γ(vk). Therefore:
pik = p
∗
ik ≥ −γ(vk) ≥ − max
v∈V (G)
[γ(v)] > −m[γ]−  = pjk
So, pik > pjk, as required.
Secondly, suppose that vk /∈ ΣB. Then by (10.12), pik =  and pjk = −m[γ]/2.
Therefore, it is clear that pik > pjk, as required.
Proof of statement 2: Suppose that vi ∈ ΣB and vj /∈ ΣB. To prove statement 2, we
require that:
pki < pkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , κ}
Again, there are two cases to consider. Firstly, suppose that vk ∈ ΣA. Then by
(10.12), pki = p
∗
ki and pkj = . Since p
∗
ki = pA(vk, vi) in G
∗, we have that p∗ki = 0 or
p∗ki = −γ(vi). Therefore:
pki = p
∗
ki ≤ 0 <  = pkj
So, pki < pkj, as required.
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Secondly, suppose that vk /∈ ΣA. Then by (10.12), pki = −m[γ] −  and
pkj = −m[γ]/2. Therefore, it is clear that pki < pkj, as required.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
In fact, the relationship represented by (10.12) can be written as a single matrix
equation.
If we define the following binary (column) vectors, which store information about
whether or not a given vertex is in a player’s strategy set:
sA = (1ΣA [vi])i∈{1,...,κ}
sB = (1ΣB [vi])i∈{1,...,κ}
(10.13)
then the transformation from P∗ to P can also be expressed as:
P = P1(P
∗, sA, sB)− P2(γ, sA) + P3(sB) + P4(γ, sA, sB) (10.14)
where:
P1(P
∗, sA, sB) = diag(sA)P∗ diag(sB)
P2(γ, sA) = (m[γ] + ) (Iκ − diag(sA)) Jκ
P3(sB) = Jκ (Iκ − diag(sB))
P4(γ, sA, sB) =
m[γ]
2
(Jκ,1 − sA) (Jκ,1 − sB)>
and where Jκ,1 is a κ-dimensional column vector of ones.
Since the OMSs of the EGSG, G, are the same as those of the game defined by
the payoff matrix P, equations (10.10) and (10.14) allow for the application of the
standard techniques of matrix games to compute these OMSs (see, for example,
Morris, 1994, pp. 99-114).
P also offers an alternative to the formulae (10.7) and (10.9) for calculating the
expected payoffs of different mixed strategies.
Specifically, suppose that the vectors
τA = (τA[v1], . . . , τA[vκ])
> ∈ [0, 1]κ
τB = (τB[v1], . . . , τB[vκ])
> ∈ [0, 1]κ
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allocate probabilities to the vertices of G such that each constitutes a valid mixed
strategy for Players A and B respectively. That is, we suppose that
∑κ
i=1 τA[vi] = 1,∑κ
i=1 τB[vi] = 1 and that vi /∈ ΣA ⇒ τA[vi] = 0 and vi /∈ ΣB ⇒ τB[vi] = 0. We have:
E[pA(τA, τB)] = −E[pB(τA, τB)] = τ>APτB (10.15)
To summarise, we have defined the payoff matrix P of a game whose OMSs are
identical to the OMSs of a given EGSG, G, and whose rows and columns correspond
directly to the vertices of the graph G over which G is played. The definition of this
matrix will serve to facilitate both the calculation of OMSs and expected payoffs for
G, as discussed above, and the work on patrol games presented in Section 10.4.
10.3.3 Measuring the value of a general mixed strategy for
the EGSG
In certain cases, computing the true OMSs of an EGSG may be impossible or im-
practical, perhaps owing to the size or complexity of the space over which the game
is played. In such situations, it would be useful to have some measure of the quality
of a general mixed strategy, to allow different options to be compared or to serve as
an objective function for some form of iterative optimisation.
One very simple measure of the quality of a mixed strategy is given by the minimum
possible expected payoff that can be obtained when the strategy is employed, con-
sidered across all possible pure strategy responses from the opponent. The payoff
matrix P, defined in Section 10.3.2, can be used to facilitate the calculation of these
values.
Given a particular EGSG, G, consider the following vector functions of the mixed
strategies τA for Player A and τB for Player B:
zA (τA) = P
>τA = [zA(τA, v1), . . . , zA(τA, vκ)]
>
zB (τB) = −P τB = [zB(τB, v1), . . . , zB(τB, vκ)]>
Observe that the terms of zA (τA) and zB (τB) are the expected payoffs to the
corresponding players when using the mixed strategies τA and τB when the opponent
deploys at each vertex of G, except where a vertex does not lie in the relevant
opponent’s strategy set, in which case the term is replaced with an upper bound on
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the player’s possible payoffs from the game (note that m[γ], which appears in the
definition of P (see (10.14)), is greater than or equal to Player B’s maximum payoff
by definition):
zA(τA, vB) =

E[pA(τA, vB)] , vB ∈ ΣB;
 , otherwise.
(10.16)
zB(τB, vA) =

E[pB(vA, τB)] , vA ∈ ΣA;
m[γ] +  , otherwise.
(10.17)
Finding OMSs σA and σB is thus equivalent to choosing τA and τB to maximise
the minimum term of each of the vectors P>τA and −P τB.
Therefore, if the true OMSs of an EGSG cannot be calculated, a measure of the qual-
ity of any given mixed strategy, τA for Player A or τB for Player B, may nonetheless
be calculated on the basis of the values of the following objective functions:
ZA(τA) = min
vB∈V (G)
zA(τA, vB) = min
[
P>τA
]
ZB(τB) = min
vA∈V (G)
zB(τB, vA) = min [−P τB]
(10.18)
Note that, by definition, σA and σB are OMSs for each player if and only if
ZA(σA) ≥ ZA(τA) for all valid mixed strategies τA for Player A and
ZB(σB) ≥ ZB(τB) for all valid mixed strategies τB for Player B, respectively.
The notation that has been introduced in this section will prove helpful in
Section 10.3.4, where we will prove a useful result on the OMSs of the EGSG for
Player B.
10.3.4 A proposition on the optimal mixed strategies of the
EGSG for Player B
In this section, we present a proposition that provides a useful indication of whether
a given vertex should be considered by Player B as part of a good mixed strategy
for a given EGSG. The proposition is based on a consideration of the value function
γ, and allows for vertices whose value is too low to be part of an OMS for Player B
to be removed from consideration, thus simplifying the analysis of the game.
307
Proposition 10.3.2. Consider an EGSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ) with r = 1 and
suppose that σB is an OMS of the game for Player B. Consider also a subset of
Player B’s strategy set SB ⊆ ΣB for which |N [vA] ∩ SB| ≤ 1 , ∀vA ∈ ΣA .
Suppose that there exists y ∈ ΣB such that:
γ(y) <
( |SB| − 1
|SB|
)
min
x∈SB
γ(x) (10.19)
Then σB(y) = 0.
Essentially, this proposition states that if a set of vertices can be found for Player B
such that the closed neighbourhoods of these vertices do not intersect (or, more
precisely, such that any such pairwise intersection of these neighbourhoods contains
no vertices in ΣA), then Player B should not play any vertex that has a lower value
than ZB(τ SB), where τ SB is the mixed strategy which chooses a vertex by means
of a discrete uniform distribution over SB. In fact, the proposition as stated is a
slightly weaker result than this, since the right hand side of (10.19) is actually a
lower bound on ZB(τ SB).
The proof of the proposition requires the following lemma:
Lemma 10.3.3. In the EGSG G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ) with r = 1, if SB ⊆ ΣB is such
that |N [vA] ∩ SB| ≤ 1 , ∀vA ∈ ΣA and τ SB is the mixed strategy defined by:
τSB(vB) =

|SB|−1 , vB ∈ SB ;
0 , otherwise.
then:
ZB(τ SB) ≥ min
x∈SB
γ(x)
( |SB| − 1
|SB|
)
Proof. Observe that:
ZB(τ SB) = min
vA∈V (G)
zB(τ SB , vA)
= min
vA∈ΣA
E[pB(vA, τ SB)]
= min
vA∈ΣA
∑
w∈SB\N [vA]
γ(w) |SB|−1
≥ min
vA∈ΣA
[
|SB \N [vA]| |SB|−1 min
x∈SB
γ(x)
]
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The required result follows by observing that, since |N [vA] ∩ SB| ≤ 1 by definition,
we have that:
min
vA∈ΣA
|SB \N [vA]| ≥ |SB| − 1
We now prove Proposition 10.3.2 .
Proof. Given an EGSG, G, with r = 1, let σB be an OMS for Player B and let the set
SB and the vertex y be as defined in the proposition. Assume (for a contradiction)
that σB(y) = ζ > 0 and let the vector σˆB = (σˆB(v1) , . . . , σˆB(vκ)) be defined by:
σˆB(vB) =

0 , vB = y ;
σB(vB) , otherwise.
Note that σˆB is not a valid mixed strategy, because its terms do not sum to 1, but
rather to 1 − ζ. However, the following vector clearly is a valid mixed strategy for
Player B:
ρB = σˆB + ζτ SB
where τ SB is as defined in Lemma 10.3.3.
Now, observe that:
ZB(ρB)
= min
vA∈V (G)
zB(ρB, vA)
= min
vA∈ΣA
E[pB(vA,ρB)]
= min
vA∈ΣA
∑
w∈ΣB\N [vA]
γ(w) (σˆB(w) + ζτSB(w))
= min
vA∈ΣA
 ∑
w∈ΣB\N [vA]
γ(w)σB(w) + ζ
∑
w∈ΣB\N [vA]
γ(w)τSB(w)− γ(y)σB(y)1ΣB\N [vA][y]

= min
vA∈ΣA
[
E[pB(vA,σB)] + ζE[pB(vA, τ SB)]− ζγ(y)1ΣB\N [vA][y]
]
≥ ZB(σB) + ζZB(τ SB)− ζγ(y)
≥ ZB(σB) + ζ
[
min
x∈SB
γ(x)
( |SB| − 1
|SB|
)
− γ(y)
]
(By Lemma 10.3.3)
> ZB(σB) (By (10.19))
So ZB(ρB) > ZB(σB) , but this is a contradiction, since σB is an OMS. Therefore
the assumption was invalid and σB(y) = 0, as required.
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As mentioned earlier, Proposition 10.3.2 provides a method for the simplification of
EGSGs through consideration of their vertex values. Specifically, if a set SB can be
identified which satisfies the conditions specified in the proposition, then the right
hand side of (10.19) represents a lower bound on the value of any vertex that must
be considered for the allocation of a positive probability in an OMS for Player B. All
vertices with values below this value may effectively be removed from ΣB, though
they may naturally still represent valuable strategies for Player A.
In this section, we have extended the concept of the SSSG through the consider-
ation of situations in which the value of the underlying space is non-uniform. In
Section 10.4 we will further extend the game by allowing Player A to move through
the space according to a flexible stochastic patrol strategy.
10.4 The Graph Patrol Game (GPG)
10.4.1 Preliminary definitions
For the remainder of this chapter, we turn our attention to the scenario discussed
in Section 10.1, in which, rather than requiring Players A and B to simultaneously
pick points of a space at which to deploy, we instead suppose that Player A must
choose a certain strategy of patrol around the space to best protect it against the
deployment of Player B, which will occur at an unknown moment in the future.
This concept will be formalised through the definition of the Graph Patrol Game
(GPG). We begin by setting out the key components of the GPG here, with a
more detailed explanation of how the game is played and how payoffs are calculated
presented in Section 10.4.3. A discussion of the optimal strategies of the game is
provided in later sections.
Note that, throughout the course of this section, we extensively employ the termi-
nology and results presented in Section 2.4, relating to time homogeneous Markov
chains.
As with the EGSG, we consider a simple graph G, with the symmetric adjacency
matrix M = (aij), a finite set of κ vertices:
V (G) = {v1, ..., vκ} (10.20)
a set of edges:
E(G) = {{vi, vj} : vi, vj ∈ V (G) and aij = 1}
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an associated value function:
γ : V (G) → R+ ∪ {0}
v 7→ γ(v)
two non-empty subsets ∅ 6= ΣA,ΣB ⊆ V (G) and a positive real number r, referred
to as the detection radius.
For the work presented in this section, we require that G is a connected graph.
Therefore:
dG(vi, vj) <∞ , ∀i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } (10.21)
deg(vi) > 0 , ∀i ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } (10.22)
where dG(vi, vj) represents the length of the shortest path connecting vi to vj in G
and deg(vi) represents the degree of vi in G, as usual. We also fix a positive real
number λ, which is bounded above by the reciprocal of the maximum degree of G:
0 < λ ≤ ∆(G)−1 (10.23)
The role of λ will be discussed later.
The Graph Patrol Game (GPG), Gpatrol = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ, λ), is a two-player game
played over G. In this game, Player B chooses a vertex vB from his strategy set ΣB ,
as in the EGSG. However, rather than choosing a point vA ∈ ΣA , Player A instead
chooses a κ × κ transition matrix, TA = (tA,ij)i,j∈{1,...,κ} , and a column vector of
non-negative real numbers of length κ, dA = (dA,1 , . . . , dA,κ)
>, whose components
will be referred to as dwell times.
The matrix TA is chosen so as to define a time homogeneous Markov chain over
V (G), with tA,ij representing the probability of a transition to vi from vj. This
matrix is further constrained such that only transitions between adjacent vertices of
G are permissible, with all other transitions being allocated zero probability.
The dwell time vector dA alters the dynamics of the Markov chain by establishing
the amounts of time that the process waits at each vertex before undergoing a change
of state in line with the relevant transition probabilities. The dwell times at vertices
that do not belong to ΣA are constrained to be equal to zero.
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Together, the random sequence of vertices generated by the Markov chain defined
by TA and the dwell times contained in dA describe the patrol strategy employed by
Player A. This concept will be discussed in greater depth in Section 10.4.3.
The complete sets TA and DA from which TA and dA are respectively chosen, may
be written as follows:
TA =
{
TA ∈ Rκ×κ : T>A Jκ,1 = Jκ,1 , λM 4 TA 4M
}
(10.24)
DA = {dA ∈ Rκ : dA < 0κ,1 , diag(sA) dA = dA } (10.25)
Here, Rκ×κ is the set of all κ × κ real-valued matrices, Jκ,1 and 0κ,1 are column
vectors of length κ containing ones and zeros respectively, 4 and < represent the
inequalities ≤ and ≥ applied component-wise, while sA is a representation of ΣA as
a binary vector, as defined in (10.13).
Considering (10.24) more closely, the condition T>A Jκ,1 = Jκ,1 states that the columns
of TA each sum to 1. Also, the condition λM 4 TA 4 M is equivalent to the
statements:
aij = 0 ⇒ tA,ij = 0
and aij = 1 ⇒ tA,ij ∈ [λ, 1]
 ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} (10.26)
In other words, this condition ensures that TA allocates a probability of 0 to tran-
sitions between non-adjacent vertices of G and a probability of at least λ to transi-
tions between adjacent vertices. This explains why λ was constrained not to exceed
∆(G)−1 in (10.23), since columns of TA representing vertices of maximum degree
might otherwise be forced to sum to some value greater than 1, which would con-
tradict the condition T>A Jκ,1 = Jκ,1.
Taken together, the conditions imposed on TA ensure that it is a valid transition
matrix for a Markov chain.
Turning to (10.25), observe that the conditions dA < 0κ,1 and diag(sA) dA = dA are
respectively equivalent to the statements:
dA,i ≥ 0 , ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} (10.27)
and vi /∈ ΣA ⇒ dA,i = 0 , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , κ} (10.28)
Given TA and DA, we may precisely specify the strategy sets of the GPG for each
player.
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Clearly, ΣB is the strategy set of the GPG for Player B, just as it was in the
EGSG. However, while ΣA clearly affects the range of strategies available to Player A
through its influence on the dwell times, it is no longer his true strategy set. Instead,
the strategy sets for the GPG are defined as:
ΣA,patrol = TA ×DA
ΣB,patrol = ΣB
(10.29)
10.4.2 Properties of a GPG Markov chain
In Section 10.4.3, we will discuss the GPG and its interpretations in detail. First,
however, we will prove a result (Corollary 10.4.2) on the properties of the Markov
chain defined by TA, which is of fundamental importance for the rest of the work
presented in this chapter. Note that the following arguments rely on concepts de-
fined in Definitions 2.4.3, 2.4.4 and 2.4.5.
Since we have specified that G is a connected, undirected graph with a finite num-
ber of vertices, the fact that the probabilities corresponding to transitions between
adjacent vertices of G are constrained to equal or exceed λ allows us to make the
following statement:
Proposition 10.4.1. The time homogeneous Markov chain defined over the finite
state space V (G) by any transition matrix TA ∈ TA is irreducible.
Proof. To demonstrate that the Markov chain defined by TA is irreducible, it
suffices to show that any two vertices vi, vj ∈ V (G) communicate (in the sense
vi → vj), when considered as states of the Markov chain. In other words, for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, we must show that there exists some positive integer K, such that
the K-step transition probability p
(K)
ij is strictly positive.
There are two cases to consider. Firstly, if i 6= j, then by (10.21), there exists
a path of finite length dG(vi, vj) connecting vi to vj in G, so in this case we set
K = dG(vi, vj). Secondly, if i = j, then since G is an undirected graph and
deg(vi) > 0 (by (10.22)), there is clearly a closed path of length 2 in G (if we
allow the repetition of an edge), which begins and ends at vi, so in this case we set
K = 2.
In both cases, by (10.26), the transition probability associated with each step be-
tween adjacent vertices along the path that has been identified between vi and vj
is greater than or equal to the strictly positive value λ. Therefore, in both cases,
p
(K)
ij ≥ λK > 0, which proves the proposition.
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The key result of this section is a corollary of the above proposition:
Corollary 10.4.2. The time homogeneous Markov chain defined over the finite state
space V (G) by any transition matrix TA ∈ TA has a unique stationary distribution
pi[TA] = (pi1[TA], . . . , piκ[TA])
> ∈ [0, 1]κ, satisfying:
TA pi[TA] = pi[TA] (10.30)
pi[TA]
>Jκ,1 = 1 (10.31)
pi[TA]  0κ,1 (10.32)
where  represents the inequality > applied component-wise.
Proof. This result follows from Propositions 2.4.6, 2.4.7 and 10.4.1.
As discussed in Section 2.4, while pi[TA] is not necessarily a limiting distribution
of the Markov chain, from any starting point, the stochastic process defined by TA
will nevertheless visit every state infinitely many times (since the chain is positive
recurrent), with the terms of pi[TA] representing the proportion of time spent at each
vertex in the long term. Note that this would not necessarily have been the case if
transitions between adjacent vertices had been permitted to equal zero, rather than
being bounded below by λ , since, under these conditions, some vertices could be
completely inaccessible from certain starting points.
As will be explained in the following sections, Corollary 10.4.2 is highly important
in relating optimal strategies of the GPG to those of the corresponding EGSG.
10.4.3 A detailed description of the GPG and its payoffs
Before defining the payoff functions for the GPG, we pause to provide a more de-
tailed explanation of the concept of the game and of how it relates to the objects
defined in Section 10.4.1.
The GPG proceeds as follows. Player A attempts to protect some space, repre-
sented by G, by patrolling randomly according to a Markov chain over the vertices,
based on a matrix of transition probabilities TA , which he chooses. Beyond those
requirements that are necessary to define a valid Markov chain, Player A’s choice of
transition probabilities is further constrained in two ways. Firstly, it is constrained
such that he will only ever move between vertices that are adjacent in G, thus
respecting the geography of the space. Secondly, it is constrained such that the
Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution pi[TA] (by Corollary 10.4.2) and
such that, no matter at which vertex he begins his patrol, Player A will visit every
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vertex of G infinitely many times, a desirable property for a viable patrol strategy.
Unlike a standard Markov chain, Player A does not spend the same amount of time
at each vertex, but rather chooses a set of dwell times dA to determine the time that
he waits at each vertex before continuing his patrol. Each dwell time corresponds
to a single vertex, such that Player A passes the same amount of time at a partic-
ular vertex every time he arrives there. Vertices that do not appear in the set ΣA
must be allocated a dwell time of zero, indicating that these vertices are effectively
passed through instantaneously. Transitions themselves are also assumed to be in-
stantaneous. In this way, letting ξ represent the time elapsed since the start of the
patrol, given an initial deployment vertex for Player A vA[0], the Markov chain and
the dwell times define a stochastic process that generates a current vertex vA[ξ] for
Player A for any positive real time ξ > 0.
Player A’s initial deployment location is chosen according to the probabilities given
in pi[TA]. This ensures that the probability distribution of his location at any partic-
ular iteration (without consideration of dwell times), is also equal to pi[TA]. In many
cases, this specification would not be necessary, since pi[TA] will often be a limiting
distribution for the Markov chain, with any initial distribution µ converging to pi[TA]
for future iterations. However, if the Markov chain exhibits periodic behaviour,
convergence of this sort will not occur (although, in such cases, the proportions
of visits to each state across the complete history of the process will nonetheless
converge to the components of pi[TA], as discussed in Section 10.4.2), leading to
an undesirable potential source of long term predictability in the patrol strategy
(see Ross, 1996, p. 177). Taking pi[TA] as the initial distribution is intended to
avoid this issue.
For her part, Player B chooses a point vB at which to deploy, exactly as she would
in the EGSG. This deployment happens at some unknown but fixed future time
ξB , which is supposed to occur long after the start of the patrol. Intuitively, we
might express this statement in terms of the largest dwell time, through the rela-
tionship ξB  max dA , but, as we will see later in this section, knowledge of the
precise moment at which Player B deploys is not relevant to our subsequent analysis.
Player B’s deployment ends the game and payoffs are determined as in the EGSG,
with Player A considered to have deployed at his final location vA[ξB].
Unlike with previous games discussed in this chapter, we treat the GPG as a Stack-
elberg game (see Section 7.3.7), in which Player B is able to observe the strategy of
Player A and is assumed to employ the optimal response. Crucially however, while
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Player B knows the strategy (TA,dA), since she has no information on when Player A
commenced his patrol, or of his location at any time prior to her deployment, she is
effectively playing against the long term average behaviour of the random process
defined by TA and dA.
Based on the above, we know that the payoff functions for the GPG are given by:
pA,patrol( (TA,dA) , vB ) = pA( vA[ξB] , vB )
pB,patrol( (TA,dA) , vB ) = pB( vA[ξB] , vB )
(10.33)
where, pA and pB are the payoff functions of the EGSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ), as de-
fined in (10.2) and (10.3), and where vA[ξB] is a random variable whose distribution
depends on TA and dA, as discussed. Owing to the simple relationship between their
payoffs given in (10.33), the fact that the GPG is a zero-sum game clearly follows
immediately from the fact that the ESSSG is a zero-sum game.
We observe that, given strategies (TA,dA) and vB, the expected values of these
payoff functions could be written explicitly if the distribution of vA[ξB] over V (G)
were known. In fact, given our assumptions, this distribution is easy to determine.
Disregarding the dwell times for a moment, we see that since the distribution of
vA[0] is equal to pi[TA] and since pi[TA] is the unique stationary distribution of the
Markov chain defined by TA , over any sequence of states generated by the chain,
the expected proportion of iterations that Player A will spend at vertex vi is equal
to pii[TA], for all i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}. Reintroducing the dwell times, we see that in the
limit as ξ → ∞, the expected proportion of the time interval [0, ξ] spent at vertex
vi is equal to:
pii[TA] dA,i
pi[TA]>dA
(10.34)
Therefore, since neither player knows the duration of the time interval [0, ξB] between
the start of Player A’s patrol and Player B’s deployment, except to the extent that
this duration is large in comparison to the time that Player A passes at any vertex,
from the perspectives of both players, the term given in (10.34) may effectively be
considered to be equal to the probability that Player A will be found at vertex vi
when Player B deploys:
P [ vA[ξB] = vi ] =
pii[TA] dA,i
pi[TA]>dA
(10.35)
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This means that, given strategies (TA,dA) and vB, the expected payoffs of the GPG
for each player may be written:
E [ pA,patrol( (TA,dA) , vB ) ] =
κ∑
i=1
pii[TA] dA,i
pi[TA]>dA
pA( vi , vB )
E [ pB,patrol( (TA,dA) , vB ) ] =
κ∑
i=1
pii[TA] dA,i
pi[TA]>dA
pB( vi , vB )
(10.36)
The GPG is therefore effectively reduced to a Stackelberg version of the EGSG in
which Player A plays the mixed strategy ρ[TA,dA] , defined by:
ρ[TA,dA] = ( ρ1[TA,dA] , . . . , ρκ[TA,dA] )
> =
diag(pi[TA]) dA
pi[TA]>dA
(10.37)
and we may write:
E [ pA,patrol( (TA,dA) , vB ) ] = pA(ρ[TA,dA] , vB )
E [ pB,patrol( (TA,dA) , vB ) ] = pB(ρ[TA,dA] , vB )
(10.38)
Note that in (10.36) and (10.38) and in all that follows, the notation E [ · ] is used
to refer exclusively to the expectation with respect to variation in the vertex vA[ξB]
at which Player A deploys. For the sake of clarity, the calculation of expectations
relating to the particular choice of pure strategy made when using a mixed strategy,
is here assumed to be included in the payoff functions pA,patrol , pB,patrol , pA and pB .
Henceforward, therefore, these functions are taken to refer to the expected payoff to
the corresponding player, given any mixed strategies employed.
(10.38) highlights an important relationship between the payoffs of the GPG and
those of the corresponding EGSG. In Section 10.4.4, we will show that there is also
a relationship between the optimal strategies of these two games.
10.4.4 Optimal strategies of the GPG
We now investigate the optimal strategies of the GPG and their relationship to the
OMSs of the EGSG. As we will see, for the GPG, there is no need to consider mixed
strategies, since the conditions for optimality can be satisfied in pure strategies only.
This is an intuitively sensible result, since, as we have seen in Section 10.4.3, a pure
strategy of the GPG for Player A, (TA,dA) ∈ ΣA,patrol , corresponds to a mixed
strategy ρ[TA,dA] of the corresponding EGSG, while Player B has no need of a
mixed strategy, since she is able to observe the strategy of Player A and to employ
an optimal pure strategy response.
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A justification of the above assertions will require the following proposition:
Proposition 10.4.3. Consider a GPG, Gpatrol = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ, λ) with r = 1,
and the corresponding EGSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ) . Given a valid mixed strategy
ςA of the GPG for Player A and a vertex vB ∈ ΣB, there exists a valid mixed strategy
ςˆA of the EGSG for Player A such that:
E[ pA,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] = pA( ςˆA , vB ) (10.39)
E[ pB,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] = pB( ςˆA , vB ) (10.40)
where pA,patrol, pB,patrol and pA, pB are the payoff functions to each player for the
games Gpatrol and G respectively.
Proof. We prove (10.39), which relates to the payoffs for Player A. The proof of
(10.40) would be identical.
By definition, a valid mixed strategy ςA of the GPG for Player A defines a proba-
bility measure PςA over the strategy set ΣA,patrol . Recalling that pA,patrol is itself a
stochastic function of its arguments, even when considering pure strategies only (see
(10.33) and (10.35)), the expected payoff in (10.39) may thus be written explicitly,
in terms of the general Lebesgue integral (see Craven, 1982, pp. 90-93), as2:
E[ pA,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] =
∫
ΣA,patrol
E[ pA,patrol(x , vB ) ] dPςA (10.41)
Note that, for reasons of clarity, a change of notation has been made, with x replac-
ing (TA,dA) as a general point of ΣA,patrol .
By (10.38), and using the linearity of the Lebesgue integral (Craven, 1982, pp. 95-96),
we therefore have:
E[ pA,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] =
∫
ΣA,patrol
pA(ρ[x] , vB ) dPςA
=
∫
ΣA,patrol
κ∑
i=1
ρi[x] pA( vi , vB ) dPςA
=
κ∑
i=1
[∫
ΣA,patrol
ρi[x] dPςA
]
pA( vi , vB ) (10.42)
2 The right hand side of (10.41) is an explicit representation of the expectation related to
variation in Player A’s particular choice of pure strategy when he employs the mixed strategy
ςA. Variation related to uncertainty in the vertex vA[ξB] at which Player A actually deploys, given
that a particular pure strategy has been chosen, is not accounted for in this integral representation,
hence the continued presence of the expectation function E [ · ] in the integrand. This is in line
with our explanation of the usage of this notation, provided at the end of Section 10.4.3.
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Now, let:
ςˆA,i =
∫
ΣA,patrol
ρi[x] dPςA , for i ∈ {1 , . . . , κ}
and, using the linearity of the Lebesgue integral once again, observe that:
κ∑
i=1
ςˆA,i =
κ∑
i=1
[∫
ΣA,patrol
ρi[x] dPςA
]
=
∫
ΣA,patrol
[
κ∑
i=1
ρi[x]
]
dPςA
=
∫
ΣA,patrol
dPςA
= 1
Furthermore, by the definition of ρ, given in (10.37), and the relationship between
dA and ΣA, defined in (10.28), we have:
ςˆA,i ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ {1 , . . . , κ}
and vi 6∈ ΣA ⇒ ςˆA,i = 0
The vector ςˆA = (ςˆA,1 , . . . , ςˆA,κ)
> is therefore a valid mixed strategy of G for
Player A and, by (10.42), we can write:
E[ pA,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] =
κ∑
i=1
ςˆA,i pA( vi , vB )
= pA( ςˆA , vB )
This proves the proposition.
Focusing on Player A only, Proposition 10.4.3 states that mixed strategies of the
GPG correspond to mixed strategies of the EGSG. Since we have seen that pure
strategies of the GPG also correspond to mixed strategies of the EGSG (see (10.38)),
this result demonstrates that both pure and mixed strategies of the GPG can be
said to operate in a similar way, in some sense.
At this stage, we pause to consider the optimal strategy of the GPG for Player B.
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that Player A employs a mixed strategy
ςA , since pure strategies are a special case of mixed strategies.
3 Since the GPG is a
3 In fact, the assumption that Player A employs a mixed strategy is made purely for the
sake of the clarity of our argument. We will see (by Proposition 10.4.4, Proposition 10.4.5 and
Lemma 10.4.6) that Player A has a pure strategy that satisfies the conditions for optimality.
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Stackelberg game, Player B observes ςA and employs her optimal response.
By Proposition 10.4.3, Player B knows that if she plays vB ∈ ΣB, her expected payoff
from the game will be pB(ςˆA, vB), where ςˆA is the mixed strategy defined in the proof
of the proposition. By the results of Section 10.3.2, we see that the expected payoffs
pB(ςˆA, vi) for i ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } are given by the components of the vector −P>ςˆA ,
where P is defined as in (10.14). Player B’s optimal response to ςˆA in G is therefore
vι , where ι is the index of the maximal entry of −P>ςˆA, and her expected payoff in
this case is:
E[ pB,patrol( ςA , vι ) ] = max [−P>ςˆA ]
Note that, by (10.15), if Player B were instead to employ a mixed strategy
τB = ( τB,1 , . . . , τB,κ )
>, her expected payoff would be:
E[ pB,patrol( ςA , τB ) ] =
κ∑
i=1
τB,i E[ pB,patrol( ςA , vi ) ]
= −τ>BP>ςˆA
Bearing in mind that the entries of P are non-positive, this clearly does not exceed
max [−P>ςˆA ], and therefore:
max
vB∈ΣB,patrol
E[ pB,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] ≥ E[ pB,patrol( ςA , τB ) ]
for all mixed strategies ςA over ΣA,patrol for Player A and τB over ΣB,patrol for Player B
in Gpatrol . This confirms the assertion that, in determining her optimal response,
Player B need not consider mixed strategies. Henceforth, we therefore consider only
pure strategies for Player B.
The next proposition uses Proposition 10.4.3 to identify a potential route for finding
a pure strategy of the GPG that fulfils the optimality conditions.
Proposition 10.4.4. Consider a GPG, Gpatrol = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ, λ), with r = 1 and
let σA be an OMS of the corresponding EGSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ) , for Player A.
Suppose that there exists (T ∗A,d
∗
A) ∈ ΣA,patrol such that ρ[T ∗A,d∗A] = σA . Then the
pure strategy (T ∗A,d
∗
A) is an OMS of Gpatrol for Player A.
Proof. We must prove that:
min
vB∈ΣB
E[ pA,patrol( (T
∗
A,d
∗
A) , vB ) ] ≥ min
vB∈ΣB
E[ pA,patrol( ςA , vB ) ] (10.43)
for all valid mixed strategies ςA over ΣA,patrol of Gpatrol for Player A.
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Using (10.38), Proposition 10.4.3, and the fact that ρ[T ∗A,d
∗
A] = σA , (10.43) may
be written:
min
vB∈ΣB
pA(σA , vB ) ≥ min
vB∈ΣB
pA( ςˆA , vB )
We complete the proof by observing that this inequality holds by definition, since
we have assumed that σA is an OMS of G for Player A.
Proposition 10.4.4 tells us that if we know an OMS σA of the EGSG for Player A,
then finding a pure strategy of Gpatrol for Player A that satisfies the conditions
for optimality requires only that we identify some (T ∗A,d
∗
A) ∈ ΣA,patrol such that
ρ[T ∗A,d
∗
A] = σA . Constructing such a strategy is the objective of the next proposi-
tion.
Before stating the proposition, we must define the following additional notation:
deg[V (G)] = [ deg(v1) , . . . , deg(vκ) ]
>
We also recall that, given a valid transition matrix TA ∈ TA , pi[TA] is the unique
stationary distribution of the time homogeneous Markov chain over V (G) that is
defined by TA (see Section 10.4.2), while M = (aij)i,j∈{1,...,κ} is the adjacency matrix
of the graph G over which the GPG is played.
We now state the following proposition.
Proposition 10.4.5. Consider a GPG, Gpatrol = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ, λ), with r = 1 and
let σA be an OMS of the corresponding EGSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ), for Player A.
Letting X = diag(deg[V (G)])−1, if we set:
T ∗A = MX
d∗A = diag(pi[T
∗
A])
−1σA
(10.44)
then the strategy (T ∗A,d
∗
A) ∈ ΣA,patrol satisfies:
ρ[T ∗A,d
∗
A] = σA
Note that the two inverse diagonal matrices mentioned in the proposition both ex-
ist, since, by (10.22) and (10.32), the vectors from which they are constructed have
strictly positive components.
Before proving Proposition 10.4.5 itself, we must demonstrate that (T ∗A,d
∗
A) is indeed
a valid strategy for the GPG for Player A. This is the purpose of the following lemma:
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Lemma 10.4.6. Given T ∗A and d
∗
A , defined as in Proposition 10.4.5:
(T ∗A,d
∗
A) ∈ ΣA,patrol
Proof. We must prove:
1. T ∗A ∈ TA ;
2. d∗A ∈ DA .
where TA and DA are defined in (10.24) and (10.25) respectively.
Proof of 1. By (10.24), we must show that T ∗A ∈ Rκ×κ, T ∗>A Jκ,1 = Jκ,1 and
λM 4 T ∗A 4 M, where Jκ,1 is a length κ column vector of ones. Each of these
statements is easily proved in a component-wise fashion. First observe that:
X =
(
δij
deg(vi)
)
i,j∈{1,...,κ}
where δij is the Kronecker delta, defined in (10.11). This implies that:
T ∗A = MX =
(
aij
deg(vj)
)
i,j∈{1,...,κ}
∈ Rκ×κ (10.45)
since deg(vi) > 0 , ∀i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } . We can also prove that T ∗>A Jκ,1 = Jκ,1 as
follows:
T ∗>A Jκ,1 =
(
κ∑
j=1
aji
deg(vi)
)
i∈{1,...,κ}
=
(
deg(vi)
deg(vi)
)
i∈{1,...,κ}
= Jκ,1
Next, observe that, in component-wise form, λM 4 T ∗A 4 M is equivalent to the
statement:
λaij ≤ aij
deg(vj)
≤ aij , ∀i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ }
The right hand inequality follows from the fact that deg(vj) is a positive integer.
We prove the left hand inequality by contradiction. Suppose that there exists some
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i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } such that λaij > aij deg(vj)−1. We would then have:
aij
(
λ− deg(vj)−1
)
> 0
⇒ aij = 1 and λ > deg(vj)−1
⇒ aij = 1 and λ−1 < deg(vj)
However, by (10.23):
λ−1 ≥ max
j∈{ 1 , ... , κ }
deg(vj)
This is a contradiction, and therefore λaij ≤ aij deg(vj)−1 for all i, j ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ },
as required. This completes the proof that T ∗A ∈ TA .
Proof of 2. By (10.25), we must show that d∗A ∈ Rκ, d∗A < 0κ,1 and
diag(sA) d
∗
A = d
∗
A, where 0κ,1 is a length κ column vector of zeros.
As in the proof of 1, we take a component-wise approach. We have that:
d∗A = diag(pi[T
∗
A])
−1σA =
(
σA,i
pii[T ∗A]
)
i∈{1,...,κ}
∈ Rκ
since pii[T
∗
A] > 0 , ∀i ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } . Since σA is a valid mixed strategy of G for
Player A, we also have that σA,i ≥ 0 , ∀i ∈ { 1 , . . . , κ } , which guarantees that
d∗A < 0κ,1 , as required.
Now, using the definition of sA, given in (10.13), the statement diag(sA) d
∗
A = d
∗
A
may be rewritten as:
1ΣA [vi]σA,i
pii[T ∗A]
=
σA,i
pii[T ∗A]
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}
where 1ΣA is the indicator function of the set ΣA , as defined in (10.5).
We prove this by contraction. Suppose that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, such that:
1ΣA [vi]σA,i
pii[T ∗A]
6= σA,i
pii[T ∗A]
Then we must have:
vi /∈ ΣA and σA,i > 0
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However, since σA is a valid mixed strategy for Player A in G, this is a contradiction,
and diag(sA) d
∗
A = d
∗
A , as required. This completes the proof that d
∗
A ∈ DA and
hence proves the lemma.
We now prove Proposition 10.4.5.
Proof. We wish to prove that, for the T ∗A and d
∗
A given in (10.44):
ρ[T ∗A,d
∗
A] = σA
Observe that, by (10.37):
ρ[T ∗A,d
∗
A] =
diag(pi[T ∗A]) d
∗
A
pi[T ∗A]> d
∗
A
=
diag(pi[T ∗A]) diag(pi[T
∗
A])
−1 σA
pi[T ∗A]> diag(pi[T
∗
A])
−1 σA
=
σA
J1,κ σA
= σA
where J1,κ is a length κ row vector of ones.
This proves the proposition.
In summary then, we have demonstrated that an optimal strategy of the GPG for
Player A may be constructed from a known OMS of the corresponding EGSG for
Player A. We have also identified Player B’s optimal response. These are the key
results of this section, which we state concisely in this final proposition:
Proposition 10.4.7. Consider a GPG, Gpatrol = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ, λ), with r = 1 and
let σA be an OMS of the corresponding EGSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ), for Player A.
• The pure strategy (T ∗A,d∗A) ∈ ΣA,patrol , as defined in Proposition 10.4.5, is an
optimal strategy of Gpatrol for Player A.
• The pure strategy vι ∈ ΣB,patrol , where ι is the index of a maximal entry of
−P>σA , is an optimal strategy of Gpatrol for Player B (where P is defined as
in (10.14)).
• The value of Gpatrol (to Player A) is min
[
P>σA
]
, which is equal to the value
of G (to Player A).
Proof. The first part follows from Propositions 10.4.4 and 10.4.5. The second part
follows from Proposition 10.38, 10.4.5 and the definition of P in Section 10.3.2. The
third part follows from the other two, recalling that the GPG is a zero-sum game,
and from the definition of the value of a game.
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10.4.5 The GPG as an optimisation problem
Through Proposition 10.4.7, we have a method for constructing an optimal strategy
of the GPG for Player A using an OMS of the corresponding EGSG. As we have
seen, the latter may be calculated through the application of standard techniques
to the payoff matrix P, which was defined in Section 10.3.2. We have also seen that
the optimal strategy for Player B is to observe the strategy (TA,dA) of Player A and
to respond by deploying at the vertex vB that corresponds to the maximum entry of
the vector −Pρ[TA,dA] (where ρ[TA,dA] is defined in (10.37)).
We now conclude this chapter by asking whether the optimal strategy (T ∗A,d
∗
A) of
the GPG for Player A, as defined in Proposition 10.4.5, is the unique pure strategy
in ΣA,patrol satisfying the equation ρ[TA,dA] = σA, given a particular OMS σA of
the corresponding EGSG.
To address this question, first observe that the proof that d∗A ∈ DA, which forms
part of the proof of Lemma 10.4.6, and the proof of Proposition 10.4.5 are unaffected
by the multiplication of d∗A by a positive real scalar η > 0 . Therefore, if (T
∗
A,d
∗
A) is
an optimal strategy of the GPG for Player A, then so is (T ∗A, η d
∗
A).
Next, consider the entry-wise description of the transition matrix T ∗A , given in
(10.45). This expression shows that, from a given vertex vj ∈ V (G), T ∗A allocates
a probability of 0 to transitions to vertices that are not adjacent to vj and equal
probabilities of deg(vj)
−1 to all other transitions. In other words, T ∗A describes an
unbiased random walk over the vertices of G.
However, note that the proof that d∗A ∈ DA and the proof of Proposition 10.4.5,
require only that T ∗A corresponds to a unique, positive-valued stationary distri-
bution pi[T ∗A] over V (G), a requirement that holds for all valid TA ∈ TA (by
Corollary 10.4.2). We may then observe that every TA ∈ TA corresponds to an
optimal strategy (TA,dA) ∈ ΣA,patrol of the GPG for Player A, where dA is consid-
ered to be a function of TA , given by dA = diag(pi[TA])
−1σA . We therefore see that
the specification of Proposition 10.4.5 that T ∗A should define an unbiased random
walk was made purely for the sake of simplicity, this representing, in some sense,
the ‘most natural’ set of transitions to choose.
Combining the above observations, we have that, given an OMS σA of the appro-
priate EGSG, each T †A ∈ TA defines a one-parameter family of optimal strategies of
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the GPG for Player A:
(T †A , d
†
A ) = (T
†
A , η diag(pi[T
†
A])
−1σA ) ∈ ΣA,patrol (10.46)
Since there may also be many possible choices for σA , we observe that, in general,
there will be a wide range of possible optimal strategies of the GPG for Player A.
This raises the possibility that, rather than simply playing the optimal strategy
defined in Proposition 10.4.5, Player A might instead choose an optimal strategy
of the form given in (10.46) on the grounds that it exhibits a particular desirable
property. For example, it may be helpful to specify the mean of the dwell times dˆ,
to ensure that the rate of progression of a patrol is appropriate for the particular
scenario under consideration:
κ−1d>AJκ,1 = dˆ
This may be achieved by choosing the appropriate value of η. Substituting from
(10.46), we have:
η =
κdˆ
σ>Adiag(pi[T
†
A])
−1Jκ,1
(10.47)
It may also be desirable that the dwell times should be roughly equal (excepting
those corresponding to vertices that are not in ΣA, which are constrained to equal
zero), since this would make the corresponding patrol strategy simpler to implement.
This suggests that we should attempt to minimise the empirical variance of the
components of dA, given by:
1
κ
d>AdA − dˆ 2 (10.48)
Since dˆ and κ are specified constants, this is equivalent to minimising:
d>AdA (10.49)
Now, using (10.46) and (10.47), (10.49) may be rewritten as:
κ2 dˆ 2
σ>A
[
diag(pi[T †A])
−1
]2
σA[
σ>Adiag(pi[T
†
A])
−1Jκ,1
]2 (10.50)
Finally, since this is a function to be minimised, the positive constant multiplier
κ2 dˆ 2 may clearly be disregarded, resulting in the following objective function to be
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minimised over TA:
Z[TA] = σ
>
A [diag(pi[TA])
−1]2 σA[
σ>Adiag(pi[TA])−1Jκ,1
]2
Taken together, these desires and constraints may be stated as the following contin-
uous optimisation problem:
The GPG as an optimisation problem for Player A:
• Given:
– A GPG, Gpatrol = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ, λ), with r = 1 and |V (G)| = κ ;
– An OMS σA of the corresponding EGSG, G = (G,ΣA,ΣB, r, γ), for
Player A ;
– A positive real number dˆ > 0 .
• Minimise:
Z[TA] = σ
>
A [diag(pi[TA])
−1]2 σA[
σ>Adiag(pi[TA])−1Jκ,1
]2
• Over:
TA ∈ Rκ×κ
• Subject to the constraints:
T>A Jκ,1 = Jκ,1
λM 4 TA
TA 4M
• Where pi[TA] ∈ Rκ is the unique vector satisfying:
TA pi[TA] = pi[TA]
pi[TA]
>Jκ,1 = 1
pi[TA]  0κ,1
Despite the linearity of the constraints, the complicated structure of the
objective function and its relationship to the optimisation variables (the
entries of TA) means that finding an optimal solution to the problem may not be
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straightforward.4 Therefore, while a detailed investigation of the problem would pro-
vide an interesting avenue for future research, it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, observing that the objective function may be written as:
Z[TA] =
κ∑
i=1
[
σA,i pii[TA]
−1]2
[
κ∑
i=1
σA,i pii[TA]
]2
and since the terms of pi[TA] and σA are all non-negative, by the triangle inequality
(see Sutherland, 2009, p. 39), we see that Z[TA] ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, since the
feasible region is closed and bounded (if considered as a subset of Rκ2) and non-
empty (since T ∗A, as defined in Proposition 10.4.5, is a feasible solution), we would
suggest that some form of systematic search of this region would represent a plausible
initial approach to the problem.
10.5 Summary and conclusions
In Part III, in line with the research objectives set out in Section 1.5, we have de-
fined a search and concealment game, the SSSG, which differs from the majority of
games considered in literature both in its generality and in its explicit consideration
of the strategic interdependence of positions based on spatial structure. We believe
that formulating the game in terms of metric spaces may allow new tools and results
from this area of mathematics to be applied to search and concealment problems,
facilitating the identification of OMSs in a variety of different cases.
We have examined the way in which the game theoretic concepts of dominance
and equivalence of strategies are manifested in the context of the SSSG and have
presented various methods for analysing the SSSG played over a graph (the “Graph
Search Game” or GSG), including:
• The reduction of GSGs with detection radius r 6= 1 to games with r = 1.
• The formulation of lower and upper bounds on the value of the GSG.
• An algorithm that applies the concept of IEDS in the explicit context of the
GSG and which has been demonstrated to reduce games played on trees to
cases in which OMSs can be immediately determined.
4 Indeed, it is known that optimisation problems of this nature can prove extremely challenging
to solve. For example, Galli and Letchford (2015) describe non-convex, quadratically constrained,
quadratic programs (a specific variety of optimisation problem whose objective function and con-
straints are quadratic in the optimisation variables) as being “not only NP-hard in the strong sense,
but also very difficult in practice.”
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• A method for simplifying the analysis of GSGs using automorphisms of the
graph.
• The introduction of the concept of an “equal oddments strategy”, and a demon-
stration that such mixed strategies are optimal for both players.
• The presentation of explicit OMSs for a particular family of GSGs; those played
over “poly-level graphs”.
In this chapter, we have extended the SSSG to consider spaces in which the points
of the space over which the game is played may differ in value to the two players.
We have considered the OMSs of this extended game (the ESSSG), with particular
reference to the case in which the game is played over a graph (the EGSG), and
derived a proposition that could simplify the task of identifying these strategies (in
Section 10.3.4).
Finally, we adapted the EGSG to consider scenarios in which, rather than remaining
stationary, the searching player was able to patrol the space, drawing on methods
from the theory of Markov chains and demonstrating key connections between the
optimal strategies of the patrol game and the static game.
It should be noted that the GPG defined in this chapter differs from the majority of
patrol games considered in the literature (such as those proposed by Alpern et al.,
2011b and Basilico et al., 2012), both in the stochastic nature of its patrol strate-
gies and in the fact that the patrolling player controls a neighbourhood around his
current location, rather than simply the location itself. These differences allow the
GPG to take full consideration of the geography of the space over which it is played
and of the impact of this spatial structure on the interaction between the players,
rather than simply using space to determine the set of valid patrol routes.
In the final part of this thesis, we will reflect on the work that has been presented,
assessing our results against the research objectives, considering the relevance and
limitations of our conclusions and discussing how the work might be built on and
extended. We will also present some brief ideas on how the work of Parts II and III
could be brought together before drawing our arguments to a close.
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Part IV
Conclusions
330
Chapter 11
Conclusions, synthesis and further
work
Some material in Section 11.3.3 is adapted from the article Static search games
played over graphs and general metric spaces, published in the European Journal of
Operational Research (Ole´ron Evans and Bishop, 2013).
11.1 Research outcomes
11.1.1 General comments
In this thesis, we have considered two broad perspectives on the relationship be-
tween local interactions, global outcomes and spatial structure in models of systems
of interacting individuals. The first may be described as a ‘wide-angle’ perspective,
in which individuals are treated as simple stochastic automata, with no explicit de-
cision making capability. The second may be described as a ‘close-up’ perspective,
in which individuals are treated as sophisticated decision-making agents.
We have explored each of these perspectives through the use of a different modelling
paradigm: individual-based modelling in the first case, where we focused on the col-
lective dynamics that emerge from local interactions between individuals, and game
theoretic modelling in the second, where we examined the relationship between the
geography of a space and the strategic behaviour of its inhabitants.
A detailed list of the original contributions to knowledge presented in the thesis is
provided in Section 1.7. Rather than reproducing that list here, we will instead
discuss the outcomes of the research in broader terms, with specific reference to the
objectives presented in Section 1.5.
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11.1.2 Perspective one: Individuals as automata
The first perspective was examined in Part II, whose major focus was a particu-
lar family of stochastic cellular IBMs, described as one-dimensional, single species
B-models (defined in Section 4.4), which were derived from the NANIA predator-
prey model (defined in Section 4.2). This family of models was used as a basis for
an examination of our first two research objectives:
• To improve understanding of the relationship between the long term pop-
ulation dynamics of spatially explicit IBMs and the dynamics predicted by
corresponding non-spatial models, derived using mean field theory.
• To develop methods to understand and explain the causal link between local
spatial interactions and global population dynamics in such models.
The objectives were addressed in two phases. First, in Chapter 5, a large number of
computer simulations of one-dimensional, single species B-models were performed,
systematically varying the model parameters so as to thoroughly explore the pa-
rameter space. Through visualisation of the resulting population dynamics, it was
possible to create a taxonomy of possible model behaviours, and to broadly define
the region of parameter space in which each behaviour was prevalent. A compari-
son of the observed long term mean population densities in these simulations with
the stable equilibria predicted by mean field theory, alongside an analysis of spatial
correlations between cell states, allowed us to understand, in an empirical sense,
how varying the parameters impacted on the relationship between the IBM and a
corresponding mean field model.
Since the B-model parameters, α, β, γ, , ζ, are each explicitly related to the fre-
quency with which a particular local transition (individual behaviour) occurs, it
was possible to ascertain that α-transitions, representing the mortality of isolated
individuals, are associated with poor ‘mixing’ of individuals throughout the system
(in the sense that such transitions induce substantial correlations in the states of
nearby cells), while all other transition types are associated with good mixing. This
explained why higher values of the parameter α were observed to produce simula-
tions with increasingly poor correspondence to mean field models, since local spatial
correlations between cell states invalidate the necessary independence assumptions
of mean field theory.
While the simulation experiments had identified a connection between α-transitions
and local spatial correlations, they did not explain the causal nature of this rela-
tionship. Therefore, in order to address this issue and thus to more fully achieve the
332
second of the above objectives, in Chapter 6, a more theoretical approach was taken.
The new approach involved the translation of the dynamics of the one-dimensional,
single species B-models into a new space and the analysis of the possible effects of
each type of transition in this new context. A measure of clumping was introduced
to describe the spatial distribution of individuals throughout the system, and this
measure was used to explain the unique effect of α-transitions on the spatial distri-
bution of individuals. Using the new representation of the model and the clumping
measure, an argument was presented to explain why the mean field equilibrium could
be considered, in a certain sense, ‘unstable’ under α-transitions, but ‘stable’ under
all other transitions.
11.1.3 Perspective two: Individuals as decision-making
agents
The second perspective was examined in Part III, in which we created, analysed and
extended a general game theoretic model, the Static Spatial Search Game (SSSG),
with the aim of addressing our remaining research objectives:
• To create a general, explicitly spatial, search and concealment game, in order to
unite many similar games presented in the literature under a single theoretical
framework.
• To develop general results on the optimal mixed strategies of this game and
on how these strategies may be determined.
As originally defined in Chapter 8, the SSSG is a two-player game, in which a search-
ing player and a hiding player simultaneously choose points of a known metric space
at which to deploy. In this framework, an ‘interaction’ between individuals consists
exclusively of whether or not the searching player locates the hiding player. This
occurs when the distance between the two deployment locations (in terms of the met-
ric) is smaller than a pre-specified “detection radius”, with a fixed payoff awarded
to the searching player if the hiding player is located, or to the hiding player other-
wise. To fully address the first of the two objectives listed above, in Section 8.2.2,
we discussed several other games from the literature that could be formulated as
special cases of the SSSG.
Over the course of Chapters 8-10, a number of special cases and extensions to the
SSSG were presented and analysed, most notably the case in which the metric space
over which the game is played is a graph (the “Graph Search Game” or GSG), an
extension of the model to consider spaces of non-uniform value and the development
of a model to represent situations of patrol and infiltration, in which the searching
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player moves randomly through the space according to a set of probabilities that
he has chosen. The consideration of these cases served two main purposes: firstly,
to make the game more amenable to analysis, allowing for the derivation of general
results in line with the second objective stated above, and secondly, to broaden the
potential applicability and relevance of the game.
In terms of the second objective, results presented in relation to these games can
be divided into two categories. Firstly, there are results that serve to simplify the
analysis of a game or that seek to approximate important quantities. These in-
clude the derivation of bounds on the value of the GSG to each player, a method
to reduce all GSGs to games with unit detection radius, a reformulation of the it-
erated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) algorithm to simplify the task
of identifying optimal mixed strategies (OMSs), and methods to simplify GSGs by
exploiting graph automorphisms. Secondly, there are results which allow for the
calculation of precise OMSs in particular cases; for example, in GSGs played over
trees or “poly-level” graphs (defined in Section 9.4.1), in GSGs admitting “equal
oddments” strategies (defined in Section 9.3.3), and in patrol games over graphs for
which the optimal strategies of the corresponding SSSG are known.
11.2 Discussion
11.2.1 The choice of models studied in Part II
We now present a critical discussion of our research outcomes. Our purpose is to
highlight the extent and significance of the work and to justify some of the decisions
that were made with regard to direction, content and focus.
First, we consider Part II, discussing our choice of models and the scope of the
research presented. A natural question that arises is why the NANIA model was
chosen as a starting point for our investigation and why, subsequently, the focus was
shifted to the family of one-dimensional, single species B-models. This question was
addressed in Section 4.4.1, and we now expand on and reiterate the arguments given
there.
We note that, as discussed in Section 4.2.1, the NANIA model is of relevance in
and of itself, both since it is often invoked as an archetypical example of an IBM
for the purposes of teaching and visualisation and because it is related to the more
widely applied ecological patch models, discussed in Section 3.3.3. We would fur-
ther contend that the discrete space-time stochastic models of class B, of which the
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NANIA model is a special case, represent a potentially important and fundamental
family of IBMs, whose study could provide important insights for the wider field of
agent-based and individual-based modelling as a whole. These models are concep-
tually simple and have been shown to be related to certain IBMs in the literature,
yet although parallels can be drawn between these models and previous objects of
study (certain of the “simple programs” examined by Wolfram (2002), for example),
general results and analysis of such models are largely absent from the literature.
For these reasons, alongside their simplicity and their compatibility with mean field
analysis, B-models represented an ideal framework in which to address the first two
of our stated research objectives. One-dimensional, single species B-models may be
considered to represent a minimally complex setting in which the issues raised by
these objectives – comparing the population dynamics of spatial IBMs with those
of non-spatial mean field models and understanding the causal links between local
and global features – may be observed and investigated.
While it could be argued that one-dimensional, single species B-models constitute
too narrow a category of IBMs to successfully address our objectives, the fact that
such models have seen little study in their most general form necessitates a sim-
ple initial approach, to form a firm foundation for future work. The approaches
that have been employed for the analysis of these simple models may inform the
study of more complex systems going forward. Furthermore, the restriction to one-
dimensional, single species models served to sufficiently reduce the range of pos-
sible dynamics such that a thorough exploration of the parameter space could be
conducted through experimental simulation, something that would not have been
possible if a more detailed family of models had been considered.
The high level of abstraction of B-models is also worthy of comment. It is clear
that, in reference to Gilbert’s (2008, pp. 41-44) categorisation of models (see
Section 2.2.2), these systems fall firmly into the class of “abstract models”. While
it is true that B-models would not be suitable for modelling of any particular real
world system or class of systems without significant extension and development,
they are suitable for the purposes for which we employ them; namely, to investigate
more general theoretical questions about the behaviour of IBMs, their relationship
to non-spatial mean field models and the causal relationships connecting local and
global dynamics.
In support of these arguments, we would once again invoke the words of San Miguel
et al. (2012, p.250), previously quoted in Section 4.4.1, who stated that:
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“Simple models are essential to uncover the basic mechanisms [of complex
systems] and provide insight into fundamental questions.”
It is precisely in this spirit that B-models have been employed in this thesis.
11.2.2 The use of mean field theory
Turning to more specific questions on our methodology, there are a number of ways in
which mean field theory could be adapted to provide a better match to the behaviour
of IBMs. For example, we could have employed a spatial rather than a non-spatial
approach, producing a representation of the model as a system of PDEs, rather than
a system of ODEs (see Section 3.2.4). However, PDE representations such as these
cannot truly be considered to provide simplified representations of model dynamics,
since they require complete knowledge of the initial microstate of a model to predict
its future behaviour, rather than knowledge of the population density only, as in the
non-spatial case. If our goal is to reduce the number of variables needed to usefully
describe the state of a system, then PDEs are not necessarily an appropriate tool.
Alternatively, rather than describing the state of the system with a single variable,
u, representing the population density, further variables could be introduced to
account for some limited spatial correlations. For example, we could consider the
simultaneous dynamics of a second variable, v, representing the proportion of the
neighbours of occupied cells that are themselves occupied (but assuming no other
statistical dependencies between cell states). A mean field type approach could then
be applied to produce dynamical equations of the form:
u˙ = f1(u, v)
v˙ = f2(u, v)
More spatial information could be accounted for by introducing more and more vari-
ables of this nature (i.e. w to represent the proportion of the neighbours of pairs of
consecutive occupied cells that are themselves occupied, and so on).
While exploratory work in this direction (which is not presented in this thesis) did
produce ODEs that provided a better match for the dynamics of our IBMs than had
the basic mean field models, there were still discrepancies between the observed and
the predicted equilibria. Given a sufficiently large number of variables, it would be
possible to account for all spatial correlations in this way and to produce a system
of ODEs that precisely represented the behaviour of a particular one-dimensional,
single species B-model (at least up to effects due to time discretisation). However,
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the number of variables would necessarily be large and the approach would not cor-
respond to the way that mean field techniques are used in practice. Nevertheless, it
may be possible to use autocorrelation plots such as those presented in Section 5.4.1
to determine the amount of spatial information that a system of ODEs would need
to represent in order to provide accurate dynamical predictions for a given model
and thus the number of variables that should be used. This approach is, however,
beyond the scope of this thesis.
11.2.3 The methods and conclusions of Chapter 6
Moving on to the methods presented in Chapter 6, it could be argued that the
technique employed for translating the model into a new space, is so specific to the
one-dimensional, single species B-model, that it could not be profitably adapted to
other contexts. While it is true that the method is quite specialised, there are two
reasons why we believe that it may nonetheless have broader relevance across the
field of individual-based modelling.
Firstly, the approach can be seen as a simple proof of concept. The problem of
explaining the causal relationship between local individual interactions and global
emergent behaviours in IBMs is often considered to be largely intractable, and is
therefore often not attempted. However, in identifying those local transitions that
are conducive to mean field type behaviour and those that are not, and in explaining
these differences in terms of the effect of different transitions on the spatial distribu-
tion of individuals, we have demonstrated that finding explicit causal relationships
between events at the local and the global scales in IBMs is not always a futile
pursuit.
Secondly, although the translation procedure – in which a microstate is represented
in terms of the distances between consecutive occupied cells in the underlying one-
dimensional ring of cells – is clearly not immediately transferable to B-models over
higher dimensional grids or over more general graphs, nor to situations of multi-
ple species, it is possible to imagine ways in which the procedure could be adapted
to these broader contexts. For example, it may be possible to represent a system
through the distances between each occupied cell and a certain number of its near-
est occupied neighbours. Different species could either be considered equivalent, or
there could be multiple different such representations corresponding to each species,
or to each ordered pair of species. In this way, many different sets of nearest neigh-
bour distances would be considered, with the combination of these representations
providing an overall picture of a current microstate.
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Naturally, unlike in the case of the one-dimensional, single species model, such rep-
resentations may not unambiguously represent the precise microstate of the system.
However, they may still be sufficient for the derivation of analogous quantities to the
clumping measure defined in Section 6.5, and could conceivably allow for a similar
investigation of the link between local interactions and global dynamics. Further
research would be necessary to assess the validity of such an approach.
As a final comment on the work presented in Part II, although the different effects of
each of the possible single species B-model transitions on individual clumping were
demonstrated in Section 6.6.3, it should be remarked that a fully rigorous argument
on the relationship between local transitions, individual clumping and equilibrium
population density proved elusive. While the case presented in Section 6.6.4 went
some way towards achieving this goal, providing a causal explanation for the fact that
observed equilibrium densities in models with α > 0 lie below the predicted mean
field equilibrium, the argument relies upon intuitive reasoning on how changes to the
clumping of individuals (as measured by our clumping measures) should affect the
correspondence between model behaviour and mean field dynamics. Further work
in this area, to make this argument more rigorous, would be desirable.
11.2.4 Limitations of the SSSG
Turning to consider our work on the SSSG and its derivatives, the most obvious
limitation of the game as a modelling tool is its restriction to situations with only
two players. Clearly, some scenarios that we may wish to model would necessitate
multiple searching and hiding players or would otherwise require that multiple units
are available for each player to deploy at different locations. For example, if we
wanted to model the policing of outbreaks of rioting across an urban street network,
we might represent the police (the “searching” player, in terms of the SSSG) as a
single player with many units to deploy, while groups of rioters (“hiding” players)
would be modelled as many independent players.
This limitation represents one reason for which the SSSG should be seen primarily as
a basis for further development, rather than as a complete modelling tool. In com-
mon with the B-models discussed above, the SSSG is certainly an abstract model
in terms of Gilbert’s (2008, pp. 41-44) categorisation, and would require significant
further enhancement to serve as a valuable representation of a real world system.
Indeed, given its intended role as a framework to unite other models, this high level
of abstraction is inevitable.
The fact that the model is limited to two-player scenarios does not necessarily mean
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that it has nothing to contribute in situations in which there are a greater number of
interacting individuals. It may be valuable to investigate to what extent the OMSs
of the basic two-player game could form a basis for good strategies of multi-player
versions. For example, in a GSG in which the searching player were allocated two
units, the first could be deployed according to the OMS for the basic game, while
the second could be deployed according to an altered version of the same probabil-
ity distribution, in which the point at which the first unit is deployed is allocated
zero probability, with all other probabilities scaled accordingly. Alternatively, the
probability distribution for the deployment of the second unit could be determined
by removing all the vertices that lie in the neighbourhood of the point at which the
first unit is deployed from the strategy set of the hiding player, and recalculating an
OMS for the searching player in this new context.
While neither of these methods would generally give a true OMS of a multi-player
or multi-unit game, they may nevertheless provide good benchmark strategies for
searching or hiding players, particularly where the underlying graph is large and the
effect of removing any one vertex is therefore small. In situations where searching
or hiding units act without coordination (for example, in the case of independent
groups of rioters), we might also expect the OMS of the two-player game to provide a
good strategy for the multi-player extension, since each such player would effectively
be playing as if they were alone. Further research would be necessary to determine
the true relationship between OMSs of the basic two-player game and good strategies
of more general multi-player and multi-unit games.
11.2.5 Results on identifying optimal mixed strategies
It would be true to say that several of the results relating to the OMSs of the SSSG
and its derivatives that are presented in this thesis relate only to rather specific
cases. For example, while we were successful in determining precise OMSs for poly-
level graphs (see Section 9.4), if the game were to be adapted to model real life
scenarios, it would be more useful to have results relating to less structured graphs.
Some suggestions as to the most valuable developments that could be made in this
direction are outlined in Section 11.3.
The IEDS algorithm presented in Section 9.2 could potentially form the basis of
an approach to determining good strategies for games over irregular geographies.
However, to be considered a valuable tool, the algorithm would have to be strength-
ened considerably, perhaps through the inclusion and exploitation of results such
as Proposition 10.3.2, for spaces of non-uniform value. As it stands, although the
algorithm has been demonstrated to be particularly powerful for GSGs played over
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trees, for more highly connected graphs it is often unable to simplify them to any
great extent, owing to the rarity of pure strategy dominance in such settings. If the
algorithm were adapted to detect mixed strategy dominance (in which a weighted
average of pure strategies dominates another pure strategy in terms of expected pay-
off), then it may be able to simplify the analysis of a much wider range of GSGs. An
investigation of how effective the algorithm is over specific families of graphs may
also be of interest (e.g. complete graphs, bipartite graphs, planar graphs, scale-free
graphs, etc.).
11.2.6 Limitations of the GPG
In allowing the searching player to move around the space, the Graph Patrol Game
(GPG) of Section 10.4 addresses one of the key weaknesses of the original SSSG.
However, certain of the simplifying assumptions made when defining the GPG may
limit the immediate applicability of the game to real world scenarios.
For example, it was assumed that the time lapse between the start of Player A’s
patrol and the moment at which Player B deploys is sufficiently great that the
Markov chain governing Player A’s movement around the space could be consid-
ered to have converged to its equilibrium distribution. However, this assumption
probably does not correspond to many of the real world scenarios that we may wish
to model. A genuine patrol (for example, of security officers protecting an airport
from potential terrorist activity) may need to start afresh each day or to allow for
the rotation of personnel. While it would in theory be possible to restart a pa-
trol from the point at which it was halted after such a disruption, or to randomise
the starting point in line with the probabilities of the equilibrium distribution, in
many cases this may not be practical. To model such situations effectively, alter-
ations would need to be made to the ways in which the GPG is defined and analysed.
The assumption that Player B only has access to information about the patrol
strategy, rather than about the precise location of Player A at any particular time
prior to Player B’s deployment, is also problematic. In cases in which the expected
time required to get from one point of the patrol (vertex v1, say) to another (ver-
tex v2) is large, observing that Player A is at v1 at time t1 might allow Player B
to deploy safely at v2 at some later time t2. Concerns of this nature could poten-
tially be addressed through careful tuning of the optimisation procedure discussed in
Section 10.4.5. Including terms relating to the maximum expected travel-time be-
tween pairs of vertices in the objective function could allow vulnerabilities of this
nature to be mitigated.
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11.3 Directions for further research
11.3.1 Research scope
Some potential directions for future research were suggested in Section 11.2, with
the goal of addressing specific limitations of our results and methodology. In this
section, we present further suggestions to develop, extend and build on the work
presented in this thesis.
One potential starting point for further work would be to extend the scope of our
investigation to consider more detailed and sophisticated models. As we have re-
marked, both the IBMs of Part II and the game theoretic models of Part III were
specifically chosen to be very simple, owing to the theoretical nature of the research
objectives we have sought to study (see Section 1.5). However, most models used to
represent real world systems involve significantly more detail than those considered
here. Therefore, to accurately gauge the scope and relevance of our conclusions, and
to fully understand the extent to which we have successfully addressed our objec-
tives, it would be useful to consider a broader range of models.
In the case of the IBMs studied in Part II, increasing model detail could simply
mean considering B-models with more species or over higher dimensional grids.
Alternatively, more fundamental enhancements could be made, based around the
introduction of some of the agent-based modelling concepts discussed in Section 2.2,
such as allowing individuals to choose their actions based on sophisticated
goal-oriented decision making procedures or to adapt their behaviour based on
past experience. On the other hand, rather than augmenting models that we
have already considered, we could expand our investigation to include other
ABMs and IBMs from the literature, such as the Schelling model (Schelling, 1971)
or some of the many flocking models that have been proposed (see, for example,
Mirabet et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Sun, 2013).
Similarly, for the game theoretic models, detail could be enhanced in simple ways,
such as by introducing additional players or by allocating multiple units for each
player to deploy, as discussed in Section 11.2, or in more complex ways, such as by
allowing both players to be mobile or by considering more sophisticated patterns of
movement in the patrol game. It may also be of interest to attempt to derive results
for games over specific families of graphs, such as regular graphs or scale-free graphs.
In more general terms, for any new model that were to be considered, there are
two key questions that should be addressed in relation to the work presented in this
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thesis. Firstly, can the methods used to investigate and analyse the simple models
treated here be successfully adapted for use with the new model? Secondly, how do
the results derived for these simple models relate to the new model and under what
conditions (if any) do they hold?
Thinking more broadly, a third question also presents itself: do any of our current
results represent general principles, which may have broader implications across a
wider range of complex models? A general investigation of these questions, in the
context of a more extensive selection of models, would be of vital importance to fully
understand the scope and relevance of our work.
Going beyond these considerations, although our IBMs and game theoretic models
are quite abstract, as has been discussed, it may nonetheless be of interest to use
them to model real systems and to compare the model outputs with reality. For ex-
ample, a multi-species B-model could be used to represent a particular ecosystem,
with the values of model parameters calibrated against empirical observations. How-
ever, given the level of abstraction of this family of IBMs, such an approach should
necessarily be seen strictly as an exploratory investigation of the model itself, rather
than as a genuinely informative representation of the system in question. A valid
aim would be to determine which aspects of reality the B-model is able to repli-
cate and which it is not, in order to inform the development of more realistic models.
Despite its simplicity, in its current form, the SSSG is perhaps better suited to direct
application than the B-model IBMs. For example, following the riots in England
in the summer of 2011, the game could be used to examine possible deployment
strategies for the police. To take a specific case, Manchester city centre, where a
number of incidents occurred over a relatively compact area (Rogers et al., 2011),
could be represented as a graph and OMSs could be sought to determine the best
location for a police unit (the searching player) to protect retail centres from a band
of rioters (the concealing player). Potential adaptations to the SSSG, which could
allow for the consideration of multiple police or rioter units were discussed briefly in
Section 11.2.4.
11.3.2 Extensions to the work on individual-based modelling
Moving on to some more specific suggestions for further research, given its role as
an exemplar for the communication and visualisation of ABMs (see Section 4.2.1), a
more detailed study of the basic NANIA predator-prey model would be of interest.
Although a theoretical correspondence between this model and the Lotka-Volterra
equations was demonstrated in Section 4.3.4, it would be instructive to know under
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what conditions and to what extent the behaviour of the NANIA model is well rep-
resented by both these equations and by its corresponding, spatially explicit, mean
field PDE model (see Section 3.2.4).
An interesting research question relating both to the NANIA model and to B-models
more generally would be to investigate the possibility of using time series observa-
tions of the models to identify situations in which one or more species in a system
is at risk of becoming extinct. From informal experimentation, we have observed
that, for certain choices of the model parameters, the underlying graph and the
initial conditions, the NANIA model can display Lotka-Volterra-like coupled popu-
lation oscillations that appear to be stable over many thousands of iterations (see,
for example, Figure 4.5), but which are nonetheless subject to rare stochastic ex-
tinctions. Reliable methods for predicting such extinctions through examination of
current and past system states, both in the NANIA model and in other B-models,
would represent a step forward in the understanding and control of such systems,
with potential implications for mathematical modelling in the field of conservation.
It would be particularly useful if methods were also sought to suggest interventions
(the introduction of a group of individuals at a particular location, for example) that
could “nudge” a system containing a species at risk of extinction back to a more
secure region of its phase space.
Some exploratory work on this question, which has not been included in this
thesis, used image recognition techniques and machine learning (specifically, lin-
ear principal component analysis (see Sahani, 2013) and support vector machines
(see Yang et al., 2007; Steinwart and Christmann, 2008)), achieving some limited
success in predicting extinctions in the NANIA model through consideration of the
densities of the prey and predator prey species only. Further work would be required
to determine whether additional spatial information might be incorporated to im-
prove prediction performance.
The main focus of Part II was on understanding the relationship between the
behaviour of one-dimensional single species B-models and that of corresponding
mean field ODE models, in line with the first of the research objectives stated in
Section 1.5. However, this issue was examined exclusively through a comparison
of the predicted mean field equilibrium population density with the observed noisy
equilibrium of the B-model. To address the objective in greater depth, it would
also be necessary to investigate the manner in which these equilibria were attained.
For example, if, for some set of parameters, the equilibrium density predicted by
the mean field equation and the observed noisy equilibrium of the corresponding
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B-model were equal, but one of the two models approached this equilibrium di-
rectly, while the other exhibited oscillations that decayed to the equilibrium, this
might indicate a fundamental difference between the two representations that would
not be identified by our current analysis. A more detailed consideration of this issue
would complement the conclusions presented in Part II.
As a final note on our work on IBMs, we would reiterate the contention that
B-models (and the broader class of A-models) could be considered to represent a
fundamental family of discrete space-time stochastic IBMs, which has seen relatively
little theoretical study. It is our belief that further work on the foundations and fea-
tures of such models could have implications for many more complicated systems
with which these models share key characteristics. The simplicity of these mod-
els and their discrete nature combine to make them potentially significantly more
tractable than many more widely studied IBMs, meaning that they could form an
ideal “sandpit of complexity”, in which to examine key concepts such as emergence
and self-organisation.
11.3.3 Extensions to the work on game theoretic modelling
Regarding future research directions for the SSSG, it would be desirable to develop
more results for the most general version of the game, played over a metric space.
The majority of the work presented in Part III relates to the simpler case of the GSG,
where the game is played over a graph. However, results on the optimal strategies
of a metric space version of the game would potentially be of more value, since they
would allow for the modelling of a wider variety of real world environments. A par-
ticular area of interest is the analysis of games in which Ω is a region of R2, where
the searching player can search a disc of radius r. An understanding of such cases
would make the game more applicable in real operational research scenarios, such as
the deployment of patrol ships to locate pirates over areas of the ocean or searching
archaeological sites for features of historical interest.
A possible starting point for research on metric space games would be the reformu-
lation of some of our graph specific results to apply in the more general case. It may
be possible to formulate analogues of many of these results for games over metric
spaces through the careful application of topology and measure theory. This would
be an important first step in increasing the applicability and relevance of the SSSG.
However, since general results for games over metric spaces may prove elusive, it
would be useful to derive results for the OMSs of games played over rectangular
grids (or indeed over graphs based on other regular tessellations in the plane), or of
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graphs formed from multiple connected grid-like components. Lattices such as these
could potentially be overlaid on maps of geographical regions, thus enhancing the
potential applicability of games played over such graphs and the consequent impor-
tance of any general strategic results derived for them.
In the case of regular lattices, it may be possible to produce analytic expressions
for their OMSs by extending the ideas used to analyse games played over poly-level
graphs. However, for large, irregularly shaped graphs or graphs formed from con-
nected segments of lattices, it seems likely that developing improved algorithms for
the approximation of OMSs, rather than searching for exact solutions, may be the
only realistic way forward.
One possibility would be to seek algorithmic methods for the identification of equal
oddments strategies. Even where equal oddments strategies do not exist, it may
nonetheless be possible to find an equal oddments ‘distribution’: a distribution
of real numbers over the vertices of a graph, which satisfies condition (9.10) of
Definition 9.3.5 (the “neighbourhood sum” condition), but which does not neces-
sarily define a valid probability distribution. An investigation into the connection
between the true OMSs and these invalid equal oddments distributions may be in-
structive.
With regard to the algorithm of Section 9.2, it would be useful to have explicit
results on its computational efficiency and on how the structure of a graph affects
the extent to which a corresponding GSG can be simplified using IEDS. It may be
possible, for example, to identify other families of GSGs (aside from those played on
trees) for which the method is particularly effective.
With regard to the representation of geographical spaces, it would also be interesting
to know to what extent (if at all) the OMSs of games played over continuous metric
spaces matched the OMSs of games played over discretised versions of these spaces,
such as grid graphs. Such results would indicate whether or not the discretisation
of a continuous geographical region may be a valid approach for determining good
strategies for a search and concealment game played over that space.
A simpler method for extending the scope of the SSSG would be to relax certain of
the metric space axioms (as discussed in Section 8.2.1), to consider spaces in which
distance is not symmetric (i.e. where the distance from x to y is not necessarily
the same as the distance from y to x), as in directed graphs, or spaces in which the
distance between two points may be infinite, as in disconnected graphs. However, it
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is not clear to what extent such versions of the game would be relevant to any real
scenarios that we may wish to model.
Moving on to the GPG of Chapter 10, observe that none of the methods or analyses
presented there necessarily require that the adjacency matrix M of the correspond-
ing EGSG and the adjacency matrix used to determine permissible patrol strategies
in the GPG should be the same. In other words, it would be possible to consider
a game in which the adjacencies used to determine whether or not Player A suc-
cessfully intercepts Player B and the adjacencies used to determine how Player A
was able to move around the space were defined differently. Consideration of such
situations would add an additional degree of flexibility to the GPG, which may be
worthy of further attention.
Clearly though, one of the most pressing unresolved questions of the thesis is how to
find solutions to the optimisation problem outlined in Section 10.4.5, which aims to
identify particular optimal strategies of the GPG. For this game to be of value as a
modelling tool, it would be necessary to identify some approaches by which solutions
to this problem might be identified. However, the nonlinear nature of the objective
function Z[TA] and particularly of the constraint TApi[TA] = pi[TA], suggest that
these optimisations may be extremely difficult to solve (see footnote 4, p. 328). A
deeper investigation of this problem would therefore be a valuable focus for future
work.
Finally, in relation to all the work in Part III, it must be remembered that when
games are used to model real world scenarios, employing a mathematically optimal
strategy is not necessarily the best course of action. This is because the assumption
that other players will themselves employ optimal strategies may well not be appro-
priate. Human beings often do not use mathematically optimal strategies, whether
because they fail to identify them, because they do not have complete knowledge of
their situation, because they are incapable of the randomness required to effectively
implement a mixed strategy, or because they expect their fellow players to act in a
particular (suboptimal) way.
In game theoretic scenarios, when an opponent is using a suboptimal strategy, em-
ploying an OMS will not generally guarantee the largest possible expected payoff.
For this reason, with all of the games that we have proposed, it may be valuable
to undertake experiments to determine common characteristics of strategies that
human players might employ if they were actually required to play the game. This
process would involve enlisting human subjects to play selected spatial games, ei-
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ther once or many times (possibly via a website), and recording and comparing the
results. This would allow for the calculation of “super-optimal” mixed strategies, or
algorithms for creating such strategies, which could then be tested against further
human subjects.
11.3.4 Synthesis of the two modelling perspectives
Throughout this thesis, the two perspectives that we have considered – treating
individuals in spatially explicit multi-agent systems as simple automata or treat-
ing them as decision-making entities – have largely been examined separately. We
now present a brief discussion of how the two approaches might be brought together.
Firstly, as we observed in the introduction (see, in particular, Figure 1.1), for the
majority of the work in this thesis, both in Part II, based around individual-based
modelling, and Part III, based on game theory, space is modelled as a graph, with
individuals occupying particular vertices. In both B-models and GSGs, the struc-
ture of this graph is of critical importance, because whether or not two individuals
may interact is determined purely on the basis of whether their vertices are adjacent.
Consider the basic NANIA predator-prey model, which was defined in Section 4.2.
In this B-model, there are two species: prey, which may reproduce if they are adja-
cent to an empty cell, and predators, which may reproduce if they are adjacent to a
cell containing a prey individual (the prey individual is consumed).
Now, under our first perspective, individuals are treated as stochastic automata.
They do not choose their actions to advance towards any particular goal, but merely
act according to predetermined probabilities. However, if we were to enhance the
model to incorporate goal-oriented decision making, as discussed in Section 11.3, it
would be reasonable to specify that these individuals should act so as to attempt to
maximise their chances of survival and reproduction.
Given these goals, predators would like to be positioned such that their local neigh-
bourhood contains a prey individual, while prey would like to be positioned such
that their local neighbourhood does not contain any predator individuals (and such
that it contains a large number of empty cells, into which they might reproduce). If
predator and prey individuals were to be given control over their direction of move-
ment, they would be free to make strategic decisions about how to move so as to
achieve such positions.
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Note that the positional aims of the predators and the prey correspond closely to
those of the searching and hiding players respectively in the GSG. We might there-
fore conjecture that the OMSs for each player of a GSG played over the underlying
graph of this NANIA model may provide valuable information about how the preda-
tors and prey should move through the space to maximise their reproductive success,
in this goal-oriented version of the NANIA model. More specifically, a good strategy
for the predators may be to move according to an optimal strategy (for Player A)
of the corresponding patrol game over this graph.
Such a correspondence between our two modelling perspectives could have broader
implications for the way in which goal-oriented agents should behave in spatially
explicit systems driven by local interactions. If a link of this nature were identified
between these modelling approaches, then the OMSs of the GSG could potentially
be thought of as strategic maps of the space, indicating the most tactically advan-
tageous points for each player. However, a deeper investigation would be necessary
to determine whether it would be valuable to combine our two perspectives in this
way.
11.4 Concluding remarks
In this thesis, we have examined two different perspectives on the relationship be-
tween local interactions and global outcomes in systems of interacting individuals.
Our first perspective involved considering individuals as simple stochastic automata,
using individual-based modelling to examine and identify the causal mechanisms
linking local events and global dynamics in a particular family of models. Our sec-
ond perspective involved considering individuals as sophisticated decision-making
agents, using game theory to model situations of search and concealment and deriv-
ing results on the OMSs of the resulting games in a variety of contexts.
Through these investigations, we have gone some way towards addressing the re-
search objectives set out in Section 1.5, building understanding of the links between
the local and global dynamical scales in IBMs and formulating a general game for
the analysis of spatial search and concealment scenarios. However, as discussed in
Sections 11.2-11.3, there is a good deal more work to be done in these areas, both
in terms of broadening the scope of work on the dynamics of IBMs and producing
further theoretical results on the OMSs of spatial games, but also on the far larger
question of developing a unified mathematical theory of agent-based and individual-
based modelling, an issue that was discussed in detail in Section 2.2.8.
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It is to be hoped that the work presented in this thesis may provide a basis for
further research in these directions, along the lines set out in the preceding sections.
In any case, we conclude by reiterating our belief that, given their widespread use
as research tools across the social sciences and beyond, the goal of constructing a
solid theoretical foundation for models of systems of interacting individuals is of
vital importance to ensure that future researchers can have complete confidence in
the results and conclusions drawn from such models.
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